I am not saying that this is not the case withl all knowledge that is not a direct empirical observation like "it is raining, here, now". Claims such as those can be verified to be true by anyone else who is present. — Janus

I think most human experience - consisting in thoughts, feelings, emotions, desires, etc. - tends to be personal and unverified by others. Unless we are the type of person that has an irresistible urge to communicate their every move, physical or mental, to the whole world .... :smile:

In any case, I for one find the idea of having my experience of life "validated", "certified", and "approved" by others, a strange proposition.

I wasn't questioning whether religious experiences are real. Of course they are real. — Janus

If we are saying that religious experiences are "real", then presumably we know that they are real. In consequence, we cannot insist that "we don't know".

Besides, I was not talking exclusively about "religious" experiences. It can be experiences without any specific "religious" content.

If I had dreams on a regular basis that predicted the future, then I would not dismiss that. — Janus

Exactly. This would be one example where an intelligent and educated person would be able to determine of their own accord that their experience is real and not imagined, without having to check with others, which was the point I was trying to make.

Another example would be lucid dreams. I think there would be no need for an intelligent and educated person to consult others in order to determine that they actually experienced that particular state of consciousness and not just imagined it, etc.

So, we don't always depend on others for knowledge. What we know does not always need to be confirmed or validated by others.

You can't get from a feeling of certainty to an absolute certainty that could not be mistaken. — Janus

The same is true of everything else, though.As per your own below statement:

No one can ever know that they have access to truth in any absolute sense. — Janus

Weren't you suggesting that a certain level of intelligence and education would enable you to "tell the difference"? If it is only that they might enable you to tell the difference, then you are back to my position; that is that you cannot be sure you can tell the difference. So, the "necessarily" seems to be necessary to your argument. — Janus

In normal circumstances, I think an intelligent and educated person is quite capable of telling the difference between real experience and imagination.

We don't normally ask others every five minutes whether what we are experiencing is real.

If we take reported instances of precognitive dreams, for example, where a person has a particular dream that corresponds to real events experienced a few days later, should that person dismiss it as "imagination"? If yes, on what criteria?

Nor is there any mention of "the One" here. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no need to explicitly mention the One everywhere. The point is to follow the logical process suggested in the dialogues. Once a principle of inquiry has been established that reduces everything to a first principle, then we must logically arrive at an irreducible One. Of course, we are under no obligation to do so. It is a matter of personal choice.

In terms of the relation between intellect and Forms, the intelligibility of sensible objects consists in their samenesses and differences, and these are explained by Forms.

Plato defines the relation between sensible objects and intelligible Forms in terms of “to echein” (having) and “to metechein” (having a share in or “participating”), i.e., “having” and “co-having” (meta + echein, “to have with”).

A further distinction can be made between that which participates (to metechon), that which is participated in (to metechomenon), and that which is unparticipated (to amethekton).

A beautiful girl, a beautiful horse, and a beautiful lyre are beautiful by reason of their co-having, having a share, or participating in the Beautiful (or Beauty) itself (Hipp. Maj. 287e-289d).

The girl, horse, and lyre are things that participate; beauty is the property or attribute they participate in; Beauty itself is the unparticipated, transcendent Form to which the property or attribute properly belongs.

The difference between “having” and “co-having” or “sharing in”, is that (1) the properties that make up the co-having particulars do not belong to the particulars but to the Forms, and (2) the co-had properties are distinct from the Forms.

Plato distinguishes between a property, e.g. Beauty, “itself” (auto to kalon), and beauty in beautiful things or in us (en hemin kalon) (Phaedo 102d). Beauty itself is perfect, eternal, transcendent and “unparticipated”. It is not for having. It cannot be co-had. What is co-had is an imperfect, transient, immanent and “participated” or “shared in” version or likeness (homoiotes) of Beauty, also referred to as “enmattered form” (enulon eidos).

This explains how Forms can be at once transcendent to and immanent in sensible objects, and suggests how Forms play a role in creation: they are the paradigms used by the Divine Intellect to shape the objects of the Cosmos. In other words, sensibles are nothing but a blend of matter and likenesses of Forms formed into things by the Divine Intellect.

The Forms’ paradigmatic status also clearly shows that they are not universals. They are ontologically prior to the creation of the things that share in their properties.

We can also see why the objects presented to our senses have no existence of their own, being mere combinations of likenesses of Forms without which they would not exist. Therefore, they are “not real” (or “less real”) when compared to the eternal, unchanging, and therefore real Forms.

The distinction between the status of Forms and sensible objects is also reflected in the way we cognize them. As indicated by their designation, sensibles are things we perceive by means of sense-perception. We see things like “girl”, “horse”, “lyre”, and we see “beauty” in them. The process of cognition begins with the data presented to the mind by the faculties of sensory perception, e.g., “girl” and “beauty”. But when we make a predicative judgment as in the statement “the girl has beauty (or is beautiful)”, then we transcend the level of sense-perception and rise to the level of intellection.

It is this ability of the human mind to rise above the particularity of sensory data to the universality of thinking that enables us to use language and build thought constructs from the most simple to the most complex. And the mind does this on the basis of Sameness, Identity, and Difference, i.e., the Forms that Plato is talking about and without which thinking and communicating would be impossible.

So, Plato’s Forms perform a dual explanatory function in respect of both (1) human cognition and (2) cosmic creation. Human intellect generates predicative thought in conjunction with principles such as sameness, identity, difference. Divine Intellect generates the sensible world in conjunction with Forms of which the said principles are “likenesses”. This means that the Forms are the ontological basis for predicative thought. However, in both cases the creative agent or efficient cause is intelligence (nous).

If we use the four-stage model described in the Analogy of the Cave, we can identify four phases of cognition:

1. Eikasia (sensory data accepted uncritically): We see a beautiful girl.
2. Pistis (belief accepted on trust): The awareness arises in our mind that the girl’s beauty is not perfect and that a more perfect beauty must exist. (As Socrates puts it, even the most beautiful girl will be “ugly” when compared to the Gods (and Goddesses) - Hipp. Maj. 289b)
3. Dianoia (knowledge based on reason): We conceive in our mind the concept of perfect beauty.
4. Noesis (intuition or insight): We have a direct experience of the Form of Beauty itself.

We can see from this that all elements of cognition from sense-perception to Form are rungs in the ladder that takes us from the lowest forms of cognition to the highest and, ultimately, to Ultimate Reality (the One) itself. The agent of this process of ascent is intelligence, in the same way Intelligence was the agent in the process of descent (or cosmic creation).

This is the position normally taken in Platonism. But, as I said, it is by no means mandatory.

Don't you see this as a contradiction? The "One" by the fact that it is one, is a particular. So to say that Plato was interested in the One, but had no interest in particulars cannot be true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Personally, I see the One as not comparable to a particular sensible object. To begin with, it is not an instance of a universal. So it is not a particular. :smile:

We are beings of this world, and can know truths only in the context of this world. — Janus

That isn't necessarily true. If another world or dimension exists, then there may be a possibility of establishing contact with it.

Otherwise, if we deny the possibility, we are like those inside the cave who insist that nothing else exists. I think Plato is saying the opposite.

In theory and in practice it could be imagination — Janus

It could be but it doesn't have to be.

I think it is hubris to think that "a certain level of intelligence and education" would necessarily enable you to tell the difference. — Janus

1. You think. You don't know.

2. You can't exclude the possibility.

3. I didn't say "necessarily".

We tell the difference between what we know and what we think we know by checking with others. — Janus

Sure. But (1) we first check with ourselves, and (2) we can't check with those inside the cave as they have no means of knowing.

No one can ever know that they have access to truth in any absolute sense. — Janus

Well, you don't know that, do you? You only think so.

Plus, the person who has been outside the cave does not necessarily know the whole truth or know it "absolutely". It is sufficient for them to know more than those inside, which they will logically do once they've seen the world outside.

It is not a matter of being omniscient. It is enough to know that you know something that you didn't know before. Of course, in theory it could be imagination, but I think most people with a certain level of intelligence and education would be able to tell the difference.

And how does Apollodorus know what he says is true? — Janus

Basic logic. Either someone has access to truth, or they don't. If they do, then they know that preaching the truth, as suggested by Tom Storm, will "set them on a collision course with others". Therefore, they will avoid communicating it except to a select few.

The 'truth' doesn't set us free - it sets us on a collision course with others. — Tom Storm

That's why the enlightened don't go around preaching to the unenlightened.

By definition, special knowledge is the prerogative of the specialists. The masses must remain unenlightened unless they make an effort to acquire special knowledge.

On their part, the enlightened must compromise and externally adapt to the world of the unenlightened.

But inwardly, that is, intellectually and spiritually, they have been set free from ignorance.

if these independent Forms are dependent on an intellect it is a divine intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. “Intellect” means the Divine Intellect. The Divine Intellect contains the Forms, the human intellect thinks or philosophizes about the Forms (until it has elevated itself to a level from where it can directly grasp or “see” them). The Forms are independent of human intellects but dependent on the Divine Intellect of which they are a part. The Creator-God who creates the Cosmos is the Divine Intellect.

Individual human souls are each endowed with an intellect (nous) of its own that contains something of the Divine Intellect within it. In addition, according to Plato’s Theory of Recollection (anamnesis), due to its pre-existence, a soul possesses latent knowledge or memory of knowledge it once had, including of Forms, and this is reactivated in the right circumstances and under the right stimuli.

Plato does not propose a coherent theory of Forms. He exposes problems with the theories which were current at his time, pointing to incoherencies and incompatibility with the scientific knowledge of his time, but does not propose a solution. This is why Aristotle claims to refute Pythagorean idealism, and what he calls "some Platonists". What is taken to be "Platonism", at that time, has already become divided, dependent on interpretation, and this is prior to the problem we have today with translation, which only increases the divide. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we look at some of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s teachings, it can immediately be seen that they make no sense.

For example, Forms are supposed to be causally inert and so cannot explain change or generation:

To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model of the Ideas (Aristot. Meta. 991a)

The obvious answer is the Creator-God or Divine Intellect (Plat. Tim. 28c, 29a).

In everything that is generated matter is present, and one part is matter and the other form. Is there then some sphere besides the particular spheres, or some house besides the bricks? Surely no individual thing would ever have been generated if Form had existed thus independently … Obviously therefore the cause which consists of the Forms (in the sense in which some speak of them, assuming that there are certain entities besides particulars), in respect at least of generation and destruction, is useless; nor, for this reason at any rate, should they be regarded as self-subsistent substances (Aristot. Meta. 1033)

However, the point Plato is making is that a Form is a paradigmatic characteristic or property.

So, it does look like Aristotle’s criticisms refer to earlier, incomplete teachings of Plato, or indeed, to positions held by different currents within the Academy. Or he may have had other reasons.

But you are quite right, we cannot “refute” any of Plato’s supposed theories without an exact knowledge of what those theories entail. A small missing detail can cause even the most credible “refutation” to fail. A large dose of caution seems advisable and not too much emphasis should be placed on Aristotle’s criticisms – unless there is some anti-Platonist agenda. :smile:

Besides, what matters at the end of the day is not whether an argument is 100% watertight but what Plato is trying to tell us. Logic for Plato is just a means to an end. Logic is a particular modification of intelligence. And Plato is not particularly interested in particulars. What counts in the Platonic project is the Absolute or the One. The Platonic philosopher must go beyond logic which is a product of the human mind and elevate himself to the plane of Universal Intelligence or Divine Intellect itself.

One might argue that the true followers of Plato (Platonists) adopted a position of skepticism, and because of this we cannot claim that they have a "view on the Forms" to refute. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is entirely possible. There is some evidence to suggest that under Arcesilaus and others the Academy took a turn in the direction of skepticism. This does not necessarily mean that Plato himself was a skeptic, though. Only that his school went through a period of skepticism.

As far as I can tell, you have still not demonstrated to me, where you derive this idea from Plato, that "the One", is the creative force of the Cosmos. He refers to a divine mind, and a creator, but I don't see that it is consistently called "the One". — Metaphysician Undercover

For obvious reasons, Plato cannot be expected to give a detailed account of the One, and he tends to refer to it indirectly, using the language of analogy and myth. His intention is not to provide his readers with an exact description of the One, but to point them in its direction. Still, I believe that he provides sufficient information for us to form a fairly clear idea of what he is talking about.

1. The One is the First Principle which is “beyond being” and “beyond essence”.
The One cannot be many (Parm. 137c).
The One is without parts, without beginning or end, unlimited, formless, etc. (Parm. 137d-e).

2. The Good is One over many Forms (Analogy of the Sun) and beyond being. Therefore it must be fully real and creative (Rep. 509b).
The Forms are good in virtue of the Form of the Good.
Plato predicates “good” and “one” of all the Forms.
Therefore the Good is the One.

3. The Good is the cause (aitia) of knowledge and therefore a form of intelligence.
The Creator-God who is called Maker and Father of the Universe (Poietes kai Pater toude tou pantos, Tim. 28c) and endows the Universe with intelligence is identical with Intellect or Nous: “All the wise agree that Nous is king for us of heaven and earth" (Phileb. 28c6-8). Nous or Intelligence arranges, orders, and rules the Cosmos (Phileb. 30c), etc.

I think that when all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have been put together, the logical conclusion is that what Plato is describing is one ultimate reality that is the cause of the Cosmos or Universe. Accordingly, a hierarchy of causes may be identified as corresponding to the various aspects or manifestations of the One:

The One is (a) efficient cause as the One, (b) paradigmatic cause as Intellect and Forms, (c) final cause as the Good, (d) formal cause as Creator-God (e) material cause as the Dyad, etc.

The One, which is infinite and formless, imposes limit upon itself by means of the Dyad of (1) Unlimited (apeiron) and (2) Limit (peras), and then through (3) the interaction of the two (“Mixed” or meikte), it produces Ideal Ratios or Proportions (Forms) that become the content of (4) Intellect (Nous). The Intellect, the fourth element, which is nothing but Creative Intelligence with Forms, brings forth the Universe (Phileb. 27b-31b).

So, Intelligence is the creative force of the universe and the three basic aspects or levels of reality are:

1. The One a.k.a. the Good.

2. The Creator-God or Creative Intelligence.

3. The Cosmos or Universe which is a living being endowed with an intelligent soul.

This is entirely consistent with the inner logic of Plato’s metaphysical system. Plato says that whenever inquiring into intelligible things (e.g., Forms), the philosopher must always rise to the first principle (arche) and apprehend everything in conjunction with that. He reduces the Forms to the transcendent first principle of the One and then deduces all things from that (Rep. 511b-d).

Plato inherited Socrates’ constant quest for the truth, but whilst Socrates’ main concern was ethics having the Good as final end, Plato focuses on metaphysics which has the One for its ultimate goal. But the Good and the One are the same one ultimate cause and creative force of the universe.

But when they are understood as active in causation, it is impossible that they are at rest. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. But I’m not saying that Forms are “at rest”. On the contrary, Forms seem to be nothing more than a particular function of intelligence (in which case they are not separable from the Intellect within which they have their existence). And, personally, I find the idea of “motionless intelligence” hard to imagine, a bit like “dead soul”, really.

At the same time, as I pointed out earlier, something that is outside the spacio-temporal realm cannot be susceptible to either rest or motion in a conventional sense. Presumably, there is some form of "activity", but it wouldn’t be what we normally understand by that term.

In any case, Forms and Intellect seem to stand in a relation of cognitive identity to one another. At the end of the day, Forms are not ultimate realities and they depend on an ultimate principle. They have no separate existence.

As regards the theory of participation, I tend not to find it quite as problematic as others do. After all, we are talking about things that humans have no direct experience of. And I can see no evidence that Plato’s views on the Forms have been conclusively refuted by anyone.

That's a very relevant passage. Notice how he says the causes which most men consider as primary (the efficient causes dealt with in science), are really secondary causes. They are secondary because they do not act with reason, like Soul does, so Soul employs these as auxiliary causes. The first causes belong to the Intelligent Nature, causing what is good, whereas accidents are attributed to the secondary type of causes — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s what I meant. There are causes that operate with Nous and others that don’t. The real issue is how to classify or prioritize them. According to Proclus and others, there are at least six different causes of which some are primary and others are contributory.

Primary Causes (aitiai):

Productive/efficient (poietikon)
Paradigmatic (paradeigmatikon)
Final (telikon)

Contributory causes (synaitia):

Formal (eidos)
Material (hyle)
Instrumental (organikon)

But what Plato is really saying is that the ultimate cause (aition) of the Cosmos or Universe is the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence, but that for a more precise human understanding several causes (aitiai) are introduced.

Obviously, the Absolute has no need of human explanation for its activities or existence. Explanation(s) is for the sake of man that he may grasp a higher truth and elevate himself to its level. Otherwise put, for lower intelligence to understand the higher intelligence that is its source and return to it. In Plato, everything starts with intelligence and ends with intelligence.

In fact, the Parmenides (127e ff.) expressly states that the purpose of introducing Forms is to solve the puzzle raised by things being both one and many, and like and unlike. The puzzle is a human one and different solutions may be deemed satisfactory or otherwise by different minds. So, it all boils down to how we choose to classify the causes and how we, humans, think they relate to one another. But this is not necessarily how things are from a higher perspective ....

To say that the Creator-God creates by means of Forms, is not to deny that the Forms are themselves active causes. In fact, the tools, in this case the Forms, must be themselves causes, or else they would have no role in the creative process. The human being creates through the means of machinery and all sorts of tools, but that does not mean that the tools are not active causes. And, if there is a multitude of tools being used, as distinct causes, this does not imply that there is more than one person using those tools. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is correct. I am only saying that the Forms cannot properly be said to create - in any case not on their own - as it is the Creative Intelligence which creates by means of Forms. Humans, do indeed, create things through tools and machinery but it is still the humans who create, not the tools or machinery.

As regards Forms, they certainly are one of the causes involved in creation. The question is their exact role in the process or their relation to the actual creator, viz., the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence.

In other words, if they cooperate in creation, which appears to be the case, in what capacity do they do so?

One way of looking at it is that Forms exist within the Intellect in which case they are inseparable from it and if they act at all, they do so in conjunction with Intellect.

Plato mentions various types of causes, among which the primary are always associated with Intelligence:

.... Now all these are among the auxiliary Causes which God employs as his ministers in perfecting, so far as possible, the Form of the Most Good; but by the most of men they are supposed to be not auxiliary but primary causes of all things—cooling and heating, solidifying and dissolving, and producing all such effects. Yet they are incapable of possessing reason and thought for any purpose. For, as we must affirm, the one and only existing thing which has the property of acquiring thought is Soul and Soul is invisible, whereas fire and water and earth and air are all visible bodies; and the lover of thought and knowledge must needs pursue first the causes which belong to the Intelligent Nature, and put second all such as are of the class of things which are moved by others, and themselves, in turn, move others because they cannot help it. And we also must act likewise. We must declare both kinds of Causes, but keep distinct those which, with the aid of thought, are artificers of things fair and good, and all those which are devoid of intelligence and produce always accidental and irregular effects ... (Tim. 46c-e).

This is the problem with the theory of participation, as addressed in the Timaeus. Forms, as prior to the material things which follow from them in creation, must be actively involved in the act of creation, as causes. Therefore we cannot accurately describe the Forms as passively being participated in, they must be described as actively creating the material things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point. However, to begin with, we need to establish what is meant by “create” or, rather, who creates.

The way I see it, it is not the Forms that create the material things. According to Plato, the Cosmos was created by the Creator-God by means of Forms. If the Forms were to create anything then there would be a multitude of creators and this is not what Plato is saying.

The creator of the Cosmos is God’s Creative Intelligence or the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos):

Midway between the Being which is indivisible and remains always the same and the Being which is transient and divisible in bodies, He blended a third form of Being compounded out of the twain, that is to say, out of the Same and the Other; and in like manner He compounded it midway between that one of them which is indivisible and that one which is divisible in bodies. And He took the three of them, and blent them all together into one form, by forcing the Other into union with the Same, in spite of its being naturally difficult to mix ... (Timaeus 35a-b ff.)

Common substitutions in Hebrew are Adonai ("My Lord") or Elohim (literally "gods" but treated as singular when meaning "God") — Wayfarer

Apparently, Adonai comes from the root “dn” from which “adon” that can mean “lord” or (especially in the plural adonim) “God”.

For example, Joseph is referred to as “adon” or “adonim” (Genesis 43:20; 44:5, 7-9, 18 -20, 22).

Joseph is called “adon”, “lord” because he is said to be ruler over all of Egypt.

The Egyptians had a God of the name Aten/Aton who was represented by the disc or orb of the sun.

Aten/Aton was raised to the status of supreme or sole God by Pharaoh Akhenaten (c. 1353–1336 BC).

Akhenaten also built a new capital city with a large temple to Aten/Aton and prohibited the cult of other gods and the use of religious statues.

Akhenaten regarded himself as the son of God Aten/Aton, therefore he was both “lord” and “God”.

The Hebrews lived in Egypt for some time before returning with Moses to Canaan.

Could there be a link between Aten/Aton and Adon?

[The name of Mose (Moshe) itself may be derived from or otherwise connected with Egyptian "mose" ("son") which occurs in the title of Egyptian kings like Thutmose.]

See also Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism

Also, I forgot to mention in my previous post that there is another school of Hindu thought called Kashmir Shaivism which is similar to Advaita in many ways, the main difference being that the phenomenal world is a direct manifestation of the divine energy of the one consciousness and not necessarily an illusion. — Paul Michael

This is not exclusive to Kashmir Shaivism. In his commentary to the Brahma Sutra, Shankara speaks of Māyā (“Illusion”) as the creative power of Brahma, i.e., the power of the Absolute in its aspect as Ishvara or Creator God. And similar statements may be found in the Upanishads and elsewhere.

Shankara also equates Māyā with Avidya or Ajnana (Ignorance). Obviously, from the perspective of Brahma, Māyā can be neither “illusion” nor “ignorance” as it is Its own creation and Brahma is perfectly aware of it. So, Brahma is comparable to an illusionist or magician who performs a feat of magic whilst knowing perfectly well what he is doing.

From the perspective of the human soul (jiva) who is a manifestation of Brahma, the world is not an illusion either, as its experience of the world is real in every sense.

The illusion or ignorance consists in the soul thinking that the world has any existence independently of Brahma, that the world is the only reality, and its lack of knowledge of its true identity as a manifestation of Brahma.

We can see some parallels here with Platonism’s belief in the physical world as a “world of shadows” created by the Cosmic Intellect, the essential identity of the human and divine intelligence, etc.

I agree. It's hard to tell what actually happened there. Quite possibly, he does have some psychological or personality issues. I'm not excluding that.

But someone in his position has no direct contact with the world, he knows what he is told by others and precisely because he wasn't a professional politician I don't think he understood how things are done outside the business world. He obviously doesn't have the refinement and social skills of someone who has been a lawyer and politician for many years.

Still, he did quite well in the polls until the epidemic started to bite and the issue of police racism flared up in combination with the general public frustration. But none of those issues were his fault.

After two World Wars, one would think they've learned fighting each other is no good. — Manuel

Correct. Total waste of time, money and other resources that could be put to better use. And other powers are taking full advantage to increase the division for their own agendas.

But, the dementia seems to show when he tried to spin the 2020 elections. — Shawn

I agree that this was a big faux pas as was his "debate".

But I'm not sure about "dementia". I think his biggest problem was that he had no knowledge or understanding of politics and he surrounded himself with advisers whose advice he half of the time chose to ignore.

And let's not forget that the pandemic was unprecedented, and no one was prepared for it. He could have done better, but he didn't handle it much worse than many other leaders around the world.

Most philosophers I'm aware of are poor. To the extent phych is a step-child of philo, it's an ugly one that figured out how to get rich instead of tending bar. — James Riley

Depending on the type, psychology tends to be science-oriented, but I think it should be borne in mind that psychology emerged out of philosophy and that philosophy has a moral and spiritual dimension to offer that may help where science can’t. I think even culture and religion can be of some use in restoring psychological balance. After all, humans are complex creatures with complex needs, so an exclusively scientific approach should be avoided.

If philosophy helps to bring some order and meaning to someone’s psychology, and I think this was part of the original objective of philosophy, then this can’t be a bad thing. IMO better than putting people on medication, in any case. But, as I said, the issues in question would need to be identified at a fairly early stage in order to have a good chance of success.

The EU itself, as it currently exists, is extremely anti-democratic, relying on fanatical market bureaucrats. Maybe Trump winning again they'd talk about doing something, and then they'd do nothing. — Manuel

Something doesn't seem quite right with the EU. It isn't for nothing that the UK got out and apparently Poland and others are beginning to have second thoughts.

It's a shame really because I think Europe needs to be united in order to survive. The question is how to get a democratic leadership when the interests of corporations and their political collaborators are put before the interests of the people ....

if you know someone who is suicidal, depressed or anxious, don't steer them toward psychology, where they might get a degree, and a license, and start blindly leading the blind. — James Riley

That's an interesting point. I think some people consciously or unconsciously steer themselves in the direction of psychology due to certain issues they have or think they have, and some may actually become successful in helping themselves and others. Unfortunately, others never make it, or try and fail.

I suppose it depends on how advanced their condition is as well as other factors - circumstances, social and cultural influences, luck, destiny, karma, or whatever. But I think in many cases placing them in a situation where they get some emotional support to begin with, tends to help them get back on their feet at least to some extent.

The OP title says "What should the EU do when Trump wins the election?" So I think it is about the EU. And the EU has close economic links with China, not only with the US.

The EU can't suddenly forget or ignore China just because America changes presidents. International relations operate within a global situation, not in some isolated EU-US rapport.

But is Xi a threat to the EU? — Wheatley

I think he is. Not (yet) militarily, but certainly economically the EU is becoming dangerously dependent on China. With economic influence, sooner or later comes political influence and interference.

Which option should the EU go for? A divided world dominated by fascist China or a united world keeping Chinese expansionism under control?

How should other countries react to the fascist douche being elected? — Benkei

1. I think that unless Biden makes some serious blunders or fails on health reasons, it is unlikely Trump will be elected.

2. Trump is less fascist than Xi.

3. So, irrespective of who the POTUS is, I think the EU and the West in general should form a united front with Russia, India, and Japan against China.

Things of a certain Form are not just similar, they are, by virtue of being of the same Form, the same. Second any two things may be the same in some way are not thereby the same kind of thing. Dogs and cats are the same in some way but dogs are not the same as cats. — Fooloso4

Of course different things are the same as others to the degree they share the same property or properties with them, and different to the extent they do not. It may also be said that a thing is the same as itself but different from others, etc. There is nothing new about it.

The Forms are said to be eternal and at rest. The category things that are eternal and at rest consists of Forms. Beauty itself is unchanging but things that are beautiful are not. The Small itself is unchanging but things that are small are not. — Fooloso4

However, Forms may be said to be "at rest" in relation to the sensible world, but being themselves outside the spatio-temporal dimension, Forms cannot ultimately be susceptible to rest or change. So, it is a mater of perspective or point of view.

This is why Plato insists that the Forms can be fully understood only in the light of the One (or the Good). We cannot selectively critique some aspects of the Forms in isolation of the Whole.

I respectfully ask you to reconsider whether, upon reflection, you want that accusation to remain in the record of this otherwise vigorous and valuable discussion. — Srap Tasmaner

Personally, I would have preferred the discussion to remain free of any accusations. Unfortunately, given some participants' persistent claim that certain statements are true when they patently are not, I think my "accusation" was not entirely unfounded. If it is not "mendacity", then what shall we call deliberately and knowingly making inaccurate statements? I am open to suggestions.

Meantime, if they retract their uncalled-for and evidently false accusations of "ignorance", I am prepared to retract mine. In fact, I think this would be the ideal solution and I have already removed the "compulsive mendacity" bit.

if "Form" refers to the defining principle of a group of things, then we must allow that the Form is independent from the group of things, as evidenced by "the empty set". Someone might propose "a kind" which has no members of the group This makes the Form itself something which needs to be understood as something independent from the group of things which serve to exemplify it. Therefore no degree of analysis of different groups of things can give us an adequate understanding of Forms themselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think one of the factors leading to the misconception of Forms as "kinds" may be the tendency of looking at them through Aristotle's categories.

In terms of how Forms are seen by Plato himself, at least as evident from the dialogues, I think "paradigm" (paradeigma) would be a much more accurate description of Form than "kind".

Essentially, Forms are paradigms of the generated world as indicated in the Timaeus and elsewhere:

Everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause; for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming. But when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model (paradeigma) of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity be beautiful; but whenever he gazes at that which has come into existence and uses a created model, the object thus executed is not beautiful (Tim. 28a-b).

Incidentally, Aristotle himself says that being a paradeigma is "especially characteristic of Ideas".

Plato's concept of participation (metoche) is particularly enlightening. Sensible objects exist by participation in a Form's property. On this subject, Proclus distinguishes between (1) that which participates, (2) that which is participated in, and (3) that which is unparticipated.

The Form's being a Form is its being a paradeigma whose property or properties are participated in by sensible objects. In other words, a Form is the eternal paradigmatic cause of the things that are eternally constituted according to nature:

I think the most likely view is, that these Ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in Ideas is assimilation to them (Parm. 132d)

As the Timaeus shows, the Form is perfect, the sensible objects fashioned after it are not so. The Form itself is the perfect paradigmatic original which is "unparticipated" and therefore transcendent. Its image, on the other hand, is an imperfect version of the perfect paradeigma or model, is "participated" and therefore immanent.

maybe physicality alone can't create self-awareness — Yun Jae Jung

I think the question of self-awareness is a very interesting one.

What is "self"? Presumably, what (individual) "consciousness" identifies with, e.g., body, emotions, thoughts, etc.

But can consciousness be aware of itself beyond that? If yes, what is the object of that awareness? How could it be described or conceived?

I think that to say that a Form is a kind, is a misunderstanding of Forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. For the previously stated reason(s) the answer to the question "what are Plato's Forms?" cannot be "Kinds".

So, Forms and Kinds are not the same thing.

I think it is important to eliminate misunderstandings, otherwise no meaningful discussion is possible.

If Forms are not Kinds, what should we call them? Any suggestions?

the eternal cannot be a "kind", as "kinds" are how we classify things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I think it is important to see the difference between how or what things are and how the human mind classifies them.

"Kinds" are a posteriori classifications, Forms exist prior to human cognition. Therefore, Forms cannot be kinds.

I would appreciate it if you did not accuse forum members you disagree with of lying. — Srap Tasmaner

As a matter of fact, it was they who accused me of being "ignorant" (and of lying) and not for the first time:

Having come to the point of demonstrating your ignorance of a fundamental element of the language, I stopped trying to make my interpretation more clear to you. — Valentinus

I didn't accuse anyone of anything. I simply asked what they would call the obviously incorrect statements they keep making. Hence the question mark.

1. There is no grammatical rule that says that to translate English "a noble lie" into inflected languages like Greek requires four words.

2. τι ἓν does not mean 'put forth a particular thing'.

3. ψευδομένους (pseudomenous) cannot be "a single lie" because it is plural.

4. ψευδομένους (pseudomenous) is not "neuter".

5. ψευδομένους (pseudomenous) does not refer to τι ἓν.

6. γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους (gennaion ti hen pseudomenous) is not a phrase and it does not translate as "a noble lie".

7. As I repeatedly pointed out, the phrase "a noble lie", Greek ἓν γενναῖον ψεῦδος (hen gennaion pseudos) is not in the Greek text of the Republic or anywhere else in the Platonic corpus.

8. As I repeatedly stated on the thread "An analysis of the shadows", the Wikipedia article has the following correct translation:

"... a contrivance for one of those falsehoods that come into being in case of need, of which we were just now talking, some noble one..."

Noble lie - Wikipedia

9. As can be clearly seen, the translation does not contain the phrase "a noble lie" and the relevant section of the text stops before "pseudomenous" (ψευδομένους). The obvious reason for this is that the participle "pseudomenous" means neither "lie" nor "lies" and does not refer to the preceding "some noble one".

As anyone with some knowledge of Ancient Greek can confirm, "a noble lie" is not in the Greek text. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that it is.

Yes, the form is a plural neuter accusitive participle. — Valentinus

I don't think so, Mr Valentinus (Fooloso4?). Ψευδομένους is masculine. Nothing whatsoever to do with what you are claiming there!

Wow. That is a spectacularly ignorant comment. That principle does not work in modern languages, even those sharing many rules of word order to give parts of speech. To apply it to an inflected language borders on the moronic. — Valentinus

Really?! How about the following inflected languages???

French: un mensonge noble

German: eine edle Lüge

Spanish: una mentira noble

Modern Greek: ενα ευγενές ψέμα (ena eugenes psema)

Ancient Greek: ἓν γενναῖον ψεῦδος (hen gennaion pseudos)

IMHO the principle seems to work very well in most if not all European languages. In fact, far too well for what you are claiming to be true.

So, dodgy translations, invented “grammatical rules”, false statements ... accident or design?

What you are looking for is in the remainder of the sentence. The grammar requires four words but the phrase you are asking for is underlined. The γενναῖόν (true to one's birth) modifies the noun ψευδομένους (a single lie). The grammar of τι ἓν says something like 'put forth a particular thing'. The thing being referred to is the lie. — Valentinus

Well, that's where the problem is.

1. How would you say "a noble lie" in Greek?

2. The English phrase "a noble lie" is only three words. It should not require 4 (four) Greek words when translated back into Greek. There is no grammatical requirement for four words to translate "a noble lie".

3. ψευδομένους (pseudomenous) cannot be "a single lie" because it is plural.

4. The four words you have underlined there are not one phrase, and they don't translate "a noble lie".

They translate εἶδος as form and as kind — Fooloso4

Of course they do. However, "form" and "kind" do not seem to be the same thing.

Normally, "form" refers to shape or the visible aspect of something. "Kind" refers to species, group or class. They are not one and the same thing.

For example, English "Form" is given for Greek "eidos" and "kind" for Greek "genos" (Republic 435b). So, Form and Kind cannot be the same.

"Form" also seems to have a particular meaning in Plato's philosophy. For example, "there is one Form (eidos) of excellence or virtue" (445c), etc. I don't think "Kind" can be substituted for "Form" here.

Besides, you started a thread on "Plato's Metaphysics" and I have heard that according to scholarly opinion Forms are central to Plato's metaphysics. So I thought maybe you wanted to share your views on the subject with us.

Once again, this is how it is defined by Liddell & Scott with bolding since you apparently missed it the first two times: — Fooloso4

I know how Liddle & Scott defines "εἶδος", thank you.

However, Liddle & Scott does not say "Forms are Kinds". That is YOUR statement:

You seem unaware that Forms are Kinds. — Fooloso4

So, since you made that statement, presumably you know in what sense "Forms are Kinds"? And if you know, then it should be not too difficult for you to explain in a few words what you mean, so that we all know what you are talking about?

Basically, the world is chaotic, pulling us in all directions. — TheMadFool

The sensible world certainly seems to be fairly chaotic and confusing. This is why Socrates says:

Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things.
But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith (Phaedo 79c-d).

I think there is an element of Heraclitus there.

Awareness of the confusing chaos of ordinary experience must have been what has led philosophers like Socrates and Plato to look to a more stable reality that can bring some order, stability, focus, and sanity to everyday life ....

Together with terms such as 'class', 'genus', 'species', 'look', 'shape', 'type', and others they give the scope of the meaning of the Greek term εἶδος. And of course the English terms have a scope of meaning as well. There is no one term that is a perfect match. — Fooloso4

We already know this. But that is beside the point.

The issue is not finding a "perfect match". The issue is your statement below:

You seem unaware that Forms are Kinds. — Fooloso4

If you think that you are aware of things others are not aware of, then you should be able to explain what you mean by your statement.

So, I think you should either:

1. a) define "Kind" and b) show that a Form is a Kind.

or

2. Retract your statement.

Otherwise you are talking meaningless gobbledegook IMO.

Plato uses the phrase in the Republic 414b-c. I gave the Greek text for it here, in Shawn's OP, An analysis of the shadows. — Valentinus

This is a preposterous claim.

The text you provided was this:

γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν; — Valentinus

As I pointed out to you, quoting a line of 17 Greek words (!), does not amount to showing the phrase "a noble lie". You might equally post the whole dialogue and say "look, it's here!" :smile:

As a matter of fact, Plato does not use the phrase. Were this not the case, you would be able to show us the three Greek words that together form the phrase "a noble lie". But you can't do that because it's not there.

This is why I suggested to you that more recent translations like Desmond Lee's offer a better reading. But it seems that you prefer to reject any translator other than Cornford - except when it suits your agenda.

Cornford has many worthy challengers. In the text under discussion, and throughout this dialogue, he at least displays the virtue of being consistent in translating Kind for γένη and Form for εἶδος. — Valentinus

"Consistently" translating Kind for γένη and Form for εἶδος is complete nonsense for the obvious fact that meaning changes according to context!

Besides, I don't see why any serious reader of Plato would insist on sticking to Cornford who really belongs to a different era (1874 – 1943). The world has moved on since Cornford, has it not? IMO, precisely because Plato is so difficult to translate into modern English, different translations should be consulted, especially more recent ones that tend to avoid the pitfalls of their predecessors.

Anyway, the indisputable fact is that the Greek passage starts with “to kata gene diaireisthai”, “the division by genera (classes, or kinds)” and is part of the general discussion of the Method of Division or diairesis.

As can be clearly seen from the previous pages (252e-253b), the topics discussed are the three arts, grammar, music, and dialectic, and how their objects, viz. sounds, letters, etc. combine or not with the others. So, it is imperative to read the passage in its proper context.

The objects of dialectic are the Genera or Kinds (gene). Hence “division according to genera” (253d).

Of course, the Division Method may be applied to Forms, and Forms (eide) are, indeed, mentioned in the dialogue.

However, (1) gene does not refer to Forms and (2) focusing exclusively on Forms misses the whole point of the dialogue.

Plato’s central intention is not the application of Division to Forms, but to the distinction between philosopher and sophist, in order to avoid misidentification. Hence the title of the dialogue. Therefore, individual passages must be read in light of the whole, not in isolation.

The Sophist begins with division or distinction between people who may be “gods” or “mere strangers”, and then proceeds to discuss sophists, statesmen, and philosophers, and the difficulty of classifying them. And classification involves identification, in this case, how can we tell a sophist from a philosopher.

A "kind" is a class of things, as Appollodorus has been pointing out, and neither "rest" nor "change" refers to a class of things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. And if he asserts that "Forms are Kinds", then he should (1) define "Kind" and (2) show that a Form is a Kind.

Otherwise, his assertion is meaningless. After all, everything is a "kind" of something! :grin:

By the way, Valentinus, you seem to be very adept at pulling up the most highly relevant and significant passages from Plato. How do you do this? What supports that skill? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think there is a long history of providing dodgy translations as we have seen on the other threads on Plato's dialogues. Let's not forget he picked the passage he wanted and the "translation" he wanted to back up his claims. No one invited him to do so. Could this be the sophist's trademark technique of evasion, diversion and misdirection?

And he still hasn't shown us where Plato uses the phrase "a noble lie" ....

The Greek includes εἶδος, the word that is used for Forms, as an essential part of the description. The description does not turn 'kind'; and 'form' into one word. But to deny the close link made between them in the passage is odd. It is like you are trying to use alternative translations of the text to be used as changes to the text. — Valentinus

Nonsense. It is the other way round.

You deliberately cherry-picked Cornford which is one of the worst possible translations.

As you can see for yourself, "eidos" can mean "form" as well as "kind", "species", or "class", depending on the context.

Noun
εἶδος • (eîdos) n (genitive εἴδους or εἴδεος); third declension

1. That which is seen: form, image, shape
2. appearance, look, beauty (comeliness)
3. sight
4. fashion, sort, kind
5. species
6. wares, goods

Eἶδος - Wiktionary

It is very obvious that he Stranger is talking about the division of things by classes or genera (gene), NOT by Forms. Dialectic is about things in general, not exclusively about Forms.

How can he talk about classes or genera and suddenly bring Forms into it?