He's emmerding his allies by reminding them that they will need to make peace with their enemy, that however giddy they are about emmerding the Russians, ultimately they will need to make peace with Russia, so they might as well start a conversation about how this might happen. — Olivier5

The focus is not making peace with Russia but under what conditions. Macron is expressly making a point about anti-NATO security guarantees for Russia.
Besides his analogy with the eventual concession of Alsace-Lorraine region by France to Germany (in that interview) is muddling his point about international law and respect of territorial integrity in the case of Crimea.
Always in that interview Macron was also referring to another critical issue: the recent unfair/protectionist American policies (maybe deniable by the US but not implausible) which may compromise the European re-industrialization program.
So he made himself vulnerable to criticisms from every side: Ukrainians, Americans, Eastern Europeans. And he weakened both his arguments at once by triggering a predictable polemic over the question of security guarantees for Russia which in turn shadowed the merits of the other argument against the American anti-EU policies.

But as I said, that's the way he communicates. It is often effective in a strange, unconventional way. — Olivier5

I also agree with your comment about arrogance being counter productive — Olivier5

I don’t know what evidences you have that his communication style is effective in international affairs, but that interview on very critical subjects is hardly evidence of that.

I agree with ssu that such a project has zero chance of working anyway, as long as NATO functions reasonably well. It can only work as an alternative to NATO, and such an alternative will only be considered if Europe has very very good reasons to mistrust the US. — Olivier5

If there is zero chance of working, what’s the point of invoking an "obvious" discussion about anti-NATO security guarantees for Russia? What's the point of remarking the "effective in a strange, disruptive way" of his communication style? Macron’s proposals would just look as wishful thinking. Besides working on an alternative to NATO when we have “very very good reasons to mistrust the US” might be already too late. I guess many European politicians can understand and share Macron’s concerns but he’s committing such alienating missteps in an already unfavorable European political and economic environment that his leadership is unfortunately easy to question.

In this modus operandi of Macron, it's not his problem if others are annoyed at him; it's their problem. They are only annoyed because somehow, somewhere, he is right; they know it and he knows it. So the annoyance generated is just a proof that the message has been heard. — Olivier5

I deeply disagree with that too. Even if “somehow, somewhere, he is right”, as Gérard Araud (ex-diplomatic adviser to Emmanuel Macron) twitted: En politique étrangère, on ne dit jamais publiquement tout ce qu’on pense. Avoir raison ne suffit pas. Il faut aussi le dire au bon moment sinon on risque d’atteindre le résultat opposé au recherché. Je dis ça à tout hasard… Soupir (https://twitter.com/GerardAraud/status/1599692520794968064). Publicly framing the peace issue in line with Putin’s anti-NATO narrative was a questionable rhetoric move because this time he’s not “emmerding” the bad citizens for the sake of the good citizens, but “emmerding” his allies for the sake of the enemy, an enemy who is eagerly looking for exploitable devisions among Westerners.
Besides if Macron doesn’t manage to build a consensus among European partners around his idea of a European Security system which is other than just more NATO, then he’s going to fail his declared objective. So it’s his problem too.

I note that Mario Draghi said things along similar lines when he was Italian Prime Minister, about the need to make peace with Russia, ultimately. But he said them nicely and softly, and hence no one paid any attention. — Olivier5

Anybody can talk peace with Russia, even Zelensky. The problem is on what grounds. In any case, Mario Draghi never talked about security guarantees for Russia as far as I know. Yet he did talk about security guarantees for Ukraine: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-golovoyu-radi-78129
And support for enlarging NATO: https://www.euronews.com/2022/05/19/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-italy-finland

Russian nationals fighting for Ukraine vow to resist Moscow’s forces ‘until the end’
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/05/europe/russians-fighting-for-ukraine-intl-cmd/index.html

Could've been a quote from Germany in the '30s. — Tzeentch

Really?! Macron's quote is extrapolated from an interview where the interlocutor reports that 85% of patients in reanimation were non-vaccinated and that their cases were saturating intensive care units to the point that many operations were deprogrammed. Can you pls quote politicians from Germany in the '30s enraged with non-vaccinated people because of the saturation of intensive care units by willingly non-vaccinated people?
In any case, what certainly couldn't be from Germany in the '30s was the free public polemic reactions of political opposition, media and civil society against Macron's controversial wording choice [1]

Right?

[1]

On the other hand, he is basing his view on not returning to the previous status quo. He wants to talk about that instead of postponing the topic until after some presently inconceivable terminus. That approach may become useful someday. — Paine

Sure. But his moves do not seem effective in building consensus. To work in that direction I would expect Macron to pursue bilateral accords with other European countries (including eastern European countries), to assure enough convergence with European leaders behind doors before coming out with challenging ideas and see those give him a cold shoulder, and to put France more at the forefront of the European military support for Ukraine (e.g. as relevant if not more relevant than French military involvement in Syria in a war against terrorism). It's unlikely he will meet his strategic goals for Europe if he doesn't address Eastern Europeans' security concerns in a persuasive way (especially if predictable national interests lurk behind his behavior).

It seems to me that your speculations about Macron dreaming to become Napoleon IV are not empirically testable and serve no purpose that I can see. You might as well speculate that Biden secretly wants to enslave Western Europe, or that Merkel fantacized to become a second Hitler — Olivier5

Then, that’s not an objection to what I said, but an objection to a caricature of what I said. Indeed you can not quote the claim you attribute to me. So let me double down on the facts that support my speculation.
Macron’s dreams were stated by himself and promoted by his own initiative already in 2017 [1]
En matière de défense, l’Europe doit se doter d’une force commune d’intervention, d’un budget de défense commun et d’une doctrine commune pour agir. Il convient d’encourager la mise en place au plus vite du Fonds européen de défense, de la coopération structurée permanente et de les compléter par une initiative européenne d’intervention qui permette de mieux intégrer nos forces armées à toutes les étapes.
That his proposal is seen as an attempt to emancipate Europe from NATO [2] is in line with his declared project for European security, his declarations during NATO summits [3] and became manifest to the large public since when he declared NATO brain-dead [4] . That Macron’s initiatives and aspiring leadership is not as appealing as Macron might wish is not only evident by the reaction of the other NATO partners but also acknowledged by French commentators as well as politicians like Arnaud Danjean (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnaud_Danjean) [5]

Notice, I’m not suggesting some evil intentions on Macron such as pursuing some kind of French imperialism (even though I get why he might be caricatured as a “petit Napoléon” or “petit de Gaulle” and can't discount his pursuit of national strategic interests in Europe and outside), or unreasonable concerns about European strategic autonomy (on the contrary I myself expressed that concern earlier [6]). My point is simply that as the war unfolds Macron’s pushy attitude as a European leader and promoter of European security autonomy is wearing out in support.

[1] https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique

[2]
L’atlantisme est-il un anachronisme ? Le nécessaire débat sur l’avenir de la politique étrangère de la France
https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-et-strategique-2017-4-page-16.htm

L’Alliance atlantique selon Emmanuel Macron
https://www.cairn.info/revue-defense-nationale-2021-2-page-95.htm

Une idée incertaine de l’Europe. Comprendre les ambiguïtés stratégiques d’Emmanuel Macron
https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-champs-de-mars-2020-1-page-149.htm

[3]
https://otan.delegfrance.org/Conference-de-presse-du-President-Emmanuel-Macron-a-l-issue-du-sommet-de-l-OTAN
https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/285669-emmanuel-macron-30062022-otan

[4]
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-nato-braindead-idUSKBN1Y21JE

[5]
« Etre un peu plus humble dans notre approche »
Dans cette nouvelle redistribution des cartes, la France se positionne en leader, ce qui n’a rien d’étonnant selon Arnaud Danjean. « Depuis le départ du Royaume-Uni de l’UE, la France objectivement est la principale puissance militaire d’Europe, qui a en plus une gamme complète y compris avec la dissuasion nucléaire, ce qui est tout à fait singulier en Europe. Donc la France est naturellement dans un siège de conducteur pour l’Europe de la défense. » Mais ce spécialiste des questions de défense et sécurité met en garde la France. « Ça nous oblige nous Français, à un grand travail de conviction vis-à-vis de nos partenaires. Et parfois, je trouve que ce travail est fait avec un peu trop d’arrogance. Car on se satisfait d’être dans la position de leader et on a envie d’imposer cela à tout le monde, on pense que c’est une évidence pour tout le monde. Je pense que l’on doit être un peu plus humble dans notre approche. » Un message clairement destiné au président français Emmanuel Macron.
https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/europe-de-la-defense-la-france-fait-preuve-d-un-peu-trop-d-arrogance-estime-arnaud

[6]

Yet what worries me more than nuclear escalation is the vulnerabilities of the Western front which will likely remain (if not deepen) after the war ends: uncertain American future commitment within the Western front (due to domestic unresolved political tensions and impending competition with China more than with Russia), Europe without military and economic security (e.g. Germany is losing at once energy input from Russia and output to China) and its political polarisation between East and West Europe. Add to that the possibility of having an unstable Russian Federation at risk of collapse. — neomac

Sure that's my point about Macron too. But I don't see much consensus around his views. My impression is that the gap between his dreams of leadership and the reality has deepened over time during this war.

then I don't know what statement of mine you are objecting to.
Calling "speculation" statements of mine which start with "My guess is" or "Here is my counterfactual" doesn't sound as an objection. They are speculations. If you want to claim they are implausible where is the argument?

Not directly related to Ukraine, yet still related to Western security concerns:
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/beijing-s-long-arm-china-s-secret-police-stations-in-europe-a-d6732094-ca32-4c0a-8e6f-58b395b946aa

More speculation. — Olivier5

Are you talking to me?

had the European leaders understood the need to take into account Russia's security concerns earlier, in say, 2021, this entire war could have been avoided. — Tzeentch

Here is my counterfactual: had the European leaders understood the need to take into account Western security concerns earlier, in say, 2014, this entire war could have been avoided.

That's speculative, and far fetched. — Olivier5

Speculative to some extent. After all "Unfortunately, the French president tends to come up with abstract ideas [in the public space], but never develops them to a level of specific programs or road maps. This allows officials, including those at the French Foreign Ministry, to interpret these ideas at their own discretion. Therefore, it is still too early to say if this particular initiative Macron has proposed will develop into something more significant. The current situation as it is, considering some comprehensive European security system is at least premature," he pointed out.
https://tass.com/politics/1546113


Why far fetched if " the only nation ever pushing back against the US is France"?

France intends to create a new "security framework" during the presidency. "We need to build it between us, Europeans, share it with our allies in NATO, and propose it for negotiation to Russia," Macron said.
https://www.dw.com/en/macron-proposes-security-pact-to-make-europe-a-power-of-the-future/a-60482625

The expansion of European defence capacities strengthens NATO, but France's goal remains strategic autonomy for Europe. Finally yet importantly, France claims leadership within this new European security architecture.
https://www.freiheit.org/european-union/frances-new-security-strategy

I doubt Macron is trying to appease Putin. I don't quite see what the point of that would be, and he can't do that all alone anyway. I mean, the guarantees he is talking about would be given by NATO, not by France, so there's no sense in trying to go alone on this. — Olivier5

I agree. Yet he keeps talking about discussing anti-NATO security guarantees for Putin, “the rapist” - to recall your analogy - while still raping. Why? Even French commentators on TF1 look baffled at his words [1]
My guess is that Macron is fancying some security system alternative to NATO for Europe. So he’s trying to use Russian security concerns as a pivot to make Europeans step in that direction, hopefully with the support of other prominent allies.
The immediate vocal reaction of other NATO partners against his words (while none in their support as far as I know) along with a very weak French military support for the Ukrainian resistance so far, tell me that after 9 months of rehashing the same refrain [2], Macron is nowhere close to build any consensus around his ideas or leadership.


[1]


[2]

Macron is only stating the obvious — Olivier5

I disagree. Macron is not stating the obvious. He's talking about discussing "security guarantees" for Russia. And as far as I know these are the security guarantees Putin wanted: no more NATO enlargement; no missile deployments near its borders; and a scaling back of NATO's military infrastructure in Europe to 1997 levels. Opening to Russia's anti-NATO security concerns before even having Russia opening to Ukrainian and Western security concerns, along with Macron's position toward Putin since the beginning of this war seem more in line with a political agenda and likely an understanding of NATO's role that neither the US nor other more involved NATO partners are sympathetic with. So not only Macron is far from stating the obvious but he holds no leading position to weigh in.

Meanwhile, leaked Kremlin poll shows 55% of Russians want to see negotiations with Ukraine to end the war: report
https://money.yahoo.com/leaked-kremlin-poll-shows-55-184223785.html

I don't know how much Macron's position on this war is conditioned by domestic politics. I understand his foreign affairs moves more as aiming at gaining a leading role in the EU, so I read his call for "security guarantees" for Russia as a way to restrain the American influence in Europe while profiting from the German weakness to advance French leadership (also for what concerns EU security matters).
But what are the odds for him to succeed? His losing popularity in France, in EU, in the US, and in Russia (after expressing his support for investigating Putin's war crimes)

1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon

Not sure about the explanatory power of this premise. It's not clear to me to what extent one can determine the way we are prior to determining what we do: e.g. if X kills somebody, X is a murderer. In this case, we wouldn't explain X killed somebody (what X did) because X was a murderer (the way X was) but the other way around: X is a murderer because X killed somebody. One could claim that some set of X’s features pre-existing the murder explain why X committed a murder: all right, what is this set of features exactly? One can claim that thanks to some human science research (sociology, criminology, psychology, etc.) we can determine at best some set of features correlated with unleashing murderous impulses with great probability.There are 2 problems with that: 1. Great probability doesn’t mean “necessary” 2. Unleashing murderous impulses doesn’t necessarily lead to murder (think of all the ways murder attempts could fail), so my features would explain my doing when it succeeds and it fails. Yet it’s what results from our doing that may loop back to gratify or frustrate, reinforce or weaken those features, as well as the pool of related possibilities and expectations, so again changing what I am. In other words our doing redefine our identity, the way we are.

Acknowledging that Russia had reasons to wage war against Ukraine the way Russia did so far based on whatever has been declared by Russian representatives ("NATO enlargement", "denazification", "genocide", “provokation”, etc.) or otherwise guessable (security threats for the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, long range missiles in Ukraine, worse if equipped with nuclear warheads, American military bases at the border with Russia, no-fly zone over Ukraine, risks of direct military clashes between Russia-NATO, risks of nuclear escalation, etc.), doesn't compel people to take those reasons to be justified. Indeed I think avg Westerners can question those reasons on moral, legal, geopolitical grounds more consistently and plausibly than avg Westerners can defend them. Besides my guess is that the same is at least partially true if we replace "avg Westerners" with "avg Russians” (avg wrt to standard of life and education)

Yet what worries me more than nuclear escalation is the vulnerabilities of the Western front which will likely remain (if not deepen) after the war ends: uncertain American future commitment within the Western front (due to domestic unresolved political tensions and impending competition with China more than with Russia), Europe without military and economic security (e.g. Germany is losing at once energy input from Russia and output to China) and its political polarisation between East and West Europe. Add to that the possibility of having an unstable Russian Federation at risk of collapse.

Beliefs about one thing entail beliefs about another. I believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that only one person is President. I believe that Donald Trump isn't President. I believe that Barack Obama isn't President. — Michael

"Belief" as a factual cognitive attitude doesn't entail any other beliefs, since entailment pertains to the domain of semantic and logic normativity. In other words, “entailment” expresses nothing more than a rational link that beliefs must comply with to be considered rational. So anybody can believe a certain proposition to be true and yet not believe all that it entails, out of ignorance or irrationality.

To say that moral claims can be true is to say that there are inherently true moral claims, claims that by definition are not supported by external evidence. Such claims are needed because extrinsic truths depend on intrinsic truths to be truths. It cannot be that the only moral claims that are truthful are those that depend on other moral claims to be true. Any moral justification that lies outside the thing itself - extrinsic morality - "x is good because it does abc and abc is good" - requires claims outside itself to be truth in order for it to be truth. This creates a never-ending chain of justifications, each new justification passing the problem onto something else. This is moral relativism and subjectivism. They are absurd, literally.

The problem of needing axioms is not the problem, the problem is that there are no such moral axioms that are true. Valor is only good because of its effects. So is truth, justice, love, peace, etc. The closest any system (that I know of) gets to claiming moral axioms is hedonism. In it, good feelings are good, bad feelings are bad. But they're wrong: they're merely things that evolution created to help us survive. They are not actually inherently good or bad, despite Hedonism's claims. There is no true reason why they should or should not exist. — Leftist

Your position looks contradictory, here is why: on one side, you claim that extrinsic truths depend on intrinsic truths (that I assume you would call “true axioms”) and that intrinsic truths (=true axioms) by definition are not supported by external evidence, so extrinsic truths depend on truths not supported by external evidence (=true axioms). At the same time, you claim that moral claims can not be intrinsic truths (=true axioms) because “good feeling” and “bad feeling” are not inherently good nor bad because of evolution. The problem is that either “evolution” is an external condition for the truth of our moral claims, but you stated that intrinsic moral truths are such that are not supported by external evidence, so truths about evolution are irrelevant for intrinsic moral truths to be true axioms. In other words, taking evolution as an external condition of truth for moral claims contradicts your definition of true axiom. Or “evolution” is taken as an internal condition for the truth of our moral claims, but then this supports the claim that “hedonistic” axioms are inherently true moral claims. In other words, taking evolution as an internal condition of truth for moral claims contradicts your claim that there are no moral axioms that are true.

this fantasy in which the United States is some spreader of peace and love — Tzeentch

Can you quote anybody here talking about the US as "some spreader of peace and love"?

the foolish notion that countries in the EU and NATO are sovereign — Tzeentch

Maybe it's your notion of "sovereignty" which is foolish. Indeed its normative usage in international relations is more nuanced than you might think, for example it shouldn't be confused with the notion of "independence" nor "autarchy" nor with "territorial control": Sovereignty may be recognized even when the sovereign body possesses no territory or its territory is under partial or total occupation by another power. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty#External

if the premise is true, that doesn’t logically prove the definition. — neomac


Nope. Indeed it doesn't.

that premise is compatible with other arguably more plausible definitions like “Ukrainian is a person with Ukrainian passport”, incompatible with the definition you provided: indeed not all persons under the rule of the government of Ukraine are Ukrainians, likely the non-Ukrainian foreign professional, tourists or residents located in Ukraine. — neomac


It is, yes.

the claim “Ukrainians will always be controlled by Ukraine” doesn’t logically follow from your definition of “Ukrainian” unless “Ukraine” in your conclusion is understood NOT as a territorial entity but as the government of Ukraine. — neomac


That's right..

Other irrelevant facts about my post are that it contained 114 words and doesn't once use the letter 'j'... if you're starting a collection . — Isaac

The facts I listed are relevant to establish whether your argument is fallacious. Your stats aren’t.

The argument is that control over the people of Ukraine is in the hands of the Ukrainian government.

The idea of a group of people literally controlling a 'territory' is absurd (what are they going to to do control it's geography?). What is controlled is people not land , and the way people control people is primarily via a government making laws. So the only matter in consideration is what government controls which people, and by what means. — Isaac

The expression “controlling a territory” was more clear before you tried to clarify it. Indeed what your clarification misses is that the idea of “controlling a territory” suggests a geographic perimeter for people’s or government’s controlling activity. Not surprisingly you talk about “government of Ukraine” to refer to a government meant to rule over the territorial entity called “Ukraine” and not “Botswana”.
Besides “primarily” doesn’t mean exclusively nor necessarily. But, most importantly, a government controlling a territory doesn’t need to be one that represents people’s will in a democratic way, which is a more relevant point to @Olivier5’s argument as far as I understood it.
See clarification is very important for rational people debating over complex topics. Unfortunately you spectacularly suck at it.

The argument is that there's no 'natural unit' of people who all have some single homogeneous set of needs so the grouping used has no bearing on the life of any given member. — Isaac

No bearing?! If one is Australian, then she doesn’t need a permit to enter and live there, while non-Australians do, so the grouping based on citizenship has a bearing on people’s life.

Each individual ukrainian might be better off sharing their control over their government with other Ukrainians, or New Yorkers, or Parisians. — Isaac

Not sure what you can infer from such a random hypothetical.

There's nothing about the border of Ukraine which makes the people within it better off sharing control with each other than with people outside that border. — Isaac

It sounds like claiming: “There is nothing about the walls of a flat which makes the family members within it better off sharing control with each other than with people outside those walls” which, if it has a meaning, is likely a preposterous one.

Your comment here makes no sense at all. Nowhere is the word 'clarified' clarified., nor what you mean by 'supposed to mean'. In fact your whole post is just garbage. What do you mean by "make any sense" in the first sentence. You've not provided any measure of what 'making sense' would constitute, nor a method for how we'd judge it. And "play any other role" is ambiguous. What is a 'role' here, how do we determine whether something is or is not 'playing a role', your argument is just nonsensical unless you can define these terms and how we'd measure them. Then there's "arguably more plausible". How are we going to judge if something is, in fact, arguable? Or plausible? Without these things defined first we can't possibly make any sense at all of what you've written. "Likely". How likley? You've got to be specific here otherwise we can't judge. Is 80% enough? Baysian or frequentist likelihood? How will we measure it?
It seems you've got a ton of work to do before anyone can make any sense whatsoever of your post. Alternatively, we could act like reasonably intelligent adults and accept that although some terms have fuzzy definitions we need not clarify every single one in advance of making any point. — Isaac

I agree about your claim marked in bold. But here you are clearly abusing it, and playing dumb is making things look even worse. Indeed you spontaneously proposed a definition of “Ukrainian” and a clarification of “controlling a territory”, namely two very ordinary notions that so far the interlocutors you are dealing with managed to use intelligibly and correctly without your proposals (luckily so, since they are ineffective). Yet you don’t feel the need to define nor clarify the locution “morally 'correct' unit of government” which sounds pretty esoteric (google reports zero results for “morally 'correct' unit of government”), indeed nobody has used it so far, except you, and despite sounding very important to you since you keep framing your thoughts on this war in moral terms?! And then you dare lecturing me if I protest about it?! Are you crazy?!

But then it seems absent of asking for definitions, you've nothing to say. — Isaac

It hurts, I know. Sorry, but not sorry.

What about Ukraine being under the control of Ukrainians? Is that totally out of question? — Olivier5


Doesn’t make any sense. Since’Ukrainian' is not a natural kind, it's not a subspecies, or a genetic type, Ukrainians will always be controlled by Ukraine since the definition of ’Ukrainian' is 'person under the rule of the government of Ukraine’.

There's no difference between a citizen of Donetsk having to accept power sharing with a citizen of Lvov, than that same citizen having to accept power sharing with a citizen of Rostov, or New York, or Paris. They're all miles away. No magic connects Lvov and Donetsk more than New York and Donetsk that somehow magically renders the former a morally 'correct' unit of government, but the latter not. — Isaac

Your argument doesn’t make any sense: first, the premise “Since ‘Ukrainian' is not a natural kind, it's not a subspecies, or a genetic type” doesn't seem to play any other role than putatively supporting your definition of ’Ukrainian’ as 'person under the rule of the government of Ukraine’. Even if the premise is true, that doesn’t logically prove the definition. Indeed that premise is compatible with other arguably more plausible definitions like “Ukrainian is a person with Ukrainian passport”, incompatible with the definition you provided: indeed not all persons under the rule of the government of Ukraine are Ukrainians, likely the non-Ukrainian foreign professional, tourists or residents located in Ukraine.
Second, the claim “Ukrainians will always be controlled by Ukraine” doesn’t logically follow from your definition of “Ukrainian” unless “Ukraine” in your conclusion is understood NOT as a territorial entity but as the government of Ukraine. Yet, if @Olivier5’s claim has to do with control of territorial entity (Ukraine) by a group of people (the Ukrainians), as it seems to me, then your argument is irrelevant, because your argument deals with the control of a government (the government of Ukraine) over a group of people (the Ukrainians).
Third, nowhere is clarified what “morally 'correct' unit of government” is supposed to mean, nor why “mileage” would make no difference in identifying “morally 'correct' unit of government”, nor why these claims would be relevant for Olivier’s question to another interlocutor.

:up:

If nothing else, it fits the signature of Putin's Russia. Other than that, I'd take it with a grain of salt. — jorndoe

Agreed. But it's interesting to keep an eye on, since not only Russia is reluctant to return the occupied Kuril Islands to Japan but it also started militarizing them: https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-are-russia-and-japan-gridlocked-on-the-question-of-the-kuril-islands-58074

fun fact: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-planned-attack-japan-2021-fsb-letters-1762133

Meaning pointing out US's invasion of Iraq was not an act of "defiance" does not create some situation where the "contrasting" the concepts of maverick and defiance has anything to do with anything.

You receive criticism ... can't deal with it, then move the goal posts. Obviously, you're no longer remotely arguing that Russia's breaking or not breaking international law is a justification for Western policies. — boethius

But I wasn’t talking about the American invasion of Iraq, I was talking about Russian invasion of Ukraine. To repeat it once more:
I listed facts that support that claim, like the fact that Russia didn’t halt its invasion even after a UN resolution against it as widely voted by West/NATO/US, with ensuing sanctions and continued military support to Ukraine by the West. If that’s not an act of defiance by Russia against West/NATO/US, then I don’t understand your usage of the word “defiance”: if X is warned, condemned and sanctioned by Y for a certain choice, and X knowingly pursues its choice despite of that, that’s for me enough to call X’s behavior defiant toward Y. EVEN MORE SO, if X were to question Y’s authority with “tu quoque” arguments (as you suggest with “but also the US has little respect for international law”)!!!
Your criticism doesn’t address my claim and plays with words (“maverick”, “justification”) in interpreting my original claims which weren’t using such terms. Your conceptually confused or caricatural way of rendering my claims is good to mislead or brainwash you, not me. Anyways yes the Western reaction against Russia is justified on geopolitical and legal grounds.

I point out that your argument about "defiance" is unsound and invalid, at no point does party A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified and what any of those or then third parties should do about it, and you then formulate my position as somehow contrasting maverick with defiance ... but they are compatible. Sure, you can also have the maverick defier, but that was not my statement which was just pointing out the US invasion of Iraq was not "an act of defiance” and then pointed out how your whole topsy-turvy defiance logic makes no sense.
Which you've entirely abandoned, formulating your position as very clearly support for US hegemony. — “boethius

First, in your blablabla is not clear to me what argument you claim as being invalid and unsound (the piece you quote is not my argument, but arguably Isaac's), so first show the argument of mine you are objecting to, then show why it is invalid, then show why it is unsound. Second, I didn't express myself the way you report "A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified". Third, you said I committed a strawman before making the distinction between maverick and defiant attitude [1], and what follows doesn’t prove that my objection to Isaac’s argument from the post you cite was a strawman wrt Isaac’s argument, it just offers another argument which is supposed to somehow save Isaac’s argument. However Isaac’s argument as it is formulated remains fallacious or inconclusive as I claimed. Four, your distinction between maverick and defiant is a diversion from what I was talking about, and it's irrelevant wrt what I originally claimed (it doesn't matter only who transgresses international law, but also against whom the transgression has been committed, especially if it looks like an insubordination from a minor power to a greater power), so why on earth would I let you drag me into a dispute grounded on a misunderstanding? Five, I didn’t abandon anything, it’s you who is progressively discovering how poor your understanding of my claim was and still is.
Anyways feel free to brainwash yourself into believing otherwise. Along with your sidekick. As I said, it's pathetic but expected. Fun fact is that even in two you can't manage to build a decent objection.

No, when we say you've moved the goal posts to something trivial, the triviality maybe true, but that doesn't support your position.

You have a bunch of elements in an argument that doesn't support your position: we point that out and then you move the goal posts to focusing on just one element, such as "defiance", or then just generalising your argument into a tautology which you quite clearly didn't say, but very clearly said something specific but unfortunately unsupported. — boethius

You and your sidekick focused on the word “defiance” from a comment of mine addressed to another interlocutor and for reasons apparently evident to you both, and yet when I questioned you both you are incapable of making a point without rephrasing in a caricatural or confused way my claims. Besides you are no credible referee nor credible reporter of our past exchanges. So I don’t see the point of such preposterous summaries other then offering cues to your sidekick to parrot.
BTW my claimes are "trivialities" or "tautologies" or "both"? Quote 2 trivialities/tautologies I claimed, and quote the claims expressing my position which the trivialities/tautologies I claimed later were moving from.

Do you just not remember what you've already written and what we've been discussing?

And the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. — neomac


Clearly your position at the time can be summarised as Russia defying international law, the West/NATO/US therefore needing to apply that law somehow, and to make things more abundantly clear "violation of international law" is another way to say "defiance of international law”. — boethius

NO, IT CAN’T be summarised in the way you rephrased it. I wrote in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US not in defiance of international law. I get that the expression “Russia defying international law” is useful for your and your sidekick’s preposterous counterargument. But that’s NOT what I said. So it was you who tried to generalise my argument into a dumb claim about international law violations and arbitrarily conflating it into international law defiance. And that's why you committed a fallacious strawman argument against me! But once you realised how dumb your counterargument is, you started accusing me of shifting subjects to “tautologies” (do you know what “tautology” means? Explain that to me!) which you must agree with. How pathetic is that.

So you're saying something that is of "practical rationality" to do would not be justified to do it? Why would it being both practical and rational to do ... not therefore be a justification to do it?

How is "practical rationality" anything other than a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of saying "justification".

If I ask why you did something and you answered with the practical and rational reasons for doing it, how is that not you justifying your actions with those reasons? — “boethius

I clarified what I mean by “practical rationality” as applied to geopolitics: rational geopolitical agents must (logical requirement) effectively link geopolitical means to geopolitical goals.. While we could use the word “justification” to refer to practical rationality, one could use it also to refer to “moral justification” and “legal justification”. For that reason, there is a risk of conflation between three different cases of justification, and that’s why I didn’t use it. Since you didn’t clarify the way you use the notion of “justification” I’m not sure we share the same usage, nor I’m sure that you are not conflating different meanings (indeed, I suspect you conflate different meanings). In any case I do not feel compelled to use your wording to express my ideas.

Again, so if Russia wins the "struggle" over Ukraine then it's actions were justified all along and Ukraine just picked the wrong side since 2014?

You're only substantive criticism of Russia seems to be they haven't won yet ... but the US hasn't won this struggle yet either. “Might is right" is not a slogan, it's just exactly what you are describing: if the US can dominate Russia in this confrontation then it should do so, which of course exact same thing applies to Russia dominating Ukraine. — boethius

See how you reframe all my claims with terms I didn’t use, to make claims I didn’t make, while ignoring my other contextual claims or subsequent clarifications, and despite the fact that I complained about such approach several times?
My claim is more like this: if the US has valid reasons to perceive Russia as a security threat and has effective means to repel such threat, then it’s rational for the US to act accordingly. As it is doing.
The claim “might is right" is conceptually confused or misleading, it doesn't sound anything but a slogan to me. I could never use it to express my beliefs.

Nothing is preventing anyone here arguing the cost is worth it. No one in the West hesitates to argue the cost to defeat Hitler was worth it. Sometimes great causes have great costs.

Of course, in the case of WWII the people arguing the cost was worth it actually sent their own soldiers to fight and share that cost. Saying the cost to Ukraine is worth it for our policies, such as not needing to "win" just damage Russia a lot, is quite clearly a cynical exploitation of Ukraine for our own ends.

However, nothing stops anyone from arguing the cynical exploitation and manipulation of Ukraine for our own ends is justifiable, that we will save more lives in the long run in the Baltics and Poland.

However, my question is not some "conceptual framework" that makes sense to reject. If you advocate some goal, such as in this case harming the Russians, "what would be a reasonable cost to attain that goal?" is just common sense. Obviously you wouldn't sacrifice every single American to harm one Russian soldiers knee ... so between that and achieve your objective at the cost of a cup of coffee there obviously some zone of acceptable cost (to the US, to NATO, to Ukraine) which you're comfortable with.

It's simply a common sense question to participants who reject a negotiated peace and any essentially any compromise whatsoever, what cost to Ukraine they think would be worthwhile in refusing to compromise. Would 300 000 lives be worth it to conquer Crimea? Is clearly a reasonable question. Of course, people can argue that 300 000 lives wouldn't be worth it, but it can be conquered with some amount of lives that is worth it. However, to be an honest participant in this debate one should be able to answer such simple questions.

That the questions simply point to a total incoherence, ignorance and Russophobia underpinning your position doesn't somehow make these simple questions as part of some "conceptual framework" that can be rejected. — boethius

I argued against such putative “simple questions” a while ago. They are not simple, they are simplistic. In other words, I find them conceptually flawed.

Like who? The Baltic states? Poland? Germany?
And in what conditions and scenario does Russia just start invading East-ward?
Also, if Russia can do what you say here, doesn't that just make them the Hegemon? — boethius

All the alleged reasons that pushed Russia against the West (NATO expansion, Russophobia, protection of Russian minorities, existential threat, securing strategic military assets like in Crimea) may still be exploitable in the future once Russia recovers enough to pursue its geopolitical ambitions and if circumstances are more favourable (e.g. a US more isolationist toward Europe, China more supportive toward Russia) that could be a problem for unprepared westerners. But it’s not on me to figure out future plausible geopolitical scenarios and security threats from an authoritarian, expansionist and anti-Western Russia, I’m not a geopolitical analyst. I just read them.

You say this question of cost is both dumb and emotional/moral blackmail ... while stating you already answered this question literally a few sentences later:

Is the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable?
— boethius

I answered yes and argued for it a while ago. It was among my first posts to the thread. — boethius

Right. Indeed, also on that occasion I criticised the conceptual framework of my interlocutor who was wondering the same questions and supports your views. I'll let you guess who he was.


[1]

What's the purpose of "defiance" in your strawman here? — boethius

Why strawman? — neomac

Your full sentence was referring to Russia, whereas my statement was referring to the US invading Iraq was not "defiance". — boethius

Meaning?

Your full sentence was referring to Russia, whereas my statement was referring to the US invading Iraq was not "defiance". Maybe follow the context.

You then setup some sort of maverick-defiance strawman stated above, which obviously has nothing to do with anything. As the following statements you cite demonstrate, pretty much doing anything can be construed as "defiance" of someone who disagrees.

Why are we talking about defiance? Because your argument about the West needing to deal with Russia's "defiance" (originally of international law) justifying Western policy, couldn’t standup to Isaac's criticism so you've again do what you always do and focus on some trivialities and moving the goalposts: in this case moving the goal posts from Russia is defying international law and that broadly support your position, to Russia is defying the “West". — boethius

Same steamy pile of shit as usual:
First, you keep repeating that I made a strawman argument. Do you know what strawman argument means? Explained that to me. And show me how that applies to my counterarguments.
Second, I already explained what I mean by “defiance”, it’s you who didn’t.
Third, your and Isaac’s duo-promotion is pathetic, but expected. Intellectually misery at its finest. Besides I don’t care about the scores you assign to me, I care about arguments.
Forth, every time you call my claims trivialities, that means you agree with me. And since I keep disagreeing with you by virtue of those alleged trivialities, then it means that you disagree with yourself. Do you see the problem, dude?
Besides my arguments are always the same ones. Just looping through them for a while now. And if I find your approach conceptually flawed, I don’t feel rationally compelled to stick to it.
Fifth, quote where I made such a claim “Russia is defying international law”, you serial liar.

Notice how this, your actual position of supporting US hegemonic power, has nothing to do with justifications of US actions — boethius

What do you mean by “justification”? I clarified for the thousand time my point when talking about practical rationality. While you keep playing with words.

First thing to notice, is that if Russia is a Hegemonic power in its neighbourhood then Ukraine should be compelled to treat Russia with submissiveness.

The only justification here is who has the hegemonic power in the region should call the shots in Ukraine. If Russia comes out on top in the war then it was the Hegemonic power all along, Ukraine should have submitted and that would be that.

Your argument basically boils down to might is right, so who has the might is the key question which the war is going to uncover. — boethius

No, there is no reason to constrain the field to region in the sense you suggest here. When great powers struggle for hegemony they can do so over all domains within their reach on earth, sea, space, virtual space. Small powers pick their side according to their means and convenience. Besides I don’t reason through caricatural slogans like “might is right”. I’m not sure it makes even sense.

Just wow. The question of whether the cost to Ukraine of our policies of encouraging, financing, arming more war is worthwhile cost so far to accomplish ... "liberation" of the Donbas? Crimea? well whatever it's accomplished compared to the offer at the start of the war, and what cost do Zelenskyites think would be reasonable to pay to accomplish the objectives of the "common cause" ...

... is akin to asking if being gay is a sin against God to an atheist. — boethius

When you are asking ME your questions you look as dumb, yes. I don’t share your conceptual assumptions. And for exactly the same reason, your rhetoric attempt of emotional/moral blackmailing me looks even dumber to me. And if you are doing it for your fans and sidekicks, I don’t give a shit about it.

Your whole premise is:
Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period. — neomac
... So what's there to fear? — boethius

Russia can still do lots of damage and especially at the expense of the American allies. Indeed if there is going to be a more direct clash between the 2 powers, this is going more likely to happen in Europe than on the American soil.

s the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable? — boethius

I answered yes and argued for it a while ago. It was among my first posts to the thread.

Where do I do this? — boethius

Here:

"move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance. — boethius

The US's maverick attitude in invading Iraq with sufficient justification or a credible plan, somehow succeeding in making things worse than under Saddam, is an act of defiance against international law and morality. If Russia is doing the same, that's just called “learning” — boethius

Then neither Russia nor you learnt well. First of all the act of “defiance” which I’m interested in must be assessed wrt the subjects supporting some international law resolution against the violator. So my question to you is: what is the UN resolution that the US was acting against during its invasion of Iraq, exactly?
Secondly, the US’s invasion turned out to be a reputational failure for the US and set a dangerous precedent exploitable by anti-Western authoritarian regimes. Still the US is the hegemonic power which the Westerns rely on, so Western countries are not compelled to treat Russia with the same submissiveness they treat American abuses on geopolitical grounds. Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period.
Third, as I said elsewhere, I’m siding with the US not because I think the US is good nor because I think the US is good for the West, but because I think Russia or China would be worse than the US for the West if they managed to extend their hegemonic influence at the expense of the American hegemony in the West. So until there is a better alternative for the Westerners in the foreseeable future, I would find more reasonable to partner with the US than to partner with Russia or China.

The word play in this little dialogue is your use of the word “defiance” to somehow imply justification of something, in this case, Western policies.

Russia and allies "defied" Hitler in WWII ... did that make Hitler’s war justified?

"Defiance" doesn't justify anything. Ukraine was defying Russia by financing and arming Nazi's ... so according to you the entire Russian war effort is justified due to the defiance of Ukraine. — boethius

The word “defiance” is perfectly intelligible with or without reference to any legal or moral justification as a form of intentional disobedience. Since I’m reasoning on geopolitical grounds, I will assess Russian geopolitical posture as the challenger of the West accordingly.
Concerning your likely confused questions, rational geopolitical agents must (logical requirement) effectively link geopolitical means to geopolitical goals. That’s how practical rationality must be applied to geopolitics. This is true for ALL geopolitical players: Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, China, ISIS, the US, Ukraine, Switzerland, the Vatican, Roman Empire, etc.

Again, what threat? Make your case. Russia is about to invade all of Western Europe? — boethius

Looping for the thousand time on the same point: the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. Besides Russia is capable to blackmail the West (and the rest of the world) with wheat and gas supply (among others), threaten it with nuclear weapons, fund pro-Russian lobbies in the West, conduct cyber-warfare against Western facilities/institutions and project military assets in Africa, Middle East and Mediterranean sea through the Black Sea (basically encircling Europe), while increasing Putin's authoritarian regime and spiking Russian budget for military expenditure [2] with the money earned during Putin's 20 years of happy business with the West, instead of investing this money to improve and widen system of rights, education and welfare for his people.

... with it's incompetent army that can't do anything right? — boethius

Wrong, with its incompetent army Russia did lots of damage. So far not enough to win its strategic war against the West, though.

The key question of the recent dialogue is "at what cost to Ukraine?" and is this cost reasonable to ask a proxy to pay.

You and all the other Zelenskyites simply keep dodging the question. — boethius

Your question is based on assumptions we do not share. It’s like asking to an atheist: is being gay a sin against God or not? Likely the atheist answer won’t be based on what is claimed in the Bible, but on his disbelief of any such thing as “sins against God”, right?
The same between us, so here is my answer: at whatever cost Ukraine and the West as geopolitical agents are willing to pay. It’s reasonable in geopolitical terms if it’s effective for any of them. Hopefully for both of them.
Besides given the rate I'm repeating my answers to your objections, it's less that I'm dodging your questions and more that you are playing dumb.

There is no guarantee that the current policies actually turn out bad for Russia. — boethius

We are reasoning under uncertainty. Yawn.

In the current trajectory, Russia will have a far stronger army, ramped up arms industry, and has already reoriented its entire economy away from the West so if the West isn't willing to do more, Russia now has basically a free hand vis-a-vis it's neighbour’s. — boethius

What?!

What has the war established so far? — boethius

So far? NATO alliance was revived (and will likely expand). Russian original goals failed. Russia has been humiliated on the battlefield. And other countries are distancing themselves from Russia (even countries within within Russian sphere of influence, like Kazakhstan).

It's mostly established NATO cannot defeat Russia through proxy means and is unwilling to intervene directly and sanctions are an empty threat that have already been expended, and the Russian military is willing to suffer large costs to achieve military objectives and can and will destroy your essential infrastructure if you "defy" them.

We keep on being told Ukrainian victory is just a battle away, but that hasn't happened. — boethius

The same blablabla. We have already been through this, here is my answer once again:
The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West.

P1. If West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then Russia didn’t violate international law in defiance of West/NATO/US
P2. West/NATO/US has little respect for international law
C. Russia didn’t violate international in defiance of West/NATO/US — neomac


Again, more bullshit soup.

What's the purpose of "defiance" in your strawman here? — boethius

Why strawman?

Obviously if West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then breaking international law is a homage to their realpolitik "move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance. — boethius

You are contrasting "maverick attitude" with "some sort of act of defiance", as if if they were incompatible, while Russia can be described as both. You are just playing with words (without defining them) and I don't care about your miserable rhetoric games. What I care about is the substantial security threats that an expansionist Russia constitute for the West.
BTW there is no international law resolution that NATO expansion has violated. While there is an international law resolution against Russian invasion of Ukraine. So what homage are you talking about?

You seem to be holding on this word defiance like mould to stale bread because if Russia is "defying" the West ... then it follows in the topsy-turvy mental gymnastics of the propagandist the West must do something about that "defiance", regardless of the consequence on Ukrainians or even if our anti-defiance policies even work. — boethius

Here I re-edited your caricatural bullshit to something that can express justified Western security concerns. BTW the West is already doing something about Russian defiant attitude, no matter what the Western propagandist and the pro-Russia propagandist like you is saying.

In other words, you just have "tautologies" that in the end you must agree with, dude. So suck it up and move on.

So the problem I saw here was that violating international law is not in defiance of "the West/NATO/US” because "the West/NATO/US" have little respect for international law either. — Isaac

And that objection is supposed to prove an “obvious error” I committed?! Are you crazy?! Aside from the fact that it fails to land anywhere near the target, I don’t even see how it can take off. Indeed, as it is formulated, your objection is a non sequitur, logically speaking. To be logically valid, it should look something like:

• P1. If West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then Russia didn’t violate international law in defiance of West/NATO/US
• P2. West/NATO/US has little respect for international law
• C. Russia didn’t violate international in defiance of West/NATO/US

To be sound both premises must be true. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that P2 is true, what about P1? Is it obviously true?! To me it’s the opposite of it. If it’s an empirical claim, where is the evidence to support it? If it’s a semantic entailment, can you exactly spell out what that is?
Anyways your objection totally misses the target. Let me repeat once again the point: my main claim wasn’t about international law violations but about Russian defiant attitude against West/NATO/US support for Ukraine. So I listed facts that support that claim, like the fact that Russia didn’t halt its invasion even after a UN resolution against it as widely voted by West/NATO/US, with ensuing sanctions and continued military support to Ukraine by the West. If that’s not an act of defiance by Russia against West/NATO/US, then I don’t understand your usage of the word “defiance”: if X is warned, condemned and sanctioned by Y for a certain choice, and X knowingly pursues its choice despite of that, that’s for me enough to call X’s behavior defiant toward Y. EVEN MORE SO, if X were to question Y’s authority with “tu quoque” arguments (as you suggest with “but also the US has little respect for international law”)!!!

Also, I found your evidence that this is, indeed, Russia’s intent to be sketchy at best. A lot of supposition, very little empirical ground. — Isaac

At this point, I don’t know really nor I’m sure I care about how you assess empirical evidence for whatever claim about “Russia’s intent” in this war made by avg dudes on a philosophy forum, not to mention that I take the facts I listed in my argument as common knowledge as the obvious mundane truism that Russia violated international laws. But you can always show me a comment of yours about Russia’s intent (or the US, NATO, West, Ukraine intent for that matter) that is more than “sketchy at best” and with great “empirical ground” and I might reconsider.

This doesn't seem to have a point related to the argument. You've stated a fact (Russia has this capability) but you've not made any argument about what is consequent to that fact. No one has expressed disagreement on those grounds, nor any argument assuming the opposite. So the statement just hangs purposelessly. Yes, Russia has that capability. So what? — Isaac

Security concerns are about means and intentions of potential hostile subjects: Russia has proven capability of damaging the West and proven intent to do so. If you do not understand the purpose of my argument about security concerns for the West (because I care for the West and reject Russian expansionism), that’s intellectually self-discrediting. These are pretty basic concepts and “as I said, you need to meet a minimum threshold of comprehension to take in part in discussions at this level”.

The argument being made is that Russia getting its way would be bad, but Russia not getting its way would be bad too (nuclear escalation). Therefore some negotiated compromise between the two positions is the best course of action.
You've only concurred that, yes, Russia getting its way would be bad. This adds nothing to the discussion because we were all already agreed on that matter, it's right there in the argument.
To dispute the argument, you have to show that one is worse than the other. Not merely that one is bad. — Isaac

To begin with, who is “we”? You commented a post of mine which was part of an exchange I had with another interlocutor. In that exchange he didn’t claim anywhere Russia getting its way would be bad for the reasons I discussed (as far as I read and remember of his previous posts he simply acknowledged that Russian aggression must be morally condemned, then he questioned the Western support of Ukraine for the risk of nuclear escalation). That’s why I discussed them. Actually, at some point, he expressed his disagreement with me. For that reason, I find your claim “we were all already agreed on that matter” twice false.
Secondly, I don’t buy the caricatural way you frame the problem, nor I care much about you pressing anybody to delimit the scope of the discussion the way you see fit. As far as I’m concerned, I don’t assume that my understanding of this war is nearly enough as good as the Western administrations’ one, starting with the US. And I have no strong reasons to question rationality, means and intentions of all directly or indirectly involved parties about avoiding any spiraling of this war into a nuclear world war, even in the case that tactical nuclear weapons would be used by Russia. From the news reporting the American establishment representatives’ doubts about the Ukrainian intentions to seize back Crimea (like Gen. M. Milley), one can guess some pressure by the Americans on the Ukrainians to get back at the negotiation table. Even in this case, that alone wouldn’t be enough evidence to support the idea that the Americans are acting primarily out of concern for a nuclear escalation. Also because in an hypothetical scenario where Russia is in such desperate conditions to use tactical nuclear weapons at some point, I wouldn’t exclude that the Western following military response, however not in kind, may decisively worsen the Russian situation on the battlefield.
Anyways, currently, there seems to be still room for continuing an attrition warfare without involving nuclear weapons. And if that’s expected to be in line with Western and Ukrainian objectives at the expense of an expansionist Russia, I’d welcome it too.

When you later reduced it to nothing more than "Russia broke international law", I found I agree entirely. — Isaac

What was exactly that I reduced before reducing it? Can you spell it out? Can you quote me?
Indeed I said a lot more than "Russia broke international law". Here, I'll repeat it again:
the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. Besides Russia is capable to blackmail the West (and the rest of the world) with wheat and gas supply (among others), threaten it with nuclear weapons, fund pro-Russian lobbies in the West, conduct cyber-warfare against Western facilities/institutions and project military assets in Africa, Middle East and Mediterranean sea through the Black Sea (basically encircling Europe), while increasing Putin's authoritarian regime and spiking Russian budget for military expenditure [2] with the money earned during Putin's 20 years of happy business with the West, instead of investing this money to improve and widen system of rights, education and welfare for his people.
So I do not see how exactly letting Russia get what it wants expressly out of fear of Russia under the eyes all other authoritarian challengers of the West is to the best interest of the West (if you care for the West, of course).
Do you have any ideas about this issue? Maybe we can try see things from a different perspective: maybe it's not simply that the West is helping the Ukrainians but also that the Ukrainians are helping the West.
Why did you select just that fact from all I said, believing it was an "error" and then LATER you agreed with it. What is the error? Can you spell it out? Can you talk me through it?

There's nothing to rebut. I completely agreed. — Isaac

BTW, if you agree with all I wrote, then why did you write the following claim?

None of this nonsensical verbiage alleviates your error. — Isaac

Why "nonsensical"? why "error"? All that sounds contradictory with your claim that you agree with me, right? do you agree on that truism too?

Probably, from past experience, when pushed you'll end up claiming it only says that Russia exists, or that people sometimes think before they act. You seem to want to write at enormous length explaining boring and obvious truisms that everybody already knows.

I expect I'll agree with your next post too if it is, as I predict, a 500 word masterpiece concluding that, yes, there is a war in Ukraine. — Isaac

Probably, from past experience (and this quotation confirms it), when pushed or catastrophically fail to understand and rebut on rational grounds, you'll end up caricaturing your opponent's view to make a point. How pathetic. Ops, I just stated another example of boring and obvious truisms that everybody already knows ! LOL

Back to the same transparent strategy you used last time when boethius pointed out your obvious error. Reduce the scope of your claim to something so utterly mundane that no one could disagree. — Isaac

He didn't point any "obvious error". You can't even clarify what the error is, as he couldn't. But I understand that as his sidekick you should try to come to rescue and troll once more over the same shit. "Same transparent strategy". Besides if you agree and what I say is mundane, where is the error? What's more catastrophic in your support to boethious' position is that he (not me) essentially believes that international law is ornamental and zero meaning, but if it's that the case then the putative examples of international law violations and injustice by the US are violations of something ornamental and meaningless! So what's the point of crying justice over something ornamental and meaningless? None, right?
I made plenty of claims, so it's not my fault if you both pick always the claim you finally end up agreeing with. Choose better next time.

So what you're now saying is just that Russia broke international law. Yes. Well done. — Isaac

Now? That's the same fact I claimed in the piece you yourself quoted: the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law
Where is the error dude? Can you spell it out?
Besides I didn't just claim a fact, I brought it in support of my claim about Russian expansionist attitude "in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US". Isn't that obviously true? it's all mundane and tautological, yes?


All I said about international law is consistent with what I already told you a while ago:

Besides global governance institutions far from being an infallible or impartial normative constraining factor for geopolitical agents, they are often instruments of geopolitical power, so it’s naive to form rational expectations from global governance institutions and their history without considering the subjacent geopolitical power struggles or equilibria. Always for the same reason, prescriptions (moral, legal, epistemic) to be rational must be grounded on possibilities, means, powers. So we shouldn’t confuse the expert in the domain of what is allowed by the norm, with the expert in the domain of what can be done with proper means. Or infer from what the expert of the normative domain assesses as legitimate or illegitimate the conclusion that is what is likely the case (this would be a confusion between should and can) without further assumptions. Failing to acknowledge this would amount to another rational failure of yours. — neomac

So now do you agree with that too? it's all mundane and tautological, yes?

From November 1 to December 31, 2022, call up for military service citizens of the Russian Federation aged 18 to 27 years who are not in the reserve and are subject in accordance with Federal Law No. 53-FZ of March 28, 1998 "On military duty and military service" call for military service, in the amount of 120,000 people.
https://rg.ru/documents/2022/09/30/prezident-ukaz691-site-dok.html