It has not been a good couple of years for this Supreme Court.
Public confidence in the court as an impartial arbitrator of the law as opposed to just another political branch is at an all time low and not likely to recover soon.
I am beginning to think lifetime appointments are not a good idea and are giving us a court well out of touch with mainstream public opinion, the present and the likely future.
Packing the Court seems like a bad idea and one not likely to solve the problem
I have begun to think term limits (the 18 years and then revert to a lower federal court) which would allow and new justice to be appointed every two years (each session of congress) would help keep the court better in line with and more able to serve the society.
The affirmative action decision actually has majority public support but only because the history and present reality of systemic and institutional racism are something not experience or understood by the majority but lets not talk about teach or examine critical race theory (especially in Florida).

One can erase, change, modify or even eliminate the social constructs around gender roles in society.
Doing the same for the physical or biological aspects of sex or gender represents a more difficult problem.

Almost all of perceptual processing takes place at a level below "conscious awareness".
We as an organism are aware of much that we as a "conscious self" are not.
Experience and awareness (forms of mind) are ubiquitous in nature (unconscious experience).
That inner dialogue and self awareness that we focus on so hard is just a small portion of mental processing and environmental awareness.
Can there be any doubt that mind, experience and consciousness are evolutionary products?
"The jellyfish advances and withdraws" A.N Whitehead
Attraction and repulsion one of natures most fundamental features the forerunners to emotion and feeling which are the forerunners to what we call "self conscious awareness".
The neurology literature is full of examples of the disassociation of the conscious self from the awareness, experience and perception of the organism, blind sight is merely one example.

it would be really helpful if people would state what definition of "direct realism" and "indirect realism" they are using when they are posting.


Also explain how you think the science of color perception is compatible with "direct naive realism" as traditionally defined.
The physiology of perception of of perceptual disorders from brain injury stroke of even drug induced alterations pretty much supports the traditional concept of "indirect realism" as the term is defined in philosophy although many users here seem to have their own definitions which impairs meaningful discussion.

BTW the abstract from Penrose and Hameroff paper
Conscious Events as Orchestrated Space Time Selections
What is consciousness? Some philosophers have contended that 'qualia', or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being comprised of 'occasions of experience'. To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of space-time - as is described by Einstein's general theory of relativity - and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter - as described by quantum theory. This leads us to employ a new physics of objective reduction: 'OR' which appeals to a form of 'quantum gravity' to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline (Penrose, 1994; 1996). Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific 'objective' criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness. OR is taken as an instantaneous event - the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental space-time - and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead-like 'occasion' of experience. How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate an OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons (Penrose and Hameroff, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996). In this model, quantum-superposed states develop in microtubule subunit proteins ('tubulins'), remain coherent, and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy threshold (related to quantum gravity) is reached. At that stage, self-collapse, or objective reduction (OR) abruptly occurs. We equate the pre-reduction, coherent superposition ('quantum computing') phase with pre-conscious processes, and each instantaneous (and non-computable) OR, or self-collapse, with a discrete conscious event. Sequences of OR events give rise to a 'stream' of consciousness. Microtubule-associated proteins can 'tune' the quantum oscillations of the coherent superposed states; the OR is thus self-organized, or 'orchestrated' ('Orch OR'). Each Orch OR event selects (non-computably) microtubule subunit states which regulate synaptic/neural functions using classical signalling. The quantum gravity threshold for self-collapse is relevant to consciousness, according to our arguments, because macroscopic superposed quantum states each have their own space-time geometries (Penrose, 1994; 1996). These geometries are also superposed, and in some way 'separated', but when sufficiently separated, the superposition of space-time geometries becomes signifcantly unstable, and reduce to a single universe state. Quantum gravity determines the scale of the instability; we contend that the actual choice of state made by Nature is non-computable. Thus each Orch OR event is a self-selection of space-time geometry, coupled to the brain through microtubules and other biomolecules. If conscious experience is intimately connected with the very physics underlying space-time structure, then Orch OR in microtubules indeed provides us with a completely new and uniquely promising perspective on the hard problem of consciousness.

I'd best not get into that here, it's completely different from whatever it is that Roger Penrose is describing. But I do agree that his 'proto-consciousness' seems pretty close to panpsychism, and also that it might be compatible with process philosophy. — Wayfarer

ok, I will tell you a search for Penrose and monism or Penrose and panpsychism makes for some interesting and relevant reading on the topic.

There are many theories that try to explain consciousness starting from non-consciousness. E.g.: identity theory, functionalism, computationalism, and others are even stranger, like Joscha Bach's virtualism. These seem to explain consciousness without mentioning the emergence from non-conscious to conscious, sometimes giving me the impression that they can be explained without this phenomenon, be it weak or strong. — Eugen

Of course the various forms of panpsychism attempt to do percisely that. Experience does not emerge mysteriously from non experiential matter. Consciousness does not pop into existence de novo. It is a particular form of mind or experience which has evolved from more primitive mental precursor states.

"Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal
region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience
which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity of
clear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experience.
Also this character of our existence suggests that consciousness is the
crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base.
(p. 267)
Whitehead is saying that unconscious experience is the ground of consciousness;
therefore, the unconscious is a necessary presupposition"

So is anything necessary regarding direct naive realism? If we’re already given that which is necessary, with respect to an answer to a question concerning some particular dilemma, what else do we need? — Mww

As long as one understands the process of perception and its inherent limitations, I do not care if you call it direct or indirect, and the distinction seems more semantic than fundamental given that understanding.

How can you speak of causal efficacy, a mysterious connective substance for sure, when you cannot see or touch a tree?

When the dog sees the rabbit, and gives chase, there is not a great deal of consideration of self, nor of causality going on. One does not say the dog's brain sees an image of a rabbit or that the dogs legs run after it — particularly, the dog or its legs cannot be running after a perception in its brain. No, the dog is running after the rabbit, that it has seen, not in its mind or its brain, but in the field, because that's where the rabbit is. — unenlightened

Of course we can both "see" and "touch" a tree using our sense and perception. It is the type of connection between the tree and our perceptual process that is up for discussion.
Dogs, I grant, are not given to discussions or considerations of direct versus indirect realism and perhaps we are likewise wasting our time engaging in them. The blind dog does not "see" the rabbit and even the "seeing dog" sees only certain aspects of the rabbit.

The post was not a response to you. Panpsychism in its various forms is pretty directly related to Penrose and his notions of proto consciousness, it just different uses of language.

ps://bigthink.com/mind-brain/the-universe-may-be-conscious-prominent-scientists-state/#:~:text=Penrose%20doesn't%20go%20so,that%20gave%20rise%20to%20it.%E2%80%9D[/url]

https://medium.com/paul-austin-murphys-essays-on-philosophy/is-physicist-roger-penrose-a-tacit-panpsychist-5591b4a65fc5

This is very much what Karen Armstrong has in mind as a 'mythos'. It's not just myth in the pejorative sense of 'a story that isn't true', but a narrative structure which accomodates all of those elements of existence by giving them a kind of over-arching metaphorical or symbolic structure. The Greek Myths and the Christian mythos are others. Even in modern Western culture many of these themes surface through super-hero movies and the like (per Joseph Campell, 'Hero with a Thousand Faces', one of the main sources for Star Wars.)

That's where I would situate your undertaking. — Wayfarer

Myths are not literally true, but they have meaning non the less in imparting values and understanding.
The story of the good Samaritan does not have to be true or even to have happened to impart the message and value that it is meant to convey. Religion as "mythos" is not meant to be an insult quite the contrary, it is meant to convey meaning. I am just agreeing with you.

Direct realism is a necessary condition for the proper functionality of sensory apparatus as such, nonetheless, and should be taken as granted from either point of view. — Mww

A direct link of causal efficacy is necessary, but that is a different proposition than direct naive realism.

↪prothero I always appreciate your contribution, and I'm interested in improving my understanding of Whitehead and process philosophy, although you're right in saying that we come at these questions from highly divergent perspectives and it's a difficult division to navigate. I've been reading a book on philosophy of physics, Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin, which incorporates many of Whitehead's ideas. Still working through it. — Wayfarer

Whitehead is fundamentally a monist although the fundamental unit of nature is an "event" or "occasion" these events have aspects which are temporal, physical and "experiential". What is meant by "experience" here is not the standard implication of the word and whitehead uses "feeling" or "prehension" interchangeably with this conception of non conscious experience. Part of nature is always hidden from empirical measurement and external observation or reductionism.
You fundamentally implied you are not a monist?
You also implied you limit any type of mental aspect to living forms?
So the gap between us is wide but not too wide for dialogue.

↪prothero I would agree with you if it weren't for...well...Chalmers. He's got a paper on proto-consciousness and for him it is non-experiencial, it's not consciousness, but it's not matter either. Because of that, I can't be sure Penrose isn't on the same track. — Eugen

A semantic difference in the use of the term experience. Many types of systems take in information about the environment and respond to it. You can call that proto consciousness if you wish but others are calling it awareness or experience.

If you are truly interested try searching for non conscious experience, or Whitehead on “feeling” or “prehension”. Different authors use the terms differently and we all have our favorites but in order to discuss these issues we have to have some common concepts to work with.

Whitehead on Feelings – The Pinocchio Theory

(PDF) From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience

↪frank So far an AI would be none the wiser (with respect to direct / indirect perception). All these clouds floating around, trees in heads or not in heads--it gives one a headache. The AI overheats and shuts down. — BC

Well, yes, what is important is understanding the process of perception not engaging in a semantic argument about the meaning of "direct" or "indirect". Perception is a process with its limitations and bees have their own perceptual process which in some respects is superior to our own.

↪prothero So you're saying Penrose is actually referring to phenomenal consciousness but he calls it proto-consciousness just because most of people conflate consciousness with self-awareness? — Eugen

Well, yes, people use different terms to try to avoid the confusion which goes with using "consciousness". I am not sure what you mean by the term "phenomenal consciousness" just as you would not be sure what I mean by panexperientialism or prehension. The general idea is that some form of mind or experience is widespread (if not ubiquitous) in nature and that human consciousness is just one of many forms of mind or experience in nature. As I alluded to before the human brain takes in much more experience of the world than we are "conscious" of.

If we take the premise "god = existence", then the question "does god exist" is redundant as its like saying "does existence exist?"
— Benj96
:up: — 180 Proof

Well if one is to discuss whether god "exists" or not, it would be good to start with a discussion of what one means by "God". The source of much talking past each other.

Then why don't they just call it consciousness?
— Eugen

I'm not sure. Maybe they want to avoid potential accusations of anthrpomorphization. They perhaps want to avoid being accused of saying that atoms fondly remember days of their youth in stars and regret they are now stuck in some cold asteroid a zillion miles from anywhere interesting. So instead of this kind of conscious experience we as humans are familiar with, they give the experiences of atoms, whatever they might be, a different name to distance them from us. I don't know. I haven't read much by people who are specifically pan-proto-psychists. — bert1

Yes, I think that is precisely correct. They use different terms to avoid precisely that confusion and if reading the various posts about consciousness is any indication it is a confusion worth trying to avoid.
I did enjoy your example about atoms, stars and asteroids.

The phrase "external world" implies a separate "internal world" in which presumably "perception" happens, as distinct from "seeing" which happens in the external world when for example, the dog sees the rabbit. Indirect realists are happiest talking about seeing and most unhappy talking about touching, for reasons that are probably fairly obvious.

But the problem with this dual world that indirect realism seems to require is that bodies, sense-organs and' most of all, brains, are part of the external world that they have no direct contact with. — unenlightened

I think the distinction between self and other is pretty fundamental to human cognition and psychology.
Although I would agree we are embedded in and part of the larger world and that our perception of the tree is as "real" as the tree itself, it would seem a semantic distinction between the tree as it is separate from us and our perception of the tree as formed in the mind and through the senses is warranted.
Yes there is a direct path of causal efficacy from the eternal world to the perception and so in that sense it is "direct" but that slanders my understanding of the direct realism or Naive realism argument.

Solipsism is a rabbit hole and once you go down, it can be difficult to find your way out.
Solipsism is an extreme form of skepticism. A little skepticism is good but too much can be disabling.
It is kind of like an addiction, first you have to want to change.

Is this your argument? I can't see everything, so I can't see anything. If you have a picture of the world, how do you see it? Indirectly? — unenlightened

I do not think that was the argument; It was more we don't see everything not we do not see anything. Yes sense perception has a direct causal link to the external world but the senses are selective and perception is a process that occurs in the brain not in the external world. Again how are you defining direct realism vs indirect realism ?

Your conclusion doesn’t follow. Another possibility which is consistent with the premises is this: we see things in certain human ways, but it’s the things we are seeing, not representations thereof. That’s direct perception. — Jamal

If that's your definition of direct realism then the distinction between direct and indirect disappears but I do not think that definition is the one universally applied in the argument.

We have devices that can show us those. So, it's not the issue. — L'éléphant

Quite the contrary IMV, direct and indirect realism are questions about perception not about scientific instrumentation. Furthermore what makes you think scientific instrumentation reveals all?

Well there is faith in the scientific method and faith in religious propositions, but I am not sure we are really talking about the same methodology in both spheres?

I have never been able to fanthom the "direct realism" argument.
Our senses (body and mind) filter, organize and present information (data) from the external enviroment in a way that is advantageous (usually) for our survival. Do our senses give us an entirely complete picture of the external environment, it would seem quite clearly not; we don't see UV or Infrared, we do not hear frequencies above or below certain limits. So our picture of the world including the way we color it is a representation of reality, not a complete picture of all or nature.
So for me, it is the direct realism argument which is undermined by the science of perception.

I'll try and say what I feel is mistaken with Penrose's efforts in this regard. To me, he seems to be attempting to arrive at an objective account of the nature of consciousness (or mind). Whereas the way I see it, is that the mind (or consciousness or awareness) are not known to us as an object of experience (in the way that all material objects are, being spatially located and sense-able). Of course, I can infer all kinds of things about the nature of mind or consciousness through objective analysis within the scope of cognitive science, but what consciousness is, its essential nature, as the ground or basis of experience, is another matter. It seems to me that Step 1 in the investigation is acknowledging that limitation, which is a problem in principle, not simply a matter of acquiring more data. — Wayfarer

Here again, at a fundamental level I would take issue with your distinction between mind and matter. As Whitehead would say “the jellyfish advances and withdraws” likewise the electron is attracted and repulsed. There is (in my worldview)” no such thing as inert, independent matter with inherent properties. There are no quantum particles with inherent values. Instead there are quantum events occurring in space time with some measurable relationships. The reductionist and empirical approach of science gives a partial view of nature. There are much deeper and hidden connections between processes and events which are somewhat beyond our understanding (quantum entanglement is a good example).

There are always physical correlates to experience but measurement or observation of the physical correlate alone does not give you a complete picture of nature. Activity in certain areas of the human brain is associated with certain mental experiences (emotions, hunger, anger, etc.) but that observation or empirical measurement is not the totality of the “event” or experience. In my view that is true of all empirical reductionist approaches to nature although what is left out of the description in physics is much less than what is left out in biology.

When people have such profound differences in their ontologic worldview it is hard to see how they will ever come to agreement about more derivative matters. So such discussions may allow them to understand each other's point of view but not to agree. It is like two different cultures with two different worldviews colliding. The best we can do is better understand each other. Since so much of these discussions is speculation the best that can be hoped for is to be exposed to some new ideas to consider or new approaches to explore. These are not arguments to be won or minds (no pun intended) to be changed.

And this I profoundly differ with. I'm more inclined to accept the basically Aristotelian distinction between the living and non-living, and also between the sentient and non-sentient (e.g. animal and vegetative) and rational and non-rational (human and animal). These signify fundamental differences as far as I'm concerned. Trying to attribute consciousness to matter or work out how it is that matter can be or become conscious seems mistaken to me. And the idea that everything is composed of a single substance is lumpen materialism (which I don't think Penrose actually advocates.) — Wayfarer

As is usual in these types of discussions we would be starting from very different ontologic assumptions. I think the distinction between living and non living is somewhat artificial and any sharp line drawn can be shown to be arbitrary in nature. I also think the way people bandy the term “consciousness” about leads to considerable confusion since they do not agree on a definition or common usage. How can we discuss what “entities” might be “conscious” if we do not agree on a meaning for the term? If we do not know what “counsciousness” is how can we discuss proto-consciousness? Human consciousness is associated with human brains. What term should we use for the seeming mind or intelligence (experience or awareness if you prefer) of an ant colony or a bee hive? Since “consciousness” for most people means that self aware internal dialogue we as humans experience is it really the appropriate term for other types of experience and awareness of other creatures, systems and organizations?

I ascribe to a form of panpsychism which still strikes many as nonsense despite the increase in popularity and consideration of the term and idea among many philosophers of late. Of course the experience of a jellyfish is nothing like the consciousness of a human, but is it a difference in ontologic kind or just a difference in degree and form?

I am also a monist although a discussion of the nature of “matter” or “substance” would be in order since I would object to being categorized as a “lumpen materialist” since I am more of a process philosophy advocate.

I think even most human experience (the taking in of information from the environment, the filtering, organization and presentation of such data) to the human mind does not rise to the level of conscious awareness i.e. most human mental activity is not “conscious” in the sense lay people understand and use the term.

Well let us see a little of what Penrose has to say:
“But there is one thing that I do believe in relation to this problem [of consciousness], and that is that it is a scientific question that eventually should become answerable, no matter how far from being about to answer it we may be at present.” — Roger Penrose
“The question is significantly raised, of course, as to whether a paramecium — or, indeed, an individual human liver cell — might actually possess some rudimentary form of consciousness [].” Roger Penrose
“If we are to believe that neurons are the only things that control the sophisticated actions of animals, then the humble paramecium presents us with a profound problem.”
So what is the nature of that problem? Penrose continues:
“For she [a paramecium] swims about her pod with her numerous tiny hairlike legs — the cilia — darting in the direction of bacterial food which she senses using a variety of mechanisms, or retreating at the prospect of danger, ready to swim off in another direction. She can also negotiate obstructions by swimming around them. Moreover, she can apparently even learn from her past experiences [].”
Finally:
“How is all this achieved by an animal without a single neuron or synapse? Indeed, being but a single cell, and not being a neuron herself, she has no place to accommodate such accessories.”
“such (putative) non-computational processes [i.e., in the brain and which Penrose believes are vital for both consciousness and what he calls “understanding”] would also have to be inherent in the action of inanimate matter, since living human brains are ultimately composed of the same material, satisfying the same physical laws, as are the inanimate objects of the universe”.
Penrose also tells us that he doesn’t “perceive any necessity that such a device [one that instantiates or merely simulates consciousness] be biological in nature”. He goes on:
“I perceive no essential dividing line between biology and physics (or between biology, chemistry, and physics).”
Nevertheless [] the behaviour pattern of an ant is enormously complex and subtle. Need we believe that their wonderfully effective control systems are unaided by whatever principle it is that give us our own qualities of understanding?”

How does this differ from some forms of panpsychism? In particular panexperientialism?
I think the use of the term consciousness is confusing and there is no uniform usage or definition.
It does seem like awareness of the enviroment and adpatable response is fairly widespread (perhaps ubiquitous) in nature and so as not to confuse these forms of experience or mind with human like self awareness and reflection perhaps some other term like mind, experience or awareness is appropriate.

The all knowing all seeing invisible god once again escapes detection and destruction. It seems unlikely the argument will convince.

From Wikipedia
Throughout its history, Hermeticism was closely associated with the idea of a primeval, divine wisdom, revealed only to the most ancient of sages, such as Hermes Trismegistus.[10] In the Renaissance, this developed into the notion of a prisca theologia or "ancient theology", which asserted that there is a single, true theology which was given by God to some of the first humans, and traces of which may still be found in various ancient systems of thought. Thinkers like Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) supposed that this 'ancient theology' could be reconstructed by studying (what were then considered to be) the most ancient writings still in existence, such as those attributed to Hermes, but also those attributed to, e.g., Zoroaster, Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, the 'Chaldeans', or the Kaballah.[11] This soon evolved into the idea, first proposed by Agostino Steuco (1497–1548), that one and the same divine truth may be found in the religious and philosophical traditions of different periods and places, all considered as different manifestations of the same universal perennial philosophy.[12] In this perennialist context, the term 'Hermetic' tended to lose even more of its specificity, eventually becoming a mere byword for the purported divine knowledge of the ancient Egyptians, especially as related to alchemy and magic. Despite their occasional use of authentic Hermetic texts and concepts, this generic and pseudo-historical use of the term was greatly popularized by nineteenth- and twentieth-century occultists.[13]
From this initial reading, I am not interested in Hermeticism as it seems to be a form of special revelation, have supernatural aspects and predate our modern scientific worldview but perhaps you can somehow make it interesting?

Long term safety certainly has not been established. That said, I have no doubt many therapeutics are approved prior to long term safety being established. — Janus

600,000 thousand and counting dead in the U.S. from the virus or complications. How many deaths from the vaccine? What long term deleterious effects are you rationally contemplating that could make the vaccine the less good choice?

The philosophical problem is to construct a system of thought, ideas or concepts which accommodates religion, science, experience and reason. No easy task

Maybe private morality, but public behavior or morality may be a different thing?
consenting adults in the privacy of their own dwelling and all that. I am sort of a libertarian.

There was a true story about a German man who wanted to be killed and another party who agreed to do it … would you consider this behaviour moral under the golden rule principle as long as two parties agree on something even if it borders on the absurd then it is moral? — Deus

Personally I think if two adult mentally competent individuals want to engage in BDSM of any of a number of other private personnel behaviors it is none of my business.
Likewise, I think competent adults who wish to end their own life, should have the right and maybe even to enlist assistance if needed (ALS or other limiting circumstance).
I have to wonder though under what general moral philosophical principal I am operating (certainly not the golden rule or the ten commandments).

There are many themes within religious traditions and various traditions of thought, so it is extremely complex, but some thinkers do believe that knowledge of the ultimate is beyond any one particular tradition. — Jack Cummins

Well, you know, you get quotes:
"God is too big to be put in a box", "God is too big for one religion"
that is all fine.
One can state why one ascribes to a particular religious viewpoint and respond to queries, questions and challenges.
We can exchange viewpoints and try better to understand each others point of view but there is no definitive authority for religion.
Some religious conceptions are clearly at odds with reason and science and as such probably cannot be entertained or discussed on a philosophy forum.
It seems to me supernatural theism and special revelation fall into this category. Many literal interpretations of scripture (created in six days, 6000 year old earth, etc) are also beyond rational discourse.
I think much traditional Christian orthodox theology and doctrine is beyond rational discussion. Some more esoteric or mystical version or interpretations of Christianity might be accepted.
Eastern traditions especially those which emphasize divine immanence and the impersonal nature of the divine probably are more easily accommodated into a world view which includes both reason and science. What do you believe and why? or which particular religious concept do you wish to explore?

I am asking, beyond any one specific view or interpretation of religion, whether the symbolic ideas in various religions traditions have any relevance for consideration in the widest scheme of philosophy. — Jack Cummins

What is the purpose of religion as you see it?
What is the purpose of studying the philosophy of religion?
Religious philosophy is speculative philosophy and as such analytic philosophers or logical positivists will have none of it.
Whiteheads definition
Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. By this notion of ‘interpretation’ I mean that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme. Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and, in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here ‘applicable’ means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and ‘adequate’ means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation.
Thus an adequate speculative philosophy should include religion or at least values, purposes and goals.
You could also start out with a particular theme like life after death in comparative religions.

We certainly don’t know however we can speculate on Gods attributes all knowing all seeing. Creator of chaos and order … likes to roll the dice — Deus

Time and chance happens to us all.
I always question the first premise all knowing, all seeing, all powerful as giving intractable problems with free will and divine benevolence.
I like to think maybe creation is hard work and maybe the laws of nature are the method of achieving it.

There are many threads on this site which do look at varying viewpoints, ranging from the Taoist to Buddhism, but, often, these are separate from the scope of philosophical analysis. So, in this particular thread, I am probably looking for analysis of how these ideas can be compared critically, in the overall formulation of a way of seeing life and philosophy. — Jack Cummins

It is not clear to me what you wish to discuss?
Things like: What are more common or useful notions?
Immanence vs Transcendence
Supernatural Theism (miracles and interventions) vs. the Laws of Nature
Revealed Religion vs. Meditation and Rational Inquiry
Personal vs Impersonal Notions of the Divine

Certainly, familiarity with religious conceptions from around the world and history are useful to philosophers of religion. Also certainly the advances in our understanding of science and nature gives us cause to review our religious conceptions and try to avoid the cognitive dissonance that occurs from separating our notions about how the world works from our religious inclinations.

I do not have nearly as much to say about "God" as you.
I am always skeptical of too many and too detailed claims about the divine reality.
If there is a god and god creates then the universe must be part of god's creation.
So to study, observe and regard nature with a certain amount of awe and appreciation is a form of religious practice.
I see no evidence of a God who intervenes in nature by supernatural acts or who reveals him/her/itself through special revelation to selected individuals or tribes.
If there is a god it acts through nature and the processes of nature. I regard the self organizing features of nature and the progress from clouds of interstellar gas to stars and planets and simple bacteria to humans capable of regarding all of nature as evidence of some divine reality. The true purpose of the universe is hidden from me, but I like to think of it as novelty, creativity and intensity of experience. I don't think God is a petty moralist primarily concerned with human behavior.

If there is going to be a section on philosophy or religion it would seem some discussion of various religious conceptions and the role they play in human affairs should be permitted without absolute derision.

Humans are meaning seeking creatures, religion has been with man as long as recorded history.
Religion stills plays a large role in the lives of many people and is a major influence in their lives.
It is true that the more educated a person is in the scientific method and the findings of science perhaps the less likely they are to believe in traditional or supernatural theism.

Many people have turned away from traditional Western religious thought and towards Eastern religions and mystical practices. The religious inclination is still strong worldwide.

I don't see any problem with religious notions like panentheism or even outright pantheism. Regarding the universe with a certain amount of awe and consideration of it in holy, numinous or scared terms seems within the realm of rational behavior. It is even for those not entirely conceptually committed to an entirely mechanistic, deterministic and reductionist view of nature to see some self organizing inherent capability resulting in creatures capable of such considerations.

We don't all have to ascribe to Christopher Hitchens views:
As Hitchens put it so eloquently, if also partially, during his debate with Blair:
“I come before you as a materialist. If we give up religion, we discover
what actually we know already, whether we're religious or not, which is
that we are somewhat imperfectly evolved primates, on a very small planet
in a very unimportant suburb of a solar system that is itself a negligible
part of a very rapidly expanding and blowing apart cosmic phenomenon.”
Hitchens here emphasizes the absurdity of our purely empirico-physical understanding
of the larger cosmos. Based only on sensory observation of primary qualities like mass
and motion, and mathematical analysis of them in terms of measurable quantities, the
universe reveals no apparent purpose. It is only the poetic indulgence of the human
imagination that fools us into believing otherwise.

Some of us can ascribe to the views of Whitehead and other religious philosophers
Philosophy attains its chief importance,” according to Whitehead, “by fusing the two, namely, religion and science, into one rational scheme of thought” (p. 15). The revelations of modern science concerning the regularities of nature have made belief in miracles seem antiquated and superstitious, but the religious impulse itself seems to run deeper than the need for magic tricks offering proof of the divine.1 As Hitchens admits, humanity’s sense of the numinous and transcendent—of “something beyond the material, or not quite consistent with it”—is what distinguishes us from other primates. We are not only the wise, but also the uncanny species. To be human is to participate in both time and eternity, to be embedded in history with an intuition of infinity, our birthright an experience of what Thomas Berry called incendence.
The vast majority of human beings feel compelled to respond to this feeling of incendence religiously, either as evidence of a personal deity (as in the Abrahamic and some Vedic traditions) or as evidence of an impersonal creative plenum or ground of being (as in Buddhism, Taoism, and many indigenous traditions). Whitehead's dual conception of the ultimate in terms of God and Creativity, respectively, helps us understand these cultural differences.

Not all religious conceptions lead to bad behavior or to rejection of the utility of science in understanding our world.