Well, do you know what lead up to the invasion of the Ukraine. If not don't waste my time. — boagie

It's been a long thread. You didn't say anything we didn't hear already a thousand times.
Being you pro-Russian, it would be more interesting if you told us where the Russian propaganda about the genesis and the purpose of this war may be wrong.

The goal is to drip feed arms to Ukraine enough to prop it up in order to damage Russia (which may not even be happening), super charge arms profiteering both directly to Ukraine as well as indirectly by creating a new Cold War, protect the USD from the Euro by having the Europeans destroy their competitiveness and fully prostrate themselves as meaningless vassals on the world stage. — boethius

What will be the goal (in Ukraine) if Trump wins the elections? Can you predict that too?

I don’t want to share that yet because it is too premature. — Bob Ross

Unfair enough.

It could be the case that no one is morally justified in sacrificing that child and that the child would have, if they were the sole survivor, no feasible living arrangement afterwards.

Perhaps this factors into your moral reasoning though: to you, does that reason count in favor of potentially sacrificing the child? I don’t believe so. — Bob Ross

It would factor in my moral reasoning. Not sure that would be enough to reach my conclusion though, I’ll come back to this later.

That child nor I can use other people as a means to and end, even if that end is saving other people. I cannot throw you into a moving car to stop it from running over my child. — Bob Ross

People as a means to an end? We find it permissible to hire people as a means to an end which is making our own living as much as they make their own living by doing business with us, and some may find morally permissible even to do business over currently illegal jobs like prostitution, selling organs, dealing drugs.
How about living creatures, animals? Can you torture and kill animals as a means to people’s end? One might obviously argue that we already do this, we eat animals after all, and the food industry from start to end is a torturing experience for animals. So what makes human beings so special?

if we must choose, would it be permissible to have child X to be safe at the expense of the rest of the human species to be immediately annihilated?

My answer would also be no. — Bob Ross

You have the choice to refrain from actively violating someone’s rights in both scenarios: what you don’t have control over is the predestined stipulations of the thought-experiment. You can say no and simply not be morally blameworthy for the annihilation of the human species (by my lights). — Bob Ross

But if the premises of your thought experiment are:
- your choice determines the fate of humanity
- the moral rule is something like “do not sacrifice any life to save another for whatever reason in all possible scenarios” (so it is neither permissible to sacrifice the remaining human species to save a child, nor to sacrifice a child to save the remaining human species)
Why am I not blameworthy for the annihilation of the remaining human species, exactly? My choice to sacrifice the remaining human species as a means to save a child would still break the rule “do not sacrifice any life to save another for whatever reason in all possible scenarios”.
There is no room for distinguishing choice abstention from choosing to sacrifice (not to mention that even abstentions are often perceived as morally blameworthy).

what lesson do you wish to draw from this hypothetical predicament?


Is consequentialist normative ethical theories valid in any scenario? That’s the question. — Bob Ross

I’m reluctant to accept the distinction between consequentialism and deontology because I’m not sure to find it intelligible. Sometimes we reason in terms of rules as it happens with non-moral rules, like when playing games according to conventional rules. Sometimes we reason in terms of consequences or instrumentally given certain goals. Other times we reason in terms of basic social norms: e.g. those related to human rights. But even basic social norms don’t need to be intrinsically and unconditionally compelling. How would I identify such “basic” norms? In hierarchical terms, if I see other social norms based on them. And/or in temporary terms, if I see social norms that vary, while these are preserved. And/or in psychological terms, how they have been internalised: as default behaviour/habit or degree of readiness to willingly sacrifice at least one’s or beloved ones’ comfort and life for the sake of it. Your deontological position seems to me focusing on cases testing such internalisation/commitment in some form toward other people as people. What I would find more interesting is to explicit the reasons for such internalisation/commitment and to what extent they are taken/expected to be universal.

you cannot violate that child’s rights, period. Doesn’t make baby hitler right in doing atrocities later in life, but we cannot violate peoples rights period; especially over ‘forseeable’ consequences of their existence (which I find really unreliable, but that’s irrelevant to my main point). — Bob Ross

OK, take a more real life case: abortion.
- Scenario 1: We may save either mother or baby during a difficult delivery, but not both. Yet we know the kid has developed a torturing and deadly disease which will make it die any time soon after birth, should we let the mother die so we are not blameworthy to kill the baby?
- Scenario 2: We may save either mother or kid, but not both, and if we do not intervene they both will die. Killing a mother/baby even to save the other is immoral, so we let both die but we wouldn’t be blameworthy for it?

Metaethically, I would say there aren’t any moral facts. With respect to normative ethics, I would say we must treat persons with respect as objects of intrinsic respect. Admittedly, I am still working out the details. — Bob Ross

You can at least draft arguments for why people must follow what you claim to be “moral rules”, can’t you?

I merely created a thought experiment taking this to its extreme: what if, right now, we had to perpetually torture a child (and I will let you use your imagination on what exactly is done to them) to prevent the immediate annihilation of the entire human species — Bob Ross

I am puzzled by your thought experiment. As it is formulated, it seems that the two scenarios are, respectively, one in which a single child X is annihilated and/or tortured while the rest of the human species is not immediately annihilated. The other scenario is one in which the entire human species (including millions of other children), including child X, is immediately annihilated. In other words, in both scenarios that child won’t be safe anyways. Even if you meant that in at least one scenario the child would be safe, one may wonder: how would a child even live and evolve as a psychologically and biologically sound human being if the rest of humanity would be immediately annihilated?

Even if we want to put aside our suspension of disbelief (but why exactly?), I would also wonder: if we must choose, would it be permissible to have child X to be safe at the expense of the rest of the human species to be immediately annihilated? Because if neither killing/torturing a child is permissible even when the rest of humanity would be safe, nor having the rest of humanity safe at the expense of killing/torturing a child, and we must choose anyways (why exactly?), what lesson do you wish to draw from this hypothetical predicament? If your thought experiment was designed to lead to a moral choice paralysis, I do wonder: what’s even the point of moral reasoning over thought experiments designed to fail in guiding choice and action exactly?

BTW, since we put aside our suspension of disbelief, we can be more fancy in elaborating the original thought experiment: let’s imagine that that child X whom nobody is permitted to sacrifice, is somebody who will soon develop a torturing mortal disease for natural causes and die atrociously even if the rest of the human species was immediately annihilated to save the child, or that the child is a psychopath who enjoys torturing living creatures before killing them for the rest of his life or a Hitler on steroids which will torture and exterminate the entire human species anyways and repeatedly if he only had the chance. What would be morally legitimate to do? What if the lesson we draw from the thought experiment varies remarkably depending on how the thought experiment is construed?

The problem is not much that there is a moral rule (where?!) that says “do not torture or kill any child ever for whatever reason” but more why would we be committed to such rule exactly? Saying because it is moral, it would shift the problem: how did this rule get the label “moral” in the first place? What is there in claiming “morality” that would me make me feel (?!) or taken (?!) to be committed to it or compelled BY DEFAULT and without consulting me first? And if it is not that what is implied, what else is exactly?

At this point the West has its own persisting issues with NATO which the enlargement didn't fix:
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/01/trump-2024-reelection-pull-out-of-nato-membership/676120/
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/15/i-haven-t-changed-my-number-macron-still-open-to-peace-dialogue-with-putin_6347805_4.html

Putin insists that his objectives are/were denazification, demilitarization, and neutral status of Ukraine.

So no Putin's intentions weren't just annexing Donbas, Crimea and a land bridge.

↪neomac
This isn't primarily a philosophical discussion.

If you want to have a philosophical discussion, at least be so forthright as to clearly indicate what question or topic you want to discuss, rather than throwing up semantic smokescreens. What you're doing now smells of deflection and sophistry. — Tzeentch

What I take to be a philosophical exercise is “to investigate very basic (mostly implicit) assumptions of somebody’s beliefs. ” Among such assumptions there is our basic (mostly implicit) conceptual framework. So addressing such conceptual framework and how it applies to concrete situations (like the war in Ukraine) is part of the philosophical investigation I’m engaging in. The fact that you take as “semantic smokescreens”, “deflection”, “sophistry” what I find legitimate to philosophically question in this forum proves at best how self-evident you take your conceptual framework to be. So much so that you don’t feel the need to clarify better any of your claims even when expressly and repeatedly solicited. As far as I’m concerned, you expressed beliefs about:
- When this conflict “started”
- What “primarily caused” this war
- What Europe or Ukraine “should do”
- The distinction between “colloquial” evil and “moral” evil
- The distinction between “moral” claims and “strategic” claims
- The nature of States as “abstractions and not moral actors”
- The “right to self-defence” as grounded on “international law and not morality”
- Who is to blame
Your clarifications about such claims in our recent exchange were rather poor to me: labeling your normative claims as non-moral without clarifying on what grounds you discriminate between moral and non-moral is not that helpful. Nor is it helpful to clarify it by means of other ideas that I expressly find questionable (like “primary cause”, “strategy”). Besides you continue applying them in a way that I find rather confusing if not confused, like “Europe should not make itself complicit in such a senseless waste of life”, as I argued. And I wasn’t even trying to put all the burden of the clarification on your shoulder, see my comments on your idea of the “primary cause” of this war , or your idea of when the conflict started, or your idea about normative claims about strategy, or your idea about what is “senseless waste of life”, etc.
Notice also that I don’t find your accusation of “semantic smokescreens”, “deflection”, “sophistry” self-evident either, so I can legitimately challenge you to clarify such ideas as well. But I’m fine to discuss the points of my previous post, for now. This is also to say, that I wasn’t deflecting (from what exactly?), I was doing what I think it’s most certainly appropriate to do in this forum, even when talking about the war in Ukraine. But you do not need to take my word for it, because my comments and questions remain philosophically legitimate EVEN IF I was deflecting. So the point is not really about my intentions in trying to play the philosophical game (as I understand it), but if you are interested or not to play it independently from my intentions.

↪neomac
You think playing coy is a way to be taken seriously on this forum?

Ask me three honest and straightforward questions, and I'll answer them for you. I have no patience for whatever game you're trying to play. — Tzeentch

Dude, as far as I’m concerned, that’s a philosophy forum, not a political forum, not a military forum, not a Tzeench-certified forum. So I have no idea what philosophy is to you, but to me it is at least to investigate very basic (mostly implicit) assumptions of somebody’s beliefs. That’s the game I’m trying to play with you and others for my own personal intellectual entertainment, as I repeatedly stated in this thread. And that’s the game I expect others to try to play here, especially if they want me to take them seriously. So I addressed many “honest and straightforward questions” about your assumptions to you in my last post according to the game I’m trying to play. I don’t expect you to try to answer all of them at once. But if you really have no patience to the game I’m trying to play here then my “honest and straightforward question” to you is: Why should I (colloquially, morally, strategically, legally, or politically) give a shit about it exactly?

“Evil” in a moral sense? — neomac


No, 'evil' in a colloquial sense… — Tzeentch

“Colloquial”? Not sure to understand. Is, for example, covid evil in a colloquial sense?
How about examples of colloquially “necessary evil”? Vaccins are necessary evil for unnecessary evil covid?

...so why do you think “neocon foreign policy” deserves the title of “primary” cause of this war? — neomac


Because this conflict started when the United States (led by the neocon foreign policy establishment) expressed its desire to incorporate Ukraine into NATO, and they never over the course of some 15 years took Russia's objections seriously. — Tzeentch

That’s a very problematic claim for several reasons:
1 - the United States expressed their desire also in 2008, but grievances about the US involvement in Ukraine and the Soviet Union’s ex-sphere of influence started well before 2008 and before Putin. On the other hand, in 2008 it turned out that Western countries were reluctant to let Ukraine join NATO no matter what the American desire was. Besides the conflict with Russia didn’t turn into a “real” conflict until 2014, while the Westerners were still against Ukraine joining NATO (Russia’s could enjoy the support of France, Germany, Hungary, Turkey to veto this). Not to mention that we had Trump antagonising the West more than Russia. So there seem to be many starts here, and many conflicts involving the US’s desire to expand its sphere of influence in Ukraine which anyway weren’t sufficient to let Ukraine join NATO (and that also proves that the West took Russia’s security concerns seriously to the point of refusing Ukraine within NATO). BTW why did it take Russia so long to invade Ukraine if the provocation was so obvious and intolerable for 15 years?
2 - The idea that the conflict started with the US expressing “its desire to incorporate Ukraine into NATO” makes likely sense in Russian strategic perspective, not in the Ukrainian, American or Western perspective, because the West and Ukraine do not share Russia's strategic perspective as much as they don’t share the Russian national interest. For Ukraine, Russia may have likely started the conflict by protesting over its sovereignty and territorial integrity. For the US, the conflict may have likely started when Russia protested against the Western-led world order since the fall of Soviet Union. You can blame it on the neocon agenda as much as I can blame it on Russian imperialism which is much older than neocon agenda. And Russia couldn’t possibly expect that the US as the hegemon would refrain from “expressing DESIRES” because Russia demanded it, especially when Russia wasn’t still that scary. ESPECIALLY if the US wasn’t hostile toward Russia, because it offered globalization in return which empowered Russia (and made it scary as it is now) way more than the threat of Ukraine joining NATO weakened Russia economically and militarily. Am I right? Russia too didn't perceive NATO as significantly hostile since there NATO there were conjoint exercises with the Russians against Islamic terrorism (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_103663.htm) as the greatest security threat for the West and Russia. Right?
3 - We have repeatedly been told that Russians’ grievances started with the broken promise over NATO expansion, so by the same logic should we expect Russia will invade the ex-Warsaw pact states and ex-Soviet Union republics? Or should we just roll back NATO as requested by Putin in his diplomatic negotiations with the West to respect Russia’s strategic concerns seriously (https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-unveils-security-guarantees-says-western-response-not-encouraging-2021-12-17/)?
4 - I still don’t see the reason why you keep talking about “primary cause”. A possible alternative could be “primary reason“ instead of “primary cause”, couldn’t it? It would make sense to talk about primary reason if we take incorporating Ukraine into NATO as the primary security concern to Russia under certain assumptions (among which we must include Russia’s “hegemonic ambitions”). So I do wonder why you keep talking about “primary cause” instead of “primary reason”. Also a rapist “primary cause” for rape may be the raped teenager was dressed sexy. If somebody said "the teenager started her rapist’s aggression", would make this claim sense to you? What would be the point of making such claim exactly?

So states do not enjoy moral rights but they enjoy legal rights like right to self-defence? How so? — neomac


States are not moral actors, so they have no moral rights. Individuals have moral rights.

And states obviously have legal rights because virtually all states on the world have signed the UN charter and thus recognize the legitimacy of international law, which includes a right to national self-defense. — Tzeentch

I’m not sure you understood my question: “How come that the abstractness of the notion of ‘state’ allows a state to enjoy legal rights but not moral rights?”
Given your input, I can reformulate it as follows: states as abstract entities (which I charitably understand as “legal institutions”, am I wrong?) can’t possibly sign UN charters nor recognise the legitimacy of international law by themselves, while individual agents as state representatives can and do. Who signs is a concrete individual human being or a bunch of concrete individual human beings, not an abstract legal entity, right? But individuals as state representatives can still be morally and legally accountable, even if that involves an “abstract” institutional entity, right? If so, state representatives (like Putin, Biden, Zelensky) are morally and legally accountable based on acknowledged state rights.

Besides if you acknowledge that Ukraine has a legal right to self-defence and the West is not violating international laws by military supporting Ukraine, what should we do with the “provocation” accusation from Putin which doesn’t look neither moral nor legal, in your views? — neomac


I'm not sure what 'provocation accusation' you're talking about, — Tzeentch

I'm talking about this:

As you probably know, my view is that the Russians were provoked into invading Ukraine. — Tzeentch

It's clear to me that this war was purposefully provoked. — Tzeentch

but what Europe should do is pull the plug on military support for Ukraine. Helping another nation exercise their right to self-defense is only rational if it has a chance of succeeding. There is no such chance in the case of the Ukraine war, and thus Europe should not contribute to the illusion that Ukraine can win this war. Stopping the support will hopefully will bring Ukraine to stop sacrificing its people in vain sooner rather than later — Tzeentch

.

I still don’t get how come you keep talking about what Europe should do, so in normative terms, over legal institutions in other terms than legal. Apparently there are “strategic” normative claims besides “moral” and “legal” (and "colloquial"?), yet it’s not clear how you assess strategic normative claims. To me strategic normative claims in politics of national states should be processed by taking into account national states’ priorities in the long term: for example, Ukraine’s priority is to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity even at the expense of Russia’s hegemonic ambitions, for Russia is to pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and the US’s hegemony, for the US is to pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of its competitors (including Russia). Concerning Europe, AFAIU, the priority is to preserve political stability under American protection (which is why Europeans can sacrifice trade relations with Russia and China).
Besides I don’t know how you assess the chance for success in strategy (especially if military goals must be distinguished from political goals). Does Hamas have any chance of military/political success in fighting Israel’s occupation of Gaza? Is it rational for Palestinians to support Hamas? Why do many foreign states (including Western state) politically, economically and/or military support Palestinians if they have no chance of succeeding? Should Europeans stop financing Palestinians and stop acknowledging Palestine as a sovereign state?

If Ukraine wants to continue throwing its people's lives away, then that's their right. However, Europe should not make itself complicit in such a senseless waste of life. — Tzeentch

How can Europe be “complicit” if European states and EU are just legal entities and Europe is not violating international laws by supporting Ukraine? Are you talking in moral terms?
If it makes sense to them, why do you call it “senseless waste of life”?
Given your military analysis, I understand why you reached your conclusion. Yet I don’t think military analysis suffices to determine political choices. I suspect that it is the other way around. For the good and for the bad. In any case, it is hard to prove that costly choices in the present would repay well in the future. This is the Russian bet anyways and the challenge to the West.

Is Putin’s aggression of Ukraine pure “evil” or just “necessary evil”? — neomac


The war in Ukraine is completely pointless and a shining example of the unnecessary evil of states - all states involved, including the state of Ukraine itself. — Tzeentch

Is this still a strategic claim? Or a “colloquial” claim? Or a “moral” claim? Or a “legal” claim?

Why not in the same way? What is the difference? — neomac

The difference is that Russia tried to find a diplomatic solution, but was snubbed by the Americans on every occasion.
Israel on the other hand did everything it could to prevent a diplomatic solution. — Tzeentch

Is this some colloquial/moral/strategic/legal normative claim or a factual claim? Because if it is a factual claim, it is questionable (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_peace_process). Besides we do not know if diplomatic efforts would work with Russia, since Russia repeatedly threatened and violated Ukrainian’s sovereignty despite all past agreements. Agreements will give Russia the chance to stabilise its conquests and keep destabilising Ukraine.
Besides this shows another difference relevant for diplomatic solutions: Russia is threatening/violating Ukrainian sovereign integrity after repeatedly acknowledging it while Israel didn’t acknowledge Palestine as a sovereign state. The diplomatic solution sought by Russia is grounded on condoning a fundamental international law violation (territorial annexations) which even the Great Satan never dared to commit so far, right?

I'm a classic liberal in the practical sense, and an anarchist in an idealist sense.
For me, states are a 'necessary evil' at their very best, and more often than not just 'evil’. — Tzeentch

“Evil” in a moral sense? But if states are not moral agent, why do you call them “evil” or “necessarily evil”?
Are they evil in the same sense the covid pandemic is?

My arguments vis-á-vis Ukraine are not moral in nature, and the idea that this war is primarily caused by neocon foreign policy is not moral either.

Sometimes the sheer disgust I feel towards some of the clowns that inhabit the spheres of international politics shines through. Sue me. — Tzeentch

Those aren't moral 'shoulds' though, and attributing blame isn't necessarily moral in nature either. These are questions of cause & effect, strategy, etc. — Tzeentch

You mean the same disgust you would certainly feel toward the corona virus that has killed almost 7 million deaths (since Jan ’22) according to some estimates?
As far as I’m concerned, I find causal links very misleading in attributing responsibilities if we do not assume moral agency.
Indeed, how can you even determine that the war was primarily caused by neocon foreign policy instead of being primarily cause by what caused neocon foreign policy ? Or by what caused the cause of neocon foreign policy? O by what caused the cause of the cause of the neocon foreign policy?
In a pool of concurrent causes for this war haw do you determine what is primary and what is non-primary?
Wars are a very common pattern in the entire human history and most certainly well prior than the diffusion of “neocon foreign policy”, and we can find reasons for war across a wide range of incompatible regime driving ideologies, so why do you think “neocon foreign policy” deserves the title of “primary” cause of this war?

States are abstractions and not moral actors, so they have no moral rights.

As I said, morality is simply not a useful lens through which to evaluate the behavior of states.

Note that in the case of the Israel discussion, Israel has no legal right to self-defense, which is why the discussion shifted to the question of whether it had a moral right.

And no, of course my belief is not that Putin has a moral right to invade Ukraine.

For the purpose of this discussion I've always supposed Ukraine had a legal right to self-defense and that Russia's invasion is illegal, and never claimed otherwise. The basis for that is international law, and not morality. — Tzeentch

So states do not enjoy moral rights but they enjoy legal rights like right to self-defence? How so?
How come that the abstractness of the notion of “state” allows a state to enjoy legal rights but not moral rights?
Besides if you acknowledge that Ukraine has a legal right to self-defence and the West is not violating international laws by military supporting Ukraine,
what should we do with the “provocation” accusation from Putin which doesn’t look neither moral nor legal, in your views? Is Putin’s aggression of Ukraine pure “evil” or just “necessary evil”?

Let’s do another test, if I claimed: “Russia should stop illegally occupying Ukraine. That's an action that it can and should undertake unilaterally.
They should stop illegally occupying Ukraine, and stop committing human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity. As long as Russia is the occupier and refuses to carry out the relevant UN resolutions, RUSSIA IS THE PROBLEM”.
Would you agree with that? — neomac


No, I don't believe Russia is responsible for the conflict in Ukraine in the same way that Israel is responsible for the war in Gaza.

Russia is part of the problem, and its invasion and occupation are illegal. I can agree to that much. — Tzeentch

Why not in the same way? What is the difference?

The problem is Europeans' free riding can also weaken NATO deterrence power (given Russia, given China, given Trump). In the end, only wars can prove the reliability and efficacy of a military alliance.

Things are looking grim for Europeans. Despite the Western propaganda and the US hegemony, the compelling point of the "Western world order" was/is not much "the Rest of the world must be like us because we are awesome" but more "either the Rest becomes more like us or we will (need to) become more like them". The European populist and nationalist movements are already on the rise.

Is this simply the primacy of economics having become to ingrained, so European leaders have trouble actively shaping a geopolitical policy? — Echarmion

The war in Ukraine was a wake up call for Europeans:
Europe is not prepared for a war with Russia and is in danger of being “washed away” in a conflict, much as the Holy Roman Empire was broken up by Napoleon, Germany’s pre-eminent military historian has warned.

At a high-level defence conference in Berlin, several German generals also suggested that Nato might be unable to win the “first battle” in a defensive war on its eastern flank, because it would struggle to ship sufficient numbers of troops and equipment to the front line quickly enough.

Sönke Neitzel, professor of military history at Potsdam University and the leading academic authority on the modern German armed forces, described the logistics as a “nightmare” and said it could take at least 15 years before Germany was ready for
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/europes-weak-armed-forces-could-be-washed-away-by-russia-bmxbc22gc

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/04/white-house-ukraine-military-aid-warning

Zelensky is under pressure internally:
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/4/7431535/
https://www.20min.ch/story/interview-vitali-klitschko-ueber-selenski-sprichwoerter-korruption-und-neid-263819931851

From a moral standpoint I view states as being fundamentally flawed from the outset. — Tzeentch

Meaning?

But my engagement in the discussion about the Ukraine war has never been moral in nature. Morality isn't even a useful lens through which to view the conduct of states, since they are not moral actors — Tzeentch

.

Do you mean that “those were blocked by the US simply to save Washington's ego” and “how many thousands of lives and billions in damages is Washington's ego worth?” do not express moral evaluations? Neither “my perspective presupposes peaceful coexistence is (or "should be") the goal of nations. Sadly, many nations and certainly the U.S. are not driven by that goal”?

How about the conduct of Putin, Zelensky, Biden, Macron, Scholz, Boris Johnson? Can we assess their political choices morally since they are moral actors? How about “These people are unhinged. The Netanyahu regime has got to go. Can we get regime change in Israel, please?” ? Does it express a moral evaluation?

Ukraine has a right to defend itself from a standpoint of international law, which is something I would never deny.

You have to pay attention to what is said, not fill in the blanks with what you would like to believe "I meant". — Tzeentch

If you do not want me to fill in the blanks, as you claim, you should try to be more clear next time. Here is what I got so far, about your beliefs: Ukraine has a right to defend itself from a standpoint of international law. But not right to defend itself from a standpoint of morality because… it is not a moral actor?
Now the question: Putin who is a moral actor (right?) can invade Ukraine and violate its right from a standpoint of international law because from a moral point of view Ukraine has no right to self-defence?

As for the rest, I believe Ukraine will achieve nothing by continuing to fight, except for a worse bargaining position and further destruction of Ukraine.

There's nothing 'pro-Russian' about that, even if it's not what cheerleaders want to hear.

Yes, I believe Russia most-likely achieved its primary objectives. Yes, I believe the Ukrainiain bargaining position has only deteriorated since the negotiations of March/April 2022.

And on the topic of trust; it's Ukraine who stands to lose most in this war, so trust or no trust, refusing negotiations will only deteriorate its position further. — Tzeentch

What you have conveniently removed from this presentation of your views is all your normative claims about what Ukrainian should have done, what the US/Europeans should do, and who is to blame. Besides pro-Russian propaganda could make the same arguments, even if that’s what you do not want to hear. Indeed, you are still arguing based on factual claims that you believe compelling in their accuracy and sufficient to support surrender.
Let’s do another test, if I claimed: “Russia should stop illegally occupying Ukraine. That's an action that it can and should undertake unilaterally.
They should stop illegally occupying Ukraine, and stop committing human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity. As long as Russia is the occupier and refuses to carry out the relevant UN resolutions, RUSSIA IS THE PROBLEM”.
Would you agree with that?

Again easy to retort. You are cheerleading Ukrainian surrender to Russian demands. — neomac


No, I'm not. Quote me if you believe I'm saying that.

Perhaps you take my cynical views of Washington's stake in this war as 'pro-Russian', but that's simply a mischaracterization. — Tzeentch

I don’t believe you said that. I believe you mean that. Indeed, if these are your assumptions:
1. You believe that state do not have the right to fight in self-defence [1]
2. You believe that Russia succeeded in its military goals (faint around Kiev and securing land bridge in the south) and Ukraine failed (it didn’t free the annexed territories)
3. That the US support (followed by weak European leaders) is cynically exploitative. And that “If anything I believe the Europeans should stop backing the war in Ukraine and encourage the Americans to leave as fast as possible.”
4. You keep repeating that in March Ukraine had the best chance to end the war and that Ukraine should negotiate regardless of the broken trust.

The argument you are pushing is something like Ukrainians have no points:
- in fighting in self-defence of their country,
- in pursuing a military victory over Russia because Russia has won on the battlefield and Ukrainian objectives are unattainable
- in relying to the US military support (either because the US is exploitative or because if it wasn’t it should stop supporting Ukraine anyways)
But Ukraine should try to negotiate anyways despite the lack of trust from the Russians, at least at the conditions of March / April 2022 (which equates to a negotiation for surrender if there are no security guarantees from other countries, which ones? The exploitative US won’t give them and it can not be trusted anyways), if Russia accepts it (what if Russia wants more?) [2][3]. So practically without leverage (which was the American military support and willingness to keep fighting), with the priority to spare “many thousands of lives and billions in damages”, and with no territorial concessions nor security guarantees.
If that is not “surrender”, I don’t know what is.

But let’s have a look at how you argue when Russia is not the aggressor [4]. No argument to support the idea that Palestinians have no right to fight to defend their idea of state, that freeing Palestine with a war is unattainable and Israel is winning by grabbing and securing more land, that Iran is exploiting Palestinians (and other hegemonically ambitious players too in the Arab world and outside), and that Palestinians should negotiate with Israel with the peace deal on terms that Israel is willing to accept. It’s all about what Israel should do.



[1]

↪javra
I agree that there is such a thing as self-defense. I just don't think it applies to war in general because what is actually being defended is not a person, but an idea of a state, territory, national pride, etc. — Tzeentch

[2]

Right now it will be very difficult to come to a peace agreement, since trust between Russia and the West has been completely shattered (it should be attempted regardless). — Tzeentch

[3]

When peace talks were started in late March, that should have been the end of the war. — Tzeentch

How far should the situation in Ukraine deterioriate before we can agree the peace accords that were on the table in March / April 2022, scarcely a month into the war, should have been carried out instead of blocked by the US?

Those were blocked by the US simply to save Washington's ego. Flipping Ukraine pro-western has been a decades-long project of the Neocon foreign policy blob, under leadership of chief blob Nuland.

How many thousands of lives and billions in damages is Washington's ego worth? — Tzeentch

[4]

Israel should stop illegally occupying Gaza and the West Bank. That's an action that it can and should undertake unilaterally. — Tzeentch

They should stop illegally occupying Gaza and the West Bank, and stop committing human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity. As long as Israel is the occupier and refuses to carry out the relevant UN resolutions, Israel is the problem. — Tzeentch

The videos I posted clearly demonstrate the groups adoption of "Nazi stuff" is far deeper than just tattoos. — boethius

And Israel and jews do not seem as concerned as the Russians.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukrainian-jews-push-back-against-putins-neo-nazi-claim-as-they-gear-up-for-battle/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-4-months-in-russian-solitary-ukrainian-officer-visits-israel-tells-his-story/

On the other side in Russia:
https://theconversation.com/jews-are-leaving-russia-again-is-history-repeating-itself-189090
https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/09/russia-inadequate-response-antisemitism-north-caucasus

Go on, explain how hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians dying for war aims that are not accomplished and seems clear to everyone now was completely obvious to everyone all along that the war aims wouldn't be accomplished with the means supplied ... is "pro-Ukrainian”? — boethius

I already answered this question. Assessing military results depend on political aims. And political aims of national sovereign states are grounded on “national interest” which is identitarian matter. So it’s on the Ukrainians to establish to what extent it is worth fighting against the Russians. Besides until the Ukrainians want to fight and have the Western military support the war is not over. And if it will be over at some point without restoration of territorial integrity, there might be political ways to restore it (completely or in part) that wouldn’t have been possible without the Ukrainian war effort. For the US it took 20 years to leave Afghanistan.

Fortunately, Hamas is competent and savvy enough to avoid a path that gets hundreds of thousands of Palestinians killed, only mere tens of thousands. — boethius

Tens of thousands over a population of roughly 2 millions is not that small either.
Fortunately, Israel is competent and savvy that didn’t kill more Palestinians, even if it had the means to do it.

More importantly, likely Hamas has achieved its war aims of demonstrating to the Arab world that Israel can be humiliated on the battlefield, this will motivate additional fanaticism for decades to come. — boethius

Hamas war ultimate aim is to liberation of Palestine, not to humiliate Israel on the battlefield. The latter is just one intermediary step.
Ukraine liberated Kiev from Russian assault and humiliated Russia too, but still is far from liberating all its territories which is the ultimate aim of Ukraine. And also the Russian atrocities may motivate Ukrainians to fight Russia for decades to come.

With enough irregular forces with enough asymmetric assets borne from modern technology, irregular forces that can't practically be deterred with nuclear weapons, there very well may come the day when the IDF loses to a ragtag collection of groups originally created, trained, financed and incubated in the wars of the US. — boethius

Maybe the Ukrainians could try to do the same then against the Russians.

It seems that the exchange of violence in this war disfavours the Palestinians, but that isn't their calculus. Hamas killed a meaningful percentage of the total Israeli population, whereas Israel has killed a meaningless percentage of the total Muslim population — boethius

The problem is that Hamas is not only an islamist but also a nationalist movement, so it doesn’t fight for all the muslisms but for the liberation of Palestine.
While the other muslim regimes do not seem particularly compelled to retaliate against Israel (not even Iran) in a more direct or aggressive way. So Hamas calculation doesn’t seem to make more sense than what the Ukrainians are doing: both are far from reaching their ultimate goal, both have sacrificed a good deal of people wrt their population, both see this tragedy as a motivational factor to continue the battle.

Yes, I do have a problem with that. I am trying to understand the conflict, not cheerleading for a side. — Tzeentch

Again easy to retort. You are cheerleading Ukrainian surrender to Russian demands.

positions that get hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and do not accomplish the war aims, is not pro-Ukrainian. — boethius

Well that presupposes that you know what is pro-Ukrainian, but who the fuck are you to tell what is pro-Ukrainian?! BTW positions that get tens of thousands of Palestianis killed and do not accomplish the war aims, is not pro-Palestianian, right?

But it's good to know that the extent of the argument doesn't go beyond "Everyone who disagrees with me is a propagandist." :lol: — Tzeentch

As I said, many times, such accusations can be easily retorted. The sources we bring up which you disagree with are propaganda to you. However the deep issue behind this easy accusations probably concern our understanding on how propaganda works in general, how my arguments work in this thread, and our respective positions toward the US vs Russia. That's why I have no problem to qualify myself as pro-US while you seem to have problems to qualify yourself as pro-Russian.

If I remember correctly, the main counter argument was that "there are Nazi's everywhere" ... I ask from where else is there similar evidence of so many Nazi's causing such big problems ... nada. — boethius

Dude, I don’t even think you watch the videos you link (I checked 4 out of 5, since one wasn’t reachable). They too mention Neo-nazi and far right movements in Europe and the US committing brutal terrorist attacks. Neo-nazi are a Western issue, not specifically a Ukrainian issue.
The question is not if the Ukrainian Neo-nazi are a problem (most certainly not in the way Putin presented it to justify his war, because “electorally they are very weak, all the far-right parties together couldn’t clear the very low bar to enter the Ukrainian parliament. In terms of mass support in Ukraine, they don’t have it”, as in one of your videos the reporter states it clearly and repeatedly). But that RUSSIA IS NO SOLUTION TO THE NAZI PROBLEM NOWHERE (INCLUDING RUSSIA). Russia is the BIGGEST EXPORTER OF FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Nazism_in_Russia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Managed_nationalism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Russia#Groups
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Utkin
https://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/articles/2022/opinion/russias-long-history-of-neo-nazis
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/02/pro-kremlin-neo-nazi-militia-inciting-torture-murder-ukrainian-prisoners
Besides, RUSSIA IS NO SOLUTION TO THE NAZI PROBLEM PARTICULARLY INSIDE UKRAINE because it’s Russia meddling in Ukraine and invasion that is nurturing particularly the Ukrainian neo-nazism (for historical reasons too).
Considering military campus for children, let’s have a look at what Russia is doing: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/children-as-a-tool-how-russia-militarizes-kids-in-the-donbas-and-crimea/
This nationalist polarisation is very common phenomenon in countries struggling for their sovereignty (see also Israel vs Palestine).

As if Heidegger couldn't do pro-Nazi propaganda, Foucault couldn't do pro-Islamist propaganda, and Sartre couldn't do pro-Maoist propaganda, because they are considered among the greatest philosophers of the 20th century.

• PART02

Now, whether this is inherently true or not, that any deal that is or was remotely feasible between Ukraine and Russia is "bad for the West", certainly, depending on the details, a peace deal would be better or worse for the West, and this is exactly the leverage Ukraine has, or at least had at one point.

How Ukraine could get concessions from the West is in threatening to go and make sure of doing exactly what you say would be bad for the West: i.e. threaten to make peace with the Russians in a way that embarrasses and weakens the West the most.

For example, Zelensky could have gone to the US, NATO, the EU, and said "look, you've slow played us into this disastrous war, if you don't give me some additional compensation (such as fast track EU membership), in addition to what the Russians are offering, so that I can do right by the Ukrainian people and we get something for giving up claim to Crimea, then I'm going to declare the West has abandoned us, no Western soldiers are coming, no no-fly zone is coming, we are alone, abandoned by our Western friends, arms and thoughts and prayers won't defeat the Russians, and therefore we will make peace with the Russians (and then imply a bunch of terms even more embarrassing for the West, such as allowing Russia to have military bases in Ukraine, station missiles, or just further economic cooperation with the Russians etc.).

At this stage of negotiation, the West would need to decide whether to play ball or not and participate in negotiations in order to be able to negotiate terms they can better spin as some sort of "victory" for the West (such as "security guarantees" for Ukraine, integrating Ukraine into other Western institutions such as the EU, and so on). If the West refuses to offer anything, well the Russian deal is still better than a disastrous war, and there's nothing to lose in trying to go get concessions also from other parties concerned. — boethius

I doubt that Zelensky would politically survive this plot twist in the face of the Ukrainians, his entourage, and his Western allies. Or be fully shielded from sabotage attempts. Besides you seem to give for granted that Zelensky can deflect his political responsibility by supporting the idea that Ukraine has been slow played into a disastrous war. But, unless Zelensky was really a puppet of the US and would now heroically denounce himself as such, maybe Zelensky bears a good deal of responsibility. Indeed, that is what is legitimate to expect from rulers of sovereign countries. Maybe he was abundantly warned behind doors by Western politicians (when politicians can put aside their rhetoric posturing and be more pragmatic) and his entourage (as the evidences of the internal struggle within Zelensky’s administration may suggest) of what risks he would have faced since the beginning of the war and of the potential constraints of the Western support. After all, the Westerners too suggested him to surrender (in the sense of giving up fighting) and flee at the beginning of the war, and after the Russians withdrew from Kherson Zelensky was again suggested by the Westerners to re-consider negotiation from a position of strength. As I suggested earlier maybe the US was just fine with freezing the conflict right there at that moment and Zelensky could have been satisfied just with his resistance against regime change and against demilitarisation, even assuming there was no peace deal and the territorial dispute was still open. This might have been enough to turn Russia into a rogue state and give Ukraine some breath while keeping the Western pressure on Russia. However Zelensky may have been compelled also by being in a unique political and historical position to take a greater risk for a greater reward with a last big push before the next American and Russian elections.

Ukraine's leverage was likely the highest before the war even started, as it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war. Now, Russia wanted more a deal with the West, a new European security architecture, which the West refused saying it's between Russia and Ukraine (exactly because neo-cons at least believe that Ukraine fighting Russia, even if irrational for Ukraine, is better than any peace; no a surprise there), that was more comprehensive, but again Zelensky (if he wasn't an idiot) could have gone and threatened the West with peace into agreeing to negotiate with Russia a new framework in which Ukraine is neutral.
Then there is the first weeks of the war where an offer was on the table, Zelensky could have closed a deal had he wanted.
War crimes are definitely usual in any war, and their investigation can be part of a peace deal; it is simply another point to negotiation, and not a reason to refuse to negotiate (even if we are assuming it was indeed the Russians and not elements in Ukraine that don't want any peace). — boethius

And, why did Russia want a deal with the West and not with Zelensky, if for Zelensky “it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war” (apparently, you really can’t help but sound like pro-Russian propaganda)?
If Russia didn’t have enough leverage to get what it wanted from the West, why are you so convinced that Zelensky had it?
If neoconservatives were bent to make Ukraine fight to the last person, even if irrational, and Zelensky is an idiot put there by the neoconservatives to play their script, why are you conjecturing that things could have gone otherwise?
Why would the leverage for Zelensky against the Europeans be bigger at the beginning of the war when Europeans didn’t experience economic fatigue than after the Europeans experienced economic fatigue for almost 2 years?
Why would Zelensky have more leverage with Europeans than with Russians at the beginning of the war? He could have exchanged Crimea and Donbas for economic compensations to Russia (or just for survival given Russian attempts to kill him) and turn into a Russian puppet right away, while sparing Putin all the fuss.
Why would any involved party trust other involved parties in this ornamental agreement with zero meaning given the historical penchant for “bad faith” on all sides?
If neoconservatives are such an evil specimen that loves to violently subjugate and exploit the rest of the world, how come that the neocoservatives’ support for post-Cold War globalization in the last decades boosted Russia (and China)’s economic-military-political growth and power projection outside their borders far more than the American “provocations” weakened their offensive power?
If neoconservatives are such an evil specimen that loves to violently subjugate and exploit the rest of the world, why do you think that the US would let the Europeans normalise their relations with Russia over a peace deal with Ukraine?
BTW can you teach me what about Zelensky’s ten points for peace negotiations in November ’22 was rational to give up (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/)? They also mention Russian war crimes among the negotiable points, as you suggested.
Again, your entire reasoning is grounded on a load of non-shared and historically decontextualised assumptions, which I even hardly find consistent as such. Apparently, history and geopolitics and national strategic interest is good to explain (justify?) Putin’s aggression of Ukraine and blame the US meddling in Russia’s backyard, but it is not good to explain (justify?) Zelensky’s, Biden’s, Europeans’ approach toward Putin.
What is so self-defeating in your all-knowing man-of-honour pedagogic stunt is that you can not use one single bit of your own impeccable definitions or military, economic, and moral omniscience to fix YOURSELF any of the rational failures, idiocy, evilness you are complaining about. You can at best whine over the internet along with your sidekicks wishing that this would do the fixing by others some day, as any random anonymous self-proclaimed man-of-honour from the internet would do, of course.

Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. — neomac


Yeah, sure, and I'd like a toilet of solid gold.

Simply wanting something is not a rational basis to fight a long and costly war that you are very, very likely to lose.

The relevant question here is whether war is a reasonable way of getting what you want. Maybe it is reasonable for Ukraine to "like to keep the Western alliance" (that Ukraine is not apart of), but it does not follow from that to fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war?!?! — boethius

I’ve been reasoning in geopolitical terms, so I meant a strategic alliance with the West, obviously.
I never argued in support of “fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war”. Indeed, you can not quote me saying it nor saying anything that logically implies this.
The political objectives, as I understand them, could have been more maximalist (e.g. resist regime change and demilitarisation, regaining territorial integrity, join EU/NATO, overthrow Putin) or more minimalist (e.g. resist regime change and demilitarisation, and then weaken Russia through other means as a rogue state). If Zelensky might likely have felt compelled to be maximalist, the US might likely have felt more compelled to be minimalist. For the US even having Zelensky escape from Ukraine, might have been enough to try to turn Russia into a rogue state: SO FAR, the US has definitely got more than it prospected at the beginning of the war. Zelensky got less than what he hoped. But not a total defeat either so he can’t now just surrender without compromising what has been able to achieve so far. From a strategic point of view, things shouldn’t look as bad as you wish to depict them even from the Ukrainian point of view. BTW even if there was no major land breakthrough in the last push, yet the successful attacks against the Black Sea Fleet may be of particular significance also for a future ceasefire negotiation. What contributed to magnify this sense of failure is arguably the Ukrainian propaganda itself which (MAYBE unnecessarily) created a hazardous hype over something that was very difficult, if not most certainly unlikely to succeed, given the inadequate/slow military support from the West.

While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US. — neomac


Sure, maybe it's reasonable for the US to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ... — boethius

I doubt it would be reasonable even for the Great Satan: if all Ukrainians got killed, there would be no resistance left against the Russians, if there are any left. So the Great Satan may want Ukrainians to spare human and material forces to continue fighting, as needed.

If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. — neomac

I am right that the US is manipulating Ukraine. For example "whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" are both obviously manipulative lies. — boethius

Again, a non-shared assumption. “Whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" is propaganda but what you wish to infer from that depends very much on how you understand propaganda. As far as I’m concerned propaganda is a political tool as much as diplomacy, war and economic sanctions. Political propaganda’s purpose is not primarily to inform but to politically mobilise people. So the information may be presented not to maximise understanding but to maximise a politically desired reaction. However propaganda has: 1. its costs, like any other political tool, including reputational costs; 2. its targets, political propaganda for the general audience is not for politicians (they have all sorts of informal and formal secured channels to communicate more PRAGMATICALLY, they are expected to be the experts of political propaganda not be fooled by it) but they send a signal to the politicians on what narrative they intend to push to gain support, typically from their fan base (but non exclusively) 3. its constraints and side-effects, fore example I find most certainly reasonable to assess propaganda within the context of other actual/potential rival propaganda (that BTW can come from internal and external political rivals). It’s in the interest of any politician to have or pretend to have rivals overstretching with their propaganda beyond sustainability to then spin the counter-propaganda against failed promises by calling them “propaganda” and “manipulative lies”.
From this perspective, propaganda is simply part of the game. For any propaganda from one political administration there is a counter-propaganda from national competitors and foreign administrations. Any propaganda is expected to stress the flaws of one policy or highlight the benefits of alternative policies, to even claim merits for others’ deeds and blame others for one’s own faults, to present one’s own representatives and choices as rational and noble while opponents as evil or stupid. So having people denouncing propaganda and others’’ “manipulative lies” as you do is not rationally compelling in an environment where everybody is and is expected to spin their own propaganda. Indeed, it proves just how committed you are in spinning pro-Russian propaganda in this forum. The only point I can agree with is that the US will likely pay reputational costs by giving up on supporting Ukraine now and/or in the future (I guess significantly bigger than the ones paid for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan). That’s why I find it unlikely that the US will give up on supporting Ukraine, just they will support Ukraine on their own terms. We will see how things will change if Trump wins.

Likewise, the billions and billions and billions (and many more billions until you've said billions at least 50 times, assuming each billion stands for at least 2 billions) in hard currency and arms the US sends to Ukraine without any tracing or auditing etc. is also a de facto area of affect bribe to all parties in Ukraine who stand to benefit from billion and billion and billions of untraceable currency and arms. That is not only clear manipulation without even attempting to avoid a situation where the money and arms are de facto bribes, but it was well known ahead of times those arms would find themselves in "the wrong hands" (to use RAND's phrasing) and would supercharge terrorism and organized crime around the world. — boethius

To me that’s not enough to assess if this lack of transparency goes against the American or the Ukrainian national interest. Since we are talking about lack of transparency one can conjecture cases were lack of transparency may still serve national interest: e.g. if part of the Ukrainian elite was running on Russian bribing, maybe bribing them back is convenient, if the money and weaponry supply is not traced maybe it’s to protect the network of local informants and dormant Ukrainian insurgents, offering both plausible deniability against Russian complaints or even curbing Ukrainian demands, and protect politicians of the current administration from future counter-investigation by internal political enemies who may compromise national interest. The lack of transparency can also backfire, of course: Russia could steal and indirectly pass to Hamas American weaponry supplied to Ukraine, to let the Western “useful idiots” exploit this to conveniently spin pro-Russian counter-propaganda. Not to mention that all wars have their nasty collateral (not only killing civilians).

However, how this would "prove" Graham shares the same definition of rational as me, and what the point would be, I honestly don't see what that argument is or would be, so you'll have to explain it.

Whatever you're trying to say, rationality does not mean "good" only lacking in self-contradiction, and "self" is a key word as a rational position does not imply a universal position.

People who want to cause as much harm as possible and do as much evil as possible in their limited time, can be perfectly rational in such a pursuit. That they may lack self contradiction in pursuing their purpose to murder, rape and torture, does not make those actions good on account of being rational nor lend any weight to the position that such purposes should be universal and adopted by all rational agents.

It may very well be that it is rational for Senator Graham, relative his neo-con ideology and evil purposes, or even just plain-ol' US imperialism in general, to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. That being true would not somehow make it true that is rational for Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. — boethius

If we are talking about national strategic interest, my understanding is that its identitarian nature makes it inherently NOT universal. Yet that doesn’t exclude possible similarities or margins for convergence with the national interest of other countries. Then we can try to assess national interest as what is desirable wrt what can be done in a similar way as computer scientists assess algorithms, namely efficacy and efficiency. The problem is that algorithms are comparable on objectives that are defined to be computable from the same sets of conditions in a finite number of steps, but from a historical perspective objectives may evolve endlessly, generation after generation, and there are no same sets of conditions. One can try to reason by historical analogy: e.g. how long did it take, how much did it cost, how successfully was it for the jews to strive and fight for their own sovereign state generation after generation? Or, how long did it take, how much did it cost, how successfully was it for the Palestinians to strive and fight for their own sovereign state generation after generation? Ukrainians may be in an analogous situation. Is it worth it? Hard to tell and it’s ultimately not on us to tell because costs and risks are primarily on their skin, future prospects remain uncertain in the long term and national interest is inherently national matter.
One might however argue that, IN THE SHORTEST TERM, a containment approach instead of a maximalist approach may be less rewarding but also less costly and more likely to succeed.

But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. — neomac


How is my interpretation questionable?

If you find something questionable, moreoverso in a philosophical debate, you should explain what's questionable about it and, in the case of interpretation, provide your position on the matter.

How do you interpret Senator Graham's statement?

Before rebutting the rest of your post, I think it is wise to take a hiatus here and see if you even have an alternative interpretation.

For, if you don't (which your failure to support your "questioning" my interpretation by providing an alternative one, very strongly implies that you don't), then your thrashing about in the void is far more easily dealt with as obvious denialism (that even you clearly see in simply denying my interpretation without providing your own) of what Senator Graham obviously has stated (the "quiet part out loud"), and that equally obvious it is a direct and clear statement of US government policy (reinforced further by the lack of anyone from the White House even bothering to contradict Senator Graham, even just for appearance sake ... as it's so obvious an admission of what is so obviously actually happening that it's easier for everyone if the mainstream media simply never cites Graham in full on the US position in the war, much less discuss it). — boethius

To begin with, let’s clarify once again what I’m questioning. Here your quote [1]. You are inferring from Sen. Graham’s quoted statements the belief that “the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one”. That is twice a manipulative interpretation of Sen. Graham’s quoted statements. Why? Since your inference is not a valid logic deduction from Sen. Graham’s quoted statements (“rational” doesn’t even figure in Sen. Graham’s quoted statements), you need some additional implicit assumptions concerning Sen. Graham’s understanding and application of the “rationality” claim to the Ukrainian case the way you do to make the inference logically valid: something like “fight to the last person” is irrational OR “fight to the last person” is irrational if a military victory is most certainly unattainable OR “fight to the last person” is irrational if a military victory is most certainly unattainable and military victory equates to regaining complete territorial integrity. But all such assumptions look pretty spurious to me. Indeed, Sen. Graham’s words make sense even without a specific “theory of victory” or chances of success you wish to question (which terms are not mentioned in the quoted statements). Sen. Graham (who also has a military background) is plausibly reasoning over necessary requirements to enable Ukrainians to military fight Russians: morale (“fighting to the last person” as upper limit of morale) and means (out of the military aid the West is capable to provide). And the former may be critically conditional on the latter.
Besides, the spirit of Graham’s rhetoric is that the Ukrainian willingness to fight to the last person (which is taken as a given not as something that needs foreign moral encouragement or chastising) is expression of admirable patriotism and freedom against the Russian oppression (denounced as a terrorist state) perfectly in line with American Republican values. Indeed, Ukrainians resisting the invasion reminded him of "our better selves in America. There was a time in America that we were this way, fighting to the last person, we were going to be free or die." https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-condemns-us-senator-grahams-comments-death-russians-2023-05-28/
Graham’s propaganda is obviously meant to boost military support for Ukraine by using Republican style rhetoric, with the likely understatement to his wider audience that Americans won’t do nor need to get directly involved in the Ukrainian war to beat Russians’ ass. Sure, it’s still a hawkish approach. But from a national interest perspective there is nothing intrinsically bad in being hawkish.
Your manipulation has two rhetoric intents: discrediting the Ukrainians (as irrational and fanatics) and the Americans (as exploitative). This is how Sen. Graham’s political slogans turn into an evident confession of exploitation by the Americans at the expense of the irrational Ukrainians in your pro-Russian counter-propaganda.

[1]

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate


Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).

And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101. — boethius

• PART 01

For example, when Merkel et. al. brag about the Minsk accords being agreed to in bad faith without any intention to implement it in order to "buy time" for Ukraine, it is called reneging. Hopefully that will help you remember the definition. — boethius

Another non-shared assumption. You keep reasoning in non-comparative and historically decontextualised ways. “Bad faith” may be a compelling reason for grievance if there is “good faith” and cooperative attitude on one side, but not in the other. If there is bad faith and unwillingness to cooperate on both sides, “bad faith” is no longer a compelling grievance for either side.
One can try to make such grievances more compelling by reasoning in terms of “who started it?”, proportionality and stakes. Minsk agreements weren’t about Russian sovereignty, but about Ukrainian sovereignty. And if a weaker state is aggressed or threatened in its sovereignty by an unprovoked (=unaggressed) hostile stronger state with a history of “bad faith” in agreements [1] and despite the reciprocal acknowledgement of sovereignty, the weaker state has a compelling reason to play deceptively, especially if the alternative is either escalation or surrender.
Hopefully that will help you remember how your “bad faith” accusation looks rather pointless to me.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was asked by a reporter if he would join negotiations mediated by Turkey if Russian President Vladimir Putin came to the table, and Zelensky said, "I don't accept it."

Erdogan "knows my view," Zelensky said. "We discussed this before the war. I told him to put Putin at the table for negotiations. 'Can we please do that? We must avert a full-scale war.' But [Erdogan] was not able to do that. Not only him — he is powerful — but he is not able to do it. And now he thinks that he is? Now we can't," Zelensky said Friday.

Zelensky explained why he cannot speak to Putin anymore.

"It is not the same man. There is nobody to talk to there," he said. — CNN


This is called repudiating negotiations.

To try to reinterpret what I say as claiming there was never any negotiations is foolish.

I clearly explain that there was a negotiation, nearly successful by some accounts (but clearly happened, was in the news and everything), and then Zelensky rejected the Russian offer and repudiated further negotiations with statements like the above.

Since even normal people intuit there's something wrong with walking away entirely from the negotiation table (the US is in continuous negotiation with Hamas as we speak), some pressure is put on Zelensky about it so he changes his position to he'll negotiation but only after Russia leaves Ukraine, including Crimea, entirely ... which is not how negotiation works. You negotiate the points of contention before an agreement is made and the exchange value actually occurs; simply demanding the counter-party does whatever you want before negotiating is another way of saying one refuses any negotiation. — boethius

I didn’t state nor suggested nor believe you are “claiming there was never any negotiations”. I claim that you are not interpreting Zelensky’s attitude toward negotiation as a function of past and present circumstances that mould the Ukrainians’ national interest as they understand it. But you have no problem to do it when it’s matter to explain (or justify?) Russian aggression and then blame it completely/mostly/primarily on the US.
Bennett in his often cited interview talks about Zelensky reaching him to mediate with Putin a ceasefire. After the Bucha massacre (while Russian state TV was broadcasting genocidal propaganda against Ukraine), Zelensky was expected to turn down that negotiation as Bennett acknowledged (not surprisingly so from a Israeli representative who knows the political impact of terrorist massacres). Another attempt happened a while later, with the Istanbul Communique (again, out of the Ukrainian initiative), the problem is that, a part of the difficulties to treat the territorial dispute, both Russia and Ukraine seek American security guarantees (which you consider “ornamental” and with “zero meaning”, right prof?) under incompatible conditions. As far as I’ve understood the problem is that Russia wants to be part of the guarantors and this might enable Russia to comfortably sabotage whatever pro-Ukrainian agenda at convenience (as it already happens within the UN), while at this point in history the US intends to turn Russia into a rogue state after its aggression of Ukraine, which includes economic and diplomatic sanctions as long as needed. So whatever negotiation scenario alternative to plain surrender, seems to require foreign security guarantees that do not depend on Zelensky. That’s how diplomatic stalemate becomes likely. And let’s pretend that , in diplomatic parlance, attempts of killing Zelensky are not really the most obvious sign of diplomatic “good faith” or “good will“ from Putin, right?
Announcing ceasefire demands (as the Russia often did) doesn’t prevent any party to keep exploring margins for negotiation through secured diplomatic channels and intermediaries, of course. The point is that after Bucha, repeated failed negotiation attempts, and Zelensky’s refusal to negotiate with Putin by decree still Zelensky’s support among Ukrainians was wide and high up until recently as far as I can tell (https://www.jpost.com/omg/article-751972). So I do not see strong evidence that Zelensky’s attitude toward negotiation goes against Ukrainians’ perceived national interest. Maybe things have changed now.

Second, hand-weaving at hypothetical compensations for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses while abstracting from relevant historical and geopolitical circumstances is a rather weak argument. — neomac


First, it's not hand waiving, it's what negotiation is about: you seek as much compensation as possible from the parties involved in exchange for whatever you're giving up (money, time, apologies, legal claims, paintings, diamonds, leaving town etc.).

So, if there was a deal on the table that was "sufficient" in terms of being preferable to continued warfare, then the only thing to do is attempt to negotiate an even better formulation of the deal but with the aim of ultimately accepting anyways. — boethius

Yes also barter is by definition about exchanging goods without using money. But what if people need money? That’s the point I’m making about the failed negotiation attempts. And I’m questioning the claim that “there was a deal on the table” for the following reason: Russia and Ukraine can agree on whatever ceasefire proposal, but if this proposal requires security guarantees from foreign guarantors, and foreign guarantors are not willing to provide them, then there won’t be a deal.

Furthermore, I am not abstracting away from anything, I have routinely and diligently analyzed the battlefield situation using both my own soldiering experience and training (including training specifically designed for a fight with the Russians and exactly the kind of warfare we've seen play out in Ukraine) as well as analysis available elsewhere, to evaluate Ukraine's chance of a battlefield victory.

My conclusion is basically no chance, due to the specifics on the ground (Ukraine lack of capacities the Russians have and Ukraine lack of quantity, such as artillery, where Ukraine does have comparable capacity: how can anyone expect soldiers to prevail in such circumstances?!).

Therefore, if Ukraine has no chance of a battlefield victory then it should strive to negotiate a peace, using the leverage of being able to do further damage to Russia (when you are a weaker party to a conflict, you're leverage is the ability to inflict damage even with little threat of victory; of course, being able to threaten actually victory is better leverage, but people seek to avoid damage if they can so generally offer concessions to terminate the war sooner rather than later; and even when no concessions are offered, such as unconditional surrender, it is still usually better, for real people under your command, to surrender unconditionally than to fight to the death). — boethius

Not all depends on the battlefield situation, the historical circumstances include past experiences and current geopolitical conditions, how all these factors reinforce cultural trends and shape national interest perception over generations. And no politicians can really abstract from them. Their political history depends on the selective pressure of those factors. So, rationality requirements in the domain of politics can’t reasonably ignore the weight of such factors. And to the extent war is politics by other means, one has to take into account the political aims of all prominent involved parties when assessing battlefield outcomes. For example, the strategy of containment adopted by the US against Soviet Union, and still adopted against Russia in some form, doesn’t require the complete defeat of the enemy, because it may not be necessary, desirable, or even possible.
Concerning your other assumptions, I’d counter that politics is primarily about LEADING people, not about pleasing people. Otherwise people could self-govern themselves as they please, right? Another assumption of mine is that politicians can AT BEST pursue national strategic interests (which will concern also future political administrations and generations). And nobody can reasonably expect political leaders to be capable of infallible, risk free or uncontroversial choices, especially in critical times like during war.
Besides many Ukrainians have all-too personal stakes in this war, also thanks to Russian broad and arbitrary massacres (which add up to the past ones). For every Ukrainian soldier or civilian that has been killed or injured in this war of aggression by Russia, there is potentially an entire social network (starting with relatives and friends) which will personally resent the Russians for that and may crave for revenge until they die. And this emotional trauma will likely nurture also future generations.
So I’ll repeat once more my previous argument: Palestinians, Afghans, Kurds fight for their independence and national identity, for generations, no matter if they are the weaker party to a conflict, no matter if they are instrumental to geopolitical moves of other bigger players. BTW how many Russians, soldiers and civilians, were killed during the great patriotic war, prof?
I find COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL to assess human behaviour based on social standards not grounded on realistic assumptions about human behaviour. Humans value social identity and freedom to the point of fighting for them to death, take revenge for it, mistrust enemies for it, and sacrifice their own individual and collective well-being/safety for it, over decades, over generations. Afghans, Kurds, Palestinians, Israeli, Ukrainians, and Russians keep reminding us that however tragic in itself and disturbing to armchair self-entitled nobodies on the internet, this is a very common hardcore driving factor of human behaviour. To what extent that holds for Ukrainians is up to the Ukrainians to tell. And when Ukrainians will grow tired enough of Zelensky, they may find their ways to get rid of him.

When I say Ukraine should seek compensation from the West in any peace deal for loss of territory, it is because they have the leverage to get that. If they can get compensation from Russia and from the West in a peace deal, that is clearly better than simply compensation from Russia. Of course now, Ukraine has very little leverage.
But at the start of the war, for example, in exchange for accepting a peace along the lines of what Russia proposing, Zelensky could have sought various compensation from the West, in particular Europe that has the most to lose from a larger and longer war: such as a fast track into the EU (which Russia explicitly said they did not oppose, only NATO). — boethius

Ukraine has its security concerns about Russia and if Europeans can’t offer security guarantees to deter Russia’s aggression and political interference, joining the EU (assuming Russia won’t be able to sabotage it) would NOT compensate the Ukrainian security concerns and at the same time will create additional security hazards for the Europeans. Besides as long as the Europeans need the US for their own security (as much as Ukraine) and prioritise security concerns over economic concerns, the Europeans might still be reluctant to question the American leadership at this point in history. Actually this war may buy Europeans time to re-arm and/or press them to re-shape their security strategy.

True, it would be a compromise where Russia is "appeased".

But as I've explained numerous times, the appeasement argument is totally fallacious and demonstrates a total lack of understanding of history.

The appeasement analogy applied to Ukraine would only be remotely similar if it was about chastising Poland for not fighting to the last Polander.

The criticism of appeasement is not levied at the smaller and weaker countries Hitler gobbled up, accusing them of surrendering or cutting deals rather than fighting to their last man and even worman, but rather the criticism of appeasement is levied at the far larger and stronger countries (UK, France, US) that had an actual chance of defeating Hitler.

Avoiding "appeasement" has nothing to do with smaller countries stuck in the middle of the great powers. It is always the same: the strong do as they will, the weak suffer what they must. And so weaker countries can only strive to suffer as little as possible in navigating the rivalry and clashes of the great powers.

A situation I do not approve of, but is created out of the system of international relations—in which the key word is "national" and the nationalism from which those nations spring—and insofar as we have a system of nations then we have more and less powerful nations and among them the "great powers" who do great things – terrible, yes, but great. — boethius

Your counter-argument fails on two grounds: first, my “appeasing argument” was targeting the strategic choices of the West (the US and its allies) wrt Russia aggression of Ukraine, not Ukraine. Indeed, I don’t even see strong evidence that Western propaganda is about “chastising” Ukraine for not fighting to the last Ukrainian. The appeasement argument is about “chastising” the West for not supporting the Ukrainian patriotic fight enough (I myself would lean that way). Something like: “I believe that we have no other choice than giving Ukraine all they need to be successful in their mission to restore their sovereignty and control on their borders: whatever less will be our failure” (https://www.corriere.it/esteri/23_novembre_27/petr-pavel-our-uncertainties-hurt-kiev-s-counteroffensive-396fdc30-8c6e-11ee-8ccd-c15b03fea28c.shtml). The problem for the Ukrainians is however that as long as Ukraine badly needs Western assistance to secure its sovereignty against Russian aggression and oppression, then Ukraine can’t discount Western conditions for such assistance (not surprisingly, Zelensky often appealed to the Western audience not with “help us Ukrainians out of humanitarian concerns“ but “help us because we are fighting for your freedom”). Second, I have no idea why you believe the “appeasement argument” can’t hold also for Ukrainians by the same logic that historical precedents exemplify. Satisfying predatory demands is not only a cost but also a big risk for the victims for two obvious reasons: if it works, predatory demands can be escalated (e.g. if a hacker gains control over your private computer and mobile, and manages to block them to ask you a ransom, you may decide to pay the ransom, but the hacker may later decide to ask you some more). Besides, the benefits coming from their predatory activity can be reinvested to perpetuate/widen predatory activities. So even victims can be compelled to not appease their predators and look for alternative coping strategies, depending on the circumstances. From a historical point of view, I’d also contend that the desire for peace within a community depends on how circumstances wear out or boost collective morale to support rebellion and fight against foreign oppression: humans may value peace at the price of enslavement (as it happened to many Africans) or marginalization (as it happened to many native Indians or Australian aboriginals) by foreign nations, but other communities may live in such conditions that polarized indigenous minorities may emerge and lead more or less complacent/passive majorities to support fight at the price of individual and collective well-being/safety for generations (like Palestinians, Afghans, Kurds), no matter if they are the weaker party to a conflict, no matter if they are instrumental to geopolitical moves of other bigger players. And also the Ukrainian fight against the Russians is generational: Ukrainians allied in the past with the Nazis to fight back Soviet Russia, now they are allying with the West to fight Putin’s Russia. So the “appeasement argument” can apply also to weaker states and be motivated by their own perceived strategic interest.
In any case, even if “weaker countries can only strive to suffer as little as possible in navigating the rivalry and clashes of the great powers” and I don’t know to what extent the Ukrainian morale will hold under external pressure (from Russia and from the West) in the current circumstances, my understanding is still that it’s on the Ukrainians to establish what it means to “strive to suffer as little as possible” and that weaker states are compelled to ally with great powers which they feel enough less oppressive at the price they find tolerable. Not to mention that you just suggested one compelling argument for old-school imperialism: the best chance for weaker states to suffer the least from wars against stronger countries that violate their territorial sovereignty would be to give up on their territorial sovereignty.

The smaller powers stuck in the middle have no interest in fighting to the death for one side or another; one needs really extreme circumstances for that option to be viable.

Now, that such a peace would be potentially "bad" for the West is from a US and Western perspective, not Ukraine's perspective. You are basically giving up the ghost of your position. You are simply taking it as assumed that Ukraine should do whatever the West wants it to do and is in the interest of the West, with no consideration for Ukraine.

And indeed, even if you are correct (which I don't think you are) in assuming any peace between Ukraine and Russia would be good for Russia and bad for the West, that's not an argument that Ukraine shouldn't make peace with Russia; only an argument that the West should not want Ukraine to make peace with Russia — boethius

.


I never argued that “Ukraine should do whatever the West wants it to do and is in the interest of the West, with no consideration for Ukraine”. Indeed, you can not quote me claiming this nor saying anything that logically implies this. On the contrary, my understanding is that the political imperative for sovereign states is the pursuit of their national interest, independently from ideology, typology of regime and capabilities (but conditionally on sovereignty claims and acknowledgments). The US should pursue its national interest, Russia should pursue its national interest, Ukraine should pursue its national interest, Israel should pursue its national interest, Iran should pursue its national interest, China should pursue its national interest, Nazi Germany should pursue its national interest, Soviet Union should pursue its national interest, etc. It’s an empirical matter if the national interest of one sovereign state converges or is in conflict with the national interest of another sovereign state. So if “make peace with Russia” is convenient to the Ukrainian national interest, Zelensky has a political imperative to pursue it no matter if the West is against it, obviously. It remains however problematic to establish what goes or should go into Zelensky’s political calculus under given power relations and past experiences, though.
Besides I’m not “assuming ANY peace between Ukraine and Russia would be good for Russia and bad for the West” unless “ANY peace between Ukraine and Russia” equates to surrender to Russian demands (like acknowledgement of annexed territories and no security compensation, which is tantamount to a loss of sovereignty to the Russians). My assumption is that surrender goes against the Ukrainian national interest as it has been understood until now by the Ukrainians themselves. If they changed their mind, that’s their decision to make. Another assumption of mine however is that the West under the American leadership will support Ukraine to avoid surrender for several reasons: reputational costs within the general public (the West abandoned Ukraine, yet another American foreign policy failure, the West lost to Russia, etc.), loss of hegemonic deterrence toward competing world leaders (emboldening competitors like China and anti-American populism, also in the West), so a significantly destabilising blow to the Western world order. And if this is not bad for the West I don’t know what is. But there are other strategic reasons why the US may be compelled to support Ukraine to avoid both surrender and peace (unless that means: Russian complete surrender or, a least, ceasefire agreements compliant with Western world order) and to support freezing the conflict, especially at the prospect of a possible military conflict with China in the next decades. Indeed, weakening Russia through economic and diplomatic sanctions, fixating Russia’s strategic concerns on its Western front instead of engaging in other arenas (like in support of China), cutting economic ties between Europeans and Russia/China (obliging Europeans to look for compensation in the rest of the Rest), and buying time to build up European and Ukrainian military capabilities/readiness may be functional conditions to support American hegemony. It’s also possible that even Trump, if in power, won’t change this trend, not immediately at least. Indeed, the frozen conflict may be exploited as a leverage both against China (e.g. Trump may promise to push for a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine in exchange for Russia breaking its alliance with China or in exchange for Europe feeding more US economy at the expense of China) and/or against Trump’s political enemies (e.g. Trump may threaten to push for a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine if his political enemies in the congress obstruct his policies in other more urgent areas).


[1]
To those who have missed the previous 30 years, here is a short list of the results of negotiations with Russia that it never respected: 1. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Russia agreed to “respect independence, sovereignty, and the existing borders of Ukraine” as well as “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”. Breached by Russia invading Crimea in 2014. 2. The Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty of 1997. Russia agreed to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and “reaffirmed the inviolability of the borders” between the two countries. Russia breached it in 2014. 3. The OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. Russia committed to withdrawing its troops from Moldova’s Transdniestrian region and Georgia until the end of 2002. That never happened. 4. The 2008 Georgia ceasefire agreement following Russian aggression against the country. Russia agreed that “Russian military forces must withdraw to the lines prior to the start of hostilities”. That never happened. 5. The Ilovaysk “Green Corridor” in August 2014 and other “humanitarian” death corridors. Russia pledged to let Ukrainian forces leave the encircled town of Ilovaysk in the east of Ukraine, but instead opened fire and killed 366 Ukrainian troops. In the following years, Russia attacked numerous humanitarian corridors in Syria. 6. The “Minsk” agreements of 2014 and 2015. Russia agreed to cease the fire in the east of Ukraine. There had been 200 rounds of talks and 20 attempts to enforce a ceasefire, all of which the Russian side promptly violated. On February 24th, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 7. The 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative. Russia pledged to “provide maximum assurances regarding a safe and secure environment for all vessels engaged in this initiative." It then hindered the initiative's operation for months before withdrawing unilaterally a year later. NB: I am only focused on deals made with Russia to address specific issues and conflicts. I am not mentioning almost 400 international treaties that Russia has breached since 2014. There are no conclusions to be drawn here, except that no one can seriously use the words "Russia" and "negotiations" in the same phrase. Putin is a habitual liar who promised international leaders that he would not attack Ukraine days before his invasion in February 2022. Russia's tactic has remained consistent in its many wars over the last three decades: kill, grab, lie, and deny. Why would anyone genuinely believe that Russia in 2023 is any different from Russia in 1994, 1997, 1999, 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022?
https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1724427557016043668

Putin and others have been saying different things to different people at different times AND provide the relevant evidence. — Jabberwock

One more evidence: 02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:

Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?

Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.

https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html

I think for the Ukrainians, the distinction between "conquest" and a "special military operation to demilitarise and denazify" is rather academic. — Echarmion

I'd rather call it pro-Russian propaganda. Indeed, these people have no problems to whine over American imperialism EVEN WHEN American didn't "conquest" anything. While they refrain from talking about Russian imperialism when the territorial conquest actually happens before they eyes while they are denying it. The intellectual misery is cosmic.
BTW here is a useful definition of imperialism from Wikipedia:
Imperialism is the practice, theory or attitude of maintaining or extending power over foreign nations, particularly through expansionism, employing not only hard power (military and economic power) but also soft power (diplomatic power and cultural imperialism). Imperialism focuses on establishing or maintaining hegemony and a more or less formal empire. While related to the concepts of colonialism, imperialism is a distinct concept that can apply to other forms of expansion and many forms of government.
And then ask them: is Russia imperialist according to that definition?
Besides the assumption that politics is about political leaders' intentions (which they wish to be more able to detect than involved political leaders) is rather myopic, also from their guru Mearsheimer's point of view . But apparently self-entitled anonymous nobodies on the internet want to teach politicians how to do their job.

Recently brought to my attention was a report written by former UN Assistant Secretary-General Michael von der Schulenberg, German professor Hajo Funke and retired formerly highest-ranking German general Harald Kujat. — Tzeentch

Where is the link to the report?

Contrary to Western interpretations, Ukraine and Russia agreed at the time that the planned NATO expansion was the reason for the war. — Tzeentch

Contrary to Western interpretations?! Nobody doubts that this is Putin’s declared reason for his aggression. The questions is: Ukraine and Russia agreed at the time that the planned NATO expansion was a LEGITIMATE reason for Putin’s aggression of Ukraine or that the US bears all/most of/primarily the blame for this war?

4) There is little doubt that these peace negotiations failed due to resistance from NATO and in particular from the USA and the UK. — Tzeentch

At this link where they talk about the report you are referring to (https://braveneweurope.com/michael-von-der-schulenburg-hajo-funke-harald-kujat-peace-for-ukraine), I see that the first cited sources are essentially Naftali Bennett, Schröder, Turkish Foreign Minister. I limit myself to say that the last two may have their interest in putting the West in a bad light. Concerning Naftali Bennett, his views are significantly more nuanced than it looks by cherry-peaking what he said in his interview (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qK9tLDeWBzs): indeed, he goes as far as to say at minute 2:45:41 “this is pre-Bucha, Bucha massacre, once that happened I said it’s over” (it would interesting to see if Bennett has changed his mind about the Bucha massacre after the recent Hamas massacre in Israel), at minute 2:59:34 “in a broad sense, I think there was a legitimate decision by the West to keep striking Putin” (referring to the more aggressive approach against Putin) or at minute 3:02:09 “there was a good chance to reach a cease fire, but I’m not sure. But I’m not claiming it was the right thing. In real time I thought the right thing was a ceasefire, now I can’t say. Maybe it would have conveyed the wrong message to other countries”.

Concerning the Istanbul Communiqué, two points remain predictably uneasy to settle: the territorial claims over Donbas and Crimea, the security guarantees. Concerning the security guarantees, either they exclude Russia so they become a version of NATO which Russia couldn’t possibly like if that’s Putin’s issue, or they include Russia (the aggressor) which can at the very least sabotage any effort of Ukrainian Westernisation (as much as it happens with resolutions that go against Russian interest in the UN) while being spared economic and diplomatic sanctions.

If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you. — neomac


No problem, I am happy to teach you. — boethius

BTW how many rubles do I owe you, prof?

First as I've already explained, it's completely irrational to refuse negotiating as the weaker party to a conflict. Not only are Russia's demands maybe their starting position and through negotiation you "talk them down" but Ukraine was also in a position to get concessions also from both Europe and the United States.

So if you don't negotiate you can't know what exactly is on offer. Perhaps Russia is offering some compensation for Crimea that makes a peace more palpable and so forth. Perhaps other European states that do not want a protracted war with Russia would also offer compensation that would make life better in Ukraine — boethius

.

Your reasoning looks rather out of historical circumstances.
First, Ukrainians didn’t refuse negotiation BY DEFAULT. There have been several attempts for negotiations for a ceasefire, all of them ultimately failed. Add to that a long history of failed agreements and reviving historical tensions between Ukraine and Russia. So the refusal of negotiation can very likely be a consequence of past failed negotiation attempts and failed agreements.
Second, hand-weaving at hypothetical compensations for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses while abstracting from relevant historical and geopolitical circumstances is a rather weak argument. Indeed, the idea that the US and European allies would compensate for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses is geopolitically questionable if that implies burdening the US as the hegemon (which has been explicitly and repeatedly antagonised by Russia) and its allies (which can’t easily make concessions to Russia without irritating the hegemon) for the Ukrainian losses (which, notice, would be also Western losses if Ukraine was meant to be more integrated into the Western sphere of influence!), the costs of compensating such losses, and the additional strategic risks (by emboldening Russia, China and Iran witnessing Western weakness) while, at the same time, condoning everything to an anti-Western Russia. And historically questionable: appeasing Hitler just emboldened his hegemonic ambitions (and also encouraged a nasty alliance with the Soviet Union before their great patriotic war, right prof?).
Third, whatever the Russian initial demands were circumstances for peace negotiation worsened within a month: the failure of the Russian special operation in Kiev (if the objective was Ukrainian capitulation) and the genocidal massacres (like in Bucha) became public (as much Russian state media support of Russian genocidal intents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Russia_Should_Do_with_Ukraine). Later, the deal-breaker demands included also the new annexed oblasts. So I’m not surprised that Ukrainians would be compelled to refuse negotiation. Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US.

As for your point about deal breakers, if you mean giving up claim to Crimea or declaring neutrality are deal breakers, those are irrational deal breakers. If Ukraine has not military option to retake Crimea then maintaining that as a deal breaker is simply irrational, it is much more rational to seek to get as much compensation for recognizing reality that you have no hope of changing through military intervention. Likewise, if Ukraine has no hope of joining NATO anyways and no hope of defeating Russia in military terms, then the rational course of action is to seek as much compensation as possible for accepting neutrality.

The justification for Ukraine's refusal to negotiate and declaring delusional objectives and ultimatums, such as only being willing to negotiate once Russia leaves all of Ukraine, was the theory of victory that Russia would fall apart under the pressure of the war, Western sanctions and domestic opposition to the war. — boethius

I was talking about RUSSIAN official deal-breaker demands (given the quotations I made) not Ukrainian deal-breaker demands. Indeed, Ukrainians were opened to make concessions. But they either didn’t satisfy Russia or didn’t satisfy the Western allies (not surprisingly so if they have to play the role of security guarantors).

None of that I would argue was rational for Ukraine to believe, but the US made quite clear that their theory was a protracted war with Ukraine, sanctions, blowing the up the pipelines, would weaken Russia long term. This is made quite clear by

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate


Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).

And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101. — boethius

If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. Indeed, if the US was in the same shoes of Ukraine, namely invaded by a foreign great power historically bent to destroy, dispossess and oppress the US, would it be irrational for Americans to hyperbolically “fight to the last person” as long as powerful foreign allies helped with the weapons the US needed and the economic support? I would expect the answer would be “absolutely-fucking-lutely!” from a real American and Republican patriot like Sen. Lindsey Graham, right prof? Especially if Sen. Linsey Graham considers Russia a state sponsoring terrorism (https://twitter.com/aaronjmate/status/1554486803431886848), right prof?
Besides, claims of “using fanatical fighters” are not particularly compelling: Russia uses “fanatical fighters” in Donbas against the Ukrainian regime AS MUCH AS “non-fanatical fighters” to spread pro-Russian propaganda with the same arguments you yourself and your sidekicks are pushing here (even with greater zealousness than pro-war Russians themselves!). And this too is a “post-WWII great-power conflict 101”.
As far as I’m concerned, between the US and Ukraine there is a convergence of interests. Until the US wants to play the hegemon and Ukraine needs the US to escape from Russian sphere of influence, there is a convergence of interests. This is the relevant point I’d make.

For Ukraine, the point of maximum leverage was in the initial phase of the war (or even before the war) and the rational thing to do is negotiate when you are strongest.

The myth building undertaken by the United States that the time to negotiate is not at the start of the war but Russia is incompetent and weak and can be pushed back, was to encourage Zelensky to reject peace as well as reassure European allies that supporting Ukraine militarily is a worthwhile endeavor (rather than forcing Ukraine to accept a peace deal, which the Europeans could have done even without the United States). Some parties in Europe were of course as enthusiastic for Ukraine to fight the Russians as you could possibly be, but many people in Europe were skeptical. — boethius

I have no reason to specifically assume that Zelensky or Western leaders are as gullible as you wish to depict them. What I have reason to generally assume is that politicians (which are always assisted by appointed military, intelligence, economic, political and communication advisors) are not expected to easily fall for propaganda as you seem to assume. Besides it’s most certainly unreasonable to expect that political leaders’ conscious decision process would be infallible and fully transparent to the general public while history is still in the making. As far as I’m concerned, Zelensky and Western political leaders may have had no need for the sort of encouragement you are suggesting, which would be best suited more for the general Western audience. On the other side, it may be in Zelensky’s interest to press partners to keep their words in terms of commitment and remind them of related reputational costs.
Concerning the Europeans, it’s up to them to decide to what extent it’s in their best interest to remain within the American sphere of influence and play along. At this point in history, the risk they may overlook to me is that the weaker, more isolationist or more distracted the US is, the greater is the risk the hegemonic game among the US, Russia, China and Islamist regimes will move more aggressively inside an unprepared Europe. So better for the European leaders to take the time the Ukrainians bought them to prepare for the worst.

Now, certainly your reply is that Ukraine really wants Crimea back and really wants to be in NATO, perhaps agreeing already with:

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.

Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.

Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to not join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business". — Echarmion


Of which the answer is literally right there in these statements.

Ukraine has no hope of actually joining NATO as Echarmion literally states. Obviously it would have been nice for Ukraine to join NATO anytime before the war or even now and have other countries come and fight your battles.

... However since Ukraine has essentially zero hope of joining NATO, then what is rational is to try to seek compensation for recognizing what you can't have anyway. What is totally irrational is to fight a costly war to defend "the right to join NATO" even if you can't actually join NATO. — boethius

Unless there is essentially zero hope for Ukrainians to obtain the wished compensation as much as there is zero hope for joining NATO.
My expectation still remains the same: to the extent the US and its European allies strategically aim at preserving the Western world order against anti-Western authoritarian regimes’ challenges, they can’t possibly dismiss Ukraine ’s security concerns and simply reconcile with Russia after what Russia has done. Russia’s imperialist ambitions need to be frustrated as much as possible, and its military/economic projection capacity and prospects of growth should impactfully drop for decades to come wrt the trends set prior to the beginning of the war. However my understanding is also that at this point in history the US has no interest to commit more than it did. Whatever the reasons are, the American hegemony and deterrence power is dangerously eroding, and failing in Ukraine will have major reputational costs for the US leadership.

To answer the question of why Russia invades to try to force Ukraine to give-up it's goal of joining NATO when Ukraine has essentially no hope of joining NATO, again the answer is right there in @Echarmion explanation of the situation.

Ukraine can't join NATO due to the war in the Donbas, but continuing that war indefinitely is not a reasonable solution for Russia. Just like Ukraine is clearly at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with Russia, the Donbas separatists were at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with the rest of Ukraine. There is clear limitations of sending "volunteers" and other covert actions to help the separatists rather than formal military formations. Eventually Donbas would be attritted away (or just leave or die of old age) and Ukraine would prevail without direct intervention of the Russian army.

Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists.

The conflict in the Donbas and the cutting of fresh water to Crimea were also serious political problems. Ordinary Russians expected the Russian government to "solve" those issues one way or another.

Again, the portrayal of the invasion as some some sort of whimsical irrational act on the part of an obsessed imperialist in the Kremlin was again myth building to portray Ukraine as an innocent victim, rather than creating problems for Russia that would inevitably lead to escalating the de facto war with Russia in the Donbas since 2014. — boethius

Sure, also the US intervened in support of Kiev to prevent the collapse of the Ukrainian regime given the military disadvantage of Ukraine in a war with Russia.
So what? Even if Russia’s invasion is some sort of sensible rational act on the part of a provoked Russia (which COMPLETELY RATIONALLY kills people Putin claims are one people with the Russians and repeatedly threatens to start a nuclear war over it despite nobody has aggressed Russia proper, right prof?) still there are very strong reasons to oppose it: Russia defies the Western world order and violates Ukrainian right to independence and territorial sovereignty AFTER having acknowledged it officially and repeatedly. What's so hard to understand, prof?
In any case, that’s my argument to question your views and it doesn’t rely to what you attribute to pro-Ukrainian Western propaganda to spin your own pro-Russian counter-propaganda . So you are not going to score points with me by deconstructing your own myth of Western propaganda.

The reason so much effort was spent by the Western media to assert there was no "provocation" was that there was obvious provocations that are easy to understand (such as cutting off fresh water supply and killing ethnic Russians, in one case locking them in a building and lighting it on fire, as well as going around with Swastikas and espousing Nazi ideology), and accepting the reality of these provocations significantly reduces a feeling of moral imperative to help a victim that provokes aggression — "boethius

.

Here you are making a big deal of a fallacious equivocation. “Provocations” as Putin and Mearsheimer’s intend it PRESUPPOSE a concept of sphere of influence (as Putin says “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia”) and hegemonic conflict. In this case, such “provocations” and whining over it are part of the business of competing for hegemony (China whines over the American provocations in the Pacific). There are no accepted supreme ruling authorities to appeal to for rights violation, just security dilemmas and ways to deal with them (ALSO offensively or preventively). Which thing makes me question also certain political or moral implications you may wish to draw from it (like putting all/most/primarily the blame on the US for the current war).
Another thing however is to claim that the Russian aggression of Ukraine was “unprovoked” because Ukraine didn’t aggress Russia proper, like Hamas did instead aggress Israel proper very recently. This point is relevant for the Western world order and the interest for the Ukrainians to join the West. Besides even when Ukraine fought ethnic Russians, the latter still were Ukrainian citizens in Ukrainian territory, some of which turned into anti-Ukrainian “fanatical fighters“ through the interference of a foreign imperialist power, namely Russia. Indeed, “fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101”, right prof? And Ukraine had sovereign power to fight them back as much as Russia had sovereign power to fight back the Chechens independence movement, right prof? On the other side, if Russia had hard power ways to end Ukrainian abuses toward ethnic Russian minorities, the West had soft power ways to obtain the same results through Westernisation (e.g. EU and NATO membership). This, again, is a rather important point if you want to talk Western world order and the interest for the Ukrainians to join the West.
BTW if Ukrainians are also “one people” with the Russians as Putin would claim , the killing ethnic Russian argument sounds rather pointless. Unless Putin explains how Ukrainians can be at the same time “one people” with the Russians but two distinct ethnic groups, to me Putin’s killing Ukrainians (including innocent civilians) amounts to killing ethnic Russians according to HIS OWN ASSUMPTIONS, right prof?
Besides Russia could have simply solicited the ethnic Russians that felt horribly “persecuted” by the Nazi Ukrainian regime to flee in Russia, like Jews did flee in Israel and the US. Russia has a big land you know and since it didn’t have problem to even forcefully and massively deport people in other parts of its own vast territory (as it did with the Ukrainians during this war and the Crimean Tatars in the past), why should it have problems to help relocate all ethnic Russians that feel persecuted by the Ukrainian regime into the motherland? Donbas’ “fanatic fighters” can’t possibly be more safe from genocidal Nazi-Vampire-Cannibal Zelensky, with all his Swastikas tattoos, worshipping Hitler and extermination of all Russians on earth in concentration camps, in some part of Siberia than in Donbas, right prof? Also because in Russia there are more nazis which will protect them than exterminating them, right prof?

If you recognize the obvious reasons for Russia seeking a military solution to obvious problems, then corollary is that Russia is a rational actor with reasonable concerns and perhaps a peace can be negotiated that is better for everyone, and likewise greatly diminishes a feeling of obligation to send free money and arms to Ukraine.

The myths required are founded on mostly just ignoring obvious facts but also just Western ignorance. Since the Western media mostly ignored the conflict in the Donbas and ordinary Westerners mostly ignore the Western media anyways, the Russian invasion came as a surprise (to them) so it is easy to build on that and portray the invasion as irrational and unprovoked, just sort of out of the blue.

You can of course argue Lindsey Graham's point that it was good for the US to create the myths required to encourage Ukraine to give up their leverage through fanatical fighting as that will "damage" Russia, but it's difficult to argue that it was rational for Ukraine to do so.

Once it started to become clear that Russia was not weak and would not be easily beaten, the new justification was that the war was existential for Ukraine, again based on the myth that Russia wants to conquer all of Ukraine: therefore it is reasonable to fight even "to the last Ukrainian" because the battle is existential. However, that argument is not only simply wrong (Russia doesn't have the force necessary to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine and there's no gain in doing so) it is also a fallacy anyways confusing what is existential for a state and what is existential for a people. — "boethius

Again, I don’t give half a kopeck about your myth of Western propaganda. I would still find arguably rational for the US and Ukraine to oppose Russia EVEN IF Russia is rational (wrt its strategic goals), provoked (in Putin’s or Mearsheimer’s sense), competent and not easy to beat. I don’t need AT ALL to deny such assumptions to make my point which you are more than welcome to criticise, prof.
Criticising pro-West propaganda can be as easy as criticising pro-Russian propaganda. But it may not be as fruitful as you wish. Indeed, the risk of spinning your counter-propaganda at large is simply to increase political polarisation that hostile powers can/will exploit, which in turn will push more authoritarian/extremist political trends in the West.
Besides, you and your sidekick and likeminded people won’t stop to promote anti-Western and anti-US propaganda EVEN IF the US/West/NATO did what you suggest for a cease-fire in Ukraine, because their historical faults for this war and beyond are endless, right prof?
Don’t ever waste your time to talk about Western propaganda with me, if you want to score points with me. Ever.

The only time it is reasonable to fight to death against impossible odds is if the aggressor anyways plans to murder you if you surrender.

If I am attacked by a larger and more skilled opponent that I am convinced is trying to murder me (not coerce me into giving him my watch) then it's reasonable to fight back even if I am fairly certain I will lose, as there is always some chance, no matter how small, of prevailing due to luck in fighting or then the lucky intervention of external forces. — "boethius

Your notion of “rationality” is grounded on your own sense of the value of life, and a convenient example were the odds are taken to be clear by default and in abstraction from the historical and geopolitical context.
Once again, yours are non-shared assumptions. As far as I’m concerned, anybody can put value to their own or other people’s life the way they feel, then one can more or less share/sympathise with. So people can value their independence and social identity, more than their own lives and more than other people can share. Indeed, your reasoning is biased by the value you attribute to life, which is typically Western. Morale at war implies readiness to sacrifice ones’ life, and for military leaders to sacrifice soldiers and civilians, also at the risk of doing it disproportionately, and even against more capable adversaries. Palestinians, Afghans, Kurds fight for their independence and national identity, for generations, no matter if they are the weaker party to a conflict, no matter if they are instrumental to geopolitical moves of other bigger players. BTW how many Russians, soldiers and civilians, were killed during the great patriotic war, prof?
I find COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL to assess human behaviour based on social standards not grounded on realistic assumptions about human behaviour. Humans value social identity and freedom to the point of fighting for them to death, take revenge for it, mistrust enemies for it, and sacrifice their own individual and collective well-being/safety for it, over decades, over generations. Afghans, Kurds, Palestinians, Israeli, Ukrainians, and Russians keep reminding us that however tragic in itself and disturbing to armchair self-entitled nobodies on the internet, this is a very common hardcore driving factor of human behaviour. To what extent that holds for Ukrainians is up to the Ukrainians to tell.
My understanding is that all countries pursuing national interest are rationally compelled to assess proximity in values, capabilities, history, ambitions and margins for cooperation wrt other countries. Ukraine is more open to join the West while Russia wants to antagonise the West. Besides, in geopolitics, as much as in the Ukrainian war, the odds especially in the long term remain uncertain. The best countries can do, is to try to gain as much relative advantage as possible over competitors, and the historical and geopolitical context offer relevant guidance in understanding the stakes of the ongoing competition.

However, not only is there zero evidence Russia plans to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, there is even less evidence Russia wishes to do so in order to murder every Ukrainian.

The war maybe existential for Zelesnky, but it is not existential for the average Ukrainian and there is no rational basis to fight a losing war.

If you are losing a war then your leverage decreases over time and does not increase. The closer the war comes to a military termination (where you lose) the less reason the opposing side has to offer any concessions and of course the more people and infrastructure you lose due to continuing to fight; and to make matters even worse, the more you lose a war the faster you lose the war in the future as the destruction of your fighting capacity means further disadvantage and asymmetry of losses. — boethius

Since the very beginning, the idea was basically that Russia will continue its war against Ukraine until it gets its demands satisfied. And such demands do not require Russia to occupy all Ukraine or murder every Ukrainian. So military loss and victory for Russia must be assessed wrt Russian demands and declared goals, as well as their evolution. And even if Zelensky’s idea of winning back all occupied territories is currently unattainable, that doesn’t imply that Ukraine is willing to surrender to all Russian demands. Indeed, until the West is backing and intends to back the Ukrainians because strategically convenient, the Ukrainians do not need to surrender to all Russian demands, even more so if they have personal reasons not to do so.

It's a foolish mythology that was required to justify refusing peace talks altogether which was completely irrational without the belief that Russia was somehow incompetent and easy to beat. — boethius

Dude, read here:
Russia's demands in the early phases of the invasion included legal recognition for Russia's annexation of Crimea, independence of Luhansk and Donetsk, as well as demilitarization and "de-Nazification" of Ukraine

After Russia declared unilateral annexation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that recognition of these additional claims were necessary conditions for any peace plan.

In April 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that he wanted any peace negotiations to focus on creating a "new world order" to counter global hegemony of the United States.

Russia's demands were Ukraine's recognition of Russian-occupied Crimea, independence for separatist-controlled Luhansk and Donetsk, and "de-militarisation" and "de-Nazification". Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that while his country was ready for talks to resume, Russia's demands had not changed.

Dmitry Peskov restated Moscow's demands, that Ukraine should agree to change its constitution to enshrine neutrality, accept that the Crimea was Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you.

is it better for the US to give up on Israel and invest on Saudi Arabia/Egypt instead? — neomac

Why not have them all as allies? No? — ssu

Sure, it is what the US is doing (I stated the same in some previous post “It’s not an aut-aut choice. The more the better.”). However you seemed to question the US support for Israel with a series of objections like:

“Both Egypt and Saudi-Arabia are allies of the US. If there would be logic here, that the issue is to prevent emergence of Iran becoming a regional power, wouldn't it then to be more logical to support the Sunni Arab states? The US has already forces in Iraq.”

“Umm... isn't the US and Egypt in good terms too? Wouldn't geopolitically the stability of Egypt be here more important? The Suez canal is in Egypt. Btw, those gas fields that Israel has aren't so important. And as Israeli is a very wealthy country, I guess it does have a lot of internet cables”

“But why not then do this with the allies that actually come to help the US in it's wars? Why not for example the UK? Give them the aid to make new joint ventures on new weapon systems with the British! They would be very happy if the "special relationship" with the US really would be a special relationship. They have a sound, well function military industrial complex I think better than Israel. Especially after the disaster of Brexit, they need friends. The British have gone with you to into Afghanistan, into Iraq, defended Kuwait alongside the US. Israel has not. Wouldn't it be more reasonable to help and improve the armed forces of your ally that for example can help you all around the World (like with AUKUS), including in the Far East?”

I limited myself to explicit the possible reasons for why the US is so committed to support Israel in the Middle East and those reasons go beyond the idea of the Evangelical support to Zionism or the humanitarian acknowledgment for the Jews' right to self-determination. There is an intelligible and bipartisan strategic interest behind the support of Israel however fallible its pursuit can turn out to be.

NATO alliance requires from the US a financial and military engagement that has become domestically controversial (and which European democratic countries are reluctant to rebalance).Israel has the benefit to not need the same kind of engagement by the US (Israel is a militarised regime) — neomac

This is simply false because of two reasons. Firstly, no NATO member has ever gotten as much aid than Israel. About 30% of all US foreign aid has gone to tiny Israel! The US has rushed it's weapons straight from it's arsenal's to Israel when it has had it's conflicts with it's neighbors. NATO countries haven't gotten such aid, so what you are saying simply is not true.

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Secondly, Europe was the primary front during the Cold War as Soviet tanks were in Central Europe. To this the Middle East was a sideshow. Now there simply doesn't exist that huge presence that the US had in Europe. And even as much Americans desperately want to "pivot to Asia" to face China, Europe still surprises them again and again with wars like with the Yugoslav Civil War and with the Russo-Ukrainian war. — ssu

Sure, the US provided a lot in military aid to support Israel, because Israel, differently from NATO countries, was under constant imminent threat from Iran and its proxies and because the Middle East has been for a while a hotter arena than Europe until the war in Ukraine. But the American financial and military engagement still remains different, as I said, because the problem is not just how much money the US puts into providing security to NATO countries vs Israel, but how much of this benefits the US interest in return. Over time, after the collapse of Soviet Union (most certainly after the war in Yugoslavia), many NATO countries have been progressively perceived as exploitative consumers of the security provided by the US, investing little in their own security, mostly reluctant to side with the US in the Middle East, getting to close to strategic rivals, like Russia and China, getting overconfident in questioning the American leadership and competing economically against the US (actually the war in Ukraine showed the weakness of the NATO allies in the face of the Russian threat). Israel has been until now in a better spot to the eyes of the US.

NATO is not just about military defense but, ideally, about military defense among countries that support “democratic values”. — neomac


Preferring Saudi Arabia and Egypt over Israel could blow back in terms of soft power, — neomac

REALLY?

Uh, when they (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) are already US allies, what here would be the blow back? That mainly Saudi terrorists made the worst terrorist attack on US and killed far more Americans than Hamas achieved killing Israeli soldiers and civilians? The killing of a Saudi journalist in a Saudi embassy? The Yemen Civil War? Has all of it upset Americans? Not much, and not much as supporting Israel's tactics in the occupied lands.

Even this hilarious photo op with the US president and the leaders of Egypt and Saudi-Arabia didn't cause an outcry, simply laughter:
23orb-superJumbo.jpg

Sorry, but here you can see the how just little the war in Yemen has been in the media than reports of Israel's apartheid system in the lands it has conquered and the fight against Gaza. In one month a lot of children have been killed and 10 000 Gazans in all. Yet in the 9 years that Yemeni Civil war has gone about 150 000 have been killed in the fighting and over 300 000 from disease and malnutrition.

All I'm implying is that if the US would take a stance to Israel as it takes to Canada, UK, Japan, Germany and any other ally, that could start to solve the situation. — ssu

If we are comparing Israel vs Saudi Arabia/Egypt as allies of the US in the Middle East (that’s what I was doing anyways) and accepting the fact that each country can have its own agency and its own agenda conflicting with the American national interest (that’s true also for Europeans), is it better for the US to give up on Israel and invest on Saudi Arabia/Egypt instead? The primary criterium can’t possible be “the unconditional respect for human rights”, since neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia/Egypt nor the US itself would pass the test in the eyes of many (inside the US too). The criterium doesn’t need to be the fitness for a NATO-like alliance which has proven to be twice problematic: there are NATO countries which do not play along with the US interests to various degrees (on the extreme side authoritarian regimes like Hungary and Turkey) and NATO alliance requires from the US a financial and military engagement that has become domestically controversial (and which European democratic countries are reluctant to rebalance). Israel has the benefit to not need the same kind of engagement by the US (Israel is a militarised regime) and at the same time spontaneously play against the emergence of regional powers hostile to the Americans (like the Arab/Islamist world) while having enough common cultural-institutional-economic-technological-security grounds and exchanges with the US to justify the privilege Israel has over Saudi Arabia/Egypt. That’s why I find the American attempt to draw Saudi Arabia and Egypt toward Israel, instead of bypassing Israel, pretty consequential.

Zelensky Rebuke of General Signals Rift in Ukrainian Leadership
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/04/world/europe/zelensky-rebuke-general-zaluzhny.html

No, it's fine, thanks.

I have also corrected him repeatedly on the actual accounts of negotiations, as reported by an actual participant, — Jabberwock

Would it be possible to link the post where you reported this?

The analogy required to understand how stupid this propaganda is, is to consider the scenario where I put a loaded gun to your head and then tell you I'm not threatening you because I don't intend to pull the trigger. — boethius

The stupidest analogy you could come up with. Military threat needs to be assessed in relative terms:
- Russia is a nuclear power, Ukraine not.
- Russia has a stronger military than Ukraine (it was/is claimed to have "2nd-best military in the world").
- Russia has historically oppressed Ukraine way more than the other way around.
You even keep repeating ad nauseam the first two points to argue that Ukraine has no chance to win Russia, after being aggressed by Russia and being deprived of 20% of its territory!
Do you even read what you write?!

"Drip Feed theory" (DFT) is that what is sent to Ukraine depends on what kind of help will prop up Ukraine in the short term while not being a real threat to Russia nor piss them off "too much".

My premise is that strategic interest of the US in the Middle East is to prevent the emergence of regional powers that challenge the American hegemony. — neomac

Yes, but does being the most staunch ally of Israel help here?

Both Egypt and Saudi-Arabia are allies of the US. If there would be logic here, that the issue is to prevent emergence of Iran becoming a regional power, wouldn't it then to be more logical to support the Sunni Arab states? The US has already forces in Iraq.

Sorry, but what US needs is a hegemony that it has in Western Europe through NATO. Countries that want it to stay in the continent. Not countries that are just waiting for it to go away, but being friendly when Uncle Sam is around. — ssu

NATO is not just about military defense but, ideally, about military defense among countries that support “democratic values”. Preferring Saudi Arabia and Egypt over Israel could blow back in terms of soft power, not only because Saudi Arabia and Egypt are most certainly not democratic countries (notice that NATO has already problems in dealing with Turkey and Hungary), but also because their population leans toward supporting the Islamic jihad ideologically and financially (Saudi Arabia has also been accused of committing a genocide in Yemen and arguably Al-Sisi too against his own people). Besides Egypt and Saudi Arabia political elites can flirt with authoritarian regimes like China and Russia, something Israel can’t easily do precisely because of the Palestinian issue. So, for the US, courting Saudi Arabia and Egypt at the expense of Israel will likely increase their negotiation power not the American negotiation power, while at the same time alienate a precious ally like Israel (less reluctant to engage in a military confrontation against hostile powers than many NATO countries) by increasing its isolation and therefore its threat perception (likely at the expense of the Palestinians). This in turn will inflame the American domestic conflict also over Israel (better would be for the Democrats to exploit the Republican sensitivity over Israel, to get a greater support over Ukraine from them in exchange of more concessions to Israel). Normalizing the relation between Israel and Saudi Arabia/Egypt may help for both containing Iran in the Middle East (likely also Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea which might benefit the Europeans) and softening the Israeli attitude toward the Palestinian issue. This might be a diplomatic success for the US (like the Camp David Accords) considering that China is working in the opposite direction by trying to reconcile Iran with Saudi Arabia.

EU Enlargement: Commission recommends starting accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and candidate status for Georgia
https://commission.europa.eu/news/enlargement-commission-recommends-starting-accession-negotiations-ukraine-moldova-bosnia-and-2023-11-08_en