The rebellion of the USA against the UK was a taxation or public administration problem rather than a cultural war. — javi2541997
Britain’s desire to maintain their mercantile economic system also encouraged the creation of the Proclamation Line. Within the British mercantile world, colonies were to produce raw materials for export to the mother country, where they would be produced into manufactured goods and sold to consumers within the empire. To keep her wealth internalized, Great Britain enacted a number of regulations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as the Navigation Acts, prohibiting her colonies from trading with foreign markets. Following the French and Indian War, Britain feared that westward expansion would lead to a growth in commercial agriculture, allowing farmers to profit by smuggling excess crops to external Atlantic markets. Instead, the government sought to protect mercantilism by encouraging colonial growth to the north and south in an effort to populate the newly acquired provinces of Quebec, East Florida, and West Florida. This would not only limit the establishment of commercially profitable farms on newly acquired western lands, but would also keep settlers within close range of Britain’s economic and political influence. Consequently, many colonials of varying socioeconomic backgrounds viewed the Proclamation Line and its restrictions as repressive measures put in place by the Crown to secure increased control over affairs in their North American colonies. — Jennifer Monroe McCutchen
The master is addicted to power and luxury, and his fear is that the slaves will revolt and enslave him in turn and beat him. This is the story of unfreedom, of being a slave to desire and fear. This is the life of a well trained dog; this is not freedom for slave or for master. So it seems that no one can be free, while another is a slave - maybe one day... — unenlightened
In every concrete expression of freedom, all or a part of existence [Tiveroerelsen] collaborates. — Kierkegaard, Papers, V B 53:21, 1844, given as a reference in The Concept of Anxiety.
The PI is opposed to Referentialism, whereby words refer to objects in the world. To be an object existing in the world in space and time it must have some kind of essence. — RussellA
The chorus too must be regarded as one of the actors. It must be part of the whole and share in the action, not as in Euripides but as in Sophocles. — Greek chorus - wiki
Being: Whatever it is that everything is doing without qualification.
Awareness: The activity that brings beings into presence
Consciousness: Whatever conditions that make awareness possible
Thinking: Talking with others and myself through making or following connections.
Time: That one is very tricky. I don't have time to explain myself.
Sensation: An integral component of perception
Perception: Distinguishing things given through sensation. (I recognize this is straight up Aristotle)
Mind: A way to talk about consciousness as an agent.
Body: What every being is with qualifications.
Good: The idea of the best as conceived against the reality of its absence.
Happiness: When I feel good.
Justice: Another very tricky one but am convinced of its importance for the Good to be.
Truth: Not sure I can handle the truth.
— Mikie
PI 182 sounds more like the anti-realist linguist than the realist engineer. — RussellA
Then Agathon, who was reclining alone on the last couch, said, “Come here, Socrates, and recline beside me so that, through contact with you, I may enjoy 175D that piece of wisdom that came to you in the porch. Of course you found it and you have it, for you would not have come away without it.”
Socrates then sat down and said, “It would be nice, Agathon, if wisdom were the sort of thing that flowed between us, from the fuller to the emptier once we were in contact with one another, just as water in cups flows through wool from the fuller to the emptier one. Yes, if wisdom 175E is like this too, then I greatly prize my position alongside you, for I believe I will be filled with a copious beautiful wisdom by your side. For my wisdom would be ordinary, even as questionable as a dream, while yours would be resplendent and would hold great promise, young as you are; and this shone forth mightily from you, just the other day, and was put on display before the eyes of more than thirty thousand Greeks.”
“Socrates, you are being contemptuous!” said Agathon. “Yet in due course, you and I shall submit these matters to judgement on the issue of wisdom, resorting to Dionysus[10] as our judge. For the moment, you should turn your attention to your supper.” — Symposium, 175c, translated by Horan
Socrates' own music consists of arguments, but that will not do for the many who need to be charmed. — Fooloso4
You are the problem. No scholar to be found far and wide. — Reflections, #19
The only thing I say I know,” Socrates tells us in the Symposium, “is the art of love (ta erôtika) (177d8–9). Taken literally, it is an incredible claim. — Amity
I do not think people are connected or related because they use the same language. — NOS4A2
I would argue that in order to do this, one must be nominalist. He must consider only the concrete, particular things involved, what they themselves tell of their lives and relations with each other, and let go of the pre-conceived, realist account of collectives. — NOS4A2
The community, to use Toennies' term, changed into a "society." "Contract" seemed to be the only bond that held men together--the contract based on the purely rationalistic' relation of service for service the do ut des, the "Contraf Social" of Rousseau. — Oppenheimer
The first man who, after enclosing a piece of land, got the idea of saying This is mine and found people simple enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society. — Rousseau
I relate to the grocer when I go to the market, for example. This is what I meant by "history", I think, the culmination of our interactions with one another. That is the extent of our relationship. — NOS4A2
From the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein has been described as a Linguistic Idealist, where language is the ultimate reality and as an Anti-Realist, someone who cannot get outside their own language in order to compare what is in their language with what is in the world. — RussellA
182. The grammar of "to fit", "to be able", and "to understand". (Exercises: (i) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only while C is stuck into H? (2) Sometimes we say that C ceased to fit into H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for its having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time if it was not actually on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask: "When did I stop knowing it?" (5) Someone asks
me "Can you lift this weight?" I answer "Yes". Now he says "Do it!"—and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would it count as a justification to say "When I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't"?
The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding', are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted to think.
(This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so, a fortiori does the assertion that a word is 'indefinable'.) — Philosophical Investigations
I can understand Augustine's position that we can discover the correct sequence of words by observing the world, and finding a correspondence between the words and objects in the world. — RussellA
Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair",
"bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself. Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.——It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.——"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"——Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used. — PI 1
We may therefore formulate our thesis: transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihiio. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence. There is something distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless creation existence of which we are not the creators. At this level man has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself, of overflowing himself, of being surprised by riches which are always unexpected. And once more it is an unconscious from which he demands an account of this surpassing of the me by consciousness. Indeed, the me can do nothing to this spontaneity, for will is an object which constitutes itself for and by this spontaneity. The will directs itself upon states, upon emotions, or upon things, but it never turns back upon consciousness. — Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre, Conclusions, translated by Kirkpatrick and Williams
One can be confident that when someone speaks of “common ownership” or “public control” of this or that, the political subject in his mind is invariably some kind of association or group, maybe society writ large, but in every case an idea without any particular referent. — NOS4A2
Thus when Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith refute Gregory Vlastos's reductionist reading of the divine sign -- the voice as a rational hunch -- they are helping to bring a suppressed side of Socrates back into the picture. Socrates' experience was genuinely religious -- which as Brickhouse and Smith also point out does not make it irrational. — Book review
His daemon, however, does not provide any reasons when warning him against doing something. — Fooloso4
