Now, whether this is inherently true or not, that any deal that is or was remotely feasible between Ukraine and Russia is "bad for the West", certainly, depending on the details, a peace deal would be better or worse for the West, and this is exactly the leverage Ukraine has, or at least had at one point.
How Ukraine could get concessions from the West is in threatening to go and make sure of doing exactly what you say would be bad for the West: i.e. threaten to make peace with the Russians in a way that embarrasses and weakens the West the most.
For example, Zelensky could have gone to the US, NATO, the EU, and said "look, you've slow played us into this disastrous war, if you don't give me some additional compensation (such as fast track EU membership), in addition to what the Russians are offering, so that I can do right by the Ukrainian people and we get something for giving up claim to Crimea, then I'm going to declare the West has abandoned us, no Western soldiers are coming, no no-fly zone is coming, we are alone, abandoned by our Western friends, arms and thoughts and prayers won't defeat the Russians, and therefore we will make peace with the Russians (and then imply a bunch of terms even more embarrassing for the West, such as allowing Russia to have military bases in Ukraine, station missiles, or just further economic cooperation with the Russians etc.).
At this stage of negotiation, the West would need to decide whether to play ball or not and participate in negotiations in order to be able to negotiate terms they can better spin as some sort of "victory" for the West (such as "security guarantees" for Ukraine, integrating Ukraine into other Western institutions such as the EU, and so on). If the West refuses to offer anything, well the Russian deal is still better than a disastrous war, and there's nothing to lose in trying to go get concessions also from other parties concerned. — boethius
I doubt that Zelensky would politically survive this plot twist in the face of the Ukrainians, his entourage, and his Western allies. Or be fully shielded from sabotage attempts. Besides you seem to give for granted that Zelensky can deflect his political responsibility by supporting the idea that Ukraine has been slow played into a disastrous war. But, unless Zelensky was really a puppet of the US and would now heroically denounce himself as such, maybe Zelensky bears a good deal of responsibility. Indeed, that is what is legitimate to expect from rulers of sovereign countries. Maybe he was abundantly warned behind doors by Western politicians (when politicians can put aside their rhetoric posturing and be more pragmatic) and his entourage (as the evidences of the internal struggle within Zelensky’s administration may suggest) of what risks he would have faced since the beginning of the war and of the potential constraints of the Western support. After all, the Westerners too suggested him to surrender (in the sense of giving up fighting) and flee at the beginning of the war, and after the Russians withdrew from Kherson Zelensky was again suggested by the Westerners to re-consider negotiation from a position of strength. As I suggested earlier maybe the US was just fine with freezing the conflict right there at that moment and Zelensky could have been satisfied just with his resistance against regime change and against demilitarisation, even assuming there was no peace deal and the territorial dispute was still open. This might have been enough to turn Russia into a rogue state and give Ukraine some breath while keeping the Western pressure on Russia. However Zelensky may have been compelled also by being in a unique political and historical position to take a greater risk for a greater reward with a last big push before the next American and Russian elections.
Ukraine's leverage was likely the highest before the war even started, as it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war. Now, Russia wanted more a deal with the West, a new European security architecture, which the West refused saying it's between Russia and Ukraine (exactly because neo-cons at least believe that Ukraine fighting Russia, even if irrational for Ukraine, is better than any peace; no a surprise there), that was more comprehensive, but again Zelensky (if he wasn't an idiot) could have gone and threatened the West with peace into agreeing to negotiate with Russia a new framework in which Ukraine is neutral.
Then there is the first weeks of the war where an offer was on the table, Zelensky could have closed a deal had he wanted.
War crimes are definitely usual in any war, and their investigation can be part of a peace deal; it is simply another point to negotiation, and not a reason to refuse to negotiate (even if we are assuming it was indeed the Russians and not elements in Ukraine that don't want any peace). — boethius
And, why did Russia want a deal with the West and not with Zelensky, if for Zelensky “it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war” (apparently, you really can’t help but sound like pro-Russian propaganda)?
If Russia didn’t have enough leverage to get what it wanted from the West, why are you so convinced that Zelensky had it?
If neoconservatives were bent to make Ukraine fight to the last person, even if irrational, and Zelensky is an idiot put there by the neoconservatives to play their script, why are you conjecturing that things could have gone otherwise?
Why would the leverage for Zelensky against the Europeans be bigger at the beginning of the war when Europeans didn’t experience economic fatigue than after the Europeans experienced economic fatigue for almost 2 years?
Why would Zelensky have more leverage with Europeans than with Russians at the beginning of the war? He could have exchanged Crimea and Donbas for economic compensations to Russia (or just for survival given Russian attempts to kill him) and turn into a Russian puppet right away, while sparing Putin all the fuss.
Why would any involved party trust other involved parties in this ornamental agreement with zero meaning given the historical penchant for “bad faith” on all sides?
If neoconservatives are such an evil specimen that loves to violently subjugate and exploit the rest of the world, how come that the neocoservatives’ support for post-Cold War globalization in the last decades boosted Russia (and China)’s economic-military-political growth and power projection outside their borders far more than the American “provocations” weakened their offensive power?
If neoconservatives are such an evil specimen that loves to violently subjugate and exploit the rest of the world, why do you think that the US would let the Europeans normalise their relations with Russia over a peace deal with Ukraine?
BTW can you teach me what about Zelensky’s ten points for peace negotiations in November ’22 was rational to give up (
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/)? They also mention Russian war crimes among the negotiable points, as you suggested.
Again, your entire reasoning is grounded on a load of non-shared and historically decontextualised assumptions, which I even hardly find consistent as such. Apparently, history and geopolitics and national strategic interest is good to explain (justify?) Putin’s aggression of Ukraine and blame the US meddling in Russia’s backyard, but it is not good to explain (justify?) Zelensky’s, Biden’s, Europeans’ approach toward Putin.
What is so self-defeating in your all-knowing man-of-honour pedagogic stunt is that you can not use one single bit of your own impeccable definitions or military, economic, and moral omniscience to fix YOURSELF any of the rational failures, idiocy, evilness you are complaining about. You can at best whine over the internet along with your sidekicks wishing that this would do the fixing by others some day, as any random anonymous self-proclaimed man-of-honour from the internet would do, of course.
Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. — neomac
Yeah, sure, and I'd like a toilet of solid gold.
Simply wanting something is not a rational basis to fight a long and costly war that you are very, very likely to lose.
The relevant question here is whether war is a reasonable way of getting what you want. Maybe it is reasonable for Ukraine to "like to keep the Western alliance" (that Ukraine is not apart of), but it does not follow from that to fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war?!?! — boethius
I’ve been reasoning in geopolitical terms, so I meant a strategic alliance with the West, obviously.
I never argued in support of “fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war”. Indeed, you can not quote me saying it nor saying anything that logically implies this.
The political objectives, as I understand them, could have been more maximalist (e.g. resist regime change and demilitarisation, regaining territorial integrity, join EU/NATO, overthrow Putin) or more minimalist (e.g. resist regime change and demilitarisation, and then weaken Russia through other means as a rogue state). If Zelensky might likely have felt compelled to be maximalist, the US might likely have felt more compelled to be minimalist. For the US even having Zelensky escape from Ukraine, might have been enough to try to turn Russia into a rogue state: SO FAR, the US has definitely got more than it prospected at the beginning of the war. Zelensky got less than what he hoped. But not a total defeat either so he can’t now just surrender without compromising what has been able to achieve so far. From a strategic point of view, things shouldn’t look as bad as you wish to depict them even from the Ukrainian point of view. BTW even if there was no major land breakthrough in the last push, yet the successful attacks against the Black Sea Fleet may be of particular significance also for a future ceasefire negotiation. What contributed to magnify this sense of failure is arguably the Ukrainian propaganda itself which (MAYBE unnecessarily) created a hazardous hype over something that was very difficult, if not most certainly unlikely to succeed, given the inadequate/slow military support from the West.
While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US. — neomac
Sure, maybe it's reasonable for the US to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ... — boethius
I doubt it would be reasonable even for the Great Satan: if all Ukrainians got killed, there would be no resistance left against the Russians, if there are any left. So the Great Satan may want Ukrainians to spare human and material forces to continue fighting, as needed.
If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. — neomac
I am right that the US is manipulating Ukraine. For example "whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" are both obviously manipulative lies. — boethius
Again, a non-shared assumption. “Whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" is propaganda but what you wish to infer from that depends very much on how you understand propaganda. As far as I’m concerned propaganda is a political tool as much as diplomacy, war and economic sanctions. Political propaganda’s purpose is not primarily to inform but to politically mobilise people. So the information may be presented not to maximise understanding but to maximise a politically desired reaction. However propaganda has: 1. its costs, like any other political tool, including reputational costs; 2. its targets, political propaganda for the general audience is not for politicians (they have all sorts of informal and formal secured channels to communicate more PRAGMATICALLY, they are expected to be the experts of political propaganda not be fooled by it) but they send a signal to the politicians on what narrative they intend to push to gain support, typically from their fan base (but non exclusively) 3. its constraints and side-effects, fore example I find most certainly reasonable to assess propaganda within the context of other actual/potential rival propaganda (that BTW can come from internal and external political rivals). It’s in the interest of any politician to have or pretend to have rivals overstretching with their propaganda beyond sustainability to then spin the counter-propaganda against failed promises by calling them “propaganda” and “manipulative lies”.
From this perspective, propaganda is simply part of the game. For any propaganda from one political administration there is a counter-propaganda from national competitors and foreign administrations. Any propaganda is expected to stress the flaws of one policy or highlight the benefits of alternative policies, to even claim merits for others’ deeds and blame others for one’s own faults, to present one’s own representatives and choices as rational and noble while opponents as evil or stupid. So having people denouncing propaganda and others’’ “manipulative lies” as you do is not rationally compelling in an environment where everybody is and is expected to spin their own propaganda. Indeed, it proves just how committed you are in spinning pro-Russian propaganda in this forum. The only point I can agree with is that the US will likely pay reputational costs by giving up on supporting Ukraine now and/or in the future (I guess significantly bigger than the ones paid for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan). That’s why I find it unlikely that the US will give up on supporting Ukraine, just they will support Ukraine on their own terms. We will see how things will change if Trump wins.
Likewise, the billions and billions and billions (and many more billions until you've said billions at least 50 times, assuming each billion stands for at least 2 billions) in hard currency and arms the US sends to Ukraine without any tracing or auditing etc. is also a de facto area of affect bribe to all parties in Ukraine who stand to benefit from billion and billion and billions of untraceable currency and arms. That is not only clear manipulation without even attempting to avoid a situation where the money and arms are de facto bribes, but it was well known ahead of times those arms would find themselves in "the wrong hands" (to use RAND's phrasing) and would supercharge terrorism and organized crime around the world. — boethius
To me that’s not enough to assess if this lack of transparency goes against the American or the Ukrainian national interest. Since we are talking about lack of transparency one can conjecture cases were lack of transparency may still serve national interest: e.g. if part of the Ukrainian elite was running on Russian bribing, maybe bribing them back is convenient, if the money and weaponry supply is not traced maybe it’s to protect the network of local informants and dormant Ukrainian insurgents, offering both plausible deniability against Russian complaints or even curbing Ukrainian demands, and protect politicians of the current administration from future counter-investigation by internal political enemies who may compromise national interest. The lack of transparency can also backfire, of course: Russia could steal and indirectly pass to Hamas American weaponry supplied to Ukraine, to let the Western “useful idiots” exploit this to conveniently spin pro-Russian counter-propaganda. Not to mention that all wars have their nasty collateral (not only killing civilians).
However, how this would "prove" Graham shares the same definition of rational as me, and what the point would be, I honestly don't see what that argument is or would be, so you'll have to explain it.
Whatever you're trying to say, rationality does not mean "good" only lacking in self-contradiction, and "self" is a key word as a rational position does not imply a universal position.
People who want to cause as much harm as possible and do as much evil as possible in their limited time, can be perfectly rational in such a pursuit. That they may lack self contradiction in pursuing their purpose to murder, rape and torture, does not make those actions good on account of being rational nor lend any weight to the position that such purposes should be universal and adopted by all rational agents.
It may very well be that it is rational for Senator Graham, relative his neo-con ideology and evil purposes, or even just plain-ol' US imperialism in general, to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. That being true would not somehow make it true that is rational for Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. — boethius
If we are talking about national strategic interest, my understanding is that its identitarian nature makes it inherently NOT universal. Yet that doesn’t exclude possible similarities or margins for convergence with the national interest of other countries. Then we can try to assess national interest as what is desirable wrt what can be done in a similar way as computer scientists assess algorithms, namely efficacy and efficiency. The problem is that algorithms are comparable on objectives that are defined to be computable from the same sets of conditions in a finite number of steps, but from a historical perspective objectives may evolve endlessly, generation after generation, and there are no same sets of conditions. One can try to reason by historical analogy: e.g. how long did it take, how much did it cost, how successfully was it for the jews to strive and fight for their own sovereign state generation after generation? Or, how long did it take, how much did it cost, how successfully was it for the Palestinians to strive and fight for their own sovereign state generation after generation? Ukrainians may be in an analogous situation. Is it worth it? Hard to tell and it’s ultimately not on us to tell because costs and risks are primarily on their skin, future prospects remain uncertain in the long term and national interest is inherently national matter.
One might however argue that, IN THE SHORTEST TERM, a containment approach instead of a maximalist approach may be less rewarding but also less costly and more likely to succeed.
But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. — neomac
How is my interpretation questionable?
If you find something questionable, moreoverso in a philosophical debate, you should explain what's questionable about it and, in the case of interpretation, provide your position on the matter.
How do you interpret Senator Graham's statement?
Before rebutting the rest of your post, I think it is wise to take a hiatus here and see if you even have an alternative interpretation.
For, if you don't (which your failure to support your "questioning" my interpretation by providing an alternative one, very strongly implies that you don't), then your thrashing about in the void is far more easily dealt with as obvious denialism (that even you clearly see in simply denying my interpretation without providing your own) of what Senator Graham obviously has stated (the "quiet part out loud"), and that equally obvious it is a direct and clear statement of US government policy (reinforced further by the lack of anyone from the White House even bothering to contradict Senator Graham, even just for appearance sake ... as it's so obvious an admission of what is so obviously actually happening that it's easier for everyone if the mainstream media simply never cites Graham in full on the US position in the war, much less discuss it). — boethius
To begin with, let’s clarify once again what I’m questioning. Here your quote [1]. You are inferring from Sen. Graham’s quoted statements the belief that “the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one”. That is twice a manipulative interpretation of Sen. Graham’s quoted statements. Why? Since your inference is not a valid logic deduction from Sen. Graham’s quoted statements (“rational” doesn’t even figure in Sen. Graham’s quoted statements), you need some additional implicit assumptions concerning Sen. Graham’s understanding and application of the “rationality” claim to the Ukrainian case the way you do to make the inference logically valid: something like “fight to the last person” is irrational OR “fight to the last person” is irrational if a military victory is most certainly unattainable OR “fight to the last person” is irrational if a military victory is most certainly unattainable and military victory equates to regaining complete territorial integrity. But all such assumptions look pretty spurious to me. Indeed, Sen. Graham’s words make sense even without a specific “theory of victory” or chances of success you wish to question (which terms are not mentioned in the quoted statements). Sen. Graham (who also has a military background) is plausibly reasoning over necessary requirements to enable Ukrainians to military fight Russians: morale (“fighting to the last person” as upper limit of morale) and means (out of the military aid the West is capable to provide). And the former may be critically conditional on the latter.
Besides, the spirit of Graham’s rhetoric is that the Ukrainian willingness to fight to the last person (which is taken as a given not as something that needs foreign moral encouragement or chastising) is expression of admirable patriotism and freedom against the Russian oppression (denounced as a terrorist state) perfectly in line with American Republican values. Indeed, Ukrainians resisting the invasion reminded him of
"our better selves in America. There was a time in America that we were this way, fighting to the last person, we were going to be free or die." https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-condemns-us-senator-grahams-comments-death-russians-2023-05-28/
Graham’s propaganda is obviously meant to boost military support for Ukraine by using Republican style rhetoric, with the likely understatement to his wider audience that Americans won’t do nor need to get directly involved in the Ukrainian war to beat Russians’ ass. Sure, it’s still a hawkish approach. But from a national interest perspective there is nothing intrinsically bad in being hawkish.
Your manipulation has two rhetoric intents: discrediting the Ukrainians (as irrational and fanatics) and the Americans (as exploitative). This is how Sen. Graham’s political slogans turn into an evident confession of exploitation by the Americans at the expense of the irrational Ukrainians in your pro-Russian counter-propaganda.
[1]
“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate
Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).
And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101. — boethius