I meant to give the word its due as a Hellenistic concept. I question that it is the only reference to the importance of speaking words in the different traditions.

Logos obviously has meaning in the narrative as a Greek word but how it is used as a source of creation is evident in Judaic literature in many different roles as well.

There is the whole dialogue of creation where God says for beings to be and they emerge within certain conditions.
Proverb 16:1 is "The plans of the mind belong to man, but the answer of the tongue is from the Lord."
In Job, the test is if the righteous man will admit to a sin which he knows he has not committed. He does not admit it.
Peter is said to betray Jesus by what he does not say.
In the conversation Pilate is purported to have had with Jesus, Pilate asks, 'are you the king of the Jews?" the reply is "Thou sayest."

This observation is not to claim one set of references takes precedence over others. It is only to note that translating the word "word" is going to be a tough rugby ball to grab in the ensuing scrum.

This maps well with Jesus' tendencies to reject this world as inherently corrupt, and the Devil as dwelling in it. — Olivier5

Whatever the source of that idea, it is incongruous with the Platonic teaching, expressed continuously over hundreds of years before Jesus, that there can only be a single universe and that evil is distance from the Good that provides order to it.

I am not aware of any place where Plotinus uses language like: "the doctrine of the Will of the One."

In the 'chain of realities' the One is not the direct source of the manifold of creation. Intelligence is the source of different beings. Intelligence reflects the One as an image of it. But it is not said that Intelligence is a change for the One. The use of the word 'will' in this case is to impute a meaning that is not intended by Plotinus.

Augustine took the Neo-Platonist cosmology and fused it with the kingdom of his 'heavenly father.' The One of Plotinus does not drop agents of his will onto the streets of Jerusalem or kick people out of Paradise.

I remember. I acknowledged that but wanted to emphasize that the observation did not pit mind against matter. What stands as objective criteria is what is in tension with experience as it is experienced.

It is a model in so far as it allows to have the 'physical' to be taken for granted.
But I will leave it there. I see that my reasoning only interests you up to the point where I don't support this "attitude."

Lewontin views the matter ideologically for purposes that do not address the limits of scientific method. If the method rejects the top-down structure of divine intellect as an explanation of causes, it no longer has a bottoms-up either. All of the formal elements used before the method to help explain the causes of phenomena are now phenomena themselves. If that half of the dyad is no longer given, the other half no longer has a job. The comparison of simple and complex beings, that was partially given by the structure of Nature as Aristotle understood it, must now be worked out in the models.

The models keep changing because they are being tested against objective criteria. How far the method may get to discovering the nature of the whole cosmos is not circumscribed by its use. There are models that use information theory and the structure of development to explain phenomena. The need to confirm these objectively is different than claiming only certain models are possible.

As I mentioned earlier, Chalmer's hard problem may be too difficult to solve. At the very least, Chalmer is not declaring victory nor defeat. The problem with the 'scientism' model is that it gives itself a limit that the method itself does not.

I am going to take some time answering. Thank you for assembling your answer.

I read Gerson's lecture; you gave me the link to the text of it. I have read a good portion of the book that lecture is basically the preface of. The "Ur-Platonism" is interesting as a general narrative but has lots of problems in the close reading of actual texts. I won't go on at length about what you have not read of Gerson.

Phenomena is what is shown and experienced. Science is empiricism. When you say Carl Sagan said, 'cosmos is all there is', and by that, he means the cosmos as discerned scientifically," is Sagan truly reducing phenomena to what can be proven in a model? Is his observation not similar to the humility expressed in the Timaeus? We live in this place. That circumstance and the conditions bounded by its existence is the foundation of anything that happens within that circumstance.

In regard to Nagel to describing the origin of the scientific method, my difficulty with relating it to the meanings of 'materiality' is whether that is an observation of what those descriptions will not satisfy or a limit on the practice itself. Do you think of it as a garbage-in garbage-out scenario?

In this discussion of 'materialism', I have been looking for a way to acknowledge Nagel's narrative of how the scientific method came about without accepting that it restricts all of its possible outcomes to descriptions of physical stuff isolated from all other physical stuff. Models have to agree with phenomena. The phenomena never signed an agreement listing what could be revealed by the process.

In that context, Gerson's schema is a response to Rorty's rejection of Plato. That conflict has its own terms that are far away from how to understand original texts. As far as I understand it, I disagree with both of them. I make no special claim at understanding either of them.

As for what Gerson thinks himself outside of that debate, there are many points where I disagree. Apart from his 'schema', I have read a number of his arguments devoted to Aristotle's text that I doubt the old guy would agree with.

Maybe there should be a discussion devoted to Gerson. He seems to be a big man on campus here.

Edit to add: I just ran a search on Gerson on the web site. This has been going on for years.

I think I understand Gerson's thesis and its relation to the development of the scientific method.

Since you spoke approvingly of phenomenology, I was asking where you thought it fit in Gerson's schema where 'Platonism' or 'Naturalism' are the only possible approaches and the attempts to find 'rapprochement' between the two are a fool's errand"

Phenomenology is not materialist nor mechanistic. It does look for a nature or environment where events happen. Does it require the possibility of "perfect cognition" that Gerson has on the Platonist checklist? And so on.

Well, that does count as an agenda. Disregard my previous reserve on that point. This place is stranger than I thought.

For my part, I don't want to assign an agenda to someone assigning an agenda. i can oppose it or question it without doing that.

That is my ideal, anyway, which I often fail to accomplish.

Yes. Click on the link Fooloso4 provided.

This part is quite exiting: "anti-Christian activists like yourself cite other anti-Christian activists like Ehrman as their "eminent authority". You aren't fooling anyone."

Do the activists go to secret meetings in order to train together? Are special handshakes involved?

And who will be the "Christian" in this matter? There are so many interpretations and forms of worship under this name that it is like being Anti-Smith as an agenda. Even self-identified anti-Christians have to say what it is before they slap it up the side of the head.

Absolutely! And it is precisely because they have started to incorporate the phenomenological and 'embodied cognition' approaches, which in turn grew out of the movement away from old-school scientific materialism. — Wayfarer

I have been reading quite a bit of Lloyd Gerson upon the strength of your recommendation. I have a growing number of problems with his thesis but leaving that aside, how does phenomenology fit into Gerson's schema where 'Platonism' or 'Naturalism' are the only possible approaches and the attempts to find 'rapprochement' between the two are a fool's errand?

He likes to say that St. Paul “cut out” the Greek tradition from Christianity — Dermot Griffin

Another possibility is that Grimes is overstating the presence of an element and has come up with a cause to explain its apparent absence. The natural question to ask is if there are other accounts that give some evidence for this "cutting out."

Exactly! I was hoping that the passage I quoted reinforced the point you were making. — Wayfarer

I was mostly hoping to challenge the utility of framing the project as a ""promissory materialism" while acknowledging Nagel's point about scientific method.

If sufficient evidence appeared proving Grimes’ thesis, then yes, I would not have a problem with that. — Dermot Griffin

Grimes also claimed that the core of Jesus' message did not reflect the concerns or concepts of Judaism. I hope the contributions by schopenhauer1 and Oliver5, amongst others here, show how ridiculous that claim is.

What I find to be particularly galling about Grimes' idea is that it means that Jesus was importing one religion into another, like a Manchurian Candidate taking control of an alien territory. It is as if the Letter to the Hebrews had been written before all the rest had happened.

Scientific models rely upon relating measurable entities to each other and testing to see if the models leave phenomena out or not. I understand Nagel's point that the model is not made out of components that cannot be approached this way. My point is that the models, in this case, are attempting to verify their validity against the very elements it cannot include within in itself. They attempt to overcome the duality that the method brought into existence.

Toward that end, the project does not involve the metaphysics of mind versus matter. The experience of subjectivity is accepted as phenomena. To explain what causes it through these models is difficult, maybe too difficult. I think that framing the problem as merely ""promissory materialism" misses the audacious uncertainty of the enterprise. That was one of Chalmers' observations, after all.

So, if Grimes turned out to be correct, you would have no problem with that?

Pierre Grimes is an insightful man. However due to my piety as a Christian, I must disagree with him when he says that the teaching of Jesus comes directly from the “Greek tradition.” — Dermot Griffin

With all of these conditions observed regarding the mixture of language and culture in such a time of extreme violence, it is difficult to say what actually happened, So I am curious why you make it a matter of faith when you reject Grimes who suggests Jesus received an education from one of the Hellenistic schools. How is that an article of faith rather than a question of fact?

I am chipping away at the lecture but have to stop all the time to research the premises. I am not a student dedicated to this period of theology. I don't know if I will get to a point to respond to it properly. Thank you for bringing it to my attention.

The matter of "univocity" versus "equivocity" in making reference to the divine is a big deal in both western and eastern churches. Is there something you like regarding the issue?

At what point do we start questioning the assumption that consciousness comes from matter? — RogueAI

As a matter of scientific method, using the models that have been developed so far is not dependent upon including "materiality" as a prerequisite. The duality in question is presented by the circumstance that our experience of consciousness happens whether it is explained or not while models that explain why it happens are not given but require much effort. The "hard" problem is not difficult because it has to prove that something like "mind" does not exist. It is difficult because the 'duality' of experience is one of the phenomena that has to be explained.

The question of whether any model will sufficiently explain the phenomena is not hanging on the balance of whether a physical or non-physical dimension is involved. The mind/body identity theorists keep changing their models when one set of factors fail to correspond with 'experience' as a fact. Jabbing at one's cranium with an index finger while exclaiming, "It is all in here" is no advance upon the problem.

An excellent account. Thank you.

In that your interest was piqued by the comment: "'addresses the psychological drives that underlie various philosophical programs and perspectives, as a form of critique', I suggest starting with the Genealogy of Morals. In that work, the "perspectives" have a history that does impart a complete explanation but is not arbitrary either.

A large chunk of secondary literature is looking for digestible bite size chunks that a genealogy will not provide.

Some agenda behind a position like that... — ZzzoneiroCosm

It sounds like some version of Bridgeman's operationalism combined with Skinner's behaviorism in order to establish Rand's direct realism as a law of nature.

Hard to say, on this side of the curtain.

It is difficult to separate the original from what some people made of it because the reports we have that have survived time and erasure are also responses to whatever was said and done. We will never get the direct feed.

Because of that, I think of it as two tracks of development that may cross paths in some places but cannot not be resolved into one: There is the uncertainty of the origins that point to a variety of sources: There are the theological edifices that were built afterwards. The "looting: of pagan thought and practices can be cogently investigated in the latter case. I think a different register is needed for exploring the former.

With that said, I do share one element of why you wanted to separate the two. I grew up in a church environment and was shocked when I actually read the New Testament for myself the first time. Hearing the words of Jesus was getting a different message outside of the bottle it was shoved into.

In regard to the Judaic elements, you may be interested in Oliver5 comments in the "Jesus Freaks" OP.

Don the Don asked the class: "What is the difference between a sophist and a philosopher?

Franz: The sophist just wants to win contests whereas the philosopher seeks what they do not know.

Don: How does this "argument from ignorance" work if the adversary rejects it as a thing?

Paine: What thing? Either the philosopher is honest about what they do not know, or they are not.

Don: Are you saying the whole enterprise revolves about the sincerity of the participants?

Franz: That would be nuts. That would suggest that all the advancements of knowledge over the centuries was somehow bound up with the character of certain people.

Paine: So, Franz, how would you test for the difference between people to confirm or deny your proposition?

Don: That is enough from both of you.

Again, its time to move on from this, you staying stuck on this terminology bit is only going to make your points stranger and stranger. — Garrett Travers

You are arrogant. That is a self-evident fact.
I will not hinder your progress with any other observations.

But the expression "F=MA" did not magically appear to you as self-evident fact. It came from years of people asking why things happen the way they did.

Edit to Add:
I scanned the article. I did not spot the "anti-science" part you spoke of in relation to identity theorists.

Much of that earlier stuff, identity theory and the like, was led to apologize years after being established for being anti-science. — Garrett Travers

Citation, please.

Why is what you ask when you think f=ma means something beyond it being described within its operant nature. — Garrett Travers

That is not how the word is used. Your definition sounds more like a premise to a model, not something found to be true by one means or another.

A concept with a clear distinction that, much like f=ma, has correspondent value. "Why", on the other hand, does not. That is exclusively a human concept that does not apply to the universe. — Garrett Travers

That is an interesting bifurcation of experience.

When shown how to complete the square in algebra, I can learn a set of rules that will work each time I use it. The method does not tell me why the rules work. The rules to calculate are arbitrary until grounded by a reliable principle that makes them valid. In the realm of scientific inquiry, the dissatisfaction with mere plausibility is why the models keep changing. The validity is hard fought over and easily lost.

It seems like much of your use of the word 'material' is a version of Mind/Brain Identity Theory. A common objective amongst these many versions of the theory is to dispense with mind/body duality in explaining and investigating the phenomena. I don't see anywhere in this group of theories any kind of appeal for the duality between 'how' and 'why' that you propose.

I was trying to make heads or tails out of the Monadology when I lost focus after seeing the other kids outside the window, throwing knives they had just made in Shop class at a spare tire conveniently mounted on the back of the Gym teacher's Bronco.

"Paine!" barked Don the Don. "How will you ever become unemployable if you keep drifting off like that!"

It seems to me that one of the points made in the Bushido culture is that accepting death is not just a matter of being willing to check out if events require it but that you come into a different kind of mind that is important to use while you have it.

Hinge propositions are predicated on facts accrued by humans through data gathering and analysis — Garrett Travers

Wittgenstein said as much.

The presupposition of belief is not necessarily a factor. — Garrett Travers

A factor of what? People more or less agreeing that some things happen but others don't? Common sense versus some other kind? Wittgenstein seems to be militating against a set of propositions being the last word on why propositions are used. The propositions in question are not like the many used to convince people of something despite good reasons to doubt them.

I am radically skeptical about everything for which there is no, or little evidence of. — Garrett Travers

Wittgenstein is asking what evidence is or looks like in this text. He may be more skeptical than you are.

Here's the point I'm making with his next statement: the conformity with mankind bit, is mankind's creation. Not the other way around. If I make a mistake in conformity with MY standards, I am still making a mistake, and have now added MY standard to the "conformity" of which Wittgentein spoke. — Garrett Travers

I don't understand what you are saying here. Perhaps you can bring in more of Wittgenstein's language that you object to for the purposes of clarification. Or maybe you could show how the article you linked to relates to passages in Wittgenstein's text.

One aspect I do think I understand is that Wittgenstein is not saying that hinge propositions are "beyond rational confirmation." You will have to do more than assert it when Wittgenstein specifically rules that out.

Edit to add:
Oh wait, I get it, It is the shared reality you oppose to objectivity. By that measure, you will never be wrong.

But, the idea that they cannot be challenged or put under rational scrutiny is bizarre. — Garrett Travers

On Certainty is not saying that. The article you linked to does not seem to understand that Wittgenstein is questioning the extent of Moore's use of self-evidence as the basis for argument. That purpose is the opposite of saying that some propositions are given special status for the sake of advancing a theory. And it doesn't sound very mystical if Wittgenstein is using a shared reality to limit the utility of Moore's certainty:

155. In certain circumstance a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

Can we say from this that Kant's idealism is a form of naturalism? — Tom Storm

Well, Kant did say this:

The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori, and consequentially whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a perhaps more extended use not restricted merely to objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was solely a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of using the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course. — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, pg 259

In due course, Kant lays out his 'determination' and says:

"Accordingly, we shall here be concerned with experience only and the universal conditions of its possibility, which are given a priori. Thence we shall define nature as the whole object of all possible experience." (299)

Therefore, objective truth is a special kind of experience:

For instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgement is as yet a judgement of perception only; I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to each other. But if I would have it called a judgement of experience, I require this connection to stand under a condition which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same circumstances. — ibid. 299

So it is by this repeatability that we can have an objective reality and it eat it too. It is transcendental in the suggestion that we couldn't possibly be putting on such a fine show by ourselves.