My point is, that when there is no one who has to born, there is no one who has to suffer.
— Antinatalist

This is where I’m curious. This is stating the obvious. Why are you focused on the ‘suffering’ though? Why do you think this justifies stating it is ‘bad’/‘wrong’ to have children. This really doesn’t make sense to me.

It is the parents choice. It is neither ‘right’ nor ‘wrong’. I can certainly imagine individual situations where circumstances may shift someone’s perspective though. — I like sushi

I agree with David Benatar with his asymmetry argument. If not having a child will prevent some good to happen for the child, it is neutral. It is not bad, because she/he will not exist. And if somebody will never exist, I can´t see we have obligation as a giving a life for a future possible child. But if someone is going to have a child and her/his life is bad, it is a bad thing and her/his parents are at least partly responsible for that. (I don´t want to mock too much parents, because I believe, after all, most of them want to good things happen for their child. And on the other hand, people are strongly affected by evolution and selfish gene. It doesn´t make having a child right, but those things make it quite understandable).

You might say for that your crossing the road -example. Suffering is part of life, and some choices prevent suffering here and might add suffering there. All suffering ain´t so bad, but some definitely is.
Fundamental difference of having a child and that crossing the road -example is that if it´s your life, cross the road or don´t, but having a child is deciding for other person´s life, without her/his consent.
Other difference is that non-existing creature does not have to make choices between bigger and smaller risks.

I understand that at times life seems terrible.

A parent who actually thinks about these things and decides to have a child is taking a risk to some degree. Most/any parents will tell you that they want to better themselves for their child. The child also reaps this benefit. It is more of a win win situation than a use use situation.

It is ‘right’ - in terms of ‘selfish’? I don’t think that measures up tbh. In terms of anthropology and modern society children were certainly ‘used’ to look after parents and such in old age. Child mortality was high too. Do we have the right to bring children into the world … sure, as much as we have the right to walk, pee and eat. — I like sushi

That is natural way to think. But you do not provide very convincing arguments for this. In matter of fact not a one.

If life is valued/celebrated (as it is by myself and yourself) then I don’t see how arguing that we have an obligation to nurture life as any worse of an argument. I don’t believe either is ‘better’ - so to speak - because I’m some kind of absurdist I guess. — I like sushi

I value life, but it is not just about life, it is highly about the existing, living person who lives that life.
And this existing person is highly valuable.

I guess all this boils down to is you must think more people suffer a substantial amount more in their lives than those who don’t AND that such suffering is intrinsically ‘bad’. I admit that last part sounds weird because ‘suffering’ isn’t generally thought of as ‘good’, but I mean something more like the use of suffering to fortify yourself for future misfortunes.

A would imagine if we could do a worldwide survey and ask every single human if they wished they’d never been born we’d find those who said ‘yes’ would likely live in a more ‘privileged’ demographic. Who knows though? I would expect most would prefer to have had a life than none at all. — I like sushi

If you are right - and let´s exclude human factor, Pollyanna principle, the ultimate empirical non-possibility to compare non-life and life (you can grab this topic if  you want, I´ve been thinking about that aspect for three decades) - that sounds utilitarian to me. And I don´t think it´s an ethical theory at all.

Why is life valuable is kind of a ouroboros. Absurdism it generally where I go.

That´s how people usually think, that it's parents´ choice. But that doesn't make it right.
— Antinatalist

As stated above. Circumstance will lean people more one way than the other. It isn’t right or wrong, any more than being hungry is right or wrong, it is just the state of affairs of humans living a life. We have moved beyond more, how should I put it, more ‘animalistic’ tendencies … or rather we’ve imbued ourselves with certain psychological restraints. I think, for the most part, we’ve learnt to make life better.

I would like to emphasise that a life without suffering (as stated by someone previously) is more cruel than a life with suffering because life requires hardships and strains, humans basically need to strive forward like Sisyphus in order to inhabit what we loosely refer to as ‘meaning’. — I like sushi

Let´s assume you are right on that. I simply can´t think any cruel acts/things etc., which does not involve suffering, which makes your assertion kind of absurd.
But let´s still assume that I am wrong on that. If you mean some suffering will prevent some other suffering (like a boxer, who will strengthen his/her abdominals that he/she will not tear apart when facing body punches in a real fight).
But that doesn't answer the question, why there have to be life in the first place.

Your new comment above about stakes being so high for a new life. This doesn’t add up if you agree that life is valuable and that suffering is a necessary part of life (from my perspective this doesn’t add up at least).

What stakes are high? The chance of suffering? Suffering is inevitable. Life (you agree?) is valuable. Is the value of life to you determined purely by the amount of suffering involved? — I like sushi

Stakes are high, when making decision for someone else's life, like I said before.
The suffering is inevitable, I agree with you on that. And some of it is just horrible. I mentioned before that I value life, but an essential factor from which perhaps all value springs is the person existing, the one who lives the life.
Like I said one previous post, I think life can have also negative value (and those, who support euthanasia agree with me on that). But the right to end will belong only to the one who lives, it´s her/his life and other people should respect her/his sovereignty.
At suffering, I don´t value purely by the amount of its suffering; but to some degree it certainly correlates. Essential other factors are how the suffering person reacts to suffering, and how she/he can affect the situation and what are her/his possibilities, and also are there some good, balancing things (I never said that good could not balance the bad to at some degree (to someone who have already born), and the good/bad -balance is different in this kind of situation than having a child, when there have not be the bad in the first place. My point of view is also that preventing harm is greater value than bringing happiness).

My throw away comment about buddhism and nihilism is an obscure view of mine. Fro what I can tell they are two extremes of the same beast. The nihilist perspective expected more from life and then ended up staring down into the abyss. The ‘buddhist’ (loose term) expected nothing of life and stare out of the abyss. Both essentially view the world through the lens of suffering and pain. — I like sushi

And both live in this world.

Striving is good. Striving requires ‘suffering’. Life requires suffering. Bringing life into the world is for gods/whatever, we merely exist and strive hoping for more tomorrow. Unfounded hope? Possibly … I’d rather not gamble when the stakes are so high (ie. the ‘value’ I habour in life).

Anyway, thanks for persisting. Not sure if you can offer up much more but hope you surprise me. I’m a pessimist so I’m always happy with what comes my way because I’ve learnt to expect far worse :D — I like sushi

I don´t know am I pessimist, optimist or something between. Maybe I haven't decided yet.

it is still wrong because it is a decision for someone else´s life
— Antinatalist

Made by an already living creature towards a "0",non existing one. And which you can never be sure (even if you had the chance) that" kid's answer" would be always a "no". — dimosthenis9

No, we can not know the potential kid´s answer. Therefore, because the consent is missing - and the stakes are so high, another human´s whole life - we must not reproduce.

Anyway as I told you I almost played all my cards here and feel like I just repeating same things. And in general spamming is one of the main things that bothers me in TPF. So I don't want to feel that I do the same.
As I told you I respect your opinion even if I totally disagree and I depart peacefully. — dimosthenis9

So, our views totally differ, but I respect your right to your own opinion and your freedom of speech.

That is just an absurd statement.
— Antinatalist

No it isn't. It's a statement that you simply can't deny. — dimosthenis9

I care about peoples´ suffering. I wrote you one post, where I touched the problems of mankind. Wars, genocide, famine, sexual abuse, other violence etc.

But my point of view is that even when we somehow can calculate that bringing child into this world will bring more happiness to child´s parents and other people than it cause suffering to the child and other people, it is still wrong because it is a decision for someone else´s life.

About utilitarianism, your arguments/reasoning seem strongly as utilitarian.
— Antinatalist

I ensure you I m not at all. Whether you believe it or not. — dimosthenis9

Okay, I am not going to argue on that, not on this post at least.

if you look the act of having a child only at parent's perspective, you use the unborn potential person as a mean - not an end itself.
— Antinatalist

The thing is that you look it only at the "unborn kid's" perspective! And don't care at all about parent's perspective. — dimosthenis9

Look at a few lines above.

Antinatalist I think you’re the one not listening. I think I can speak roughly for the person above by saying we’re not looking at it purely from the parents perspective. The thing is neither are we looking at it purely from the (possible) child’s perspective. — I like sushi

My point is that parents perspective is irrelevant in this case, because the possibly upcoming child is who is the one, whose life the decision is made about.

Again, back to the ‘possibility’ of harm being portrayed as a greater ‘wrong’/‘bad’. This sounds a lot like having ‘safe spaces’ and all that kind of dangerous nonsense.

No one ‘asks’ to be born because that is impossible. The choice, if it exists, is on the parents. — I like sushi

That´s how people usually think, that it's parents´ choice. But that doesn't make it right.

I try to not use people purely as a mean. Having a child - at least, when its main purpose is to bring happiness for parents lifes - is an example of treating a person purely as a mean.
Killing already born person is another example of that.

Self-deceit is easy, you are right about that.

↪Antinatalist You’re strange.

The word choices like ‘playing’ tell me something about you. This isn’t a logical discussion. You have an opinion that, as far as I can see, has little to no weight to it.

The comparison I made was to get the point across that we cannot fear causing ‘suffering’ every step in our lives. Every step in your life will cause ‘suffering’ some where. — I like sushi

Of course suffering belongs to life, and some suffering may prevent some bigger suffering.
My point is, that when there is no one who has to born, there is no one who has to suffer.

By this logic killing all humans will end their ‘suffering’ yet you’re not for murder … guess you’d have another name for it instead, maybe ‘avoiding collateral damage’? — I like sushi

Maybe you didn´t get it, I used concept "collateral damage" as an ironic way to underline the fact many people don´t care about horrible situations, what come for someone else.
Killing other people is crime against them as sovereign creatures. They have right for their own life.
I find your point of view strange.

There is nothing wrong with wanting to experience the joys of parenthood anymore than there is with not wanting to. I think anyone trying to take a moral high ground on what is ‘better’ is something close to what I would term ‘evil’. — I like sushi

Having a child is a decision for someone else's whole life.
About "better" and "evil", you yourself think your view is better than mine. Is that kind of conclusion - antinatalism is bad - then evil?
I find this very absurd. At the heart of ethical theories, is question what is "good", what is "bad", what is"better" and what is "worse".

Life without suffering isn’t worth living. You learn that as you mature. I guess some people get carried away with the search for some ‘answer’ or ‘solution’ to life. Again, as you mature you may see past this (I hope so). — I like sushi

Like I said some suffering is good to prevent some bigger suffering, some suffering could also evolve virtues of a human, but I really hope that you realize that all suffering simply ain´t so good.

I like humanity. I want it to keep going because I believe human life has value, because I make judgements. I’m not particularly compassionate towards nihilists or buddhists (same difference to me). — I like sushi

I also believe that human life has value. First of all, I value the human being who lives in this world. Who is thrown in to this world, never been asked if he/she wanted to.
I am an existentialist and antinatalist, and that makes me an antinihilist.

Even if you were right, your point of view is some kind of utilitarianism
— Antinatalist

I don't think it is at all. I don't even support utilitarianism. It is just a simple matter of choice for me as I told you. Nothing else.

Yes, I want human race to disappear. By voluntary choice. Not very realistic that this will happen in near future, but I think that way.
— Antinatalist

Ok at least now you admit it. I don't agree at all and I find it irrational. But as I told you I respect every opinion so I respect yours also.

My ethics is to respect people who already exist, their lives have a great value - even when they have bad ones
— Antinatalist

Sorry but it's not the case here either.
You care about the "rights" and "potential suffering" of an "unborn creature" a "0".But you don't give a fuck for the actual suffering of the ones that are already alive! — dimosthenis9

That is just an absurd statement.

If someone wants to have kids. And he truly wants that with all his heart. That will make him so happy and not having will make him miserable for the rest of his life. Well in that case with your theory you "condemn" a living creature's life into ACTUAL suffering and misery by urging him not to be happy and have kids for the sake of the POTENTIAL suffering of a non existing creature! You value potential suffering of a "0" more that the actual suffering of an already living person. So no, please don't say that. — dimosthenis9

Like I said before in one earlier post for someone else, if you look the act of having a child only at parent's perspective, you use the unborn potential person as a mean - not an end itself. And that is wrong. Of course the non-existing potential person does not suffer, but if she/he will born to this world she/he most likely will suffer. When having a child it is not only about parents, but first of all it's a decision at someone else's life.


About utilitarianism, your arguments/reasoning seem strongly as utilitarian.

Also their sovereignty as human beings obligates other people not to use them as a mean for something, and same philosophy is also one reason for my antinatalistic views.
— Antinatalist

Yes, my AN is along similar deontological ends. In the end, it's about not using people. Do not foist unnecessary, non-trivial harms/burdens/impositions to someone else. — schopenhauer1

Yes.

dimosthenis9
303
I would prefer to turn this question upside down. Life is for some people, at least, such a terrible burden that is certainly not worth of living. In earlier post I have touched the problem of suicide in many cases.
— Antinatalist

That upside down thing doesn't answer at all to my question but anyway.

You keep referring to all those who suffer (and there are many indeed). You don't say anything about those who don't see life as suffering at all. And there are also many!
So since some suffer (even if some of those still prefer life as I mentioned to you at previous post) let's not have kids at all from the fear of the potential suffering! Let's end human existence. Sounds logical??

When there are no humans, there are no wars, concentration camps, genocides, famine, rapes and other sexual abuse, any other violence, no suffering for losing your loved ones, physical pain and so on.
— Antinatalist
— dimosthenis9

So you actually admit that you do want Humans to disappear. You just try to present it like a "good", "unselfish", "moral" thing. Sorry but there is no way to accept that. It is totally out of my logic. — dimosthenis9

Yes, I want human race to disappear. By voluntary choice. Not very realistic that this will happen in near future, but I think that way.

But I think these good things in life are far from balancing the bad ones
— Antinatalist

Totally disagree. — dimosthenis9

I have touched the subject in my original text, in chapter Utilitarianism and the best possible world. Even if you were right, your point of view is some kind of utilitarianism. I think utilitarianism is a cruel philosophical ideology.

My point of view is that preventing harm is a higher value than bringing happiness.
— Antinatalist

Your point of view ends with the conclusion : that preventing harm is a higher value than life itself at the very end!! And this is something that my Logic fails to follow. It just stops being logic, for me at least. — dimosthenis9

Preventing harm by not having a child is greater value than giving life for someone not yet existing. Not "giving a life" for someone not existing, we are not doing harm for anyone. But by "giving a life" for yet not existing, we are doing harm for someone who will exist because of this act. I agree with David Benatar with his asymmetry argument.

My ethics is to respect people who already exist, their lives have a great value - even when they have bad ones (Life can have also negative value, but we have to respect peoples own choices of their own life), they only have right to end it (euthanasia and killing for self-defense are different kind of situations)). Also their sovereignty as human beings obligates other people not to use them as a mean for something, and same philosophy is also one reason for my antinatalistic views.

Let´s use "Humanism" I suppose the way you use it (you can correct me if your view is different). It is something good. Something unselfish, peace-loving, something which reach for love and justice.

On that perspective I find antinatalism very humanistic point of view.
— Antinatalist

I used the word humanism here as to describe "human species".People.
How you find antinatalism humanistic(with the way you defined it) since the ultimate result of your theory would be a totally disappearance of humans? An end to human nature?? I really can't understand this.
Doesn't that imply that you find human creatures unworthy of living? Is this a different kind of "love" for humans and I m the only one who doesn't get it? (maybe I am, don't know). — dimosthenis9

I will try to clarify my view for you.

My main reason for my antinatalistic view is few post above, so I don´t repeat it here. A different kind of perspective for antinatalistic philosophy is first of all take a long look to world, human beings, all mankind.

Doesn't that imply that you find human creatures unworthy of living? — dimosthenis9

I would prefer to turn this question upside down. Life is for some people, at least, such a terrible burden that is certainly not worth of living. In earlier post I have touched the problem of suicide in many cases.
The suicide is not a real option for all people, who live misery lives (like almost all abused children, many mentally retarded people - and I don´t mean that all retard people live misery life, and I have to underline, because I have often become misunderstood, my point of view is that the value of life of mentally handicapped is as important as anyone else’s).

But many mentally retarded people - cause of environment or their own mental condition - are not capable for doing suicide, even when their life is so miserable, that they self think it is not worth continuing. And think about children who suffer sexual abuse without any way out. That is just awful, pure evil.

I think the love for people, all mankind, is realized when they don't have to be born in the first place. When there are no humans, there are no wars, concentration camps, genocides, famine, rapes and other sexual abuse, any other violence, no suffering for losing your loved ones, physical pain and so on.

Of course you can say, in that case there are also not the good things which come with life. And you are right about that. But I think these good things in life are far from balancing the bad ones.

And even if I were wrong in the previous sentence, and we also somehow could come to conclusion that the happiness and other good things outweighs the bad, I still don´t think it is right to reproduce (let´s forget my main reason for antinatalism and think only the things I have dealt with in this post).

Utilitarians think the other way. If the good outweighs the bad in life, then having a child in this world is probably a good thing. On average, from utilitarian point of view. But I don´t think that even when considering life only from utilitarian perspective, we could come to the conclusion that in this real world good outweighs the bad.

My point of view is that preventing harm is a higher value than bringing happiness. Philosopher Sami Pihlström, who is not an antinatalist, and whose views differ in many issues from my own, says utilitarianism is not an ethical theory at all. I agree with him on that.

↪Antinatalist Answer me something that I was always curious about antinatalists. I asked the same to Bartricks also.

Let's suppose that the best scenario for you happen. And all people adopt your theory. So at the end your final claim is that humanity should stop existing right?? That no more kids, no more humans.
You find that rational?? It was always one of the main reasons I never could understand that kind of Logic! You find logical humanity to end cause we just "can't ask" an unborn, NonExisting creature?? Really that sounds rational to you??Just asking, really. — dimosthenis9

It may not sound rational of point of selfish gene (little bit anthropomorphism here). I see evolution simply as a mechanism. There are no physical laws for that human beings have to exist.
I see antinatalism as a rational, but unpopular philosophical view.

And at the end since your final conclusion is that. Then why you call yourselves antinatalists and not anti humanists?? It would be a more honest name, imo at least — dimosthenis9

What is humanity? There is many ways to use word/concept "Humanity" or "Humanism". Let´s use "Humanism" I suppose the way you use it (you can correct me if your view is different). It is something good. Something unselfish, peace-loving, something which reach for love and justice.

On that perspective I find antinatalism very humanistic point of view.

↪Antinatalist Rephrased it reads "I didn't understand the point of the thread, nor properly interpret the OP" Is this literally asking about the morality of producing children? — Cheshire

My statement is that having children is morally wrong.
I answered with following citation of my original text to I like sushi:

The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.

In case A does not have a child – and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A having a child – A will still not have actively influenced the occurrence of this bad. Let us now assume the opposite: A has a child, and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A not having a child. In this case, it is unquestionably clear that A has actively affected the materialization of this bad. — Antinatalist

Strange logic.
— Antinatalist
What? We don't consider the present is exactly the same as the projected future states? How do we pretend cardiac base tissue is a person, by other means? — Cheshire

I´m not sure do I understand your point. Can you clarify what you mean?

Or another way. Every living person is a potentially dead person so killing people is ok. — Cheshire

Strange logic.

↪Antinatalist My questions remains. How is this different from saying ‘Reasons not to cross a road’ ? — I like sushi

The fundamental difference of those acts - crossing a road or having a child - that when you are having a child, you are playing with another person´s life. Whole life.

They are very weak points. I can think of better points. For example, people who have children generally suffer more stress and have less ‘happiness’. People who don’t have children though don’t have the elated highs of being a parent.

On balance if you really think having children is bad/wrong/not good, then I don’t understand why. — I like sushi

Let´s assume that you are right on that happiness -point. So what?
I´m not a fan of Immanuel Kant, but he got something right. If you consider having a child only at parent´s point of view, you are treating the child as a mean - not as an end in itself.

So is quite understandable that many people, who suffer and are willing to die, don´t make suicide.
— Antinatalist

These cases exist indeed. But many others prefer to go on living even if they suffer cause they still think life is better. Plus when one suffers still he has hope that things will get better and he will overcome it. His hope for happier days is much stronger even from the actual suffering. — dimosthenis9

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pollyanna_principle

There are even cases among the ones you mentioned,that people just find excuses to religion and grief of their loved ones cause at the very bottom they don't want to die at all! — dimosthenis9

Maybe for someone, but there is definitely lots of people whom those are not excuses.

someone in utter pain isn't going to necessarily be able to wave such things away.. One has to eat.. etc. Joke assume easy-to-deal-with and light. Surely, someone must find ways to live in the word, lest they die (they must "deal with" inescapably lest they die by starvation). Surely, contingent, harmful events might happen to someone as well. Structural and contingent harms happen..That's no joke.
— schopenhauer1

Why you think that a person who suffers (and there might be probably billions as we are talking) don't kill himself?? Cause they STILL answer "yes" to life. Life to most people is much more preferable than "nothing","0", even if they suffer! — dimosthenis9

Many people are fearing suicide. Something of that fear could be evolutionary fear of death (this was "good" for selfish gene in human history). Something comes from upbringing and religions. Some religions, at least, are saying that if you do suicide, that is wrong and you are going to Hell. On the other hand, many people think their (possible) close ones, and don´t make suicide because they think it´s too much grief for their loved ones. So is quite understandable that many people, who suffer and are willing to die, don´t make suicide.

↪I like sushi

I hadn't been participating in this discussion. I generally avoid anti-natalist threads. But it was a slow day and decided to take a look. I think anti-natalists like to project their own misery onto the rest of us without any sign of self-awareness. I find it hard to take them seriously. — T Clark

I answered to I like sushi.

I doubt, that an antinatalistic view comes from person´s own misery, in general. Of course there could be some people who are miserable and are manifesting their own misery by antinatalistic views.
I, personally, lived quite good, not so miserable life about thirty years ago. I thought at those times about many moral and ethical issues and found that having a child is an unethical thing to do. Antinatalism as a term was not familiar for me.

To procreate is to impose a whole lifetime in this world on another person without that person's prior consent. Normally it is wrong - seriously wrong - to make a major imposition on another person without their prior consent. We recognize this in other contexts. And it doesn't get much more major than imposing a lifetime here on another person. So that's one reason - a Kantian reason - to think that procreation is default wrong. — Bartricks

Yes, normally that kind of acts will be considered morally wrong.

↪Antinatalist So you think there is something wrong with letting people commit suicide while they’re young, and at the same time you think that them not being able to do so is unjust? How can you have both? — khaled

I think assisted suicide for under-aged people is wrong.
It is different thing if they commit suicide on their own.
I know you can see discrepancy on my point of view "I think euthanasia is ethical, when person is old enough to understand the nature and consequences of the act".

Letting people do suicide is different than to assist her/him on that.
But, however, I have to admit there is at least slight discrepancy in my point of view and my practical action.
If someone under-aged is willing to do suicide, I probably will try to speak her/him not to do it.
I don´t think suicide is wrong at any age, but under-aged probably are not old enough understand the act and its consequences. So, I think under-aged suicider does not do anything wrong, but who will assist her/him at suicide is unethical in her/his act.

My views may change if I will read enough war history.
Florian Huber is a German historian, who have written book named Child, promise me that you will shoot yourself. The downfall of the common people 1945.
I haven´t read this book, but I can imagine horrible situations where people see so miserable things happening now and in the near future, that they hope that their own children will kill themselves.

↪Antinatalist
Once born, however, a human being is highly unlikely to have the sufficient skills to commit suicide before the age of five – often, in fact, not before turning ten or even fifteen. When this wish arises and the individual aims to fulfill it, surrounding people strive to prevent the suicide almost without exceptions if they only can. Furthermore, a vast number of highly retarded people exist who, due to their condition, will never really be able to commit suicide. One must in any case consider the possibility of having to live a perhaps highly agonizing period of life before suicide, due to a choice – that of creating life – for which the individual him/herself is not responsible
— Antinatalist

Your objection seems to be that not everyone can commit suicide, but everyone can return the gift. I don't find that convincing, but does it mean that if painless assisted suicide was a right, you wouldn't be AN? — khaled

I think I have written this text earlier to this forum (the following text is from my original article, which is a little bit longer than the one I posted here). — Antinatalist

Not actually, because I found assisted suicide for children and under-aged unethical. Even so, although they can live in horrible environments and undergo terrible things. Best for situation like this, is help them other way if that is possible. I think euthanasia is ethical, when person is old enough to understand the nature and consequences of the act.

It is paradoxical, however, that many people think that taking own life - suicide - is wrong, but when making a decision for other people´s life when having a child, they see not problem at all.

Gift could be harmful, but comparing gift to having a child is, although natural, but also very extreme thing to do.
— Antinatalist

Having a child is not a trivial everyday task.
— Antinatalist

I'm pointing out that just because something is an unconsented imposition clearly doesn't automatically make it wrong. So you need more premises to make the case that this specific unconsented imposition (having kids) is wrong. I am not comparing having kids to giving gifts, I'm pointing out that they share the same properties and you think one is fine while the other isn't. That needs explaining. — khaled

One point of view is that you can be unpolite, and give the gift back; or you can decide to never use it. Or throw it away. You can not return your life for anyone.
Of course some will say, that if your life is miserable, you can always make suicide.

I think I have written this text below earlier to this forum (the following text is from my original article, which is a little bit longer than the one I posted here).


On suicide

The possibility of suicide of course exists. Once born, however, a human being is highly unlikely to have the sufficient skills to commit suicide before the age of five – often, in fact, not before turning ten or even fifteen. When this wish arises and the individual aims to fulfill it, surrounding people strive to prevent the suicide almost without exceptions if they only can. Furthermore, a vast number of highly retarded people exist who, due to their condition, will never really be able to commit suicide. One must in any case consider the possibility of having to live a perhaps highly agonizing period of life before suicide, due to a choice – that of creating life – for which the individual him/herself is not responsible. And most importantly, not even suicide guarantees that the individual will achieve the state or non-state where s/he “was” before the decision of having a child was made. (Be it complete non-existence, for example).

I am an antinatalist, not pro-mortalist. And it´s different kind of case is life worth continuing than is life worth of starting.

I think the main axiom here is that prevented harms is more important than missed goods (when nobody exists to be deprived). That is the basic axiom which the rest of the asymmetry seems to follow. And it does make sense. No person to miss out on the goods of life is neutral. A person missing out on harms, is good. — schopenhauer1

I certainly agree with this, also.

Even situation like this, I don´t think it´s obligation to reproduce. — Antinatalist

I don't quite follow what you are trying to say here. I think with Benatar's asymmetry you simply have to keep in mind that preventing harm is more important than happiness-bringing. I guess that is the basic asymmetry. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I think that way also. Preventing harm is more important than happiness-bringing.

↪Antinatalist
Finally, nobody will know is it better for human being born into this world or not. However, we know that if child born into this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard.
— Antinatalist

Do you think of this when deciding what gift to buy a friend for an occasion then settling on nothing since the gift could be harmful? — khaled

Gift could be harmful, but comparing gift to having a child is, although natural, but also very extreme thing to do. For potential person´s point of view.

I find it dubious that any action that can risk harming someone automatically becomes wrong if you don’t have their consent. — khaled

Having a child is not a trivial everyday task.

Even situation like this, I don´t think it´s obligation to reproduce. — Antinatalist

You seem to have somewhat of a false dichotomy going on. Either one must have children or one must not have children. — khaled

I made very extreme scenario, where having a child is always good thing for the child. In such unrealistic world having a child is right thing to so, but not obligation.

That was theoretical scenario. In real world having a child is wrong.

2) Ethics should be based on deontological grounds more than utilitarian, but this doesn't mean that degrees of harm are not existent. Thus, as an example, a very low level theft is wrong, but not as wrong as a theft of someone's life savings or life saving drugs.

3) Amelioration is inherent in existence. That is to say, we are always compromising minimal harms to alleviate lesser harms. Perhaps the cost of a low level harm of a surprise party (because the person doesn't like being surprised) is what must happen in living in any social milieu. We are always compromising, and imposing on others by necessity. Procreation prevents any need for amelioration. All harms are prevented with no collateral damage.
a) No one is obligated to bring about happy people
b) We are obligated to prevent unnecessary harm if it's possible.
c) Not procreating prevents all unnecessary harm for another person (and conversely doesn't create unnecessary harm on their behalf).
d) Once existing, ameliorations must take place for life to move forward. Thus though things can have a low level harm, they can be necessary to ameliorate greater harms. — schopenhauer1

I definitely agree with all of this.

↪Antinatalist
Hi Antinatalist, as you may already know, I like your arguments.. Things that I have to add here:

Unnecessary, and unwanted harmful impositions are wrong, period, entailed in the fact that it is on someone else's behalf. All life has some minor transactional harms.. Even giving someone a gift can lead to some harm (butterfly affect maybe). — schopenhauer1

I agree with you.

However birth is one example where absolutely no harm will follow to any ONE (as they won't exist), and no ONE misses out either (Benatarian asymmetry). — schopenhauer1

Do you mean when somebody - there is not somebody, but how can you express this correctly in natural language - does not born, it will not harm anybody?


My point of view slightly disagree with Benatar´s. I think, he´s  partly right on that, there´s not done any harm for anyone when not having a child, because there is not anyone (I have to clarify: there are not done any harm for any potential person, some might say that not to have a child is a harm for some people, who want to have children but are not having them).

I think, Benatar is partly wrong. Theoretically, could be so that life is better than non-life. I personally don´t think it´s true in general, but I like to argue also against my own arguments.
So, if it so that life is better for someone/some people/everyone than not being at all, is true like Benatar have said there is no harm of losing something or suffering for something good, which cannot be realized. Because there is no one who could suffer from those things.

But suffering for not having something good is only part of the picture.
It ignores the theoretical fact that life could be better for "someone" than never being born.
And for this, some would say there have been done harm not having a child. I understand this point of view, but I don´t agree with that.
When speaking of doing harm or not doing harm, we also speak of duties and obligations - and rights.

The following is purely theoretical,

Let´s assume that life is always better than not life at all, and somehow we can know this fact. Let´s assume that what we call non-life is something where is no experiences at all, there is no one who could experience anything at all.

I don´t think, even in this situation, that no one has duty to reproduce. I don´t think that not having a child is harm doing for anyone (then again, I have to agree with Benatar on this, although I think he is partly wrong on asymmetry argument). Even situation like this, I don´t think it´s obligation to reproduce.

I think that most people are against antinatalism because it seems - or perhaps really is - so unnatural. The evolution is a mechanism, what "decides" whose genes will continue their journey and whose genes don´t.
If there is genes that correlates for antinatalism views, is it quite clear that those genes are not the genes, that will continue to next generations. At least, those are not the first ones.

That natalistic attitude is natural and understandable. Of course it is. Human being is animal among others. What separates us from other animals? The ability to consider philosophical topics, at least.
But this naturalistic, natalistic urge comes from something very deep, cerebral cortex maybe, I don´t know. However, it is like Richard Dawkins said, human being is the only animal who can resist the tyranny of the selfish gene.

Antinatalist I don’t buy any of that. Nor do I find it logically persuasive. Some people REALLY SUFFER therefore having children is bad? That is not even weak, it’s just plain silly.

Note: I’m assuming there is more? If not take the bombast as not bombast :) — I like sushi

First reason to not to have children: Like I said, it is decision for someone´s else´s life and that someone else pays the consequences of that decision.

Second reason to not to have children: Even if it is so that life in general, on average, is a better option than never been born at all, this situation does not apply to everyone.
We know that life causes terrible things for some unlucky people.

I hope the following will clarify my point of view:

"Bruno Contestabile and Sam Woolfe cites the story The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas by Ursula K. Le Guin. In this story, the existence of the utopian city of Omelas and the good fortune of its inhabitants depend on the suffering of one child who is tortured in an isolated place and who cannot be helped. The majority accepts this state of affairs and stays in the city, but there are those who do not agree with it, who do not want to participate in it and thus they "walk away from Omelas". Contestabile and Woolfe draws a parallel here: for Omelas to exist, the child must be tortured, and in the same way, the existence of our world is related to the fact that someone is constantly harmed. According to Contestabile and Woolfe, antinatalists can be seen just as "the ones who walk away from Omelas", who do not accept such a world, and who do not approve of its perpetuation. Contestabile poses the question: is all happiness able to compensate for the extreme suffering of even one person?[63][64]"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antinatalism

These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not to create human life in to this world.
— Antinatalist

Sorry, I missed the arguments? What argument? Suffering isn’t necessarily ‘negative’ either. It is ephemeral and allows learning. Learning is ‘suffering’ to some degree. — I like sushi

The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.

And one foundation of this argument: In case A does not have a child – and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A having a child – A will still not have actively influenced the occurrence of this bad. Let us now assume the opposite: A has a child, and the consequence of this choice is that a greater bad will take place than in the event of A not having a child. In this case, it is unquestionably clear that A has actively affected the materialization of this bad.  

Next thing that bothered me is comparing apples with oranges. Saying a statue is like a creating a baby? Is a baby a piece of art now. That just doesn’t work. Analogies are not particularly helpful here I feel. — I like sushi

Arguments have been made concerning the act of having a child that one cannot affect something that does not exist. That´s why there is the Bruce Springsteen -statue example.

Another point …

A Linkola-spirited argument to this could be: "Only what is can have value. Non-life cannot have value."

A possible response could be: "Maybe so, but similarly only what is can have non-value."
— Antinatalist

That is just plain nonsense.

The glaringly obvious point that needs to be addressed is what ‘good’ means and what ‘wrong’ means. Also, what exactly is ‘suffering’ and given that there is an underlying idea that life is only worth living if it is pleasure for the most part seems a bit strange. — I like sushi

Of course there could not be objective standards for the ´good´ or ´wrong´ (or ´bad´ or ´right´).
However, what is ´bad´ or that is ´wrong´ easier  to see than what is ´good´ or what is ´right´.
Right after I have to admit that we can not construct objective moral claims for what we should not to do.

At the chapter Utilitarianism and the best possible world I said The practical truth is that some people will get themselves used as “test animals” in discharge chamber experiments, or raped by wolfhounds, to mention just a few examples. In other words: we know that creating life inevitably results in unwanted consequences.

I think that those who have had to experience the same as the ones in example above, for example in the Second World War, really suffered. That is just a fact.
Of course everything is not that extreme, and what is suffering and what is not is always not so simple.

My point of view is not that "life is only worth living if it is pleasure for the most part ".
My point of view is that having a child is wrong, because it is decision for someone else's life. And we can not know is that life better than never being born.




One other way to approach the question - Is it wrong to have children? - is anti-utilitarian.

Let´s assume that it is so, that life in general is more happy than not. And it is better to be than not to be, on average. But we also know that some people really suffer.
Some might say, that it is not important, that´s life. That is collateral damage.

I think that is just cruel.

I published my article: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11738/is-it-wrong-to-have-children

I have an article about antinatalism, although when I wrote it, the concept of "antinatalism" was not familiar to me (I wrote article in 2004, but I think it is still highly topical). I offered article to philosophical journal, but they decided not to publish it.

About decade ago I published it at some philosophy forums. After that, I had made to my article some recent changes.

Can I publish it here?

I believe the solution to the is/ought dichotomy is that it is a false dichotomy—‘ought’ entails ‘is’, for what is the case is what ought to be the case given the available evidence and the powers of our understanding. And the truth ultimately aids us in doing the right thing. ‘Is’ is therefore an outgrowth of ‘ought’. — Adam Hilstad

I slightly disagree.

I quote Edward O. Wilson and my response for him in my essay from 2004. This is long quotation, but I think necessary.



Biological world-view and religious naturalism

"The time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized." (Edward O. Wilson, 562, 1975. Sociobiology. The New Synthesis. Cambridge, Belknap 1975.)

...some slightly irrelevant "jargon" from ought/is -perspective...


”...Many philosophers will respond by saying, But wait! What are you saying? Ethicists don’t need that kind of information. You really can’t pass from is to ought. You are not allowed to describe a genetic predisposition and suppose that because it is part of human nature, it is somehow transformed into an ethical precept. We must put moral reasoning in a special category, and use transcendental guidelines as required.No, we do not have to put moral reasoning in a special category, and use transcendental premises, because the posing of the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy. For if ought is not is, what is? To translate is into ought makes sense if we attend to the objective meaning of ethical precepts. They are very unlikely to be ethereal messages outside humanity awaiting revelation,or independent truth vibrating in a non material dimension of the mind. They are more likely to be physical products of the brain and culture.

From the consilient perspective of the natural sciences, they are no more than principles of the social contract hardened into rules and dictates,the behavioral codes that members of a society fervently wish others to follow and are willing to accept themselves for the common good. Precepts are the extreme in a scale of agreements that range from casual assent to public sentiment to law to that part of the canon considered unalterable and sacred." [Wilson, CONSILIENCE. The Unity of Knowledge 1998, 249-250. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1998.] I believe the solution to the is/ought dichotomy is that it is a false dichotomy—‘ought’ entails ‘is’, for what is the case is what ought to be the case given the available evidence and the powers of our understanding. And the truth ultimately aids us in doing the right thing. ‘Is’ is therefore an outgrowth of ‘ought’."

To this, my response is that "ought" is the will, desire or intention of a being, and in this sense it truly "is". From this intention of a being, or from the normative attitude of ”should”, no obligation can be drawn. This is purely analytic. The issue is very simple if, generally speaking, the normative attitude of "ought" is a product of the brain and culture and it is required in order to maintain human life; the occurrence of this attitude is common amongst the living. No evolutionary process can even give a probable estimate as to why life would be a value over non-life. However, Wilson is admittedly correct in stating that, when assessing the possibilities and ethicality of actions, one must consider what is possible and what is not. But to assess life as a value over non-life, there is no material produced by the rational mind or empirical data (during, for example, the evolution of billions of years). Among evolutionary biologists,organized religion has often been seen as a contemporarily meaningful adaptation of natural selection. In the modern world, however, the popularity of religion has decreased. This has been seen both as an advantage and as a handicap; a fruitful phenomenon for the scientific world-view, but also the risk of falling into a meaningless spiritual void. Religions have responded to the spiritual needs of people and, even if they were to disappear, the need for sacred narratives remains. Wilson sees this both as a problem and as a challenge for the future.

"If the sacred narrative cannot be in the form of a religious cosmology, it will be taken from the material history of the universe and the human species. That trend is in no way debasing. The true evolutionary epic,retold as poetry, is as intrinsically ennobling as any religious epic. Material reality discovered by science already possesses more content  and grandeur than all religious cosmologies combined. The continuity of the human line has been traced through a period of deep history a thousand times older than that conceived by the Western religions. Its study has brought new revelations of great moral importance. It has made us realize that Homo sapiens is far more than a congeries of tribes and races. We are a single gene pool from which individuals are drawn in each generation and into which they are dissolved the next generation,  forever united as a species by heritage and  a common future. Such are the conceptions, based on fact from which new intimations of immortality can be drawn and a new mythos evolved." [Wilson 1998, 265] 

The end of the last sentence is especially intriguing: “new mythos evolved.” However, regarding life as an axiomatic, dogmatic value can hardly be regarded as a new idea. 

Pro-life people seems not so pro life when we are including their threats and actions against abortion doctors to the whole picture.
— Antinatalist

Social death penalty is not murder — Gregory

I disagree.

Pro-life people seems not so pro life when we are including their threats and actions against abortion doctors to the whole picture.

According to Moore, we could never reach the state where we just can define something for pure and absolutely good. There´s always question about is that what we defined as good, really good.
— Antinatalist
Yes, that is the Open Question argument. I think it fails because Moore fails to define what we mean by 'good'. He basically just gives up on trying to define it, and assumes that good is indefinable, that it is just a word that refers to something we can't find in nature. This is where I disagree with him, because I think we can define 'good', indeed I think I have defined it, and I expect I shall continue to think that until someone proves me wrong.


The name of this topic is What are we doing? Is/ought divide. Do you consider also, that David Hume was wrong?
— Antinatalist — Herg

Yes. If I'm right about the meaning of 'good' and 'bad', then if an action causes pain, then that action, other things being equal, is a bad action. — Herg

You are making a naturalistic fallacy by its definition. Of course the naturalistic fallacy can be itself a fallacy. Sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson thinks that way, so you are in good company.

The fact-value bridge has been crossed, and I think we should ask ourselves, in that situation, which is more plausible: that the fact that the action is bad means we ought not to do it, or that the fact that the action is bad has no moral significance at all, and we are morally free to do it if we wish despite its badness. I think the former position is more plausible than the latter, because we are now in value territory, and there's what seems to me a compelling congruence between the good/bad split, the right/wrong split, and the ought/ought not split. This isn't a watertight argument, but it seems to me that once we have crossed the fact-value divide, there's little reason not to go the whole hog and accept that we ought not to do bad things (such as causing pain). — Herg

There´s a misunderstanding. The "no ought from is" -statement does not tell what is a morally good thing, or morally bad thing - or even what is morally permissible. So it does not say anything about what we are morally free to do.

Anyway, I find utilitarian ethics untenable.
— Antinatalist
Well, again, supporting reasons for this position would be nice. But having been told off by Gregory for being too demanding, I'm not going to push. — Herg

Of course. I just assumed - obviously wrong - that this was just a sidetrack of the topic.
In utilitarianism human being will and should - at least in some cases - treated as a mean, not the end.
While I´m neither Kantian, I agree on this with him, that we should treat human beings as end in itself rather than (merely) as means to other ends.
And I think also that Fyodor Dostoevsky was a great philosopher and some parts of his The Brothers Karamazov are very valid argumentation against utilitarianism.

I want to agree with you, but I think you are making a naturalistic fallacy.
— Antinatalist
It would help if you would explain why you think that. I've been careful to defend my view against Moore and Hare, so what now is your objection? Or, if you don't think I've successfully defended myself against them, can you say why? — Herg

There could be some important nuance in your defending, and I don´t reach it. Are way speaking of the same thing? Moore simply says that "goodness" can not reduced to natural properties of some.
I think that Moore thought that every value´s, that is naturally (or supernaturally) found to be good, relation to good itself is quite similar than the nature of mathematical theorems to completeness.
Those theorems are incomplete by their very nature (every formal axiomatic system capable of modelling basic arithmetic). I have to admit right after, that my knowledge of mathematics is very limited and some may say that this comparison is bad or even ridiculous.
According to Moore, we could never reach the state where we just can define something for pure and absolutely good. There´s always question about is that what we defined as good, really good.

The name of this topic is What are we doing? Is/ought divide. Do you consider also, that David Hume was wrong?


"I also want to say I value pleasure as a good thing, but if we look just what is pleasurable and always favor that kind of experiences, acts etc. we are coming to unbearable problems."
— Antinatalist

I haven't claimed that pleasure is the whole of ethics. I'm simply claiming that it's a fact that pleasure is good. — Herg

I assumed that that it is your point of view, I just wanted bring into focus that with pleasure could come some bad. I just wanted to make that point clear, I assumed correctly that you think like you said (that pleasure is not the whole ethics).

Somebody could have pleasure, when she/he is torturing someone else. I don´t regard that kind of a pleasure as good.
So, when valuing pleasure I think is important what kind of circumstances it occurs.
I find it hard to believe that the pleasure of the torturer could be so great that it would outweigh the pain of the tortured, so I think a simple utilitarian-style pleasure/pain calculus can deal quite easily with this objection. — Herg

Yes, I think usually that is the case. Anyway, I find utilitarian ethics untenable.

I think Moore´s point of view is more metaphysical or ontological, we have statements like "pleasure is good" and at the same time we would never know what is "good" for sure.
— Antinatalist
I suppose another way of putting that would be to say that Moore thought we can't know what 'good' refers to - what property it denotes. But it seems to me that we can't decide that issue until we have worked out what the word 'good' actually means, i.e. what function it performs in ordinary discourse. R.M.Hare, whose lectures I attended long ago when life was simpler and we all had more and longer hair (well, I did), reformulated Moore's open question and thought that in so doing he had made it unanswerable (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2252015?seq=1).

However, Hare's argument only succeeds if we agree with Hare on two points: that descriptions can never also be evaluations, and that the sole function of the word 'good' is to commend. The first of these is what we are trying to establish, so Hare's argument begs the question; and I think 'good' does more than just commend. When we say 'that was a good dinner', I think we are not just commending the dinner, we are also saying something about it, i.e. we are attributing to it some property. It would be closer to the truth if we said that we are claiming that the dinner was commendable, i.e. deserved to be commended (and of course we would then be commending the dinner by implication). However, I would want to cast the linguistic net somewhat wider, and point out (a) that commending is an activity which displays a positive attitude to something, and (b) that there are several other activities which display positive attitudes, such as approving, desiring, seeking out, etc.. It seems to me that 'good' gestures to all of these kinds of activities without specifically selecting any one of them; so I would claim that when we say 'that was a good dinner', what we actually mean is 'that dinner was such as to merit a positive attitude or activity', where the set of available positive attitudes and activities includes approval, commendation, desire, seeking out, etc..

Having established that, the next question is: is there something in nature that intrinsically has this property? I think pleasure does. By 'pleasure' I mean, strictly speaking, pleasantness. Many things can have the property of pleasantness, but it is the property of pleasantness that I think has the property of meriting a positive attitude, rather than the thing that is pleasant. So, for example, I find Beethoven's 6th Symphony pleasant, but it is the pleasantness of my experience in listening to it that has the property of meriting a positive attitude, not the symphony itself. Making someone who doesn't like Beethoven listen to the 6th Symphony would not result, for them, in an experience that merited commendation or desire or seeking out; but if I could give them my experience of listening to the 6th Symphony, then their experience, like mine, would merit those attitudes and activities.

So I think Moore had it all wrong. My metaphysical and ontological thesis about 'good' would be that pleasantness is good, and unpleasantness is bad, and therefore we do not have to look to non-natural properties (whatever they may be) to find what 'good refers to or denotes'; what it denotes is the meriting of positive attitudes and activities that is a property of the pleasantness of our own, entirely natural, experiences. — Herg

I want to agree with you, but I think you are making a naturalistic fallacy.
I also want to say I value pleasure as a good thing, but if we look just what is pleasurable and always favor that kind of experiences, acts etc. we are coming to unbearable problems. Somebody could have pleasure, when she/he is torturing someone else. I don´t regard that kind of a pleasure as good.
So, when valuing pleasure I think is important what kind of circumstances it occurs.

Georg Henrik von Wright has written on "goodness", on the deontology of goodness (The Varieties of Goodness, 1963). For example, when the chair is considered as a good chair, it have to had certain features (some would say it has to be good to sit on - of course that criteria is also arguable, but that is not the point). But maybe this is a sidetrack.

Moore had said if good is defined as pleasure, or any other natural property, "good" may be substituted for "pleasure", or that other property, anywhere where it occurs. However, "pleasure is good" is a meaningful, informative statement;
— Antinatalist
— Herg

I don't think 'pleasure is good' is informative to any being that has experienced pleasure. — Herg

I think I understand your point of view. But I also think that "pleasure is good" is a meaningful, informative statement, while it is even a truism perhaps to all beings at the same time. So It could be true or even truism for every being, but I don´t think that was Moore´s point. I think Moore´s point of view is more metaphysical or ontological, we have statements like "pleasure is good" and at the same time we would never know what is "good" for sure.

"The act of dying is one of the acts of life." (Marcus Aurelius)

I´d read this couple of minutes ago. I have been thinking similarly about twenty years. Of course this could be trivial, but I have then met many people who haven´t thought this trivial thing.

The only way one could imagine "too much" pain (suffering) is as it would prevent pleasure entirely... but, as pain and pleasure can only exist in conjunction with each other, pain (stress) can never so far outweigh pleasure (relief) as to render it impossible for the thing that experiences them.
— Marigold23


I totally disagree.
— Antinatalist


I'd like to rephrase what I said here
Anyone may say some amount of pain is "Too much pain" if by that they mean it has passed a boundary of pain which they would be comfortable with... In fact, no pain is generally comfortable so a person may say all pain is, by subjective definition, "too much pain", if they're just referring to their feelings regarding it.

Therefore, I assume by "too much pain" we must be referring to a point at which pain or discontent for an organism passes an objective limit where it fundamentally destroys the functional capacity of the organism to experience it... Death, in other words... if an organism is not destroyed by pain or discontent, then it is not "too much pain".(except by a subjective evaluation).

Pain after all is meant to be functional, and one may see how it can fail in this function and be described as "too much" or even "too little"...same with pleasure, if we are referring to some function which they carry out. That function seems most likely to be life preservation and reproduction of the organism, like most biological functions.

And of course, If pain results in death directly, then it may prevent pleasure from being experienced as well as pain... but, as an organism survives, it must be able to experience both pain and relief from pain... they go together in living things... — Marigold23

Pain could be good for to reach the higher ends or to prevent more suffering. But who needs those, if there is not life in the first place.

In biologically the purpose of life of an organism is just transfer its genes forward. That is how evolution works, but that doesn´t make it good.

I certainly argue, that people in the World War 2, suffered too much. They felt too much pain.
Like I said, I understand the view that at least some of the pain is necessary for so called higher ends and to prevent more suffering. But in general, pain is too much when comparing the pain to its option, no life at all.

I actually agreed with antinatalism for some time, so I feel a bit like I'm talking with my past self. I find antinatalism to be an intelligent conclusion in a lot of respects... I like its devotion to the adamant regret of all pain and discontent in itself.
People want pain to be relieved and pleasure to increase... but I believe they cannot want "not to be" or for pain and pleasure to be eliminated. To say "I would prefer never to have been" is the same as saying "I would prefer not to be." To believe that it would be better "never to have been" is a prerequisite to antinatalism. There is a fallacy in that statement: For one, as I said, a person can only truly desire what s/he can conceive (what has been experienced)...while a person may imagine death (as an idea of non being and non feeling like unconscious sleep), and act upon that imagining, say, to commit suicide, they cannot truly conceive of non existence, and so we must conclude they acted not with any negative association to their actual existence, but to some object or stimulation in their existence...to this extent, I must conclude that all suicide is, to some extent, unintended or accidental with regard to the relationship between the intention of the suicidal in reducing pain/discontent and the actual outcome of suicide which is pain and pleasure both being eliminated (rather than reduced) in the death of that person's ability to associate (or to think and feel)... A person cannot truly desire a state which is beyond conception. This is not to say that a suicidal person cannot understand the truth of this... in the same way that an alcoholic doesn't act logically due to the stress upon the mind in a chemical imbalance from addiction, there are all sorts of mental stimulation which hinder logical action... extreme pain and discontent are among them. There is no requirement that people must act logically, but there is a requirement that we cannot act based on inconceivable concepts... and an illogical act (like suicide) could however be a reasonable or understandable act if the discontent is more than a person can bear... but they cannot possibly associate negatively to their existence itself...we do not experience existence itself...we experience noticeable or "experience-able" things... a thing (or state) couldn't possibly experience itself because experience requires detachment from stimuli prior to any noticeable contact with it. We cannot, as we exist, be detached from existence in itself in order to experience it, and so positive or negative association with it is absurd, just as it is absurd to associate positively or negatively with non existence... — Marigold23

That is just psychological guessing. And even if you are right, what I certainly don´t believe,
if antinatalism is a fallacy, it is only that at psychologically level - and I don´t believe in even that. Suicide could be best option for someone, and saying that I´m not advocating suicide for anyone.

For another thing, a desire is expressive of a current state and past states leading up to it... to regret being itself would necessitate regret of that regret... (an association to your association). In other words, if you could truly conceive of your existence or non existence in the first place, (which you can't) and you were to associate negatively to your existence, you would also be associating negatively with that negative association. This is an absurdity, because we don't regret the fact of our regret...
try it... do you regret your regret?... if that were so, then wouldn’t you stop regretting?
And if you don’t regret your regret, then you can’t possibly regret your existence which is a prerequisite to your decision to regret. — Marigold23

I´ve always said, there is no parasites if there is no organism.
There is no paradox in your example. Of course there have to be somebody who exist, that this somebody could curse its existence. And if there is nobody who exists, there is no need for curse or suicide.

As far as the responsibility of parents for their children, I would also generally agree with you that parents are (most of time) intentionally, causally responsible, in tandem to nature itself.

Any moral responsibility though is not universal but relative and subjective, though I would also agree subjectively that there is a moral responsibility of the parents in caring for their children. — Marigold23

Ok.