you explicitly asked if I meant that the positive claim was harder to prove than the negative claim. And I explicitly said no, that I meant that some negative claims can be reasonably held with less burden than other negative claims. — InPitzotl

I'm approaching the issue with an open mind without any preconceptions or prejudices. My aim was to discover for myself why the burden of proof has to be borne by those making a positive claim and not the one making a negative claim.

By way of a possible reason, I found out that, insofar as existential claims are the issue, proving the positive is much, much easier than proving the negative. This qualifies difficulty level as a good reason why those making positive existential claim should bear the burden of proof. I'm not claiming that this is the reason but it definitely is a reason. If given a choice between easy and hard, common sense would have you choose the easy (way out).

It's crystal clear that your method is to just keep insisting you're right without addressing the arguments. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You have raised objections to my argument re why positive claims have priority over negative claims with regard to which must be first tackled in the sense proved. I responded adequately in my humble opinion to those objections. Just so you know, you actually haven't argued your stand on the issue. Thanks for the engaging discussion, I enjoyed it a lot. I hope it was the same for you. :wink: :smile:

I myself have said over and over and over that you can't form ~P without first forming P.

But, and I've said this over and over and over, that does not entail that you must first prove P.

Your "I rest my case" is empty. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sorry if you feel differently. Everyone is entitled to his/her own opinion but read the post preceding this one. It should be crystal clear why p needs to be proved before ~p.

I rest my case.

~P cannot be understood without first understanding P. But that does not entail that P must first be proved. Your "Ergo" is a non sequitur. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Suppose we're having a debate. The topic is whether god exists or not. The first proposition that kicks off the debate is without doubt the proposition, "god exists" for the reason that the negation of a proposition comes only after the proposition has been stated in positive form. In other words, the debate begins with "god exists". We know that every proposition must be supported/demonstrated with an argument. Ergo, necessarily that "god exists" must be proven before "god doesn't exist."

I haven't debated all that much in life but last I checked, the team for the motion makes the first move, followed by the team against the motion. This is a big clue in and of itself.

We don't know that P was asserted before ~P. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Negation is an operation. It needs a proposition i.e. before I negate p and get ~p, the proposition p has to be there. Right? Just think of it, "not cat" makes no sense if "cat" doesn't exist as an idea. I rest my case.

The links I provided were meant as references, not infallible sources.

You missed the point. It makes no difference whether you're talking about a horse fitting/running/anything at all. To prove that a horse is fitting/running/anything at all, all that's required for me to do is to open the fridge. Someone denying this to be possible i.e. there is no horse fits/is running/anything at all, this someone has to show that no such horse exists which would necessitate combing the entire planet, from pole to pole, east to west, to find out if such a horse doesn't exist.

I don't need to check the fridge... there isn't enough room in my fridge for a horse to run in it. — InPitzotl

So, you mean to say the positive statement, "a horse is in the fridge" is harder to prove than the negative statement, "a horse is not in the fridge"? The latter seems to follow in an immediate sense from the fact that a horse can't fit in a fridge. Thumbelina (2001 - 2018)

why I think not all negative claims have equivalent burdens? — InPitzotl

Why?

It is indeed! They are equivalent in that they are all negative claims. But I don't think they have equivalent levels of burden. — InPitzotl

On what basis do you claim that is?

You explicitly did exactly that: — InPitzotl

My bad. Yes, I did but since you raised an objection, it kinda,threw me off. What's the problem with "negative statements" being equivalent? That you assert
this self-contradictory statement

All of these are negative claims, but they are clearly not equivalent. — InPitzotl

played a big role in my confusion.

Note you say "all of these are negative claims." That's an equivalence if ever there was one!

Q1. Does p come first or does ~p come first?
A1. p of course.

Q2. Is proof required for a proposition?
A2. Yes, all propositions require proof.

Q3. So p requires proof and ~p requires proof?
A3. Yes.

Q4. Which should be proved first p or ~p?
A4. That which comes first of course.

Q5. Why?
A5. p was asserted first.

Q6. So what if p was asserted first?
A6. No assertion can be made without proof.

Q7. And?
A7. p was asserted before ~p. Necessarily that proof of p must be produced before proof of ~p

Sorry to interrupt your, what I feel is, deep meditation but I have a question to ask. It isn't something that I've given the attention it probably deserves but my hunch is it might, at the very least, amuse you.

The question is: What, in your opinion, lies beyond happiness?

Transhumanists are working under a hedonic assumption and the journey along those lines began since the dawn of human civilization and transhumanists, benefiting from roughly 7 to 8 thousand years of effort, haphazard though it was, have now provided the clearest picture of what, to use a religious term, heaven would look like. What lies beyond heaven?

I didn't say 'declare P' in the sense of 'declare P to be true'.

I mean 'state P' in the sense of writing it or saying it. Not necessarily to state that it is true. I gave you examples.

A burdenf of proof of P does not follow from the mere fact that syntactically ~P can't be formed without first forming P — TonesInDeepFreeze

Suppose there are two people (two propositions, p, ~p) in a line, and both are required to pay a fee (both need proof), shouldn't the first in the line pay the fee first (prove p first) and only then the second person (prove ~p second)?

Addendum:

Suppose I want to prove proposition P and I use argument T, in the context of T, P is true or so the claim is. Then the following is true:

1. IF P is true with respect to argument T THEN argument T is sound
2. Argument T is unsound
Ergo,
3. P is false with respect argument T [1, 2 modus tollens]

In other words, successfully refuting argument T is tantamount to proving P is false but, note, only with respect to argument T. People don't have to prove ~P, refuting the argument that attempts to prove P is the same as proving ~P but with the caveat that ~P only with respect to the argument that attempts to prove that P.

Everything we experience has value. We are sense-making creatures so what we experience matters to us in some way, whether it is boring or interesting, pleasant or unpleasant. I think the hedonic aspect of our valuations are a function of the relative assimilative coherence of what we experience in relation to our ongoing aims and goals. Hedonism isn’t some arbitrary mechanism shaped by evolution to tell us what we should like or not like, as if we would have no motivation without this ‘mechanism’. The ways in which we make sense of our world are inherently affective and hedonic — Joshs

If you say so.

That's a bad analogy — InPitzotl

Possibly but the Wikipedia page on burden of proof/can't prove a negative uses the same analogy. I'm quite content with that.

You're oversimplifying this — InPitzotl

All of these are negative claims, but they are clearly not equivalent. — InPitzotl

I didn't mention any equivalences between negative statements and how am I oversimplifying the matter?

Different reasons: — TonesInDeepFreeze

Not so I'm afraid. Whenever you declare p, you are in fact asserting p is true and that can't be done without evidence. If I had said ~p then I would need to prove that too but p was here first and so...prove p. Also, asking someone to prove ~p doesn't help your case at all. If that someone is unable to prove ~p then that doesn't mean p is true (argumentum ad ignorantiam).

Wrong. Just to merely state a sentence does not require proving the sentence. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Why would you state a sentence p?

To assert p is true.

If so, you need to justify p.

right, the point is self reflection and observation of the reflections of others, and then to consider how that reflects on the nature of humanity. — Lif3r

So? What's your take on the dilemma? Should you go for the million bucks in brand-new notes or should you save the poor fellow on the tracks?

Bear in mind that, in this case, quite intriguingly, the choices on offer aren't, as I expected, equally bad; au contraire, they're, meant to be, equally good: who wouldn't want to get their hands on a million greenbacks? who wouldn't want to save a man from death? Nonetheless, this is an illusion of course; the actual choices are, either lose a million dollars or let a man die.

If you ask me, the system of values that confer worth on the two choices are poles apart - one is that which provides us with the means to do things (the million) and the other is that which is valuable in a way that can't be converted to dollars (life).

Imagine if the choices were either a million dollars or a diamond? This is an easy one for diamonds can be converted to dollars and vice versa.

Returning to the OP's dilemma, life is priceless i.e. we can't convert the man on the tracks into dollars, not even all the wealth in the world can buy life. Ergo, save the man and forfeit the million.

That said, the dilemma blows the lid right off the existing value-systems, operating full swing in society as we know it. Money has become the touchstone of value. Want to know how much something is worth? How much is it (in dollars)? Perforce then we should, do everything we possibly can, to see how many dollars the man on the tracks is worth? The other value-system we need to worry about in this scenario is that of morality and especially how it (morality) treats life above all else? When put like that, the choice seems rather easy (save the man), making the purported dilemma not a dilemma at all?

I see your point about containers and recordings, but I do see this as the best possible source for viewing the ideas of the past. I would love to be able to meet Kant, Kierkergaard, Sartre, with you and others on the forum, and discuss metaphysics, while drinking coffee, but as that is not possible, reading is the best option.

As it is, people are beginning to do things a bit differently now, with the internet and videos. But, I am a big fan of books, so I glad I don't have to watch videos of all the most famous thinkers of the past, although it would be interesting to see what they really looked like, rather than how we imagine them. — Jack Cummins

Books are essentially information coded in light - shapes, sizes, color, spaces, are certain features of writing that seem to matter but, all things considered, they're basically characteristics of light, at least in the sense they have to be seen to be interpreted correctly.

Notice that written language, though light-based, is actually about sound. So, though the word "light" is in light-mode, its meaning is in the sound lait. In other words, when we're reading, what we're really doing is listening.

I was wondering about what the first word ever spoken was. My theory is that, supposing the first spoken word is x, x has to be, its more likely that, something heard instead of seen. To symbolize something seen with a sound is harder, requiring the ability to associate two different kinds of information (visual to auditory) than mimicking (auditory to auditory) what's heard in my humble opinion. Thus, the first words every spoken would've been sounds mimicking prey, predators, water, etc. I digress though.

Interesting question by all accounts and standards but in a sense, sorry to say, misguided.

An analogy is in order but do take this with a grain of sodium chloride. Everything, if not most things, come in some kind of container as it were. So, milk comes in cartons, gas comes in tanks, chocolate comes in packets,..., information comes in books. As a matter of course, the container is usually disposable i.e. the contents are what matters. Books, whether paper-based or electronic, by extension the written word, are containers in that they hold information and if most containers are dispensable, books too should be dealt in a similar fashion if only for the sake of consistency.

Now, it must be borne in mind that some containers, whatever might be inside them, are themselves of great interest in that they have some kind of intrinsic value. Books in particular and language in general maybe valuable in and of themselves and more likely than not worthy of formal study.

However, the truth is a book is, all said and done, primarily a medium for recording and transmitting information and, sometimes, misinformation. That being the case, to be concerned by reading (books) is barking up,the wrong tree. If it so happens that information could be put on a better medium than books, we would be asking the same question about whatever medium that is. That, of course, is a fascinating in itself but is, in a way, to miss the point.

That's a non sequitur. Yes, to have a negation there is first a statement to be negated. But that doesn't entail anything about burden of proof. — TonesInDeepFreeze

1. Negation is an operation i.e. it needs for there to be something which can then be negated e.g. to get to ~p, we need a p first.

2. From 1, p comes first.

3. No flat assertions are permissible i.e. I can't state p unless I have proof.

4. From 2 and 3, since p comes first, at the very least time-wise, proof of p necessarily precedes the proof of its negation ~p.

So what, then, is the problem with individualism? — NOS4A2

I guess we could frame the question in the context of power (weakness/strength). Our weaknesses push us towards collectivism and our strengths pull us towards indiviualism. Between the push and pull of weakness and strength respectively, our psyche is, in a way, torn into two - we need to band together but we want to live alone. Individualism is going to be an uphill task for the simple reason that weaknesses have a greater weightage than strengths - ignoring the former spells doom but surrendering the latter only means you share. I suppose in some sense dying is worse than sharing, you be the judge.

On top of that, our values, even those related to individualism, seems to have evolved in the setting of collectivism which makes it harder for individualists to ground themselves outside of collectivism. What's the point of being able to do whatever what one wants if their significance is rooted in a collectivistic mise-en-scène?

Perhaps my reading of individualism is a caricature of sorts but I'm just following the scent of individualists in a manner of speaking and it led to what I outlined in the preceding few paragraphs.

why should I be moral? — Georgios Bakalis

Kant seems to be. the go to person here. Suppose the answer to the above question is, "there are no good reasons why one should be moral." Would this answer license you to be immoral? The question itself seems to have the seed for such a course of action; why else would you ask it? I mean the query suggests that the only reason why someone would choose to be moral is if there's sufficient warrant. Absent justification for morality, it's implied, one can opt for an immoral existence.

If one is immoral, however, there is no reason why others should not be as well. Are you prepared to face the consequences, likely painful and even life-threatening? Immorality fails the categorical imperative of Kant that itself can be rephrased as a question, "can immorality be made into an universal law that everyone has to follow everyday and everywhere?" I fear the answer would be an emphatic "no!"

Thus, in some sense, you should be moral because you want others to be moral and if you make an exception of yourself, others will too and there's nothing you can do about it but then that would mean, inter alia, the collapse of civilization itself and that would be the least of your problems.

Interestingly or so I think, what of the inverse question, why should I be immoral? I'm no expert but the world seems to have a personality that makes it prudent/necessary to deviate from the straight and narrow and the legal system (judiciary/police) is almost like a refrigerator - there to keep people from going bad, not to make people good. In short, there are "good" reasons to be bad, in fact not being bad, paradoxicaly, can be as "bad" as not being good.

Also, the whole enterprise of seeking reasons to be good seems misguided in a sense. Look at altruism. Whatever it is, the aim of altruism seems to relegate/eliminate an aim i.e. altruism is about being good, period. Sure, there are reasons baked into goodness itself - the definition of good contains within it the reasons why one has to be good. That, unfortunately or not, can't be helped. However, altruism is about ignoring/eliminating reasons for being good as pertains to the altruist faerself. This can be read as an attempt, successful or not you be the judge, to reject/oppose the instinct/desire justification for morality. The altruist is good not because, the goal is, there's a reason (in its current state, benefiting the altruist) for being so; the altruist is good because good to faer is self-justifying i.e. good because good but we all know self-justification is an logical illusion - it isn't despite the word "justification" a justification).

We prove negations often.

You mentions bears. I'll mention termites. If you call an inspector to your house, and he reports "No termites", then you may say, "What's your basis? What's your proof?" And you shouldn't have to pay him if he just says, "Well, I can't be expected to prove a negative, now can I?" No, he may show you photos of the areas and surfaces or whatever. Or he may give as evidence his attestation that he examined the areas.

So there are instances where the burden of proof does go to person who claims a negation. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I gave this some thought and here's what I found out.

We start off with a proposition (p) & the negation of that proposition (~p) and discover that p v ~p is the ground epistemic state.

From here, our choices are either to prove p or to prove ~p. We can do either of them as there are no obvious reasons to prefer one over the other.

However, the catch is, appears to be, that the default epistemic stance is ~p i.e. in all cases you will be asked to prove p. Hence the rules of thumb, you can't prove a negative & the burden of proof falls on the one making the positive claim. If ~p were not assumed, we would be at liberty to take either arm of the disjunction, p v ~p and the aforementioned maxims wouldn't exist or wouldn't be part of the narrative of critical thinking like it is.

Why, you may wonder?! Is there a good reason? Is it advantageous in other ways like being easier and thus an energy/time-saving strategy? If not all that, is it an intuition and can we make sense of it?

Let's look at the choices we have:
1. Maybe Is or Maybe Is not (p v ~p)
2. Is (p Positive)
3. Is not (~p Negative)

Our journey begins at 1 (above) but proof of Is (p) has precedence over proof of Is not (~p) [can't prove a negative, the burden of proof falls on the one making the positive claim]

As far as I can tell, to the extent that it makes sense to me, the epistemic state 1. p v ~p is worrying because it represents a state of uncertainty perhaps best described as we could be wrong (~p could be the case). Since our fear is getting it wrong (~p) , why not assume that we are (~p)? It's like being uncertain whether there's a burglar in the house; the best course of action is to assume there is one.

I think the burden of proof falls on the person making the positive claim because it asserts something beyond the default position, which is skepticism. — Pinprick

Good one! The default position is skepticism but with the caveat that that's not the best concept to describe the epistemic state in question. I prefer to call it a tabula rasa kinda condition - a blank slate on which neither the proposition "god exists" nor "god doesn't exist" has been written. Skepticism proper is a state of doubt regarding propositions, their truth value to be precise and hence requires for there to be at least one proposition that can be true/false/undecided/undecidable.

That out of the way, your post, although not explicitly mentioning the point, made a lightbulb go off in my head. A negative statement can't be discussed/analyzed prior to a positive statement that's subject to a similar treatment. Before negation can be performed and a negative statement obtained, there must be a preexisting positive statement that can be negated. Ergo, positive statements precede negative statements and since every statement must be proved, it follows that the burden of proof rests squarely on the shoulders of one making a positive statement.

If the payout is proportionate to the odds — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is what bothers me. What I know of probability is that this issue raised by you has to do with what is known as expected value (I'm in two minds about whether this is the relevant concept). Suppose a game of die is such that if you get a 1 or 2 you win, any other number and you lose. If you win, you get 12 cents and if you lose, you have to pay 6 cents.

The expected value for this game = (2/6) * 12 - (4/6) * 6 = 0. That is to say, the game is fair - your losses and your gains will balance each other out with no one (neither you nor the house) gaining the upperhand. Playing this game 6 times means you will, on average, win twice and lose four times.

What this appears to be is that fair games have been designed in a way that when played, a certain combination of outcomes (2 wins, 4 losses) are supposed/expected to occur. If not, no one would play. In other words, if I lose 4 times in a row [a streak], I should look forward to a change in my fortunes, for the better that is. In fact, that's the selling point of games of chance. This simply means that the gambler's fallacy isn't a fallacy since some games like the one above are designed in such a way that streaks of losses are common and, let's not forget to mention, these streaks are supposed to be overcome. Either that or the gambler's fallacy is a fallacy but in a different setting (one such would be games that have a 50/50 chance of winning/losing).

Frankly speaking, I'm more confused than when I began. :chin:

I got that, but my Fallacy Man is a super hero and would not be taken down by a mere boy. My Fallacy Man continues on the road of correction! :starstruck: :nerd: :strong: — James Riley

Amen!

It's a mistake to believe that noting a fallacy concludes the argument. Fallacy man swoops in, notes the fallacy, one of the boys says "fallacy fallacy" and fallacy man responds "I didn't say your fallacy should stop the argument. By all means, continue. And I shall continue to moderate in case you screw up a third time. Now carry on. — James Riley

Well, the point of Fallacy man's highly informative albeit short tale is simply to make the reader cognizant of what fallacies truly are - weaknesses in the argument and doesn't/can't help in determinimg the falsehood of the conclusion.

Suppose you play a game with one die and the rules are getting a 6 means a loss. Getting any other number {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a win

You're very excited since the odds are in your favor: 5 to 1

What's the probability that,

1. You have a streak of losses (6's) on five consecutive throws and the sixth throw is also a 6?

This probability = L = (1/6)^6

2. You have a losing streak of five consecutive 6's and the sixth throw gives you any number from 1 to 5 (win and breaking the streak)?

This probability = W = (1/6)^5 * 5/6

W > L

:chin:

You should commit the Gambler's "fallacy."

appeal to authority — T Clark

I'm quite wary of authority especially because of its association with appeal to force. A better word, a more apt category, with the same role but infinitely more reliable would be experts. Appeal to experts sounds, feels just about right if you ever want to defer to someone else's words/opinions/views.

A common misuse of "I call fallacy" occurs sometimes when a person cites ad hominem. One can pile all kinds of insult on another but alongside give a good argument for one's position on an issue. Insulting someone is not necessarily the ad hominem fallacy. It's only the ad hominem fallacy when the insult is supposed to be part of supporting the argument on the matter under contention. Saying "ad hominem" sometimes itself is a fallacy - the strawman - when it is meant to discredit an argument that does not rely on ad hominem but that was accompanied by insults. Also, sometimes a person's character is itself the matter under contention. — TonesInDeepFreeze

How right you are! :ok:

The fallacy fallacy fallacy — Hanover

This would be, for me, the fallacy committed by the fallacy fallacy by wrongly assuming fallacies are about the truth value of the conclusion rather than a flaw in the logical connection between premises and conclusion.

When I point out a fallacy, I don't/shouldn't make the claim that the conclusion is false; all I'm justified in doing is to point out that the conclusion is either not necessary or not probable given the premises - the support (premises) for a proposition (conclusion) is either weak or simply nonexistent/imagined.

Well, there's not much to say, is there?

A fallacious argument doesn't necessarily have a false conclusion, but it gives no good reason to believe its conclusion, even if it were true, because it's fallacious. — Amalac

The fallacy fallacy fallacy: The mistake of thinking/inferring that the conclusion of an argument is false because you think it contains a fallacy but then think it didn't but it did. — Hanover

Fallacies, by definition, are about what logicians seem to refer to as inferential link between premises and conclusion. Fallacies are weaknesses/failures in the inferential link - the necessity/probability of the conclusion, given the premises.

The fallacy fallacy is exactly that in the sense one isn't warranted to infer the conclusion of an argument is false given the argument is fallacious. The conclusion maybe true and is in need of the right argument even though the one offered is no good, is fallacious.

Here's something that has me puzzled...

Imagine you throw a six-sided die 5 times and all times you get a 6. The probability of this happening = (1/6)^5. Suppose also that getting a 6 is a loss.

What do you think is going to happen on the 6th throw?

Probability of six 6's in a row = S = (1/6)^6 [continuing the losing streak]

Probability of the 5 sixes and the 6th roll being something other than six = P = (1/6)^5 * (5/6) [breaking the losing streak]

P > S

Gambler's fallacy??

He was called to do God’s work as prime minister — Banno

I think, good or bad, it's usually the other,way round: Prime ministers are called to do God's work :grin:

while we make sure they are not Dalit — Banno

On point! The pot calling the kettle black. We're all sinners I suppose, saints are mere myth.

We find in the Bible in the eighth chapter of the Book of John, a story of a woman caught in adultery. The Bible says that Jesus was in the temple teaching and the scribes and pharisees brought to Him a woman caught in adultery.

They told Jesus that according to the law she should be stoned. Then they asked Him, what do you say. This was done to test Jesus so that they might have something to accuse Him of.

At that point the Bible tells us that Jesus stooped down and wrote on the ground with His finger, as though He did not hear them. When they continued asking Him, He got up from the ground and said to them, “He who is without sin among you, let him throw a stone at her first.”

Then Jesus stooped down again and wrote on the ground. At that point, the Bible tells us that many were convicted by their conscience and walked away one by one. — The Good Book

Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones

I find the concept of infinity problematic with the idea of probability. The idea is that at infinity all the numbers on a die have fallen equally. But the infinity knows no completion. It goes on and on. Therefore it would generate a bogus argument. — spirit-salamander

Consider infinity as it appears in the law of large numbers not as something completed/actual (not ok) but as something incomplete/potential (ok). It only means that one can continue to perform trials ad infinitum and perhaps also ad nauseum. There's no upper limit to how many trials can be conducted and thereby hangs a tale.

Allow me to illustrate my point. Suppose you play a coin-toss game in which heads you win, tails you lose. First toss, tails; second toss, tails; third toss, tails; fourth toss, tails. You're experiencing a losing streak - 4 tails in a row. What do you suppose the next toss (fifth) will be? Heads/tails? If you commit the gambler's fallacy, you'd say, "heads." Now consider the number of tosses are increased to 10 total tosses. Do you still think the fifth toss will be heads, breaking your losing streak? You can't because even if you get a tails again, chance (the law of large numbers) has 5 more tosses to ensure that the number of heads = the number of tails. Continuing along this trajectory, imagine the total number of tosses are increased to a 100. Would you feel confident about the fifth toss turning up heads, to break your run of losses? No! Your losing run could extend up to the fiftieth toss and chance still has 50 more tosses in which to break even so to speak. Imagine now that the number of tosses extends to infinity. No finite streak of losses, no matter how large/many, can give you good reason that the next toss will be different as there are an infinite number of tosses remaining for chance to "rectify" the situation.

Hey don't sweat it. — Wayfarer

:ok:

I watched the video and although much of it was above my paygrade, I could get some idea of what the speaker had to say.

It seems that the Bell inequality is an equation inequality that claims that a certain probability must be greater than or equal to another probability IFF there are hidden variables which seems to be just another way of saying quantum mechanics is incomplete in the sense something is missing from it in its present form.

Experimental evidence seems to violate the Bell inequality which implies that there are no hidden variables so to speak and quantum mechanics is complete.

Neils Bohr won! — TheMadFool

I made a mistake which I've now corrected in the post above.

As if anyone can really fathom the greatest possible being, even in the mind. — matt

Interesting! I thought this would vitiate the ontological argument, weaken it to the point of being vacuous. The key word in the ontological argument that's problematic is "conceivable" as it appears in the premise, "god is that than which nothing greater is conceiveable."

However, we can easily skirt around that issue by reformulating the premise as "god as the greatest possible being." This might come off as a contradiction - after all it amounts to conceiving the inconceivable - but consider the statement more as a finger pointing to "the greatest possible being" rarther than a vessel holding "the greatest possible being."

My two cents

First off, using a die instead of a coin complicates the matter (for me) but it really doesn't seem to be that much of a problem. I'll use a coin if it's all the same to you.

Let's begin with stating our assumptions:

1. The coin has two faces - heads & tails - and it's a fair coin.

2. The idea that the outcomes of a coin-toss will "balance" out i.e. you'll get an equal number of heads and tails is based on infinity. My memory of this is that as the number of trials approach infinity, the difference between empirical probability and theoretical probability approaches zero. The law of large numbers? I'm not sure.

Imagine now a gambler is tossing the coin. He gets, let's say, just to make things interesting, a million heads. Is he justified in thinking the next toss will be a tails? Unfortunately, no. The law of large numbers has infinitely many opportunities (beyond a million ad infinitum) to even things out i.e. the next million tosses might be all tails. You get the picture, right?

As you can see, a streak of heads doesn't necessarily imply that the next toss will yield a tail. Keep in mind that, my interpretation, possibly mathematical nonsense, concedes that the law of large numbers would, in a sense, cause the outcomes to be dependent on each other. In other words, yes the gambler is correct in expecting a tails after a streak of heads but what he can't know is when his streak will end. Hence, the fallacy, hence the countless lives destroyed by commiting this fallacy.