Philosophy can become more meaningful if you combine it with meditation practice. Seek out the noblest and most sublime ideas and meditate on them. Studying philosophy should result in a sense of joy and liberation.

Very interesting. But how are 'moral facts held to be discovered in reason'? Again, its not that reason can apprehend moral truths, we both agree on that. Its that moral laws are somehow part of the rational/epistemic enterprise itself - viz. a moral law is just a true proposition, say. Am I getting this right?

I don't know how moral facts are discovered by reason. But they are. And yes, "moral laws are...part of the rational/epistemic enterprise itself". Insofar as something is intelligible, it is grounded in the rational enterprise. Thus all of morality stems from reason. This is my understanding.

Morality can be grounded in rational autonomy/free will (cf. Kant's Groundwork): autonomy is the condition for human reason, and the moral law is delineated in human reason. This is not constructivism, since moral facts are held to be discovered in reason, and not constructed by it. And this is not "ultimately subjective," since the faculty of reason is present among all human beings.

The Apology by Plato describes Socrates' adherence to truth despite external difficulties and betrayals. He was unjustly given the penalty of death (drinking poison) yet retained equanimity and peace due to his perspective.

If you're a Christian than the Imitation of Christ might be edifying: learning to accept life's vicissitudes with grace and anchoring oneself in the eternal.

Reading Descartes' Meditations might similarly lift your vision and make the troubles in your life seem less important.

We agree that a 'finite chain of causes' is to be preferred. And this premise leads to the conclusion that the first cause is beyond space and time. Now, to be disinclined to accept a 'supernatural' cause of the universe based in an innate predisposition favoring naturalism, seems unreasonable, given that the empirical evidence points towards a supernatural first cause. An 'imaginary supernatural being' is not being postulated; but simply some 'supernatural cause' where 'supernatural' means 'beyond space and time.' It seems that a predisposition towards naturalism, in this case, leads one to accept uncogent conclusions, and to be illogical.

The conclusion violates premise 1. Therefore the chain of reasoning must be wrong.

I agree. My aim is to show that the universe must have a cause. Perhaps I can change P1 to, "All contingent things have a cause/explanation." Since the universe is a contingent thing, I would be enabled to proceed toward the "cause of the universe" in the latter premises.

Also what do you mean by saying that "is very improbable that there is an infinite chain of causes going back forever?" Why is that improbable? What is the probability? Define your probability model and show your calculations.

The term "improbable" just refers to my rudimentary intuition. It is not at all sophisticated. I am not equipped to furnish a probability model or calculation. But I think the intuition points to something; that actual probability models/calculations might exist. But I admit that my intuition might exist merely because an infinite chain is counter-intuitive, not impossible. Perhaps someone who agrees with the conclusion "God exists" can help me out at this juncture of the argument.

My intuition is that actions are evil, either intrinsically or due to their consequences. But mere existence, unchanging, cannot be evil, since it is action-less. If some object doesn't do anything (if it is beyond action), then there is no basis for calling it evil. Mere existence must be good. Therefore since X is beyond change (being beyond time), it must be good.

This post made me stop and think a lot. (I am not familiar with philosophy of language).

I am not able to see the conflict between (1) the retention of the meanings of words and (2) the dialectical and scientific methods. Once we discover a new object in the world, or construct a new word to describe a new aspect of empirical reality discovered, doesn't the word get officially established by the scholars (i.e. written in the reference books or dictionaries), so that everyone thereafter can research the word and learn it? How can there be a threat to the persistence of meaning when all the meaning of the words, upon their inception, are located in the dictionary or reference books?

...and the limits of my language are the limits of my world...

This is a fascinating idea. Is this a common position among philosophers, that a person's understanding has a size proportionate to the extent to which he/she can express him/herself? What if a person has a great emotional life (i.e. experiences events and people through the medium of rich emotions), but a below average vocabulary?

I concede that if causality is not assumed, the cosmological argument dissolves. So I will just assume the existence of causality. This seems reasonable given that the same assumption is made in science, I think. Tallis' views cannot cohere with the methodology of many sciences, since these sciences often presuppose it: eg. these icebergs are melting because of XYZ reasons.

Also, it seems that the word "God" has a lot of baggage along with it. Some posters have referred to "sky-father" or some type of objectified thing -- and understandably so, given the religious claims that exist in the world -- whereas the God to which the cosmological argument points is beyond objectification/space/time. So I will use the term "X" to refer to this thing.

And after some thought, it seems to me that the cosmological argument does indicate something (say, X), about which the use of the term God is, incidentally, reasonable. For, if one holds the view that space and time began with the big bang (mainstream cosmological view, I think), then that which was responsible for the big bang must have transcended time and space. Admittedly, X is thereby inferred to be merely supra-spatiotemporal, and not all-good or all-loving. X is something quite amazing, though, since X was responsible for all the matter and energy in the universe.

But I can think of two arguments showing that if X is beyond time and space, X must be good.

1. If X is beyond time, then X cannot change.
2. Evil implies change.
3. Goodness is essentially static, and tied up with the nature of being.
4. Therefore, X is good.

1. Love is of the nature of unity.
2. If X is the cause of the universe, then X is something unified.
3. Therefore, one of the predicates of X is "love-nature."

Therefore, adopting mainstream scientific views on reality (namely, assuming the existence of causality, current cogency of big-bang theory), it seems that the cosmological argument points to cause-of-the-universe X, where X = (i) beyond time and space, (ii) something so amazing that all the matter and energy came from it.

Existing is an essential property of God, or existing at all times is an essential property of God, which is it?

1. God is beyond space and time.
2. Therefore, existing at all times is an essential property of God.

Precisely, "at all times" is a matter of speaking in this case, since God is beyond time. Why is God beyond space and time? Since God, if postulated, must be the cause of the universe, and space and time arose only at the time of the big bang.

I don't think you can define something into existence, as it were.

I agree. My understanding is that the original post was questioning whether it is possible that God can categorically not exist, supposing hypothetically that God did exist.

It seems there are two separate issues here. The first is whether God exists. But the second is that supposing he does exist, is it possible for him to categorically not exist. And to this I say no, since existence is an essential property of God, in the same sense, perhaps, that "having a horn" is the essential property of a unicorn.

Of course one could say that if God doesn't exist, then it is possible for him to categorically not exist, but that would be a tautology.

In the end, if God really does exist, then my view is that it is not possible for him to categorically cease existing, for the above reason.

I agree with your last post: I see that the view that the cosmological argument proves the existence of God is begging the question, since a conception of God being the first cause is sort of presupposed: the argument is being constructed in order to fit this belief. In other words, a subjectively attractive belief is being dressed up with a ostensibly rationalistic exterior. And, as you said, even if God is this first cause, we cannot know much about this God from the mere fact that he is a first cause.

How did the religious philosophers come up with a omnipotent, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent God when inductive knowledge could not demonstrably indicate such a God? Could the explanation be something akin to Descartes' trademark argument (in which case, the deist's case would be bolstered), or is the explanation related to the philosophers' psychological need to postulate some grand myth?

Is there any way to rescue the cosmological argument as a reasonable indicator of God's existence (as in an omnipresent, omnipotent, and omni-benevolent God)?

"Last Thursdayism" I am not smart enough to even follow or understand. I will agree that it fails. :).

The second argument, the "Unnumbered Now," seems to be Aquinas' 2nd of 5 proofs, the one on efficient causes. I agree that this argument fails. (I can follow it).

But has not modern science reached a consensus that time has a temporally finite past, namely via the big-bang? One thing I still haven't figured out for sure, is whether time can theoretically exist before the big bang: say, if a universe existed before the big bang.

Is it safe to say that reason cannot adjudicate the question whether or not a God exists? (And I mean God simpliciter, perhaps as it deism, and not interventionism or superstitions).

I concede that the statement "before the big-bang" is nonsensical because time arises precisely with the big-bang. But surely one can acknowledge of a sort of causality, or more precisely, responsibility, that does not pivot in the existence of time. For instance, what is responsible for the big-bang? It seems probable that something beyond space-time is responsible for the big-bang. Like a God simpliciter. Of course, this would result merely in deism: but the view that something Transcendent is responsible for the big-bang seems so clear.

So then, my understanding is the following: the human mind simply cannot cognize about "what happened prior to the big-bang", since (1) our minds operate under space and time, and (2) there was either space nor time before the big bang. So to believe in a God requires a leap of faith. But that leap of faith, by itself, does not contradict reason, as the issue of God cannot be adjudicated by reason.

If you have assumed causality is necessary, you have already assumed god.

This seems too good to be true. Is it true that if we assume the existence of causality in general (which, incidentally, seems to be a common-sense view), and trace it back, "God exists" is the necessary conclusion? So then, non-theists necessarily hold that causality is unreal?

Also, you say that the big bang, which caused the universe must have a cause because the universe is magnificent, but wouldn't the same reasoning apply to God, which I imagine you would also say is magnificent?

God is necessarily the first cause: "being the first cause" is analytically a predicate of the subject "God." The reason why God must be the first cause is because that is part of God's definition as it were, viz. "the first cause."



Thanks, I read the article. But the view that causation does not exist contradicts common intuition to such a degree that the view is rendered suspect. We can "trace back" easily, though I am not sure about the technical aspects of how. For instance, I exist due to the coming together of my parents, they exist for a likewise reason, the human species exists because of some original lifeforms in the ocean, the elements supporting life exist because of some exploding star, etc. The "tracing back" is obvious and convincing, in my view. It is true that if causality does not exist, my entire argument collapses. But I confidently assume that causality does exist, because such a view corresponds with experience and intuition.

I see that my argument was ill-constructed. Now I understand that space and time are essentially associated with the universe: that is, before the universe "banged" (presupposing the big-bang theory) there was neither space nor time. Let me re-construct my argument. It will argue that it is likely that God exists. I will assume that (a) the big-bang theory is correct, that (b) causality is real, and (c) that causality is not necessarily contingent on time (when considering a cause of the universe).

P1: Everything in the universe (the earth and the activities therein, all the galaxies, etc.) is contingent on the big-bang: that is, without the big-bang, none of these things could have existed.
P2: Time and space emerged at the moment of the big-bang.
P3: Before the big-bang, there was neither time nor space.
P4: It is probable that there was a reason, or a cause, for the big-bang (for, the universe is magnificent and even contains conscious human beings with remarkable minds).
P5: Said reason/cause must transcend space and time (since before the big-bang, space-time did not exist).
Conc.: This supra-spatiotemporal cause is likely to be God.

Also:

Why not just conclude the universe as the uncaused cause.

Since something cannot cause itself. Also, the universe contains conscious rational beings: this suggests that the ultimate, supra-temporal cause of the universe is conscious, too.

I understand better your original argument. But I still disagree that it is possible for God to categorically not exist. The definition for "omnipotence" is incorrect. Categorical non-existence is possible for many things (or perhaps all things except God), but not for God.

Premise-1: The definition of omnipotence (in relation to God) should be, "The ability to do all things possible for God," rather than "The ability to do all things possible."
Premise-2: God is the essence of being itself.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for God to categorically not exist (existence is an essential property of God).

Therefore, the chain of causation can't be infinite.

I don't understand your argument about why the causal chain cannot be infinite. I don't know what you mean by the universe "traversing" the infinite. Could you explain a bit further?

Also, we can counter the argument by positing a cyclical universe.

I am hesitant to agree that this is an adequate counter-argument. For, the cyclical universe theory entails the view that there is X-amount of matter that cyclically explodes and implodes, and that matter is eternal. But it is improbable that matter is eternal; rather, it is more probable that the evolving-devolving-matter itself had a cause: viz. why something exists rather than nothing.

Anyway, the problem with this argument is that it doesn't prove the omnipotency, omnibenevolence, and omniscience of God (O-O-O God)That's an issue because the Abrahamic God is the O-O-O God.

I agree. How is one to hold the view of the O-O-O God then? My guess is that the O-O-O view arises from the ontological argument and the argument-from-design: that the mere thought of an O-O-O God in our minds indicates that such a being really exists, and that the immensity, orderliness, and goodness perceived in the universe reflects an O-O-O God, respectively. Or are there other ways to affirm an O-O-O God?

There is a faulty premise here, namely that it is possible for God not to exist. This is a contradiction in terms, according to Aquinas' definition of God: ipsum esse subistens, or the subsistent act of being itself. Therefore since God is the essential act of existence, and since God exists inner-mostly in all things (another Aquinian def.), it is both (1) objectively impossible that God does not exist and (2) subjectively impossible to imagine it, for the very subject who affirms the so-called nonexistence of God is herself grounded in God according to the above definition.

That seems unintelligible, for how can a first cause be simultaneously a final cause? Perhaps you mean that the final cause of the universe, viz. its teleology, demonstrates the hand of a Creator, as it were. But that would be the teleological argument, not the Kalam cosmological argument mentioned in the first post.

The mere fact that the universe has a cause does not necessarily entail the view that the universe has a teleological purpose evidencing God. The latter may be so, but something beyond the poster's argument is necessary to establish it.

Nation-states are, in a sense, the natural form of human organization since they preserve a unified tribal identity alongside enduring bureaucratic structures. Contrariwise, the singularity of empires, which have difficulty efficiently managing varying groups of people of different cultures, and which are prone to internal collapse due to the bad decision of government leaders, are bound to morph and divide into smaller nation-states. Also the advance of technology has a causal relationship with the existence and strength of nation-states.

I think the question that concludes the post operates on a faulty premise. To "deprive" the "machines" presupposes that the machines have the dignity that human persons have. But this is untrue.

Also the post assumes a sort of dualism: that there is a difference between the CM and the PM. But my understanding is that most scientists reject that view and think that the so-called CM is itself the functioning of the PM. Therefore since dualism is not accepted among scientists, the question whether we ought to pursue the fusion of CM and and machines does not even arise. Rather the question becomes whether scientific technology will reach the point where the brain can be artificially replicated in machines. But this is doubtful since the brain is unique and very complex.

Here is an objection that occurs to me: the Kalam cosmological argument does not necessarily lead to an omni-benevolent and personal God. Granting the premise that the universe must have a cause, what prevents us from holding the view that the first cause might be impersonal and indifferent (not omni-benevolent)? And if the the first cause is impersonal and indifferent, it does not follow that divine justice will be eventually rendered in reference to the actions of humanity. Therefore the usual view of God is not established.

As response to the original post: Minimalism is inadequate to serve as one's worldview, since once a person rids herself of all her extraneous possessions (and perhaps activities), fulfillment does not necessarily follow. Fulfillment might arise in the process of ridding herself of the extra things, but this is an effect of the psychological satisfaction of getting more organized and seemingly eliminating useless distractions. But once the minimalist state is attained, something else beyond the minimalist philosophy is necessarily to precipitate fulfillment in her life. For instance, she could still become lonely, dissatisfied, or bored due to the newfound emptiness in her life. All in all, minimalism is neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving happiness. An Aristotelian approach, stressing virtue, balance, friendships, and moderation, seems to be more adequate as a general philosophy/worldview.

There is certainly a place for it in contemporary philosophy; but whether it can be confidently placed within a tradition is a problematic question. For "tradition," to be intelligible, seems to require some principles able to be grounded beyond the comings and goings of phenomena. But phenomenology intentionally does not exceed the domain of phenomena. Therefore it seems difficult to tie it with any tradition per se.

Though I do not subscribe to the tenets of phenomenology, it is certainly "useful" and "productive," since, when sincerely and intelligently delineated, it can, in my view, serve as the background contrast with other views that more piercingly explain reality.