We no more have a choice about whether to hold people accountable than we do for any other decision. — T Clark

Not sure how there is anything else to be said by a non-determined agent about a determined agent. Arguments feel much like they presuppose an agent to argue with that has some ability to agree or disagree on the basis of something other than the causal chain. If we have a choice in the matter, there is free will, and we can be “accountable”, if not, it seems we are determined to hold people accountable anyway.

I do find it disturbing something as simple as eating a ham sandwich can be politicalized in such extreme way. — TheQuestion

Food has been politicized for an awfully long time - be it in the context of class or nation (religion, if you must).

One day two cannibals are eating a clown. After a little while, the first cannibal turns to the second and says, "Hey, does this guy taste funny to you?"

What passes for acceptable food choices around the world is not nearly as uniform as a secular-Christian nation might suggest.

discuss a novel philosophical argument — Banno

There is nothing even remotely novel about Lewis's argument. At twelve I was perfectly able to articulate the argument and tell Christians that they believed in a bully and that they were demented for doing so. The argument is obvious on its face and is regularly discussed as a failing of Christianity.

Your god is a tyrant and yet you exalt it - what is wrong with you?

I don't see anything in the presentation of the problem that excludes Christians from joining in the dissection of it. — Isaac

This is the part that is confusing. Lewis makes it explicit that he will not tolerate any form of Christianity other than that which he sets out because he doesn't think it is real Christianity or he thinks that Christianity can't survive without his requirements. I've quoted the sections from his article.

His argument form is simple -
god is reprehensible as defined,
people that admire god share in that reprehensibility,
Christians cannot be determined to admire god until they are pointed to the "neglected argument",
once he has pointed them to it, then he can evaluate them,
if they remain Christian, then he knows they are not admiration worthy.

We can formalize the argument or refine it however you like, but what you can't do is change that Lewis has made explicit his own requirements for Christianity - if someone does not admire the reprehensible god, they are not Christian.

There was an exchange on this earlier. Someone who admires the tyrant shares in the injustice. Someone who feigns admiration is not admirable. — Banno

There was no exchange on this and nothing but a equivocation in the article. How does worship equate to admire?

Your point? — Banno

That if we are trying to critique an individual, we need to understand that individual rather than your preconceived notion of what that person believes. Rather than dwell on your refusal to do so (even after it was pointed out by multiple people), I’ve tried to directly address the Lewis article. What little discussion was had in the post (such as pointing out that worship is a fear response) was not met with your clarification of what “admire” means so-far-as I recall. I’m happy to be corrected, but it seems more straightforward to just address the question in response to this post.

The doctrine being critiqued is their own, in their own words. — Banno

What doctrine? What is being critiqued is those who admirer a tyrant. What is not explained is whether someone that worships the tyrant admires it and/or approves of the tyrant’s conduct. The article is not about what the tyrant does - it is taken for granted that it is a tyrant. The article is also not about convincing people not to admire the tyrant. The article is about judging a person on their relation to the tyrant and whether we can admire that person. Your question was about whether such a person should be denied a seat at the table discussing ethics. Show me where I misunderstand, please.

The exploitation of animals is an essential human trait that extends back into era of Homo erectus and earlier. — Bitter Crank

So because we were horrible before we should go on being horrible forever? Expanding our scope of moral regard is generally thought to be a sign of progress, not of justifying the status quo. Sure, once upon a time our survival was enhanced by the things we did. Were they necessary? Who knows. History would have gone differently had they done otherwise, but counterfactuals aren't very useful. What we can say is that we did what we did.

Without a doubt, people that have limited diets for ethical reasons make communal eating events harder, but then so did serving people who refused to eat sugar. Ending exploitation by way of consumption choices is not the invention of vegans. You can, however, just not invite the vegans or fail to accommodate them. It isn't like vegans don't expect to get the short end of the food stick.

No. I'm puzzling as to why some nonchristians feel a strong need to be so defensive of christianity. — Banno

I've no idea if I'm included in this grouping or not (and I hardly think I have defended Christianity), but some of us happen to know Christian theologians and clergy that have done lots of good things and otherwise advocated for the down-trodden that you would exclude from the table of ethical discussion merely because you willfully misunderstand their faith and can't be bothered to consider them on their own merits/beliefs. That you can't see how your OP and follow up comments made it clear that your thread is an attempt to render Christians reprehensible, unworthy of admiration without sullying ourselves, and not worthy of our acquaintance is what I puzzle over. Your unwillingness to actually engage with the article you posted makes the entire thread smack of being disingenuous and simply a hit piece on a group of people that you have made incapable of defending themselves.

The problem is this: One doesn't achieve virtue by following a particular menu. An affluent vegan's footprint will be larger than a poor carnivore's. Pillsbury's frosting may be vegan but it is still industrial in every sense of the word. — Bitter Crank

Veganism is not a diet, but a lifestyle informed by a relatively simple ethic: “[t]he principle of the emancipation of animals from exploitation by man." Although the discussion frequently gets caught up in suffering, pain, rights theory, etc., that isn't what veganism is about. Discussions of specieism is closer to the mark. To the extent that people think of veganism as being about food primarily, it is because eating is the most frequent forum in which people encounter animal exploitation. Vegans are not anti-industry. They are not anti-science. They are not concerned with "vitalism" or any particular take on nutrition and what is "most" healthy for humans.

Don't exploit animals - all the rest is commentary.

I agree, but does "mainstream" vegan doctrine? — Cheshire

What "mainstream" veganism is I couldn't tell you, but you might be interested to know that vegans are keenly aware of the symbolic nature of their veganism and how there are far more impactful ways to reduce animal suffering. Further, vegans are also aware that the increased public food choice that they enjoy comes not from the demand of vegans, but from the push to reduce meat/animal product consumption for health/environmental reasons. Stupidity/ignorance is not a problem of vegans.

Where there is tension around reduced animal suffering for non "vegan" reasons is the extent to which vegans should advocate for or economically support non-vegan solutions/enterprises. Encouraging meat reduction on "meatless Mondays" or going to Burger King to buy an Impossible Whopper are debated, but my suspicion is that a significant percentage (if not majority) of self-identified vegans are glad to have more choice and less animal suffering. Any reduction in animal suffering is better than non and veganism is not about self-denial or "purity."

From inception, veganism has recognized that eliminating animal suffering is aspirational and not possible to do completely. Veganism is, therefore, inherently pragmatic and non-absolutist. The same way that most people suck at knowing things about the doctrine of their groups, most vegans suck at it. Having an encounter with a misinformed evangelizing vegan is no different than having an encounter with a misinformed evangelizing Western secular liberal (especially those that hold the US up as being the best form of government ever).

Then there is self-righteousness--the vegan frosting on the cake (which is gluten free, fat free, egg free, and sugar-free). — Bitter Crank

Typical BC crankiness. Veganism has NOTHING to do with flavor profiles or ingredient choice outside of not deliberately contributing to animal suffering by the methods/products used in making the food item.

See this, for instance (though I won't claim that any of these are the best frosting you'll ever eat, just that LOTS of people eat them happily).

Vegan Frosting Brands

Pillsbury – All 13 Flavors of Creamy Supreme Pillsbury Frosting, the Pastry Bag Pillsbury Frosting, and the Funfetti Pillsbury frostings are vegan– even the cream cheese, buttercream, and milk chocolate flavors! This is a little weird to be but all of the Pillsbury frostings use sugar, palm oil, and corn syrup as the base with various additives to still be vegan. Granted, some vegans option to avoid palm oil as it may not be sustainably sourced and may be reducing the rain forests but in terms of straight vegan and if you’re wondering if Pillsbury frostings are vegan, they are indeed vegan and do not contain any animal product. ...
— Random Website

It is obvious to the point of tedium that christians will not be dissuaded from their belief by the arguments here. They are not the audience, either for Lewis' article or for this thread. That Srap supposes otherwise is just plain odd. It seems to be little more than a veiled ad hom directed at Lewis and myself. — Banno

Non-believers have been able to excuse their religious friends on the grounds that they are probably not clear-heading about the commitments of their worship. We can think of them as good people who have not see the perpetrator's dark side. In bringing the problem of divine evil to their attention, I am presenting them with a choice they have preciously avoided. Ironically, I may be making it impossible for myself to admire many whom I have previously liked and respected. — Lewis at 242

The argument is decidedly not aimed at Christians - rather it is aimed at the "we" in Lewis's net. His entire article is largely about what you asked initially, Banno, as to how we should respond to "them."

This is why I have tried to focus the conversation about what you understand them to be and whether your understanding is sufficient to result in actual behavior towards them or beliefs about them. Lewis says that he wants to bring the problem of divine evil to their attention precisely to force them to commit to some belief that he can then make sense of and act on. He is talking about individuals, not groups. Those that he knows have committed to the reprehensible belief, not those that can claim some excuse as to why their "faith" is not as ignoble as he supposes it to be.

So rather than seeing any discussion about individuals as special pleading, I think you should see it as essential to Lewis's argument in the first place. Once we have established that someone meets Lewis's criteria, then we have to cease our admiration of them to break the chain of contagion. He is trying to illuminate that which before was hidden about individuals - he isn't simply casting aspersions at the entirety. Can we still admire a self-described Christian who is made aware of the neglected argument without passing on the taint of the asshole god to us? Why Lewis engages in the no-true-Scotsman stuff is a bit beyond me - perhaps he has a bit too much personal investment in what a Christian IS that is not otherwise fleshed out in his (posthumous) short article.

Your suggestion that we simply question any Christian's moral judgment without individual evaluation strikes me as contrary to the article you asked to discuss.

I want to talk about the ethics of those who would worship a torturer. You pretend there are not very many folk who worship tortures. Your point is irrelevant. — Banno

It always strikes me as odd what you think I am pretending. I think virtually everyone that worships worships a torturer. But then we have to come to terms about what worship is. Which is what I asked you and you said you will get to when you have time. While you are there, you might get to thinking about reverence and veneration. While there take a pause and consider how admiration contrasts with those things and whether Lewis is playing a bit fast and lose with language when he shifts from "worshiper of the bad god" to "admirer of the bad god" or "admirer of the worshiper".

Getting to the point, worship does not suggest approval, but a display of subservience to something higher on the power chain. Sure, that display can be ritualized, but it doesn't change what it is - that which you do try to avoid suffering. Yes, it would be nice if people worshiped god because god was the A numero uno head honcho, but that isn't how it is. Worship is typically justified as a debt (for being created or permitted something desirable) or acknowledgement of power. If you like, find some examples of people (or Christians as a group/whole) saying why they think god (as Jesus or otherwise) is to be worshiped.

So I concede that worshiping the god that would damn people to hell for eternity would be worshiping a torturer. I am asking whether such worship indicates approval of the torture specifically or the god generally. The difference between god as Jesus (or at least the specific god that is to have acted in history and be in charge of our souls) and god as the omni-god is immense. Trying to reconcile the two may be where you are running into problems.

You protest too much, Methinks. — Banno

I agree entirely too little.

My interest here is as to the extent to which Christians (and Muslims) ought be allowed at the table when ethical issues are discussed. Given their avowed admiration for evil, ought we trust their ethical judgement? — Banno

You said what you wanted to talk about. I tried to talk about it. You claim that I am talking about something else. Before we exclude someone (especially the sorts of someones that might have otherwise had a place at the table for the discussion of ethical issues) based upon their belief in something, I'd like to at least know what belief it is that they have. Why don't you want to know?

You need to re-read Lewis's article. His critique applies to those Christians (on his definition) that agree with "God" in eternally damning people. That is why I wasted the time to quote his argument. First you have to find someone that matches his criteria and then argue with that sort of a person. Despite Lewis's assumption that such people constitute the majority of Orthodox thinkers, you might find that after some exploration there are markedly fewer than he supposes. Not because I don't think the majority of Christian's hold some view of eternal damnation, but because I don't think that the majority of Christians worship god for that reason or agree that if they were god, they would make the same choice.

Accepting that a person will be executed for speaking ill of the king, telling your child, "If you speak ill of the king, you will be executed", saying to your child after they have spoken ill of the king that they will be executed if they get caught, crying after your child has been caught, and staying passively by the execution knowing that if you question the authority your head will be on the block next does not strike me as the sort of mental/behavioral disposition that would make me question the parent's judgment or moral sensibility.

All I ask you to do is take his argument seriously and discuss it. If you want to just say that there are bad Christians, we agree. But you don't need Lewis or his argument to make that point.

And I agree in advance (as I have said to many a person), reward and punishment theology is perverse and people that advocate for some sort of "divine desert" are demented. The "baddest bad ass around god" is not a god that is compelling from an aesthetic perspective, but it may be compelling enough from a perspective of getting what you want.

So either the question asked is, "Can we trust the judgment of a Christian with regards to ethics given that the Christian is a Christian?" or it is something else. If we are analyzing what it is to be a Christian for this purpose, it is absolutely on point to say that AS A CATEGORY you cannot lump all Christians together, but must dig further into both the TYPE of Christian that they are and what they PERSONALLY believe. This isn't that tough of a point to understand.

I have all sorts of reason to critique Christianity on theological grounds and reject it - but the willful failure to engage with various types of Christianity is not one of them. Intellectual charity to the other's position leads to a better understanding of why they are wrong - in whole or part.

And just to remind you:

. . . The interesting variation here is that the argument asks us not to consider the morality of such an evil god, but of those who consider him worthy of praise or worship. — Banno

I am considering those who consider him worthy of praise or worship, not simply defining a strawman class. I am merely asking you to do the same.

. . .does not excuse the likes of Israel Folau. — Banno

Sure. Though I imagine that folks on a philosophy forum can be more nuanced in their critiques of theology to other folks on a philosophy forum without excusing him or those like him. Rhetoric is employed by the weak and the powerful using the metaphors, narratives, etc. that they believe will achieve their ends (be they convincing people to turn from their ways, scoring points with your in group, or being an asshole). There is a saying in another context - bad facts make for bad laws. If we simply reject anything associated with bad people, we may end up losing much of what good people enjoy.

So what is one to make of the moral character of folk who hold someone who tortures folk unjustly in the highest esteem? — Banno

The difficulty with this thread is that it veered sharply into what Christianity is, or is not, about rather than sitting with your question. I am not sure, however, that you (or Lewis) is actually interested in the answer, but the thrust of what is taken for granted. Maybe Lewis is the better source:

. . . From now on, let us suppose, for simplicity's sake, that these Christians accept a God who perpetrates divine evil, one who inflicts in finite torment on those who do not accept him. Appearances notwithstanding, are those who worship the perpetrator of divine evil themselves evil? . . .

They think that, if [someone satisfies god's damnation criteria] happens, the perpetrator will be right to start the eternal torture. They endorse the divine evil. And that's bad enough. . . .

In admiring [some otherwise admirable Christian], we too admire evil. . . .

If admiration transmits evil, then so do chains of admirers of arbitrary length.. ..

Chains of contagion can be broken because admirers are often not fully informed about the attitudes of those they admire, because admiration can be a selective matter, a response to a particular qualities. This is probably how things work in actuality. We are not all tainted with evil . . .

I suspect that the vast majority [of Christians] are more orthodox. They genuinely think that their God will commit those who do not accept him to eternal torment. . . Of course , they do not see this as divine evil. Instead they talk of divine justice and the fitting damnation of sinners. . . .

But can we [otherwise] admirer them, despite their preparedness to worship the perpetrator?

The balance seems to tilt in the negative direction.For, as the original neglected argument makes clear, the evil that God causes is infinitely greater than the entire sum of mundane suffering and sin. . ..
— Lewis at 238

The deck is stacked and the conclusion certain: Orthodox Christians are evil.

But is anything that Lewis went on about even close to right? We can start with two simple questions:

1) What is it to worship God?
2) What does it mean about a person that they can correctly identify cause and effect? e.g. "If you don't believe in God you'll go to hell because God sets the rules."


It is worth noting that Lewis does a good job of getting wrong the "distinctive ideas of Christianity." Although he hand waves in the direction of Universalism and then stumbles all over himself to lay out why reward and punishment theology is the way things are ("I find the option of limited punishment mysterious."), Christianity may not be what he supposed,

Is universalism really a Christian option? Can Christians afford to deny divine evil? Christianity, properly-so-called, requires a redemption. At its heart is the claim that Jesus was born to save us from something. The condition from which we have been redeemed must be truly horrible. What can be horrible enough except for eternal torment? — Lewis at 236 to 241

Lewis was no Scotsman.

Just because...

As we move into the middle of the 2nd Century, a shift takes place from writing works considered “Holy Scripture” to interpretations of it. The first writer on the theology on Christian Universalism whose works survive is St. Clement of Alexandria (150 – 215 CE). He was the head of the theology school at Alexandria which, until it closed at the end of the 4th Century, was a bastion of Universalist thought. His pupil, Origen (185 – 254 CE), wrote the first complete presentation of Christianity as a system, and Universalism was at its core. Origen was the first to produce a parallel Old Testament that included Hebrew, a Greek transliteration of the Hebrew, the Septuagint, and three other Greek translations. He was also the first to recognize that some parts of the Bible should be taken literally and others metaphorically. He wrote a defense of Christianity in response to a pagan writer’s denigration of it.

Prior to the Roman Catholic Church’s condemnation of all of Universalist thought in the 6th Century, Church authority had already reached back in time to pick out several of Origen’s ideas they deemed unacceptable. Some that found disfavor were his insistence that the Devil would be saved at the end of time, the pre-existence of human souls, the reincarnation of the wicked, and his claim that the purification of souls could go on for many eons. Finally, he was condemned by the Church because his concept of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit did not agree with the “official” Doctrine of the Trinity formulated a century after his death! After the 6th Century, much of his work was destroyed; fortunately, some of it survived. . . .

According to Edward Beecher, a Congregationalist theologian, there were six theology schools in Christendom during its early years — four were Universalist (Alexandria, Cesarea, Antioch, and Edessa). One advocated annihilation (Ephesus) and one advocated Eternal Hell (the Latin Church of North Africa). Most of the Universalists throughout Christendom followed the teachings of Origen. Later, Theodora of Mopsuestia had a different theological basis for Universal Salvation, and his view continued in the break-away Church of the East (Nestorian) where his Universalist ideas still exist in its liturgy today.
— Christian Universalist Association

So maybe Lewis really has a problem with Catholics (and those heavily influenced by its historic theology). Just a thought.

You seem to be forgetting that you vote for candidates which have stances on multiple issues, not just one. So by focusing on one you may end up voting against your position on other issues. — Harry Hindu

Voting is a binary choice - either you vote for someone or you don't. The candidate has no idea why you voted for them on the basis of the fact that their vote tally anonymously went up by one. Voting communicates nothing, but the vote tally decides who is elected.

The context of the vote, however, leads to many interpretations. Where you say to a candidate - "I am voting for you because..." the candidate has some semblance of why you are voting for them (or allege to be). The current US Congressional District is in excess of 700,000 people. If each person had to independently express why they will or will not vote for someone, it would take a candidate 493 days listening to constituents for one minute apiece to hear why the person is voting for them. However, if 70,000 people organize in support of an individual based upon one (or more issues), they could far more efficiently convey their ideas to a candidate even if the group's representative took 5 hours to speak to the candidate.

Modern national elections are on a massive scale where information is overwhelming for candidate and voter alike. Delegation of function - knowing the issues, soliciting votes for the person that supports your issues, getting funding to make that possible, understanding the credible opposition, etc. is essential to effectively elect individuals that represent their constituency of more than a few thousand.

That you don't like the current parties and believe your only chance of competing with them is to abolish them doesn't solve the political problems that parties organically solve (and solved). I asked you what a single issue looks like for purposes of "single issue parties" and you, someone interested in political philosophy, spent more time emoting about an example issue rather than confronting the political philosophy question posed. Expecting candidates (or officials) to focus on the important stuff of their own volition without constant reminders of what they should be focusing on is wishful thinking at best.

Political parties are not about who anyone votes for - it is about mutual advocacy and bringing the power of government to bear in the desired ways. Yes, getting your candidate elected (and re-elected) is often necessary to achieve the party's ends, but confusing the sole act that occurs a few times (at best) per year for a variety of offices as the entirety of what a party does is missing the forest for a tree.

In that context (and you are welcome to suggest that I misunderstand the role of political parties in a large representative democracy/republic), explain to me how individuals organize in a way to advocate for candidates and issues that is permissible on your view but is substantively different than a political party.

transmogrified by the state into a contract. — James Riley

Contracts are ONLY creations of the state as they are understood to be enforceable agreements between the parties. Did you have something else in mind?

An agreement between private parties creating mutual obligations enforceable by law. . . . — LII on contracts

P.S. You forgot detrimental reliance in your hornbook recitation. — James Riley

I return to this quote for a moment because it suggests something that I didn't get to flesh out. When you go into a contracts class (and get a contracts book), it is generally organized as setting forth what a contract "is" (mutually bargained for consideration), the ways in which it is established (offer, acceptance, revocation, completion, etc.), the defenses to its enforcement (mistake, unconscionability, etc.), remedies to breach (specific performance, monetary damages, injunction, etc.), and then all of the exceptions and new causes of action sounding in contract that don't actually meet the strict definition of contracts or use legal presumptions/fictions to satisfy contract requirements. Unilateral contracts, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, charitable promises, etc. The point here is that if you just opened a hornbook, you'd see examples of enforceable contracts that did not involve mutually bargained for consideration. The "law" of contracts has to exist in a context of a broader sense of social justice (call it "equity" if you want) and its language can (and has) been used to create enforceable rights that would have been unheard of 200 years ago.

I thought that was covered by our discussion of gift (and detrimental reliance), which I intended to cover all the other nuance. If I offer to give you something for nothing, and you accept, then you will need to have detrimentally relied upon my promise in order to recover. — James Riley

No you wont, and that was the point of mentioning charitable pledges which are increasingly found to be enforceable in the absence of consideration.

Here is a random quote for you:

... The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which many courts look to for guidance, goes a step beyond the relaxation of traditional contract requirements and provides that charitable pledges are binding without consideration or detrimental reliance.v This view has been adopted in at least two states on public policy grounds: "The real basis for enforcing a charitable subscription is one of public policy—that enforcement of a charitable subscription is a desirable social goal."vi ....
— Random Article

I think I could be fine with single-issue political parties. — Harry Hindu

What is an issue? Can I have a party that says "People should have unfettered access to abortion" and "People should have unfettered access to abortion and the government should pay for it" as a single issue party? What about a party that says "People should have unfettered access to abortion" and "People should have access to any reproductive technology/treatment of their choice"? And then if I couple that with broader benefits for low income families?

I just don't see how an artificial limit on what I can advocate for with like minded individuals strikes anyone as progressive. Progressivism, at least to me, seems most effective when people are organized. Limiting political organizations (and thereby prohibiting the pooling of money for common expression) of necessity favors wealthy individuals. Unless of course you think that in addition to eliminating parties you want to otherwise limit people's political speech/behaviors.

Yes, it was understood that some people think the burden is upon the victim and some don't. — James Riley

I got that (and saw your amusing quip about Dutch Colonialism), but it seems at least a little bit instructive to consider the actual history of an idea that supports "losers weepers" with respect to the rights of a person in a good acquired from a person that had no rights to transfer the good. But if we are just going to hand wave and dismiss such trends because they don't sit right with our intuitions, I suppose there is nothing more to be said. I question, however, whether strict adherence to caveat emptor in a worldwide market would be a net social good. What would your due diligence look like for buying lettuce at the supermarket? Is it that you suspect that triviality of the claim would preclude litigation against the buyer (and so is unworthy of legal consideration) or that you really want to examine the manifests for the lettuce shipment?

In any event, your challenge to Benkei about enforceable contracts with one sided consideration from the offerer, offer, and acceptance from the receiver hasn't been fully explored. Assuming for a moment that you don't think either quantum meruit or promissory estoppel qualify (consideration, even if trivial, is made by/expected from both parties to the claim), how about the enforceability of charitable pledges?

Truly progressive ideas don't usually have a precedence in history. That's why their progressive. — Harry Hindu

What is truly progressive about it? That you think political parties are somehow inherently anathema to the common person such that abolishing political parties is necessary?

So far as I can tell, political parties arise as a socializing of interests amongst people. Sure, old political parties have the features of the people already invested in them, but new political parties can be single issue, multi-issue, any issue you want. How is making a law that says me and 5,000 sympathists can't work together to establish broad social policy, governmental systems, property rights, etc. good for the common man?

P.S. You forgot detrimental reliance in your hornbook recitation. — James Riley

You already mentioned deterimental reliance, i.e. promissory estoppel, so there was no need to mention it, let alone argue about it. Although both promissory estoppel and quantum meruit have similar origin stories (consideration replacements), only quantum meruit involves enforcing a claim against someone who did not participate in or solicit the behavior of the plaintiff.

In any event, how about "Market Overt" for a more on point reference for purposes of the OP.

In general, the sale of stolen goods does not convey effective title (see Nemo dat quod non habet). However, under 'marché ouvert', if goods were openly sold in designated markets between sunrise and sunset, provenance could not be questioned and effective title of ownership was obtained.[3][4][5] The law originated centuries ago when people did not travel much; if the victim of a theft did not bother to look in his local market on market day—the only place where the goods were likely to be—he was not being suitably diligent.
— Wiki on Market Overt

But I'll await you example of a contract without consideration. I'll be particularly interested to see what a court would enforce in this hypothetical, valid, enforceable contract. — James Riley

Quasi-contracts, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit. Is that a sufficient topical reference or do we really need to go down the path of the history of inadequacies of mutually bargained for consideration as the only method by which one party can be obligated to pay the other in the absence of a tort?

And here is random cite in case you need a nudge.

Quasi contract (or quasi-contract)
Primary tabs
Definition

An obligation imposed by law to prevent unjust enrichment. Also called a contract implied in law or a constructive contract, a quasi contract may be presumed by a court in the absence of a true contract, but not where a contract—either express or implied in fact—covering the same subject matter already exists.

Because a quasi contract is not a true contract, mutual assent is not necessary, and a court may impose an obligation without regard to the intent of the parties. When a party sues for damages under a quasi-contract, the remedy is typically restitution or recovery under a theory of quantum meruit. Liability is determined on a case-by-case basis. — LII of Cornell

So let's suppose there is a God. Questions naturally arise about what kind of a God he or she is. — Gregory

I get it, but think you run off the rails rather quickly. You assume god and then question what you assumed. The attributes of your assumption are up to you.

The study of god is not unlike any other inquiry - it is steeped entirely in language, which is a wholly human construct (or at least is the construct of whatever inter subjective group you think is making the inquiry). When you ask about god, what you are really asking about is yourself. Being able to see god talk as fundamentally about our abstractions rather than something “out there” is a useful way to reconcile that we regularly talk about the ineffable.

The problem is that the media has become mouth-pieces for the political parties and people only get their information from one source - the source that reaffirms their own cognitive biases. Abolish political parties and you abolish the team mentality (group-think).

. . .

No, the typical voter is a one-issue voter and only registers as a member of the party that is on their side of their one issue, even if the other party sides on other issues the voter might take on the other issues. The typical voter isn't really interested in the other issues and allow the party they've adopted to tell them what positions to take on these other issues. These are the ones that simply regurgitate what their party is saying. — Harry Hindu

Just sounds cynical and angry mixed with a bit of misplaced optimism about how politics is some sort of vestige of power structures of yore. Political coalitions are a function of human relationships.

I actually know party members and power brokers - the sorts of people that engage in perpetuating their own power and institutional power. Even if you said that all parties ceased to exist tomorrow, they would still have the same alliances, loyalties, and social debt and assets that they had before you made your proclamation on high.

Do you mind providing some examples of societies where there are no political loyalties or other sorts of social capital used to organize 10,000 people dependent on cooperative trade/coexistence?

Is 2,574 greater than 241? — ToothyMaw

Is 1,000 greater than 800? Or 2,500 greater than 1,800? It is nice that we know how to use comparative operators, but that is exactly not the point. We could reduce the number to 0 murders (for all races) if everyone is isolated in a cell. The question is, in which world do you want to live? One in which the murder rate in a community slowly declines because of increasing social buy-in or one in which it instantly goes to 0 because everyone is in a cell?

Focusing on a metric like the murder rate is swell, but has little to do with combating systemic racism except where the system is murdering people, e.g. police killings. I don't not understand how math works, I simply disagree that your numbers are particular useful when figuring out how and when to address systemic problems. I am taking a longer view of the consequences than you are.

Do I have to be able to answer that question to build bridges? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, it is just amusing you picked calculus as the place for no contradictions. Perhaps I misread you. I was just teasingly (and ignorantly) pointing out why calculus was such a big sea change over what came prior and how refusing to allow "contradictions" probably delayed its arrival by a loooong time.


Random article, because why not?

Vickers, Peter (2007) Was the Early Calculus an Inconsistent Theory? [Preprint]

As Berkeley puts it (making adjustments for the given example),1

Hitherto I have supposed that [t] flows, that [t] hath a real increment, that o is something. And I have proceeded all along on that supposition, without which I should not have been able to have made so much as one single step. From that supposition it is that I get at the increment of [5t2], that I am able to compare it with the increment of [t], and that I find the proportion between the two increments. I now beg leave to make a new supposition contrary to the first, i.e. I will suppose that there is no increment of [t], or that o is nothing; which second supposition destroys my first, and is inconsistent with it, and therefore with every thing that supposeth it. I do nevertheless beg leave to retain [10t], which is an expression obtained in virtue of my first supposition, which necessarily presupposeth such supposition, and which could not be obtained without it: All which seems a most inconsistent way of arguing... (The Analyst, §XIV)

↪Olivier5
Allowing contradictions in how you do calculus would cause all modern bridges to fall down. Does that matter? Is it different from the point about foundations? — Srap Tasmaner

Instantaneous velocity means what, precisely?

Did I say there was no systemic racism, or did I say that we are less racist than ever? You are being obtuse. — ToothyMaw

You asked me to tell an 18 year old that he needs white people to succeed as if that isn't patently obvious. Last I checked, black separtism isn't the driving ideology of Stanford's treatment of undergrads.

I'm starting to question your good faith. Obviously those changes were necessary, but the US is, as many people acknowledge, less racist than it has ever been; that was a totally different time, and issues of race were far clearer. — ToothyMaw

Question it all you want. I neither started nor am responsible for any of the various anti-racist conversations/groups presently in existence. Tell them they are wrong and that there is no disparate impact that is presently measurable and meaningfully associated with race (rather than other categorizations such as socio-economic status). You can also educate them on how the levers of power in the US (government and corporate) are not dominated by whites and generally indifferent to remediating contemporary racial injustice.

Thus, black-on-black crime eclipses police brutality when discussing consequences. — ToothyMaw

A claim you keep making but have yet to demonstrate. When you look to the sociologists, they seem to be suggesting that creating a more just society where there is social buy-in would do even more to reduce black-on-black crime than trying to focus on typical crime reduction techniques (policing, punishments, etc.). It is like lancing a boil instead of giving antibiotics. Symptomatic treatment is fine so far as it goes (sometimes treating the symptoms is enough), but systemic treatment might very well solve the underlying problem even if it takes a bit more time to be effective and precludes symptomatic treatment in the meanwhile.

Would you tell him to his face that black boys and men need white people's help to achieve highly? — ToothyMaw

Do you know what farce is? Where do you think he would be if not for the 14th amendment, Brown v. Board, and the Civil Rights Act? Which levers of state power were pulled by non-whites to make them happen? It may be offensive that whites wield power in the US sufficient to change the course of someone's life based upon skin color alone, but it doesn't change the fact that US society was largely created at the expense of non-whites for the benefit of the powerful (the whites). Sure, we can tell lots of stories about how to divide the powerful from the powerless, the exploiters from the exploited, etc., but pretending like individuals are responsible for themselves based on merit alone doesn't even approach a level of serious conversation.

I feel like I'm bashing my head against a brick wall here. — ToothyMaw

You started a thread with the following:

I have heard a number of times that any mention of black-on-black crime is a deflection from white racism and a fallacy; . . .

However, I do not think every mention of black-on-black crime is fallacious or a deflection from white racism . . .

but black-on-black crime is also worth paying attention to; — ToothyMaw

All I tried to address is that when you are writing to a non-specific audience (especially when the people/groups that are the presumable target of your message is exceedingly unlikely to read what you are writing), your arguments are fairly meaningless and presumptuous. It isn't that I question whether you are trying to be helpful, but that your methods are ineffective. Further, I tried to highlight the way in which your methods are a performative contradiction of sorts - you say that "talking about x is not always a deflection" and want to focus on X, but you don't really stop to consider what x is alleged to be a deflection from. So yes, black on black crime is an important issue (though perhaps not for the reasons that some might suggest), but is it more important than the issue that people were otherwise discussing? In the right context, it may very well be more important. In the context of systemic racism? You have yet to make your case.

And it isn't just that you keep declining to make a case, but that when you gesture in the direction of a case, you change the conversation from systemic racism to things like stopping blacks from being murdered or that any harm to the black community is equal such that the thing causing the most criminal suffering should be the focus of conversation. In any event, instead of talking about the issue (systemic racism), we are instead talking about whether something is a deflection. Not just are we not talking about what a particular person was saying when the claim of deflection was made, but we have entirely abstracted that person's message away such that the only thing we can discuss with specificity is black on black crime.

So without going round and round the bush, what context are you talking about where someone brings up black on black crime, the other audience members accuse that person of deflecting, and you believe that the mention of black on black crime was actually material to the context? And in that context, do you believe that the audience was unaware of black on black crime prior to the person bringing it up?

I do not think every mention of black-on-black crime is fallacious or a deflection from white racism. If one cares about the suffering and death of George Floyd, for instance, then they should care as much about Robert Sandifer . . . only one of those deaths resulted in the mobilization of millions of people in one of the largest political movements ever. — ToothyMaw

but black-on-black crime is also worth paying attention to — ToothyMaw

Insofar as systemic racism relates to people of color being murdered, black-on-black violence eclipses it and it is not a deflection to mention it. — ToothyMaw

I would say that if we are concerned with saving the lives of people of color, then black-on-black crime is far more relevant than police brutality, for example (something I believe is the result of both personal and systemic racism). We should target the largest source of these murders if all we care about is stopping them and giving black lives the value they deserve. — ToothyMaw

And it very much seems to me that the conversation is indeed about the devaluation of black lives. Why else would the slogan "black lives matter" have been chosen? — ToothyMaw

And even if BLM wasn't formed for that, and they want to keep their message singular, there should be a coequal movement to stop black-on-black crime if we value black lives the way we value white lives. — ToothyMaw

Yes, these are excerpts, but I don't think they are particularly off base about what you have said. BLM, which came to be some twenty years after Sandifer's murder, was developed in a non-comparable social context for reasons that are both complex and simple - the internet and instantaneous decentralized messaging that can be effortlessly re-broadcast. To suggest that people care about Floyd but not about Sandifer by virtue of the social response each aroused is, I believe, misleading at best.

Regardless, BLM is not about the abstracted killing of people of color, but about the system's disparate treatment of people of color (especially black men). You keep putting words in the mouths of people that are responsible for the mass organization that you bemoan in order to discuss something that they are not interested in discussing. When BLM (and similar public policy advocates) discuss systemic racism and not black on black violence, it isn't because they are stupid or ignorant. Yet you act as if they are and that you repeating that black on black murders is somehow illuminating and not precisely what they say it is - a deflection from what they want to discuss.

Some of the links I posted mentioned the themes that make black on black violence unworthy of significant attention in the context of systemic discrimination - that the violence occurs in contexts created by (exacerbated by) the racist systems and that addressing the systemic issues will likely secondarily result in a reduction of black on black violence. So the advocates tell you both that they care about people of color suffering (at the hands of themselves or others) and that they are focused on systemic issues which contribute to such suffering.

No matter the inter-generational suffering, the current institutional obstacles, the historical systems of oppression, or anything else, when people of color come together to advocate for themselves, you have the audacity to say

the people of color who support BLM can at least make it possible to talk about black-on-black violence as as it is relevant without immediately being labeled a racis — ToothyMaw

while you say

I am arguing in good faith. — ToothyMaw

Who are you arguing with? Why are you telling them what to do? Who are you that anyone should care what you think?

What is racist on the face of what you are doing is that rather than listening and supporting POC as they advocate for themselves, you appear to be deciding that your way is better for them regardless of what they say or think and that they should make room to hear from you. You don't have to look at the content of what you are saying, just look at the context in which you are saying it.

As I said earlier, if you are a POC and you are having an in-group conversation such that your advocacy is the same as self-advocacy, then go for it. If the group you are speaking to still says that you are being racist, you might want to consider whether they are the ones that are missing the point or you are.

In seriousness, outside of discussion of systemic-racism, do you ever go to advocacy meetings and start talking about the scourge of black-on-black violence and your solutions for it? It it the sort of thing that impacts you or the sort of thing that you are advocating for "them"?

It isn't about what you know or what you have read, it is about whether you are trying to be a part of the system of liberation for blacks from the unjust systems or just another person choosing to ignore the unjust systems in favor of focusing on the bad behavior of individuals.

Food for thought...

↪180 Proof


I find your comments to be self-indulgent and poorly written. I shouldn't have to deal with all of that unnecessary punctuation. And I never said there was no severe white-on-white crime; I'm talking strictly about the here and now in the US. — ToothyMaw

↪180 Proof


I mean did you even read the OP? — ToothyMaw

↪180 Proof


You didn't even make an argument, bro. You just listed a bunch of examples of white-on-white violence

...

Did I or did I not say that culture plays a part and that many cultural influences are affected by racism? Did I say black-on-black violence existed in a vacuum? — ToothyMaw

I wonder how you might analyze those comments in light of your "racist" detection skills.

Those links were along the line of LMGTFY. You can find people discussing the issue to your heart's content.

As for BLM, at some point I begin to question your good faith. BLM isn't about telling someone's neighbor not to kill them, it is about reminding government (you know, a system) about something. Yes, it would be great of the racist next door also stopped being racist, but how about we start with our systems of power no longer perpetuating racism.

Here is an excerpt from BLM's official description (from their page):

#BlackLivesMatter was founded in 2013 in response to the acquittal of Trayvon Martin’s murderer. Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation, Inc. is a global organization in the US, UK, and Canada, whose mission is to eradicate white supremacy and build local power to intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes. By combating and countering acts of violence, creating space for Black imagination and innovation, and centering Black joy, we are winning immediate improvements in our lives. . . .

We are working for a world where Black lives are no longer systematically targeted for demise.

Notice whose violence they are focusing on and that they are discussing systems.

Here is a random conversation on the topic of BLM and black-on-black violence from six years ago.

. . .

Airing those viewpoints is a service—and there’s a lot to chew on that I won’t address here.

But it seems to me that the debate about whether to focus on police killings or “black-on-black” killings presumes that reducing the former will not help to reduce the latter.

What if the opposite is true?

Black Lives Matter calls for 10 specific changes to policing policy, including body cameras, an end to “policing for profit,” better training, and stricter limits on the use of force.

. . .

Black Lives Matter activists are often silent about black-on-black killings. Perhaps that is a P.R. mistake. But the reforms they are urging strike me as a more realistic path to decreasing those killings than publicly haranguing would-be murderers to be peaceful.

Black Lives Matter participants are civic activists, not respected high-school teachers or social workers or reformed gang members who can influence their former brethren.

Since police departments are ultimately responsive to political institutions, fighting for police reforms with civic activism is a relatively straightforward project. . . .

If you want to educate yourself on why black on black violence is not an overarching concern of those discussing systemic racism, the tools to do so are readily accessible.


And one more, because why not?

... Let’s stop losing focus and changing the subject when it comes to police and or vigilante violence against blacks. That is what the Black Lives Matter movement originally brought focus to. A person randomly killing someone is a totally and completely separate issue. For those so concerned about these murders, you need to offer some solutions to stop them. . . .

Here was my search terms for these articles: "black lives matters response to black on black violence"

I would say that if we are concerned with saving the lives of people of color, then black-on-black crime is far more relevant than police brutality, for example (something I believe is the result of both personal and systemic racism). We should target the largest source of these murders if all we care about is stopping them and giving black lives the value they deserve. — ToothyMaw

Again, the people who are talking about systemic issues seem to be focused on systemic issues rather than eliminating the harms of specific violent crimes. They are also talking about the systems of government and not focusing on extra-governmental (private) behavior. If those talking about systemic racism (the sorts of people that you would consider informed on the issue) are not discussing black-on-black crime, do you suppose they are ignorant? If you aren't an insider to the conversation (or in a position of power to respond to the advocacy coming from the conversation), what difference does it make if you don't understand why people aren't discussing your preferred issue?

Lay out a narrative of how it is that you are privilege to this critical issue, the systemic racism folk are unable to identify critical issues to their values, and that your bringing it up is helpful to their agenda rather than a deflection from the agenda they are already advancing.

P.S. Here are some random articles in response to a google inquiry of "systemic racism black on black crime"

https://www.afterschoolalliance.org/afterschoolsnack/VOX-5-Reasons-why-Black-on-Black-crime-is-not-a-valid_09-08-2020.cfm

https://www.teenvogue.com/story/black-on-black-crime-myth

https://www.cleveland.com/news/2020/06/stop-using-black-on-black-crime-to-deflect-away-from-police-brutality.html

https://www.vox.com/2016/7/12/12152772/rudy-giuliani-black-on-black-crime-police (from back in 2016)

And here is a random bit from someone that wants to talk about the issue:
https://www.city-journal.org/media-silence-on-black-on-black-violence

The problem in the American inner city is not white supremacy but the failure to socialize young males—a problem that is a direct result of family breakdown. As businesses and apartment buildings in the nation’s big cities board themselves up in anticipation of postelection rioting, many Americans may decide that if being “racist” in the eyes of the media, academics, and other elites means worrying about their community being looted or their children being shot, they will simply have to endure that slander.

Sure, ruling with an iron fist sounds amusing
— Ennui Elucidator

Not to me. — Bitter Crank

Police reduce crime by arresting repeat offenders, and by maintaining a certain level of intimidation (make that necessary intimidation).

To paraphrase Mao, law enforcement is not a tea party. — Bitter Crank

This certainly didn’t come across as your advocating for a reduction in policing to increase social cohesion. Maybe you can explain what “necessary intimidation is” on your view. Or maybe you think it is necessary but not amusing.