That is false on it's face.
We learned to use the word "belief" in the context of specific linguistic practices, but those practices were not about belief ascriptions. — creativesoul

I lost you again. It doesn’t really matter how you phrase it based on your questionable philosophical assumptions. All I meant was simply that you as anybody else learned the word “belief” when other speaking people around you were saying things such: I/you/he/she/we/they believe or not believe this or that etc. This is a linguistic fact. There is no possible contention on this. And that, only that, is the point I care making.
So if you are happier to write “We learned to use the word "belief" in the context of specific linguistic practices”, just go for it. The point I made still holds.

We've been using the term belief for thousands of years. We've been attributing beliefs to ourselves and others for at least that long. Some attribute beliefs to the simplest 'minded' of animals, such as slugs.

According to what you've said here, we ought make our theory of belief fit such usage. — creativesoul

Sure, why not? But our practices admit figurative and literal usages, normal and fringe cases, shared and non-shared background beliefs, successful and unsuccessful belief attributions, etc. When you were a kid you learned the word "belief" also in playful contexts and stories about fictional characters, if you had a religious education you also learned the word “belief” as applied to invisible divine beings or disembodied souls, etc.
In any case, I must confess in all honesty that I don’t know and never even heard of any example in any culture in the entire known human history where people learned the word “belief” predominantly as applied to slugs, do you? And if you don't, then this shows not only how weak your objection is, of course, but also an interesting linguistic fact that our theory of belief should take into account!


FYI I prefer arguments to emoticons.

I could be wrong, but not completely. — creativesoul

As far as I can tell, Frege published "Sense and reference" in 1892, while Gettier published his "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" in 1963, besides the JTB analysis of "knowledge" challenged by Gettier presupposes (or so it seems) the notion of "belief" as propositional attitude not the other way around. So, unless you have something more convincing to support your claim ("JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude"), b/c that is what I asked, then it is fair to say that you are completely wrong.

What are you ascribing to another prior to having an understanding of belief? — creativesoul

I lost you. I’m talking about your theoretical understanding of the belief ascription practice wrt to the notion of “belief”. A theory of belief should fit into a theory of belief ascription not the other way around, the reason being that you as any body else learned the word “belief” and its proper usage in the context of specific linguistic practices about belief ascriptions, prior to any philosophical debate. So the nature of belief should be such that it makes such a practice possible. Such practices tell us that we can provide de re/de dicto ascriptions, that they are appropriate in some circumstances not in others, that those belief ascriptions guide our understanding and expectations about other people’s behavior, that we can attribute beliefs even to non-linguistic creatures, etc. So based on these practices what can we claim about the nature of belief? That's the philosophical task that makes sense to me.

@Harry Hindu (bear with me for the non-standard quotation style)

> Were you asking me to describe the image, or what the image is about?

I was more brainstorming about Agent Smith’s question: “Are pictures/images propositions?”
The problem is that propositions are not supposed to be ambiguous, while images are.
Sentences can be ambiguous, but (not surprisingly) there are rules to systematically disambiguate them wrt to the propositions that they are supposed to represent (at least in the case of declarative sentences), that’s not the case for images.

> So A1 is said differently than B1, but you say that they are translatable and mean the same thing.

Because B1 not only matches with what A1 says (about Alice’s love for Jim) but also with how it is said by A1 (passive form)

> So, it all depends on what the goal of the mind is at any moment (intent).

That is the point I’m making as well: what enables us to single out semantic relations between signs and referents out of a causal chain of events is “a mind” with intentionality. If we talked only in terms of causality and effects, we would end up having a situation where, in a causal chain, any subsequent effect be "a sign of” any preceding cause.

> Imaginary concepts have causal power.

That is a very problematic statement to me: we should clarify the notions of “concept” and “causality” before investigating their relationship. But it’s a heavy task on its own, so I will not engage it in this thread.

> Why remember something that isn't useful? The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it so that you may recall it later (use the belief).

Not sure about that: e.g. we may remember things without believing in them (e.g. dreams). To my understanding, belief can interact with experience and memory in many ways, yet the latter cognitive skills come ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior to any doxastic attitude.

A sentence is semantically de re just in case it permits substitution of co-designating terms salva veritate. Otherwise, it is semantically de dicto. — creativesoul

All right, but pragmatic considerations should be taken into account to get the full picture of our communicative practices concerning de re/de dicto belief ascriptions (what terms are taken to co-refere, when substitution is allowed, etc.).
Besides also co-reference is matter of belief!

The point of this exercise, on my end anyway, is to show how the consequences of conventional accounting practices are absurd — creativesoul

Well, you are trying to make your belief ascription analysis fit your understanding of belief. For me, it should be the other way around.

Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working? — creativesoul

Simply because belief ascriptions are not based on such a math out-of-context, but on their explanatory power wrt to believers’ behavior in a given context.

BTW, once more, you didn’t clarify why JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude.

It has everything to do with it, for it is the basis of belief as propositional attitude. — creativesoul

Why? What are the reasons? Where are the arguments to support your claim that JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude? I mean, ought we not all do our own work?

Are you of the position that Jack cannot believe that a broken clock is working when he looks at it to find out what time it is? — creativesoul

Yep that would be my presupposition (and not only mine apparently) wrt your hypothetical case. The point is that I’m capable of de dicto/de re rendering/understanding of belief ascriptions as any other competent speaker in the right circumstances and prior to any philosophical debate. Your revisionist approach about this distinction based on your philosophical assumptions still looks unjustified for 2 reasons: 1. de dicto rendering is usually more accurate than de re rendering when we want to explain behavior 2. The success of de re ascriptions is not based on correctness but on shared assumptions between the one who makes the belief ascription and her audience on the situation at hand. If I don’t know enough Jack, I might find appropriate to make a de re ascription like this: Jack believes of that broken clock that is working.
Indeed de re belief ascriptions would still be effective if the shared assumptions were completely wrong: e.g. flat Earth believers could claim of me “he believes that our flat Earth is round” or, better, “he believes of our flat Earth that is round”.

Is that supposed to be clearer and more accurate somehow than just admitting that we can mistakenly believe that a broken clock is working? — creativesoul

Here my answer:
1. My claim is that “Jack believes that the broken clock is working” can be read in 2 ways, de dicto or de re. And de dicto ascription would be preferred over a de re ascription, when possible and based on shared understanding, because it’s more informative, more explanatory of believers’ behavior. But possibility and shareability assessments depend on the contextual assumptions of the involved parties: the one who states the belief ascription and her audience wrt the believer in the situation at hand.
2. The claim that “Jack mistakenly believes that the broken clock is working” out-of-context is more ambiguous about a de re and de dicto reading: with a de dicto reading Jack would simply be irrational (since it’s a contradictory belief), with a de re reading Jack could be either irrational or ignorant about the fact that the clock is not working. In other words, the de dicto belief ascription is more specific than de re belief ascription, therefore - if accurate - more explanatory or useful in guiding our expectations about Jack.

What would be a de dicto rendering of that toddler's belief? I mean, ought we not all do our own work? — creativesoul

Mine was indeed a rhetoric question! The example of the toddler was meant to show a common case where a de re belief ascription makes sense, since we may have at best an approximate idea of what a toddler’s understanding of the situation is (i.e. we would be much less confident in any de dicto belief ascription in this specific case). The same goes for belief ascriptions to animals. The better we understand the believer’s view of the situation, the more we would rely on her understanding of the situation to explain her behavior (or assess her rationality), and share it with others with de dicto belief ascriptions in the appropriate circumstances.

There's a difference between a statement and an utterance — Banno

How is this relevant? Instead, give me an example of a proposition, sentence, statement (or whatever else you don't care to distinguish from propositions) that can not be parsed into sequences of electric impulses of different voltage!

Those who are working on these problems accept that beliefs can be parsed as attitudes towards statements, sentences or propositions. — Banno

Sure and propositions statements sentences (and whatever else you have in your menu) can be parsed in sequences of electric impulses with different electric voltages, therefore - by transitivity - beliefs are attitudes toward sequences of impulses with different electric voltage.

"This is a picture of a duck or a rabbit, depending on how you look at it." The picture would be an example of "ambiguity". — Harry Hindu

That is the problem of putting visual content into propositional form. Images can be ambiguous in a way that is not captured by any related descriptions.
Besides one and the same image can correspond to many possible descriptions, whose number is arguably higher than any limited mind can conceive of.

The point is what you are saying, not how you are saying it. — Harry Hindu

When we translate, we take into account precisely how things are said, otherwise it wouldn’t be a translation.
So you can not use an active form in your native language to translate a foreign sentence in passive form, if you want to translate literally the foreign sentence of course.
That is why, in the examples I listed, B2 is a correct translation of A2, and not of A1, despite the fact that all 3 statements are about the same state of affaires.

I didn't say means are caused. — Harry Hindu

D'oh! I misread your statement. Apologies.

I said meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. (...) What they mean is the relationship between the scribbles existing and what caused them. — Harry Hindu

Still I disagree on this. My conviction is that linguistic meaning presupposes intentionality and intentionality can not be understood in causal terms for several reasons.
Here I limit myself to 3 and will leave it at that:
1. Causes and effects form an indefinitely long sequence of events, so in this chain of events start and end of a meaningful correlation (say between a sign and its referent) are identifiable only by presupposing the constitutive correlates of intentional states: namely subject (who would produce linguistic signs ) and object (which would be the referent of the linguistic sign).
2. “reference” between signs and referents is grounded on rule-based behavior that presupposes intentionality with its direction of fit, while causality has no direction of fit at all.
3. a sign can refer to things that do not exist, and things that do not exist can not cause anything

So beliefs would be an idea that something is true based on one observation, while knowledge would be something is true based on multiple observations that are integrated with logic. — Harry Hindu

Belief can be based on one or multiple observations, agreed. But this seems to contradict instead of supporting the idea that belief can be taken “in the form of their visual experiences”. Perceptual beliefs exceed the related visual experience: they are attitudes, but visual experiences are not attitudes. This should be true for both men and animals, to my understanding.

Russell, Gettier, and Moore all took JTB to task. — creativesoul

I don’t see what JTB about knowledge has to do with our understanding of belief ascriptions.

It's just that not all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes, and thus those exceptions cannot be sensibly rendered in those terms. That's what my broken clock example shows us, and quite clearly it seems to me. — creativesoul

Your understanding of belief ascriptions is biased by your philosophical understanding of propositional attitudes. While de dicto/de re belief ascriptions have an appropriate usage and make sanse to competent speakers independently from your ideas about propositional attitudes.
And there is a strong reason to prefer de dicto belief ascriptions over de re ascriptions b/c the former ones generally explain better believers’ intentional behavior, than the latter (assumed they are both correct).

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it! — creativesoul

Your claim is misleading for 2 reasons: 1. De re belief ascriptions make absolutely sense in some cases (e.g. when we try to solve belief ascriptions ambiguities wrt other subjects’ contextual and shared background understanding of the situation [1]), yet it’s not correctness the ground for de-re belief ascriptions! 2. Your de re belief ascription about Jack is based on a de-contextualised assumption that the description “that brocken clock” is correct by hypothesis (an assumption that nobody would take for granted in controversial real cases b/c even your belief ascriptions are beliefs after all!).


[1]
A toddler runs toward a woman walking with her partner in a park, the toddler’s father runs after him, and, knowing that couple from the neighbourhood, explains to the surprised partner: “my son believes that your wife is his mum”. Of course the toddler knows nothing about the marital relationship between the partner and the woman, he doesn’t even have the concept of “marriage”, nor “motherhood” for that matter, as shared by adults, therefore the father’s belief ascription is not de dicto (what would be a de dicto rendering of that toddler’s belief?), yet this de re belief ascription is epistemologically plausible to the father and the couple based on their background and shared understanding of the situation.

When translating languages, that is what is translated - the state-of-affairs the scribbles refer to. — Harry Hindu

Not sure about that. Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently.

Meaning, however, is not arbitrary. It is the relationship between cause and effect. What some scribble means is what caused it to exist on the paper or on the screen. It is caused by a mind — Harry Hindu

The idea that “a mind” is causing “scribble means” doesn’t sound right to me.
“Scribbles” may be the kind of entities that can be caused, but “means” are not caused, nor can be rendered in causal terms.

So non-language creatures have beliefs in that they learn by making observations and what they learn is what they believe to be the case in other similar states-of-affairs. Their beliefs are not in the form of propositions, but the visual experiences they had. The same goes for scribble-using humans, and is how they learned a language in the first place by believing that scribbles can be used to refer to what is the case or not. You have to believe that before you can begin using scribbles. — Harry Hindu

I’m inclined to agree with you in general, but the devil is in the details. So, I agree that animal cognitive skills and consequent behavior are much more constrained by their experience than human cognitive skills are. Yet it doesn’t sound right to me to claim that animals’ beliefs are “in the form of their visual experiences”. The problem is that experience (visual or other) doesn’t seem to be enough to grant belief (see the case of optical illusions like the Müller-Lyer illusion [1]: the 2 arrows keep looking different in length even if one correctly believes that they have the same size), therefore animals’ beliefs too are not necessarily nor tightly coupled with their experiences.
Besides the claim that human’s beliefs are “in the form of propositions” does sound right, at least in part. However I would complement it by saying that a belief in propositional form is just a belief that is expressed through a declarative sentence, i.e. through a specific linguistic behavior, that doesn’t imply that humans are equipped only of propositional beliefs.


[1]

1. Are pictures/images propositions? — Agent Smith

Good question. Here is another one: if all propositions can be rendered in linguistic form, then what proposition would correspond to the following image?

Mind independent abstract entities seems to be a contradiction. Abstractions are defined as existing as an idea and not as physical or concrete. So how can something that is abstract be mind independent? — Harry Hindu

Many philosophers take the technical notion “abstract entity” to mean something that is not the result of some mental operation (“abstraction”). According to them “abstract entities” are to be contrasted to “concrete entities”: indeed both of them are real (i.e. mind-independent) entities , the difference (at least according to many) is that abstract entities are not located in space and time, and they are causally inert, while concrete entities are located in space and time (or at least, in time) and are not causally inert. Propositions, numbers, sets are often taken to be some common cases of abstract entities by those who believe in their existence. So for example, while a sentence is a concrete entity, the proposition that the sentence is meant to represent would be an abstract entity of the sort I’ve just described. Frege seems to have proposed this view.

This sounds like what I was hinting at here:

What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu — Harry Hindu

Yes it does.

creativesoul's reminder of "rigid designators" is misleading. Kripke's theory of rigid designators was supposed to address the logic distinction between proper names and decriptions, and to argue against the Russellian's analysis of proper names in terms of descriptions: now, "broken clock" is a description not a proper name.
Besides we shouldn't take Kripke's theory for granted. And indeed I don't.

de re belief ascriptions can be less ambiguously rendered in the following form:
S believes of X that p
E.g. Jack believes of that broken clock that is working
The reason being that in this form, the reference to X is put within the semantic scope of the one who is making the belief ascription instead of the scope of Jack's beliefs themselves.

Other examples to consider:
a1) Jack believes that Alice loves Jim
a2) Jack believes that Jim is loved by Alice
b1) Jack believes that Alice is the sister of Jim
b2) Jack believes that Jim is the brother of Alice

Do a1 and a2 express the same belief?
Do b1 and b2 express the same belief?

That gives me a nice place to start. I'll have a look at Sense and Reference. — ZzzoneiroCosm

creativesoul's ideas about belief ascriptions sound not only preposterous (and justifiably so for me), but also very dangerous: e.g. imagine some christian reported the belief of a high muslim mufti as “he believes that Allah is Jesus” because christians take Jesus to truly co-refere to god. And it doesn't matter if christians' religious beliefs are truly true, because as long they believe they are, they are allowed to make belief ascriptions the way creativesoul is suggesting. Indeed belief ascriptions are second order beliefs, and also description/name coreference is matter of belief, that is why we can't simply overlook de dicto belief ascriptions. De re belief ascriptions, are only apparently so, and when we use them appropriately this becomes more evident.

I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition — ZzzoneiroCosm

The philosophical debate about propositions starts (or should start) from some strong intuitions that should be readily acknowledged by all competent speakers. That doesn’t mean that they are rationally justified, it simply means that philosophical accounts are supposed to neither deny nor underestimate the strength of these intuitions, but to take them as a starting point for their analysis and explanations. Here are at least some strong intuitions:
1. All the following statements say “the same” in different languages:
That apple is on the table (in English)
La pomme est sur la table (in French)
Der Apfel ist auf dem Tisch (in German)
2. All the following statements are about “the same” based on name/description coreference (I.e. “that red apple” and “that Fuji apple” co-refere to the same apple):
That red apple is on the table
That Fuji apple is on the table
3. All the following statements report different types of attitude from different subjects toward “the same”:
Jim sees that apple is on the table
Sally states that apple is on the table
Jack believes that apple is on the table
Cindy does not believe that apple is on the table
Billy hopes that apple is on the table

Alice orders that apple should be on the table
4. In any belief ascription (e.g. “Jack believes that apple is on the table”), what the belief is about is “the same” as what the statement (related to the belief ascription’s subordinate clause) is about (e.g. “that apple is on the table”)

What is “the same” in all 4 strong intuitions? “Propositions” some/many/most philosophers say, but this is a theory-laden notion and it depends on the theory of proposition one supports (I would suggest you to read Frege’s “Sense and reference” to have a better grasp on the issue).

I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition — ZzzoneiroCosm

Well, I’m not very familiar with his views (which he also revised over time) so I’m not sure how to answer. As far as I’ve understood, Moore initially takes propositions to be mind-independent abstract entities (a view that was probably inspired by Frege’s views) that constitute the objects of our thoughts and the meanings of our statements. My understanding of meaning (in semantics) is highly influenced by Wittgenstein’s views (as reported in his “Philosophical Investigations”), so for me meanings are not mind-independent abstract entities, but rules that present themselves in the course of actual and contextual linguistic practices: this implies that meanings are neither mind-independent, nor practice independent, besides they are not “objects” of thought since they regulate how we think about “objects”, they kind of operate in our thinking when we think more than being things that we consult in order to think.
So “proposition” for me is just a notion that we use for an a-posteriori semantic/logic formalisation of our language, in the same way we use the notion of “name” and “verb” for an a-posteriori grammar formalisation of our language.

Jack believed that the clock was working and believed that "the clock is working" is true. Your insertion of the adjective 'stopped' muddies the waters: it adds a perspective: it adds the perspective of some X that knows the clock is stopped.


(Again, I won't be hurt if you don't want to engage. If I can't play with others I'm content to play with myself :sweat: ) — ZzzoneiroCosm

↪ZzzoneiroCosm
You beat me to it! Of course Jack didn't know the clock was stopped. So he didn't believe a stopped clock was working, he believed a clock was workin — Janus

I made the same observation a while ago.

Be well. — creativesoul

You too along with your mentor

I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism. — creativesoul

I didn't ask for help, I asked you how you understand the relation between the notion of "belief" and the one of "concept". You retorted the question to me and I drafted an answer. Now should be your turn in answering the question I asked, right? If you are not interested to continue the exchange, just tell me. It's simpler, more honest and more respectful of each others' time.

I'm afraid that I left the reader to draw the conclusion... — creativesoul

Therefore, he believed that a broken clock was working. — creativesoul

If you don't care to argue better than this nor to address my points, I guess I'm done here.

I mean what I write. Let's focus there. — creativesoul

Sure, but again I’m interested to understand better what kind of substantial issues your claims are supposed to address. For the same reason I asked you another question that you didn’t answer yet: how is your distinction (between what belief is about and content of belief) supposed to work when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far)?

Evidently, we've very different standards regarding what counts as a "better report" of Jack's belief — creativesoul

I don’t think so, despite your claim: indeed if we stick to your other claim - “I mean what I write” - in a previous post you reported Jack’s belief as “he believes that a broken clock was working” which is a contradictory belief, while now you report his belief as “he believed that that particular clock was working” (i.e. the same way I would do) which is not contradictory. Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe.
I can readily grant you that you can make a de re/de dicto distinction in Jack’s belief about the clock but it’s still the “de dicto” rendering that is supposed to better show what Jack believes based on his own understanding of the situation.

The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about. — creativesoul

Well so far it shows just your terminological preferences. What substantial issues they are supposed to clarify is another question.
Anyhow, I am familiar with the literature where “reference” is attributed to names (e.g. Frege “Sense and Reference”). But Frege has no problems to talk about the reference of sentences either. Now, I can stick to that terminology, yet the reason why I feel justified to export the term “reference” outside the realm of semantics, it’s because semantics is grounded in intentionality as much as belief in the realm of epistemology. And, if we can talk about the content of a sentence, or what a sentence is about, or the reference of a sentence as much as we can can talk about the content of a belief and what is the belief about, then I don’t see any strong substantial reasons to prevent us from talking about the reference of a belief.
Additionally, I don’t know how much the distinction you make between “the content of belief” and “what belief is about” is supported in the literature: can you pls provide some reference?

he believes that a broken clock was working — creativesoul

That doesn’t sound a correct report of Jack’s belief. Indeed it would make Jack’s belief contradictory. A better report would be: Jack believes that clock is working. But that belief is false.
Anyway what you mean is that the difference between “content of belief” and “what belief is about” is related to the distinction between how things are and how things appear to Jack?
If so, before commenting on this further, I would like to know how your distinction works when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far). In this case, what is the content of the belief?

Name some things that you count as a concept, and it will help this along better. — creativesoul

I take the word “concept” as referring to some cognitive abilities presupposed by belief ascription. For now all I’m inclined to add is that concepts essentially involve classificatory intentional abilities (i.e. they can not be reduced to causal explanations) of some kind. What kind? I do not have a clear and straightforward answer to that, I’m still thinking about it. However I leave it open the question if concepts require linguistic abilities (surely linguistic concepts do). Yet I’m inclined to think this is not the case: i.e. what I would take to be conceptual consists in what classificatory features linguistic and non-linguistic concepts share. Related to this, I think there can be non-propositional beliefs, while there can not be non-conceptual beliefs.
To not get lost in uninteresting terminological controversies, I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures.

I do not use the notion, finding different ways of talking to be more practical. — creativesoul

What other ways did you find? Could you provide examples?

The concept of belief and belief...

Do you draw a distinction? — creativesoul

I do. Who doesn’t?

Note he asked the referent of the belief, not the word "belief". Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do. — creativesoul

It wasn’t clear to me since "the cat believes the bowl is empty” could be taken as mentioning a sentence not as using it to describe whatever is supposed to be the case. However your reply is misleading as well in this respect, because I would grant that the question doesn’t make sense if the question presupposes a categorisation of belief as a word with some referent instead of an intentional state. And this would be a categorial mistake: beliefs are not words (but is there anybody here who would believe otherwise? If not, then what's the interest in asking this question wrt to the topic under discussion?). Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you? If it is case for you too, then your previous claim was wrong, indeed it does make sense to ask what the reference of a belief is and the plausible answer would be a description of whatever a specific belief is concretely about. On the other side if you disagree, how else do you understand the different meaning of “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to”?

Indeed, we do draw correlations when imagining, remembering, creating, envisioning, dreaming, etc. I fail to see how that presents any issue for the position I'm putting forth here. I mean, I've not claimed that all correlations are belief, nor would I. — creativesoul

Let’s focus. You wrote: “All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”. First of all, to me beliefs do not consist of correlations drawn, but at best of drawing correlations. The second point is that I’m not satisfied with the latter formulation either, not because it's utterly wrong but because at best it provides a necessary condition, it certainly is not necessary and sufficient for belief ascription.
Another potential source of contention could come also from clarifying what kind of ability the expression “drawing correlations” is supposed to mean. But pls let’s ignore this last point for now.
I'm just fine if you agree on the first 2 points I made.

Are those meaningful marks imperceptible? When one believes that 3 + 2 = 5, they've done nothing more than accept the rules of arithmetic. It may be worth noting here that numbers are nothing more than the names of quantities. When one believes that God is omniscient, they've done nothing more than learn to use language to talk about the supernatural beliefs of the community, and believe that what they are saying is true. Believing that God is omniscient is to believe that there is a God, such that God exists, and that God knows everything. — creativesoul

It seems to me here you are confusing the perceptual nature of our representations with what they are about. The belief that God is omniscient or that 3 + 2 = 5 [1] are about something that doesn’t look to be perceptible in nature even if those beliefs can be rendered through perceptible statements. So the correlation of meaningful perceptible marks doesn’t imply that what it represents is a correlation between perceptible things. Unless you can clarify how.


[1] I'm not sure that arithmetic beliefs are best understood as beliefs about something to be the case. But for now I pretend to be they are.

What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno

The question makes no sense on my view. — creativesoul

I disagree. The referent of the word "belief" is a cognitive intentional state/event (depending on the dispositional or actual meaning we attribute to the word "belief").

Beliefs are complex things composed of other things. They are a result of cognitive processes. All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things. — creativesoul

My impression is that here you are confusing the content of the belief, with the belief. I think your formulation would sound better if you stated "All belief consists of drawing correlations" instead of "All belief consists of correlations drawn". Yet I wouldn't find it satisfactory: we draw correlations even when we imagine or associate ideas, but imagination is not belief. Besides what is "correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things" supposed to mean when one believes that 3 + 2 = 5 or God is omniscient?

Do you find the account I set out in the first three posts of the debate to be a complete one? — creativesoul

To me, they are enough to seriously challenge Banno's account as he presented it so far. But as I said, we can determine our views on beliefs better by clarifying other related notions, like proposition, concept, reference, perception, sentence, etc. That’s why I’m interested now to explore your understanding of the relation between beliefs and concepts.

On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

On what grounds do you believe that all concepts are linguistic constructs? What are the features you ascribe to concepts that essentially require language?

Care to further discuss the topic, as compared/contrasted to my interlocutor? — creativesoul

I don't see how we can further it. I and you seem to agree on points that he fails to address. And apparently proudly so.

I have a question more about your own views, but maybe that's not the place to discuss it: how do you see the relation between concepts and beliefs?

↪neomac
Be interesting and you might warrant a reply. — Banno

Well I'm just afraid that this one is by far the best reply you can come up with on the topic under discussion, sir.

@creativesoul,

Banno is excellent at engaging others — creativesoul

so far with half-backed stipulations and random links which he doesn't even care to support or understand. mmmkey.

Or he could try to claim that indeed the content of the proposition can not be rendered with "the proposition X is true" — neomac

Poorly articulated, sorry, I meant: or he could try to claim that, in this case, the propositional content of the belief that the present King of France is bald can not be rendered with "'the present King of France is bald' is true" but with "'the present King of France is bald' is a proposition"

@creativesoul

If "The present King of France is bald" is not a proposition, and yet it can be believed nonetheless, then it cannot be the case that either all belief has propositional content or all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or other. — creativesoul

Indeed this is what I already remarked in my previous comment:

You mean your pointless challenge: " If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example".
What about this example: X believes that the present King of France is bald. Did I win anything? — neomac

Maybe he could try to claim that either X doesn't really believe that, which is intuitively preposterous and justifiably so. Or he could try to claim that, in this case, the propositional content of the belief that the present King of France is bald can not be rendered with "'the present King of France is bald' is true" but with "'the present King of France is bald' is a proposition" . However this line of reasoning looks an ad hoc move, at least until it doesn't get properly integrated with the rest of his account (good luck with that!). Besides the metalinguistic sentence "p is a proposition" is not a proposition according to W.'s Tractatus. And we are more and more far from understanding how such an account could ever explain what a belief is about and explain the related behavior not only for non-linguistic creature but also for irrational/ignorant linguistic creature.

@Banno
I've argued at length and to the point what I think about your arguments. While you didn't serve me with the same treatment, instead you are continually dodging my direct challenges to your views, with cheap excuses and attack ad personam. Despite the treatment, I don't take it personally as much as you do. So I'm still waiting for a more focused feedback on my last comments about your views. I'm even ready to thank you for the effort, go figure ;)

@Banno

You can quote someone by highlighting their text; a pop up will appear that will link their name and the text. — Banno

Unless there is a specific reason to adopt it, I still prefer my way of quoting. Anyway thanks for the hint.

> If I were half as good a teacher as @creativesoul suggests, he would have been convinced of the error of his ideas long ago.

Unless he too was just being sarcastic. Just kidding.

> You have come in after what is literally years of discussion.

Well that's an open forum, I'm afraid this happens especially if anybody is invited to debate.

> To suggest that I have not provided "some good philosophical arguments" is puerile.

No sir, I didn't mean to suggest that you didn't come up with "some good philosophical arguments" at all in your entire life. I didn't find good arguments in the posts I've read from the formal debate entitled "The content of beliefs is propositional" (Banno and creativesoul). Therefore I quoted your remarks literally and explained my doubts.

> I wonder, did you perhaps miss the debate from whence this discussion came?

I don't remember if I read this specific post that you are linking. But it doesn't add any argument to better support the claims I quoted and commented. On the contrary I found just more claims to question.

> you do not seem to be addressing what I actually wrote, so much as a half-understood inference from the writing of other folk.

Let me repeat it once more: I didn't find good arguments in the posts I've read from the formal debate entitled "The content of beliefs is propositional" (Banno and creativesoul). Therefore I quoted your remarks literally and explained my doubts.
So I am exactly addressing what you wrote. While we can't say the same of your claims about what I wrote. Can we? Indeed you never even quoted any of my last comments to your statements on the subject under discussion.

> It looks like it will be a slow wet day, so while I have no great desire to further flog this dead horse, I might rely if addressed directly.

You mean your pointless challenge: " If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example".
What about this example: X believes that the present King of France is bald. Did I win anything?
You are forcing us to play a rigged game based on some unjustified assumptions. And when one is addressing what is wrong in your assumptions, in challenging them with the same question, you are implicitly accusing them of cowardly refusing to play your game. This looks either puerile or dishonest, to me.

> Bye the bye, this supercilious style is intended to get on your goat. It keeps me as the centre of attention.
Now it's your turn to address my last comments to your statements on the subject under discussion.
From my exchange with @creativesoul (the notes are quotations of your own statements @Banno):

- If proposition is a “more abstract entity” [1] supposed to be “common between certain statements”, then proposition are not statements, and they are not interchangeable with statements, yet he prefers to talk in terms of propositions as “statements that can be either true or false” [2]. Well if they are statements then they can not at the same time be intrinsic truth bearers and the content of our beliefs, why? Because believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true, yet “the cup is on the shelf” and "la taza está en el estante" have the same truth value.
- Commands and desires are also considered propositional attitudes but they have satisfaction conditions not truth conditions as beliefs. And as long as beliefs and desires can express different attitudes toward the same propositions, propositions themselves are not intrinsically truth bearers by themselves [2], but only dependently on the direction-of-fit conferred by the intentional attitude.
- The manifest inconsistency of claiming that beliefs about statements are exactly the same as beliefs about the way things are [3] has been already spotted by you. But his other formulations elsewhere [4] turned out to be even more preposterous because claiming that beliefs are about how we think things are is exactly like saying beliefs are about how we believe things are (kind of intrinsically reflexive beliefs).
- He claims that both beliefs [5] and state of affairs [6] can be put in the form of a proposition, but if the possibility of putting in propositional form a belief is enough to claim that belief have propositional content, then it should be also enough to claim that state of affairs have propositional content. And since propositions are sentences that can be true or false [7], then also state of affairs can be true or false as much as beliefs can be, thanks to their propositional content.
- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.
- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.
- If belief is a way to explain action [12][13] and cats do not show human linguistic skills, how could one possibly explain Lilly’s behavior by attributing to her a belief that a certain sentence about her environment is true? However this sounds too preposterous and it’s probably not what he means, what he more probably means is instead that the human capacity of rendering Lilly’s beliefs through sentences that can be true or false is what explains Lilly’s behavior. Which sounds as preposterous, doesn’t it?


[1] Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition.

[2] My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable

[3] To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; to deny this is to deny that our statements are about the way things are.

[4] Saying that beliefs have propositional content is nothing more than saying that beliefs are about how we think things are.

[5] that every belief has propositional content does not imply that every belief has indeed been put in propositional form.

[6] It should be clear from the preceding discussion that while it is not the case that every proposition has been stated, every possible state of affairs can be put in the form of a proposition.

[7] Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. Since there is no present King of France, he can be neither bald nor hirsute. "The present king of France is bald" is not the sort of sentence that can be true or false.

[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …
The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs…

[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.

[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.

[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true.

[12] Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away. This is at least part of what belief is about: that our actions follow from our beliefs, that what we do, we do in the light of what we hold to be true.

[13] My own inclination is more towards beliefs being a way of talking about, and hence explaining, our actions; that is, that they are not things stored so much as interpretations of what we do.

@Banno

> It's wryly amusing to find oneself again the topic of discussion.
And the good news is that I didn't finish yet.

> For a negotiated fee I will appear as a special guest speaker.
I'm afraid @creativesoul's cornucopia of ceremonious compliments to you are all you are going to get, sir.

Sarcasm is surely fun, so pls go ahead. It's simply that if you could add some good philosophical arguments on top of it, it would be even more fun.

@creativesoul

Thanks a lot for your feedback and pls take your time in commenting whatever I said you find worth it.

Just let me add that your understanding of his views seem more charitable and probably more accurate than mine due to your past exchanges with him.
Yet I’m still reluctant to agree with what you claim in his defense because:
- I have no reason to indulge in his over-confidence. The content of a belief is what the belief is actually about, while his clearly trying hard to identify the content of a belief based on the ways what a belief is about can be (meta)linguistically rendered or based on its logic implications/equivalences (like if p implies “p” is true or p can be rendered as “p” is true, then the content of believing in p is “p” is true) and based on that explain the related behavior. I find that simply preposterous.
- If we are not clear on what proposition or propositional form or propositional content are supposed to mean and how they relate to beliefs or state of affairs or behaviors, it’s hard to understand what we agree or disagree on.

@Athena

Thanks a lot for the additional information! I think that your manifest passion and knowledge could be better shared on a dedicated blog where to collect your forum posts, thoughts and findings on these topics. This would certainly let others better explore/assess/popularize your views. If you already did, I'd definitely like to have the link because I've been always fascinated by the subject "family", maybe more from an anthropological and sociological point of view, than from a political or moral point of view, but that's why I also see your approach as complementary.

@creativesoul

I read your three posts, and I’m inclined to agree on all points. Still the comments of @Banno to them look pretty messy to me both in addressing your points and in providing a consistent account on his own terms.
Since you abundantly discussed the former issue already I would like to take a closer look at his own view. I would appreciate if you could give me your feedback on my remarks (notes are quotations of his statements).

- If proposition is a “more abstract entity” [1] supposed to be “common between certain statements”, then proposition are not statements, and they are not interchangeable with statements, yet he prefers to talk in terms of propositions as “statements that can be either true or false”. Well if they are statements then they can not at the same time be intrinsic truth bearers and the content of our beliefs, why? Because believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true, yet “the cup is on the shelf” and "la taza está en el estante" have the same truth value.
- Commands and desires are also considered propositional attitudes but they have satisfaction conditions not truth conditions as beliefs. And as long as beliefs and desires can express different attitudes toward the same propositions, propositions themselves are not intrinsically truth bearers by themselves [2], but only dependently on the direction-of-fit conferred by the intentional attitude.
- The manifest inconsistency of claiming that beliefs about statements are exactly the same as beliefs about the way things are [3] has been already spotted by you. But his other formulations elsewhere [4] turned out to be even more preposterous because claiming that beliefs are about how we think things are is exactly like saying beliefs are about how we believe things are (kind of intrinsically reflexive beliefs).
- He claims that both beliefs [5] and state of affaires [6] can be put in the form of a proposition, but if the possibility of putting in propositional form a belief is enough to claim that belief have propositional content, then it should be also enough to claim that state of affaires have propositional content. And since propositions are sentences that can be true or false [7], then also state of affaires can be true or false as much as beliefs can be, thanks to their propositional content.
- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.
- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.
- If belief is a way to explain action [12][13] and cats do not show human linguistic skills, how could one possibly explain Lilly’s behavior by attributing to her a belief that a certain sentence about her environment is true? However this sounds too preposterous and it’s probably not what he means, what he more probably means is instead that the human capacity of rendering Lilly’s beliefs through sentences that can be true or false is what explains Lilly’s behavior. Which sounds as preposterous, doesn’t it?


[1] Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition.

[2] My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable

[3] To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; to deny this is to deny that our statements are about the way things are.

[4] Saying that beliefs have propositional content is nothing more than saying that beliefs are about how we think things are.

[5] that every belief has propositional content does not imply that every belief has indeed been put in propositional form.

[6] It should be clear from the preceding discussion that while it is not the case that every proposition has been stated, every possible state of affairs can be put in the form of a proposition.

[7] Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. Since there is no present King of France, he can be neither bald nor hirsute. "The present king of France is bald" is not the sort of sentence that can be true or false.

[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …
The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs…

[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.

[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.

[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true.

[12] Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away. This is at least part of what belief is about: that our actions follow from our beliefs, that what we do, we do in the light of what we hold to be true.

[13] My own inclination is more towards beliefs being a way of talking about, and hence explaining, our actions; that is, that they are not things stored so much as interpretations of what we do.

@Athena

Thanks a lot for your feedback and the references!

> I lost my best source of information about what Eisenhower did to embed the MIC

Isn't Eisenhower also the one who warned the US about the danger of the MIC?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gg-jvHynP9Y

@creativesoul

> I will say this, the question itself is based upon the belief that all those things mentioned are concepts. I do not share that belief.

In this context I used the term “concept” as equivalent to “notion” so not in theoretically loaded terms as to categorize the type of referents of those notions. And therefore I see this use in this context as philosophically neutral and harmless.

> Banno and I are in agreement regarding historical use of these terms.

Well I don’t know much about your reciprocal knowledge and terminological agreements. And I didn’t mean to interfere. I was just curious to understand better what these terminological agreements amount to, because I found your exchange stimulating.

> We're much the same amount of Wittgensteinian, in that regard.

Well I'm not sure yet what you mean by that, I don't k now if you are referring to some Wittgensteinian approach (in this respect we can say at least that there is the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations [1]) or stance on specific topics, in this case which ones and how you would understand that stance. Anyways this is a marginal issue wrt the current topic so let's just drop it.

[1] In both cases I don't think e.g. that Wittgenstein believed in fregian propositions

@Banno

> Yeah, come on, @creativesoul, write us an explanation of how the whole world works. Preferably in less than a hundred words.

Your sarcasm is understandable but there is a specific reason for my request. Indeed in the literature these notions can be all related in a way that it is not possible to understand one without reference to others: e.g. the notion of “proposition” and that of “concept” are related if one understands proposition as a mental representation made of a combination of concepts, the notion of “proposition” and that of “belief” too are related if one understands proposition as a mental attitude toward propositions, etc.
I wasn’t looking for arguments but more for some terminological coordinates to better understand his exchange with you.

> What this shows is that you have not understood how the word "proposition" is used

I can admit it was just poor phrasing. My skepticism is more related to the metaphysics of propositions e.g. fregian propositions. For me propositions are just abstract representations resulting from metalinguistic analysis on the truth-functionality of our descriptive statements. So there are no “propositions” as mind-independent entities, nor as original bearers of truth values. Since propositions for me require developed human linguistic skills then they can not constitute the content of perceptions.

> The only out you might make would be to vacillate between propositional truth and "true" as in "accurate", which you verge on.

Indeed, I think that perceptions have mind to world “accuracy” conditions.

> However I expect that accuracy is ultimately parsed in proposition terms. The plank is true if it conforms to specifiable criteria.

Whatever you think you are parsing in proposition terms: 1. Either that content wasn’t a proposition before that parsing, but if that content wasn’t already representational without being a proposition, the parsing would be arbitrary, and there would be no criteria for establishing if the parsing was correct or not. 2. Or it was already a proposition then there is no need for parsing.

Besides, can you clarify what you mean by proposition? There are different ways of understanding it.