I like psychoanalysis too. Just discovering Lacan, didn't know he was such a big figure in the field. — TaySan

He's controversial but taken up by fascinating philosophers like Zizek. Then Freud is taken up by Derrida and Rorty and others. So I think there's a continuum between philosophy and psychoanalysis (both of which might be called (self-criticizing) 'folk-psychology' at times.)

I understand the link with shamanism. Travelling to the collective and individual subconscious seems to be the mutual therapy. It works. — TaySan

Right. I was thinking that even if one questioned the scientific status that it's at least literature or myth that could help people orient themselves, work out their kinks (or work in their kinks.) Bloom read Freud as a modern myth maker.

Denmark is a beautiful country. Expensive though! But I suppose that doesn't matter so much when you live there. — TaySan

I believe you, and yeah I wouldn't just want to be a tourist. I couldn't afford it.

:up:

Glad you found them interesting. I don't pretend to 'get' all of Hegel, but he's a rich mine to explore. For those with an unmystical-secular mindset I'd say Kojeve's take on Hegel is fascinating (and eccentric.)
If you like Stirner, then Marx's attack on him is fascinating (The German Ideology.)

Anyway, I really like the issues you are raising. I think working out which position is virtuous or good is the center of philosophy.

:fire:

I've actually come to love his strange voice. Very cool that you were rocking his name on your bag! He was already a classic when I was young. When I was in 7th grade it was Guns & Roses and Metallica on kids' shirts. I love Blood but also Desire and then the early albums right after he went electric.

It is in the hands of philosophers. But not in the hands of scientific secularism. — Wayfarer

But I look at the politicians. What do they talk about? Justice, liberty, abundance, security. I don't deny that they use science & tech to pursue these goals.

Me too, for sure. Interesting my post provokes that reaction. Makes a point, don't you think? — Wayfarer

Sure, but the point works both ways. Where are the countries without religious tolerance (for atheism or DIY religion or religion classic ) that you'd want to live?

That could be the case. Or it could be that we simply don't have the capacity to peer into nature any further. Explanations only go so far before we are forced to conclude that "that's just the way things are". But why are they this way? Who knows? — Manuel

I guess my argument was from the 'grammar' of the word explanation. If 'explanation' is understood to mean linking one thing to another, different thing that explains it, the reality-as-a-hole has no thing that can serve this purpose. We can speculate that reality-as-a-whole is a failed concept, like the set of all sets.

Or, as you say, we can think of our presumed cognitive limits, given our finite brains and the finite time we've had to think as a species.

I am not a fan of fuzzy categories — FrancisRay

Well I think it disappoints just about any philosopher to discover/decide that language isn't what they thought it was, that it doesn't play as nice as they hoped it would.

When I say 'solution' I mean a rational and reasonable solution that can be explained to others and that does, in fact, solve the problems. — FrancisRay

But to me that sounds like old-fashioned philosophy. I encourage you to share your solutions.

Rather, on ideological grounds they choose not to study the only fundamental theory that works, or, at least, the only one they cannot prove does not work. .This is not rational behaviour but plain stupidity. . . — FrancisRay

That's a bold statement. But make your case, please.

What secular reason is missing is self-awareness. It is “unenlightened about itself” in the sense that it has within itself no mechanism for questioning the products and conclusions of its formal, procedural entailments and experiments.

This line baffles me, since philosophical secular reason seems enormously self-aware and self-critical, though it could be accused of being secular. Even that's complicated, because negative theology is treated with some respect by certain continentals.

The counterpart of science in the political world is the modern Liberal state, which, Habermas reminds us, maintains “a neutrality . . . towards world views,” that is, toward comprehensive visions (like religious visions) of what life means, where it is going and what we should be doing to help it get there. The problem is that a political structure that welcomes all worldviews into the marketplace of ideas, but holds itself aloof from any and all of them, will have no basis for judging the outcomes its procedures yield.

Isn't it more accurate to say that the liberal state enacts a blend of worldviews within the confines of the rights of individuals? I'd rather live in Denmark than Saudi Arabia.

I will say that I don't know where we are heading as a species. The next dominant 'religion' might be something like trans-humanism or something involving AI. Just guessing, but I think technology will be central, for better or worse.

Perhaps the modern-day sage is the psychologist, who comes up with theories about consciousness that cannot be located within the body (just yet). Personally I respect Sigmund and Anna Freud, Carl Jung, Donald Winnicott and everyone else in the field. — TaySan

I like psychoanalysis (Freud and maybe some Lacan) even if it might just be updated shamanism.

... recondite pleasures come in secular and spiritual flavours. — Tom Storm

:up:

My favourite Kundera quote (I can't find the source anymore) and this is better than many whole books of philosophy, 'You create a utopia and pretty soon you're going to need to build a small concentration camp.' — Tom Storm

:party: :death:

His Immortality knocked me out.

Just recently Edith Wharton's Age of Innocence. One of the most exceptionally well written and observed novels I have read. — Tom Storm

Your glowing review will be remembered for future use.

I really like George Elliot too. — Tom Storm

She translated the The Essence of Christianity, which is a great little book of philosophy relevant to the OP, a 'decoding' or naturalization of Christian doctrines.

What I mean is, that esoteric teachings are NOT simply just-so stories. They relay something crucial - vital information but which can only be conveyed to those ready to understand them. — Wayfarer

I can relate to this if I think in terms of analogies that one has to be ripe for, through study or in terms of life-experience.

But nowadays, if those ideas can’t be validated scientifically, then they are ‘just-so stories’ - notwithstanding that the entire Big-Bang-Neo Darwinian-Materialist story is the ‘just so’ story par excellence. — Wayfarer

This is where we might differ, because we've shifted from talk about human nature (the human 'soul') to biology and physics. The vibe is that you think there's a valid esoteric approach to such things. If so, that's where we diverge. Maybe the current understanding of evolution will look primitive in a few centuries (is blind to something important), but I guess I trust the biologists to keep one another honest.

Please say more. I don't want to misunderstand you.

You refer to a few writers as esoteric, having said earlier that you are opposed to the idea of the esoteric. — Jack Cummins

It's a delicate issue. I'm not simply opposed to the esoteric. Recall that I suggested that the 'rational' community was its own 'inner circle' and a kind of epistemological veganism that sneers at outsiders (a joke on my tribe, you see, to suggest a transcendence of it, but that's my tribe's endless game.)

I guess the difference between me and Wayf (he can clarify or correct) is that I'm happy saying that the esoteric stuff is 'just' stories (mythos) that can be useful to and/or tell truths about human nature. I say 'truths' because I think we think analogically, that cognition is metaphorical. To me this 'just' is not problematic, because I live in the realm of human metaphor and feelings and don't feel the lack of something beyond it. At the same time I acknowledge a non-human encompassing Nature that doesn't play by human rules & (apparently) doesn't care about us. Between me & Wayf the big difference, as I see it, is that I think Nature is 'dead' or 'inhuman.' He can give his view and correct me if I am wrong. Both of us clearly value mythos. I just want to naturalize it.

Hendrix and Lennon are great mentions. Some of the best times (the opposite of alienated and lonely times) I've had with other human beings involved listening to or making music. Do you like Bob Dylan ? He's a great synthesis of concept and sound, a critic of the world who also has a transcendent sense of humor.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hr3Stnk8_k

I don't think I've met anyone who can't enjoy high and low art together. — Tom Storm

:up:

Bukowski is certainly up there with a number of American writers (Miller/Thompson/ Kerouac) but not really my thing these days. — Tom Storm

Might add Lester Bangs to that list too. Leaving the states, do you like Kundera? Hesse? Good examples I think of philosophical novelists. For better or worse I've been reading mostly philosophy these days.

Trivers' theory of self-deception asserts that people deceive themselves in order to eliminate these microcues, in order to deceive others in turn.

This is a relevant quote that came to mind. In a book review of Teilhard de Chardin's 'The Phenomenon of Man', Peter Medawar wrote:

Its author can be excused of dishonesty only on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to deceive himself. — emancipate

:fire:

Books are useful for reading, less so as a main course for dinner. — Ying

You made me think of a counterexample.

Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested... — Francis Bacon

I like the quotes and the topic. I think it's understood that Pythagoras was a cult leader of some kind, and that Plato might have had a secret doctrine. I find it very hard to believe that the Epicureans did, given what I've read of and about Epicurus, and I couldn't find any confirmation of it. Clement was a theologian, which may speak against his reliability on this matter, but he's fascinating:

Clement suggests that at first, humans mistakenly believed the Sun, the Moon, and other heavenly bodies to be deities. The next developmental stage was the worship of the products of agriculture, from which he contends the cults of Demeter and Dionysus arose.[22] Humans then paid reverence to revenge and deified human feelings of love and fear, among others. In the following stage, the poets Hesiod and Homer attempt to enumerate the deities; Hesiod's Theogony giving the number of twelve. Finally, humans reached a stage when they proclaimed others, such as Asclepius and Heracles, as deities.[22] Discussing idolatry, Clement contends that the objects of primitive religion were unshaped wood and stone, and idols thus arose when such natural items were carved.[23] Following Plato, Clement is critical of all forms of visual art, suggesting that artworks are but illusions and "deadly toys".[23]

Clement criticizes Greek paganism in the Protrepticus on the basis that its deities are both false and poor moral examples. He attacks the mystery religions for their ritualism and mysticism.[23] In particular, the worshippers of Dionysus are ridiculed by him for their family-based rituals (such as the use of children's toys in ceremony).[24] He suggests at some points that the pagan deities are based on humans, but at other times he suggests that they are misanthropic demons, and he cites several classical sources in support of this second hypothesis.[25] Clement, like many pre-Nicene church fathers, writes favourably about Euhemerus and other rationalist philosophers, on the grounds that they at least saw the flaws in paganism. However, his greatest praise is reserved for Plato, whose apophatic views of God prefigure Christianity.

Clement argues for the equality of sexes, on the grounds that salvation is extended to all humans equally.[36] Unusually, he suggests that Christ is neither female nor male, and that God the Father has both female and male aspects: the eucharist is described as milk from the breast (Christ) of the Father.[37][38] Clement is supportive of women playing an active role in the leadership of the church and he provides a list of women he considers inspirational, which includes both Biblical and Classical Greek figures. It has been suggested that Clement's progressive views on gender as set out in the Paedagogus were influenced by Gnosticism,[37] however, later in the work, he argues against the Gnostics that faith, not esoteric knowledge [γνῶσις], is required for salvation. According to Clement, it is through faith in Christ that one is enlightened and comes to know God.[39] — wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_of_Alexandria

There's a not much of gap it seems between apophatic theology and atheism.

Strauss talks of 'parables and images,' which seems compatible with a literary interpretation of esoteric claims. Derrida writes of the metaphoricity that haunts the rational philosophy which dreams of being purely literal. A great theme, familiar through flies in bottles and disposable ladders, say. We might discuss in what sense a parable conceals. I think the Apocalypse of St. John has real world referents that couldn't be published (Nero, etc.). But we might also talk about the stimulating ambiguity of parables.

That last quote is about Pythagoras again.

Early-Pythagorean sects were closed societies and new Pythagoreans were chosen based on merit and discipline. Ancient sources record that early-Pythagoreans underwent a five year initiation period of listening to the teachings (akousmata) in silence. Initiates could through a test become members of the inner circle. — Wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pythagoreanism

It's clear that philosophy has some of its roots in 'irrationalism' by current standards, but it's not clear what to make of this. A reactionary position would be that we've lost our way. Not 'back to Kant' but back to Pythagoras! :starstruck:

Perhaps analogy is the core of cognition, so that the issue is mythos opposed to logos but rather open discussion versus initiates sitting five years in silence. Is the issue control?

Nothing. "Don't stick your nose into things that are none of your business" should be the motto. — baker

Right! And that would be a good look from the outside, a selective group that guards its secrets.

This is where the guild theme becomes useful again: If you're a member of the guild of, say, candle makers, out of professional deference, you're not going to indulge in assumptions about those in the guild of horseback saddle makers. (Ideally, you wouldn't even have the time to do so, being busy with your own craft and all that.) — baker

I agree, but consider the original context, in which an ambivalent saddle-maker can't resist trying to win the respect of the candle-makers.

I suppose the issue is just the boundary between philosophy and religion and the strange games that are played on that boundary.

Sorry, have to go for the day. — baker

See ya next time!

I think the people who buy such works do so because they see a lucrative investment in it, not because of the art.
Also, many rich people are actually the nouveau riche, social climbers who have money but lack class. I wouldn't value art by how much it sells. — baker

I don't value art that way either, and class is an interesting concept, not strictly identified with wealth. I speculate that 'being philosophical' (being 'rational' and 'scientific') is an indicator of class. Rationality (as an ideal self-image) is perhaps a kind of epistemological veganism, turning its nose up at greasy peasant superstition.

Don't you think that someone must like the art for its price to go up?

If a particular type of knowledge cannot be attained through deliberate effort, then what use is it, and what use is it to pursue it? — baker

I'm trying to isolate the difference between working hard to obtain some manual skill or traditional education program and working hard to obtain a mystical 'something' that insiders call 'knowledge.' Granted that subcultures can create their own lingo that only they understand as participants in lifestyle , what are outsiders to make of their claims?

I think we agree that someone would just have to enter the community earnestly to (possibly) find out.

If people are given freedom, they'll use it create chains and bind themselves in tribes.
It's not clear that this is the order in which things happen. — baker

Would you agree that we in affluent, (relatively) free societies tend to have more leisure time and less interference in spiritual/intellectual matters than throughout much of human history? Certainly there are still norms, still taboos. We use our freedom to create subcultures, mock people on Facebook, etc. But for the most part it's non-violent. Witches are drowned. They are just convinced to drown themselves.

This is so peculiar. By European standards, Mahler is high art, and Bukowski is popular art. Not comparable at all. The same person cannot appreciate both (unless they are confused). — baker

To me there's a class aspect and a quality aspect to the high-art / pop-art distinction. I consider Bukowksi a first-rate novelist and so 'high art' in terms of quality. I expect him to eventually be in a Norton anthology of American literature (along with John Fante and Henry Miller).

Do you think that distinction could be breaking down? What's Banksy sellling for these days?

A new day, a new record price for a Banksy artwork it seems. Game Changer became the most expensive Banksy painting ever sold at auction when it achieved £16.8million at Christie’s London on 23 March 2021, on the one-year anniversary of the UK’s first lockdown, with proceeds going to benefit the NHS. — link

https://www.myartbroker.com/artist/banksy/top-ten-prices-paid-for-banksy-art/

I think Banksy's stuff is cute and clever at times but gimmicky overall. Yet rich people want it. Why?

You also mentioned Nietzsche, and this passage (one of my faves) came to mind, which presents Jesus as a sort of mystical skeptic on the 'other side of ' or 'behind' language.

What the “glad tidings” tell us is simply that there are no more contradictions; the kingdom of heaven belongs to children; the faith that is voiced here is no more an embattled faith—it is at hand, it has been from the beginning, it is a sort of recrudescent childishness of the spirit. ... A faith of this sort is not furious, it does not de nounce, it does not defend itself: it does not come with “the sword”—it does not realize how it will one day set man against man. It does not manifest itself either by miracles, or by rewards and promises, or by “scriptures”: it is itself, first and last, its own miracle, its own reward, its own promise, its own “kingdom of God.” This faith does not formulate itself—it simply lives, and so guards itself against formulae. To be sure, the accident of environment, of educational background gives prominence to concepts of a certain sort...But let us be careful not to see in all this anything more than symbolical language, semantics, an opportunity to speak in parables. It is only on the theory that no word is to be taken literally that this anti-realist is able to speak at all. Set down among Hindus he would have made use of the concepts of Sankhya,and among Chinese he would have employed those of Lao-tse—and in neither case would it have made any difference to him.—With a little freedom in the use of words, one might actually call Jesus a “free spirit” —he cares nothing for what is established: the word killeth, whatever is established killeth. The idea of “life” as an experience, as he alone conceives it, stands opposed to his mind to every sort of word, formula, law, belief and dogma. He speaks only of inner things: “life” or “truth” or “light” is his word for the innermost—in his sight everything else, the whole of reality, all nature, even language, has significance only as sign, as allegory...Here it is of paramount importance to be led into no error by the temptations lying in Christian, or rather ecclesiastical prejudices: such a symbolism par excellence stands outside all religion, all notions of worship, all history, all natural science, all worldly experience, all knowledge, all politics, all psychology, all books, all art—his “wisdom” is precisely a pure ignorance of all such things.
...
If I understand anything at all about this great symbolist, it is this: that he regarded only subjective realities as realities, as “truths” —that he saw everything else, everything natural, temporal, spatial and historical, merely as signs, as materials for parables. The concept of “the Son of God” does not connote a concrete person in history, an isolated and definite individual, but an “eternal” fact, a psychological symbol set free from the concept of time.
...
The “kingdom of heaven” is a state of the heart—not something to come “beyond the world” or “after death.” The whole idea of natural death is absent from the Gospels: death is not a bridge, not a passing; it is absent because it belongs to a quite different, a merely apparent world, useful only as a symbol. The “hour of death” is not a Christian idea—“hours,” time, the physical life and its crises have no existence for the bearer of “glad tidings.”... The “kingdom of God” is not something that men wait for: it had no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it is not going to come at a “millennium”—it is an experience of the heart, it is everywhere and it is nowhere.... — Nietzche

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm

Since you mentioned Stirner, you might like this quote. It's Hegel's portrait of the Irony which more or less condenses Stirner into a few paragraphs.

Now if we stop at these absolutely empty forms which originate from the absoluteness of the abstract ego, nothing is treated in and for itself and as valuable in itself, but only as produced by the subjectivity of the ego. But in that case the ego can remain lord and master of everything, and in no sphere of morals, law, things human and divine, profane and sacred, is there anything that would not first have to be laid down by the ego, and that therefore could not equally well be destroyed by it. Consequently everything genuinely and independently real becomes only a show, not true and genuine on its own account or through itself, but a mere appearance due to the ego in whose power and caprice and at whose free disposal it remains. To admit or cancel it depends wholly on the pleasure of the ego, already absolute in itself simply as ego. Now thirdly, the ego is a living, active individual, and its life consists in making its individuality real in its own eyes and in those of others, in expressing itself, and bringing itself into appearance. For every man, by living, tries to realize himself and does realize himself.

Now in relation to beauty and art, this acquires the meaning of living as an artist and forming one’s life artistically. But on this principle, I live as an artist when all my action and my expression in general, in connection with any content whatever, remains for me a mere show and assumes a shape which is wholly in my power. In that case I am not really in earnest either with this content or, generally, with its expression and actualization. For genuine earnestness enters only by means of a substantial interest, something of intrinsic worth like truth, ethical life, etc., – by means of a content which counts as such for me as essential, so that I only become essential myself in my own eyes in so far as I have immersed myself in such a content and have brought myself into conformity with it in all my knowing and acting. When the ego that sets up and dissolves everything out of its own caprice is the artist, to whom no content of consciousness appears as absolute and independently real but only as a self-made and destructible show, such earnestness can find no place, since validity is ascribed only to the formalism of the ego.

True, in the eyes of others the appearance which I present to them may be regarded seriously, in that they take me to be really concerned with the matter in hand, but in that case they are simply deceived, poor limited creatures, without the faculty and ability to apprehend and reach the loftiness of my standpoint. Therefore this shows me that not everyone is so free (i.e. formally free)[52] as to see in everything which otherwise has value, dignity, and sanctity for mankind just a product of his own power of caprice, whereby he is at liberty either to grant validity to such things, to determine himself and fill his life by means of them, or the reverse. Moreover this virtuosity of an ironical artistic life apprehends itself as a divine creative genius for which anything and everything is only an unsubstantial creature, to which the creator, knowing himself to be disengaged and free from everything, is not bound, because he is just as able to destroy it as to create it. In that case, he who has reached this standpoint of divine genius looks down from his high rank on all other men, for they are pronounced dull and limited, inasmuch as law, morals, etc., still count for them as fixed, essential, and obligatory. So then the individual, who lives in this way as an artist, does give himself relations to others: he lives with friends, mistresses, etc; but, by his being a genius, this relation to his own specific reality, his particular actions, as well as to what is absolute and universal, is at the same time null; his attitude to it all is ironical. — Hegel

Here's where the criticism kicks in.

The next form of this negativity of irony is, on the one hand, the vanity of everything factual, moral, and of intrinsic worth, the nullity of everything objective and absolutely valid. If the ego remains at this standpoint, everything appears to it as null and vain, except its own subjectivity which therefore becomes hollow and empty and itself mere vanity.[53] But, on the other hand, the ego may, contrariwise, fail to find satisfaction in this self-enjoyment and instead become inadequate to itself, so that it now feels a craving for the solid and the substantial, for specific and essential interests. Out of this comes misfortune, and the contradiction that, on the one hand, the subject does want to penetrate into truth and longs for objectivity, but, on the other hand, cannot renounce his isolation and withdrawal into himself or tear himself free from this unsatisfied abstract inwardness. Now he is attacked by the yearning which also we have seen proceeding from Fichtean philosophy. The dissatisfaction of this quiescence and impotence – which may not do or touch anything for fear of losing its inner harmony and which, even if pure in itself, is still unreal and empty despite its desire for reality and what is absolute – is the source of yearning and a morbid beautiful soul. For a truly beautiful soul acts and is actual. That longing, however, is only the empty vain subject’s sense of nullity, and he lacks the strength to escape from this vanity and fill himself with a content of substance. — Hegel

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/introduction.htm#s7-3

FWIW, I think Stirner's attack on Feuerbach fails. As Marx also saw, the (Cartesian) ego is one more spook, and Stirner's gestures toward thoughtless-wordless freedom (a potential escape from the ego-as-spook) aren't appealing or convincing. Stirner himself was, I think, a good guy at heart and imagined himself as a liberator. I do like his concept of the 'sacred' that functions as an archetype for authority, as the general form of what anyone ultimately appeals to in an attempt to dominate with words.

For example: I don't think a sceptic should have defended the slavery of ancient Greece on the grounds that his scepticism leads him to do so because it is conventional and traditional. I also don't agree with Protagoras' choice of being sure that the gods of his time ought to be worshipped, specially considering the influence of such teachings to the people to whom he taught as a sophist would have, which could have been quite bad if it led them, paradoxically, to fanaticism. — Amalac

:up:

Good point. You mentioned Stirner earlier, and we can think of Marx's & Hegel's criticism of the (irresponsible) skeptic. Marx attacks Stirner directly and Hegel attacks 'The Irony,' an artsy-philosophical movement of his day. I don't think it's an easy problem to solve.

And also, though it may be hard to act contrary to custom and habit, it's not impossible if one has the will to put in a lot of effort, and sometimes one may argue that it is better to fight against conventions and traditions rather than not to, even if it's hard — Amalac

:up:

My understanding is that 'private' solutions like skepticism become popular when people feel powerless to change things. Kojeve presents scepticism (& stoicism) as a sophisticated manifestation of the slave mentality that won't risk its life against 'the master' (tyrants, ugly norms, etc.) for genuine (political) recognition of self and others and instead creates an escapist fiction. He also presents the Christian as an escapist who fantasizes a heavenly master who is the master of his worldly master, so that they are both slaves. In this vision the goal of history is a state where all individuals are recognized as equal.

If a sceptic insists that one should never do that, then it could be argued that they are no different than any ordinary citizen who never thinks about philosophy, since they behave in a very similar way in practice. What good was his scepticism then? It just lead him right back to where he started. — Amalac

Morally I agree, though the skeptic might still enjoy a questionable sense of superiority to his relatively unsophisticated neighbors.

Ok, but I guess that's what strikes non-sceptics as suspicious, because the pyrrhonian cannot know that living by custom and convention is better than not to, so why does he decide to abide by them rather than not to? — Amalac

I think @180 Proof touched on this, but here's my version. I think it's better to not view (most of) custom & convention as a conscious choice. We are trained like animals to talk, eat with forks, use paper on our ass, stand at the appropriate distance from strangers, etc. You might say that we enact beliefs that rarely become conscious. By the time we can compare skepticism and dogmatism and discuss them as options we are like complicated machines, smoothly enacting a dance of habits/beliefs without conscious effort or awareness. Genuine doubt is auto-pilot switching off with conscious troubleshooting switched on. In short, custom-convention is primarily not a choice at all but where we start, and starting with no beliefs (no enacted habits such as being able to speak a language or chew food) is clearly absurd or insane.

We can think of all the philosophers sharing this starting point in common, speaking the same language, able to navigate ordinary life, with the dogmatists making grand statements that beyond this default, that might fascinate the skeptic without capturing him. We can also imagine the skeptic living a simple life, not desperate to keep up appearances but careful also not to needlessly offend or confuse.

Doesn't this show that it is futile to even pick a side and to try and discuss anything related to (radical) scepticism (even with regards to their practice) pretending to try and solve the problems raised by scepticism, as some philosophers still do at the present day?

At any rate, there seems to be no way out of Kolakowski's maxim:

We can never escape the infernal circle of epistemology: whatever we say, even negatively, about knowledge implies a knowledge we boast of having discovered; the saying “I know that I know nothing”, taken literally, is self-contradictory — Amalac

:up:

I like the idea of a pragmatic or practical skeptic. It's insane or insincere to doubt the 'know how' of practical life, but it's possible to be fascinated by dazzling abstractions and play with them without being captured by them. I associate the skeptic and stoic as two different reactions to pluralistic chaos (to a culture that swarms with opposing voices, both seeking ataraxia, but with the skeptic being more metaphysically adventurous, something of an 'ironist' and joker, but not incapable of or uninterested in careful reasoning. One could speculate that it's only a gut-level faith or confidence that allows one to play with ideas that might terrify or swallow others.

One of my favorite 'underrated' philosophers is Kojeve, and the sage is central to his interpretation of Hegel.

The end of history as it is understood by Kojève is, of course, not the end of historical processes and events. Rather, Kojève believed that history is not merely a chain of events but has a telos, and that this telos can be achieved, and actually is already achieved. According to the Platonic–Hegelian tradition in which Kojève situated his discourse, this telos is wisdom. Kojève understands wisdom as perfect self-transparency, self-knowledge. The Wise Man knows the reasons for all his actions; he can explain them, translate them into rational language. The emergence of the Wise Man, of the Sage, is the telos of history. At the moment at which the Sage emerges history ends. — link

Basically, the theory goes, Hegel was the sage, or roughly the point where a roughly perfected self-consciousness or self-transparency was achieved, where the cat catches its tail, finally. The sage depends upon the work and wars of the past as well as of continuous, evolving conversation of preceding (mere) philosophers...and is in some sense just the one who recognizes that the dialectic has grasped its own nature, puts the last stone of the pile, completing the structure.

Here one can ask: but why is history needed for the Sage to emerge? Indeed, one can assume that it is possible to become a Sage at any moment of history – it is enough to decide to practice introspection, self-reflection, self-analysis, instead of being exclusively interested in the outside world. From the very earliest of times until now we have heard often enough the requirement to initiate metanoia – to turn our attention from dealing with the everyday world towards introspection.

However, Kojève, following Hegel, does not believe that such a shift is possible under ordinary circumstances, that it can be effectuated by a simple decision to switch one’s attention from the contemplation of the world to self-contemplation. Such a voluntary decision would be possible only if ‘the subject’ were ontologically different from the world and opposed to the world, as Plato or Descartes believed it to be. But Kojève develops his discourse in the postmetaphysical, post-religious age. He wants to be radically atheistic; and that means for him that under ‘normal conditions’ man is a part of the world and human consciousness is completely captured by the world. — link

https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/romantic-bureaucracy-2

It's a spectacular theory (which I find true at the level of various fragments.) Some thinkers have questioned whether Kojeve was being ironic or playful with his theory(he's suspected of being a spy, joked about being a god.) You can find a portrait of him and his scene here:
https://books.openedition.org/editionsbnf/387?lang=en

Perhaps the core of Hegel’s philosophy is the idea that human history is the history of thought as it attempts to understand itself and its relation to its world. History is the history of reason, as it grapples with its own nature and its relation to that with which it is confronted (other beings, nature, the eternal).
...
With the beginnings of Socratic philosophy, however, division and separation is introduced into thought – customary answers to questions of truth, morality, and reality are brought under suspicion. A questioning ‘I’ emerges, one that experiences itself as distinct and apart from other beings, from customary rules, and from a natural world that becomes an ‘object’ for it. This introduces into experience a set of ‘dualisms’ – between subject and object, man and nature, desire and duty, the human and the divine, the individual and the collectivity.
...
Kojève follows Marx’s ‘inverted Hegelianism’ by understanding the labor of historical development in broadly ‘materialist’ terms. The making of history is no longer simply a case of reason at work in the world, but of man’s activity as a being who collectively produces his own being. This occurs through the labor of appropriating and transforming his material world in order to satisfy his own needs. Whereas Hegel’s idealism gives priority to the forms of consciousness that produce the world as experienced, Kojève follows Marx in tying consciousness to the labor of material production and the satisfaction of human desires thereby. While Hegel recuperates human consciousness into a theological totality (Geist or ‘Absolute Spirit’), Kojève secularises human history, seeing it as solely the product of man’s self-production. Whereas Hegelian reconciliation is ultimately the reconciliation of man with God (totality or the Absolute), for Kojève the division of man from himself is transcended in humanist terms. If Hegel sees the end of history as the final moment of reconciliation with God or Spirit, Kojève (Like Feurbach and Marx) sees it as the transcendence of an illusion, in which God (man’s alienated essence, Wesen) is reclaimed by man. Whereas the Hegelian totality provides a prior set of ontological relations between man and world waiting to be apprehended by a maturing consciousness, Kojève sees human action as the transformative process that produces those ontological relations. While Hegel arguably presents a ‘panlogistic’ relation between man and nature, unifying the two in the Absolute, Kojève sees a fundamental disjunction between the two domains, providing the conditions for human self-production through man’s negating and transforming activities. — link

https://iep.utm.edu/kojeve/#H5

As you can see, Kojeve envisioned an atheist sage. One could argue that we're still chasing the end of history, which is a Heaven down here on earth.:

For Kojève, historical reconciliation will culminate in the equal recognition of all individuals. This recognition will remove the rationale for war and struggle, and so will usher-in peace. In this way, history, politically speaking, culminates in a universal (global) order which is without classes or distinctions – in Hegelian terms, there are no longer any ‘masters’ and ‘slaves’, only free human beings who mutually recognise and affirm each others’ freedom. This political moment takes the form of law, which confers universal recognition upon all individuals, thereby satisfying the particular individual’s desire to be affirmed as an equal amongst others. — IEP

The lectures themselves are found here: https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/25851/files/2016/02/KOJEVE-introduction-to-the-reading-of-hegel-zg6tm7.pdf

That's the right way to think about these things I think. All of it, at bottom, is utterly mysterious. — Manuel

:up:

The 'totality' seems to be beyond explanation, since explanation links this to that. But there's nothing outside the Everything that we can link it to. The 'system' hovers over an abyss.

The reason it is not taught is that it is mysticism. Here there are no 'problems of philosophy'.

If the professors studied and taught the whole of philosophy then we would not be speaking of unsolvable problems. — FrancisRay

I stared a thread on this issue. IMO, we have the different (fuzzy) categories for a reason. It's not just mysticism that solves the problems of philosophy. Pain pills work too. So does a religious creed. But to be a philosopher is roughly to approach things 'rationally,' which is to take a certain ideal for granted.

"between the lines"
:up:

As far as I can see there is a whole tension between being an individual and belonging. We live in a world where many are excluded and isolated even when they would long to be part of a larger group. We live in a very fragmented world, in which people are often seen as numbers, and are compelled rather than choose to find meaning on an individual level. — Jack Cummins

Very true. Our pluralistic, individualistic age is tough. In some ways we are encouraged to obsess over ourselves, market ourselves. It's the bleak background of those beautiful moments where we actually connect. I experience the dead writers I've mentioned as friends. IMO, anyone who passionately reads the good stuff is a deeply social being, as I was, even when I hadn't yet found my place in the world (not that one is ever done doing this, but one can feel more at home than before, and one can be playful and at ease more often but never always.)

We can think of times when priests were in power. Then the cynic/critic could understand esoteric truths as the ideology of the ruling class. 'We rule rightfully, since we are the twice-born or the three-eyed.' In these days, where do-it-yourself religion is the norm, it's more an issue of how esoteric types fit into a 'rational' conversation & the kind of rhetorical moves they have to make to do so, to not come off as evangelists or irrationalists. IMO, it's not edgy or disagreeable to defend esoteric 'knowledge' as potentially helpful metaphors or stories (to grasp it as literature.) Nor is it taboo to talk about a lifestyle community in which certain words take on meanings inaccessible to the outside (because even the kids have their slang, right?) Perhaps the issue is just the perceived arrogance. 'I see a higher level of reality.' 'Prove it.' 'Well, you'll need 7 years and 77 levels to get there, but trust me, it's worth it.'

What's more plausible to me is that someone is just cool (magnanimous, un-resentful, playful , flexible,...) and maybe you finally talk to them and fish out some of their influences, but they don't need you to recognize them (beyond the usual good vibe we all appreciate) & have nothing to sell. Their way of being and doing speaks for itself, might as well be the thing itself, tho there's nothing wrong with talking this stuff, because it's fun...it's also a way to celebrate and consolidate the 'I'm OK, You're OK' vibe.

As you suggest, altering our ways of seeing can be done in a million ways. The trick may be in which options not to choose. There's almost nothing that doesn't have this capacity - owing a dog alters your way of seeing. Having a child. Going to war. — Tom Storm

:up:

:up:

You speak of distinguishing between the I and the we, but, perhaps many people remain isolated in the form of the 'I', feeling cut off from a sense of belonging, and pursue the questions of existence more as remote, isolated individuals. — Jack Cummins

Right. They feel isolated for various reasons (perhaps they would benefit from more friends or lovers or a better relationship with family, when possible) and also for ideological reasons. The 'ghost in the machine' idea can look like the tough-minded opposite of a weak-minded sentimentality that speaks of our profound connection. This connects to a cult of individuality that has its good side but also its absurdities. The big emotional change that's happened for me over the years is something letting go of the snowflake fantasy and realizing that what's good in me is the same thing that's good in other people. The world will be OK without me. This particular face and name are not that important and not that interesting (they matter in my personal life but not to the Conversation.)

One gets bored with the idiosyncratic self-stuff and genuinely wants to move toward what we have in common, the good stuff, as found in good philosophy, literature, music, etc. The thing to overcome (here comes the folk-psychology with a dash of Freud) is 'his majesty the baby' who wants to own the conversation, own philosophy-science-religion. Stirner wrote about the 'sacred' which is kind of X that represents that fantasy lever that individuals use to authorize their royal infantilism.

Going back a moment,I remember really fearing the first death, my own little death, because I was egoistic and thought I was loaded with unique potential. Of course in some way we all are loaded with a unique potential, but the species is not so fragile to really depend on this or that individual. IMO, half of the work in studying philosophy is emotional, a matter of the heart that becoming ready to let go of self-flattering illusions that are simultaneously self-isolating (the bitterness of an unsatisfied greed for recognition of one's 'genius' or esoteric truth that 'can't be put into words.')

I see that you emphasise esoteric knowledge as being for the 'inner circle', but I am a little unclear what you see as being the purpose of such knowledge. — Jack Cummins

I'm more on the side of universalized critical thinking and against esotericism, though I do think there are reasonable ways to think about the esoteric. A naturalized version of the inner circle is any kind of subculture that one has to feel one's way in to. The strong version seems to include some kind of non-conceptual non-universal knowledge that's not just skill or the emotional grip on a metaphor.

Another of my teachers, Leo Strauss, although I know him only through his books, said that when you come upon a contradiction take this as an indication that there is something more going on and that you must play an active role in discovering how it is resolved. — Fooloso4

I haven't studied Strauss but I was intensely influenced/inspired by the lectures on Hegel by his friend Kojeve. Anyway, I like the way Strauss puts it, an active role.

We could say that there are as many dances as there are dancers, but each dancer is attempting to mesh and intertwine their dance as harmoniously as possible or with each of the others, each from their own vantage. — Joshs

I think that's reasonable. The 'single dance' is a kind of point-at-infinity. We could say that there are billions of idiolects of the English language. The dancer strives toward the center of the dance, toward an ideal community. Rationality is always 'to come.' We're on the way and our joy is perhaps a sense of moving in the right direction or a right direction.

I'm actually doing work to better myself as opposed to spending all day arguing with internet strangers about some irrelevant topic or asking someone whether colors are real. — BitconnectCarlos

It should and when people put philosophy first I hate to generalize but they end up bitter intellectuals who get upset that others don't recognize their greatness or brilliance. Sounds like a great life to live. — BitconnectCarlos

I think if being on this forum were only bitter arguments that you'd be right (I stay away from politics usually because of this.) Also agree that philosophy-identified types can be and often are like thirsty, unrecognized artists, angry that they can't get the deference due to their profundity. But there's a good side too, where one has the experience of sharing in the gift of the tradition. I'm grateful to the philosophers I love, and it's nice to share in this gratitude, celebrate certain insights, get tips and tricks and leads from others.

Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their behavior is guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their community. — Joshs

:up:

I think I agree with you. Individuality isn't nothing, isn't worthless. We're all snowflakes, albeit with sufficient similarity to relate to one another. The 'other' is (fortunately) potentially full of surprises for us, as we are (hopefully) for them. I used the metaphor of a flame leaping from melting candle to melting candle. What this metaphor lacks is the way that each candle changes the flame a little, the flame it passes on, and how the flame burns slightly differently the varying wax of the candles. In the dance metaphor, we might consider how different bodies affect the 'same' (same enough) dance.