It's not impossible that another intelligent species somewhere else in the universe (of they exist), could have such a capacity of understanding which we lack. But we're stuck with what we have, which is plenty. — Manuel

While that's certainly true, is there any reason to believe that there could exist a species that is so intelligent that it could attain an understanding of some aspect of the universe with perfect certainty? Do you really think it is the limits of our intelligence that is the limiting factor?

Descartes recognized the futility of "I think, therefore I am," as a guide to living. — T Clark

I don't think he did. In fact, he derived a proof of God based on it, and lived a religious life because if it, at least according to him (I suspect it was post-hoc rationalization, but who am I to say). What you are describing is closer to what I think was CS Peirce's critique (it might have been a different philosopher) of Descartes, referring to his radical skepticism as "sham doubt" or "paper doubt", meaning he didn't actually doubt that he existed until it occurred to him that existing was a prerequisite for thinking, he just imagined doubting. That it was just a theoretical proposition.

For clarity, are you intending to say that belief in free will's reality entails belief in a Creator Deity? — javra

I'm not. I am saying that the way that a culturally prevalent and deeply rooted force like religion effects language, the history of thought and therefore the current status quo beliefs and consensus understandings is an important piece of context when considering a question like the existence of free will. In a culture with a long history of religion whose central point is the immateriality and immortality of the soul, if free will didn't exist, it would be more likely to arise and be supported as a concept. That doesn't lead to any necessary conclusions, but it is a factor that should be added to a Bayesian analysis. Make sense?

No, but the one's that are most prevalent in the modern western world that we live in are, and that is the context for this being a meaningful and interesting question. I don't know if the question is meaningful to someone in china or someone living in a remote village in the amazon. I do know it is in the western world.

To me, all this irrespective of there being, or not being, a Creator Deity. But these are the types of differences that make a difference in relation to free will. — javra

While true, a good Bayesian analysis would consider factors such as the history of cultural myths or religions and how they might inform (or be informed by) common conceptions of things such as free will.

Perhaps. I'm not fluent in Latin, or an expert in linguistic archeology (if that's even a thing).

I dont think the central question is why philosophers have desired certainty, but how , in their quest to make sens out of a chaotic world, the notion of certainty appeared to them as something attainable. So the primary goal was never certainty but predictability, and for a period of philosophical history the concept of certainty made sense. as a way to achieve this goal. The rapid and profound successes of the natural sciences in the 17th and 18th centuries , which were based on a mathematical logic which presupposed the certainty of a cognizing subject, reinforced and encouraged the idea of rational
certainty. — Joshs

I don't think I agree with this analysis entirely. I think that there has been a search for, a belief in, and a feeling of a need for absolutes in philosophy as far back as it is recorded. Aristotle was constantly on the search for first principles, as was Aquinas later. Even in common language, the notion of "proof" and even "knowledge" to the average person implies inerrancy (even though we all know no one is immune to error). I suspect it might be something deeper than what you are suggesting.

Put differently, they are interested in more than negative critique, in what we can’t do or shouldn’t believe, but are offering positive ideas in their own right, ways of seeing the world in intimate relationships al terms unavailable to those philosophies of certainty. What philosophers like Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are doing is showing us a more intricate order hidden within the order of ‘certainty’ that older philosophies offered. — Joshs

Okay, I think we are saying the same thing, but with a different spin. I'm not lamenting the entire lack of philosophy that goes beyond the notion of the bedrock of certainty, I'm noting the existence and deep and pervasive roots of the notion in western philosophy, and perhaps if I am lamenting anything, it's that it is still incredibly pervasive.

The fascination with certainty comes from the nature of fascination itself. Or more precisely, from
the nature of desire. Our way of being is anticipatory. The meaning we see in things comes in part from what we project forward into them with our expectations. So the desire for certainty arises out of of the fact that we are anticipatory beings. We are sense-making. — Joshs

While I think I agree with the statements you made, I don't see how they answer the question. I'm asking why there is such a large amount of thought and text in the history of philosophy devoted to certainty. I feel as though the question of certainty, if and to what degree it can be attained, if it is binary or on a continuum, and if it represents a state of the world or a state of mind, underlies in some pretty substantial ways, most of the debates in philosophy. If we discarded the idea that certainty, as a state of affairs in the world, was either meaningless or indistinguishable, how would that inform our approach to questions like idealism vs realism? Determinism vs. free will?

I wouldnt say that Wittgenstein was looking for first “principles”, but rather that thinking which gives a unity to experience. The same is true of Heidegger, Nietzsche and the phenomenologists. There is a way for grounding experience without making recourse to a particular content , a particular truth. The ground can instead be self-reflexive It can have change built into its very premises. — Joshs

I guess we differ on Wittgenstein then (or maybe not). At worst, he was analyzing first principles, or maybe in a sense the very notion of first principles. I mean just the title "On Certainty" sort of intimates what I'm talking about. But Descartes and Kant are definitely better examples, which is why I put them first.

I'm much less versed in continental philosophers, and only know Heidegger by reputation (both good and bad), but I definitely got the sense from Nietzsche that his very approach only existed and made sense only in juxtaposition to the "sensible" rules that had been formally derived in the proper way from first principles. I feel like if there were no established tradition of first principles, then there could be no Nietzsche as we know him. Same could be said about Foucault. So it seems like one is either searching for the fundamental certain truths, or disabusing others of the notion of such truths.

Maybe that's what I'm trying to do here, which doesn't make me much different than the continentals that I generally find annoyingly vague. It just seems to me that you can't end up where Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and Foucault did (that's an odd triplet), never mind Descartes or Kant, if the presumption that there is a bedrock of certainty somewhere to be discovered isn't part of where you started. Get me?

There is no difference semantically, or there is some difference. The question is posed as if there were an absolute and irrefutable semantical value to these statements, but there is not. It has been shown pretty definitively that language couldn't have possibly naturally occurred without some inherent ambiguity of meaning. Context is king. Most often I would suggest that "existing" means "not imaginary", which would often but not always coincide with being somewhere at sometime. Saying that poverty exists isn't saying that it's a specific entity that exists in a particular place, it's saying that it isn't a falsehood. Saying that God doesn't exist is saying that God is fictional, mythological or imaginary. The words "real" and "exist" almost always are used in at least implied contrast with the idea of being mistaken or lying. That's why philosophers have such problems with "nothingness", because there isn't anything to contrast it to.

Under the paradigm of free will, it makes sense to create social structures such as moral and legal accountability to encourage people to choose to behave well. By extension, under the paradigm of determinism, it makes sense to create (insofar as it it possible to do so in a deterministic world... but let's put a pin in that one) structures like moral and legal accountability that attempt to make people behave well. Whether by choice, or by virtue of one's interaction with society, accountability is a means, apparently largely effective, to sway human behavior in a pro-social direction. The question of free will is a red herring.

I feel like you are being dismissive about an aspect of philosophy that is deeply rooted in its history, and still exists in a very broad sense in modern philosophy.

Not quite. All houses are subject to possibly being ruined by natural disaster, but I need somewhere to live, so I'll do the best I can. That seems like a good analogy for philosophy. That's where philosophy ends - I'll do the best I can. — T Clark

Then where does the fascination with certainty come from?

I guess I'm talking more about what Descartes was doing explicitly in "Meditations", or Kant in "Critique of Pure Reason" only slightly less explicitly, or even Hume or Wittgenstein. The search for "first principles". I mean surely we can agree that's a thing, right?

There are two common mistakes I see occurring.

The first is Sheldrake's general approach, which is one of inappropriately radical skepticism. To engage in a reductio ad absurm - one might as well ask if the rules of logic are dogmatic, reasonably conclude that in some sense they are, and then intimate that on those grounds we should feel free to selectively reject the rules of logic if they are inconvenient to us, missing the fact that what they are concluding will be illogical. Sheldrake's approach is fundamentally unscientific, but he wants the stink of science on his work.

The second is confusing speaking of experience as if it we an object and not an event. There is no thing that is "the experience of seeing a bird", having the experience is something that happened. The experience doesn't happen in my brain (or mind, doesn't matter) or in the world, it happens when my brain interacts with the world. Without both things, you don't have an experience.

But the matter of insults, the response to them, are vague. Vagueness comes with the territory. I don't know how precise we can make the perception of insults. — TheMadFool

We can make them as precise as we choose to. Clarity and specificity aren't properties of the world, they're properties of how we speak and think about the world. So when you ask a question, you can assign a clarity to the question by saying specifically what you mean. When you are asking what is the bigger insult, specifically, what are your trying to determine? How could you know that your question was answered? If you don't know this, then I don't think that what you did actually qualifies as asking a question, but instead engaging in a speech act that mimics a question.

If you think in vague terms and ask unspecific questions, then your answers will be imprecise and unclear. Some people seem to prefer this approach, no doubt for many reasons. One of the reasons appears to me to be that they can come up with vague and non-specific answers to nearly any question that are vaguely justifiable, and they can never be shown to be specifically wrong. That offers some sort of social or ego gratification. What it doesn't offer is answers that one can reliably act upon in the world, so in those terms, their answers, and the questions attached, end up being a waste of time. I'd suggest that you'd be better off not embracing this paradigm.

How do you see the difference between ''like'' and ''love'', between ''dislike'' and ''hate'', between ''Abraham Lincoln'' and ''Hitler''? I appeal to that sense of discrimination. — TheMadFool

So you prefer to remain vague? I already offered two answers that would answer to reasonable interpretations of "bigger", but you didn't like those answers, and preferred your own (strange to ask a question if the only acceptable answer is the one you have already determined). It is a certainty that if the question is non-specific, then the answers will not be specifically correct or incorrect, useful or useless. worthwhile or pointless. That's the nature of questions and answers.

You asked the question. I offered an answer based on two possible criteria. Normally, when you ask a question, you are trying to actually determine something. If you know what you're trying to determine, then the criteria should flow naturally out of that. What do you mean by a "bigger" insult?

Well, quantity is inherent in the statements, — TheMadFool

But quantity isn't necessarily the measure of how big an insult is. If you say I'm annoying, I might be mildly insulted. If you say I'm a pedophile, I'll be greatly insulted. The latter is a bigger insult, but I'm the only one insulted. It is the degree, not anything to do with quantity in both cases, that determines how big am insult is. So unless you are going to set up specific criteria by which to judge the "bigness" of an insult, then all is left is pointless semantic games.

Got it. That's not essentially different than what you originally said on the matter. No need to repeat.That's not however a criteria of the badness of an insult. A criteria would be "scale" or "magnitude", or something else that I can't think of at the moment. If you wanted a clear answer, from the criteria, you could then devise a means to measure each scenario against that criteria, and then you would have a clear answer, that would tell you that either one of the scenarios was more insulting, or that they are both equally insulting, or that there isn't sufficient information included in the question to determine the answer. If you're not prepared to do that, this is a pointless discussion.

From that point, if people disagreed with the criteria, they could.

What you are discussing, isn't the degree of badness of an insult, but the way an insult is transmitted socially.

I wasn't aware of a well established principle that supports me. You're good at bringing those to my attention. — Wosret

Glad to be of service. :D

My question was whether one thing could be said to cause the other. The murkiness of praise and blame seems too easy to get lost in. — Wosret

Actually the question I was responding to is "Do you think that the suicides are particularly immoral and selfish because of how influential these people are?". The question was about moral culpability of suicide. If you are asking if the potential societal harm is greater, then I would strongly suspect so. The Werther Effect is well established.

We regularly consider mental illness or psychological duress to be mitigating factors in criminal law, and I think that is based on sound reasoning. Why would this be different?

Do you think that the suicides are particularly immoral and selfish because of how influential these people are? I do. I think that killing themselves was highly reckless, and could inspire a number of troubled people to take similar action... — Wosret

I think there is a fine line to walk here. The act is arguably immoral and selfish, but in nearly all cases, the act would be the result of depression or other mental health issues, which is a mitigating factor. It's hard to hold someone responsible when they are acting on an impulse to ease their own pain. It is a situation where we recognize that people aren't "in their right mind".

Ok, so you've already decided then? Strange to ask the question. If you want to decide which is worse, you need criteria to judge by. Then you test each instance against the criteria. So the question goes back to you. Worse by what standard? If you can answer that question clearly and specifically, then you can answer your own question.

Which is a bigger insult to men, statement 1 or statement 2? — TheMadFool

Statement one is a wider reaching insult. It insults more people. Statement two could arguably be an insult of greater magnitude, as if it applies to fewer people, the implication is that one must meet a higher level of foolishness to be qualified as a fool.

Yes. It was not a value judgement on how good or bad modern society is, but rather an attempt to benchmark attempts at achieving this utopia like state.

I think you're missing the point. Your question is non specific. Your above response is non specific. If you seriously want to make the world better, you need to identify specific deficits in well being, and set specific, measurable and achievable standards to meet, and at that point plans can be made to meet those standards individually.

I'd have to make some assumptions about what Harris thinks. I was never a fan of his, but here's one take on it.

If the statement is meant to imply a negative hypothesis, there is no non-illursory thing that corresponds to "free will", then it isn't falsifiable. We all know that ypu can't prove a negative. If what he means is that those things that suggest to us that we have free will can be explained by other, deterministic and empirical elements, then it could be falsified by showing that those elements either aren't the things that suggest free will to us, or that such elements don't exist.

In addiction circles, they talk about drinking as being a form of self-medication. Typically with an addiction, it would be in reference to self medicating against depression or loneliness. To some degree, what you're talking about is self medicating against anxiety. I don't mean for that to sound judgy. I self medicate against starvation and dehydration several times a day. The problem with alcohol (and caffeine) is that we habituat to it if we use it too frequently. To get the best effects, you need to either drink infrequently or in increasing volumes. I tend to waste my alcohol consumption, by drinking small amounts frequently, and I barely feel an effect. At this point, a taste of beer is really more of a sentimental recollection of the feeling that you talk about, than an attempt to recreate the feeling itself.

And we've now reached a point where natural selection pretty much no longer applies to humans. The 'weak' humans end up being raised into adulthood, with just as much opportunity to reproduce as the 'strong' ones. Unless we start picking and choosing who can have children, I don't foresee any further advancement of our physical and mental abilities. — CasKev

As long as there is death and reproduction, the mechanisms of natural selection are in play. There is a common misconception that what we might think of as "better" traits are not being selected for, or what we think of as "worse" traits are being selected against, that means that evolution isn't occurring in the human population, but that betrays a misunderstanding of what evolution is. Whatever traits continue to be passed on are those traits that are "selected for" and those that are not are "selected against" given the current environment (which includes our cultural and technological environments).

Sustainability for one. Going for greater happiness is a lower priority than something that can last. — noAxioms

Same question. How much sustainability is required to be considered a "practical utopia" and how do you measure it?

Much higher happiness and well being levels all round. — Jake Tarragon

How much higher, and how are happiness and well being measured?

What would distinguish this practical utopia from modern society?

Common use just is common use. I live near an old hippy town, there's a lot of vague spirituality around there, man. Be the change that you want to see in the world. Cleanse the toxins. Manage with NLP. These things aren't my scene, I'm too pedantic and particular to tolerate the vagueness of it, but people are going to use the words they're going to use. Is it contributing to some harm? Do you think it's somehow anti-intellectual? — mcdoodle

I'm really talking mostly about the range of use between a lowest common denominator and highly specific and technical use, which is a really big range, and I although I don't doubt that includes work done by respected philosophers, there isn't one I'm prepared to cite at the moment. If you think this equivocation doesn't occur within academic philosophy, then I can dig into it to find you some good examples (or discover none and prove myself wrong). It also encompasses the sorts of dialogue that occurs on sites like this, between people who have an interest in speaking and thinking clearly and coherently on a subject, but aren't used to, or aren't even interested in, the rigor associated with academia (or semi-academic, pseudo-academic, or peripherally academic discussion). This is where I personally find the most clear cases of this sort of equivocation, and would suggest it has occurred with at least three of the people I've discussed with on this thread.

Do I think it's anti-intellectual? I guess so. I'm not sure what implications that phrase has. I think it is a case of engaging in the practice if thinking, and doing it less than optimally. I also think that the world would be a better place if we could incrementally become better at the practice of thinking, so engaging with a subject like this has a few possible goals or benefits. If I am correct that the use of the term represents "thinking poorly", then I have at least offered those engaging in this dialogue, and those reading it, an opportunity to see the flaws in this way of thinking. If I am incorrect, then I have the same opportunity.

As I indicated in writing about changing funeral options, I've found a growing acceptance of non-religious spirituality a blessing in ways like that, because when it comes to funerals, I don't want to have to choose between the rigid alternatives of Christian and anti-religious humanist. — mcdoodle

I don't understand why those are rigid alternatives. It seems to me, from the point of view of cultural practices, even within christianity, there is a broad range of practices, and the secular world is wide open. Personally, I've asked that whatever funeral ceremony that occurs when I die has a portion that is in respect to my family's beliefs (they're the one's mourning, after all) and one in respect to mine. It doesn't have to be complicated if you don't want it to be.

You're sure you're not an anti-religious humanist who yearns for that lost clarity? — mcdoodle

I don't really understand this question. What clarity are you talking about? What qualifies as being "anti-religion"? The answer might be yes or no to either or both questions, but I'm pretty sure it isn't directly relevant to my posts here. For the record, I am not anti-religion if that means that I don't respect that people have the right to believe in whatever they want in their hearts and minds. As soon as their beliefs enter into public discourse, I am anti-religion to the degree that their discourse or behaviour does harm. To that standard, I am mildly anti-religion insofar as it lowers the bar on what is considered reasonable evidence to support a belief in general. I am significantly more anti-religion when religion is used as a justification of heinous acts. I think that's a reasonable and balanced approach for someone who sees no distinction between religion and mythology. I hope that clears that up, and we can stop trying to psychologize me. Fair?

Maybe this is jumping ahead. Is the central distinction you are trying to draw my attention to the one between spirituality as a concept and spirituality as a symbol (or perhaps metaphor)?

And this ugly construct (X-according-to-Y) becomes less ugly once we realize that the intersection of the understanding of the great Y's in the history of mankind is luminous for meaning -- that the poets, prophets and philosophers basically agree on the meaning of spirit, and that the way for us to understand it is to follow their lead. — Mariner

Frankly, this is the sentiment that I have trouble getting on board with, and it's for a few reasons. First, what qualifies as "basically agree(ing)"? Where various thinkers differ are not important? What qualifies a thinker to fit into your paradigm of a great thinker, worthy of making the cut regarding their thoughts on spirituality? This formulation just seems a little relaxed, and like it could confirm any number of narratives that might appeal to a person.

Second, is the assertion that "the way for us to understand it is to follow their lead". Although I agree that a look at the history of a term can be instructive in understanding it's modern counterpart, I fear you may be putting too much weight on this. Why must we follow their lead? I'm open to hearing why it's a good idea, but I'm not sure I'll stipulate to it being necessarily true on its face.

the same problems seem to apply to the study of them as to spirituality: too many proposed indices, a lack of underlying consensus, arising from the lack of an agreed theoretical framework, but with some good work being done all the same. — mcdoodle

Let me make a distinction here. In technical, rigorous work, it is not unusual to use terminology in a specialized way. If we were talking about emotions, I don't have a problem with a psychologist saying "in the context of this paper, 'love' means the emotional state that meets the following criteria...". I do however have a problem with transferring that specialized usage into common usage, and then using that to draw some conclusions about some other, conceptually I'll defined version of the word. That is what I am suggesting is the problem with the common use, not a specialized use of the term.

because more people than before avow that they are spiritual but not (conventionally) religious. This is the opposite of equivocation: people are using the word to clarify their feelings about the world — mcdoodle

I'm not suggesting that nothing is being communicated when someone claims to be "spiritual but not religious", I'm saying that making decisions about one's life based on ill defined concepts is probably a bad idea. Language serves two functions: a means of communication, and a framework by which we can conceptualize the world we live in. "Fuzzy" concepts are a problem for the latter, not the prior.

This is like saying that in a discussion of religion it's okay to talk about religion when all you know is the religion you practice, and not anything about all the other religions. It's not. It's arguing from ignorance.

It's not conjecture. It's obvious you won't take my word for it, which is why I provided links, which you won't even then pursue. That is what being intellectually lazy is. — Harry Hindu

I never argued that evolutionary psychology was nothing but conjecture, I expressed that I had the impression that was the case, and based on that impression, it wasn't an area of interest that I was currently interested in pursuing. For some reason, you seem to have made it your own personal mission to convince me otherwise, and failing that, insulting me for not immediately being convinced. I entered this discussion with good intent, and you have been rude, and attacked me personally. That's both bad reasoning (ad hom) and just bad behavior. On top of that, it's the near certain way to potentially sour my already dubious opinion of evolutionary psychology. So job well done. I wonder if there's a response that I could offer you that would convince you that you have been rude? I doubt it. Maybe I could ask if you could imagine a situation where you were rude because you got caught up in an argument on the internet, and because you were caught up in it, you couldn't see your own rudeness? Then I might ask how this situation differs from that hypothetical. Just something to chew on.

I'm open to talk about religious matters in a way that, I'd suggest, you're not. — mcdoodle

I'm open to talking about anything in pretty much any way, depending on the context. That doesn't mean I always think that certain ways of speaking are the most useful or clear, but I'm open to them, at least in theory (with perhaps the exception of speaking literal nonsense). I wonder what conclusions you have drawn about me to make you think otherwise?

I thought your answer to him, like your answer here about 'profound', sought different substitutes or meanings for the word 'spirituality' because you don't like it and its connotations. — mcdoodle

I have no problems with any connotation. Which connotation did you think I have a problem with, and why did you think that?

If you don't want to use the word, well, fine. — mcdoodle

Language is a cultural activity, and use changes because people, sometimes explicitly, and sometimes more gradually and subtly, or even without any intent, negotiate what qualifies as an acceptable use of a word. Mostly, this is a non-political behavior, but at times it is political (I mean political only in the sense that it is behavior designed to persuade others). I'm contending that there are good reasons not to use the word as it has more recently come to be used (to refer to something non-specific, non-religious, inherently mysterious, and conceptually ill defined), at least, or perhaps especially, in the context of philosophy, as it leads to equivocation. That's it in a nutshell.