Thi

I still cant see any reason to think it would be any more or less an instance of control than making a choice. — Janus

It doesn't make sense. Causation, as I understand, is one event leading to another in a chain of events in such a way that there's no temporal delay between cause and effect. Of course, if one is to split hairs, there's always a non-zero amount of time that elapses between cause and effect but variations in this duration to the extent possible when we make choices should be impossible.

I should like to point out that the question isn't exactly «why is there something rather than nothing», rather: «What was the likelihood of there being nothing rather than something».
It brings into consideration also things like philosophical probability. — Amalac

Well, in my universe these two are two sides of the same coin - to answer one is to answer the other, no? Why is there something rather than nothing? = Why not nothing rather than something?

It seems to me that what Krauss is refering to isn't the philosophical «nothing», but rather to «vacuum» or «void». The philosophical «nothing» means, I think, «absolutely nothing», not even vacuum with energy or empty space. — Amalac

Perhaps you missed the part where I said that the "something" in your question refers to physical stuff and with respect to the physical, vacuum is nothing or, if not, is the closest "thing" we have to nothing.

Would you agree with Kolakowski then in thinking that «something exists» = «necessarily, something exists»? How would you then respond to someone who argued like this?: It is always more likely for anything to not have existed, and this is true not only of every particular thing, but also about the whole universe. A universe that was just like the actual one, but where a rock didn't exist, was more likely to exist than the actual universe because it is simpler. And so, if nothing existed at all, that's as simple a scenario as it gets, and therefore not only is it not impossible that nothing should have existed, but it was in fact infinitely more probable. — Amalac

We may need to give your idea a closer look because one could argue that, in a way, nothing ain't that simple. I don't know if this helps but consider nothing in math, zero. At first glance it has that outward appearance of simplicity - it's nothing and it's been given a symbol of it's own "0" - but try dividing by it and, supposedly, all hell breaks lose. I'm simply offering you what to me is a good starting point to make the case that nothing may not be simpler than something.

Does it though? Something may happen in spite of the fact that it is improbable. For example: It was unlikely for many people to be struck by lightning, but it happened anyway. — Amalac

My thoughts exactly. That something happened doesn't seem to mean that that something is more likely and thus I offered you two perspectives.

What's intriguing though, ignoring nuances and subtleties, events that occur, like something exists, provides no clue as to whether they were likely or not. If one wins a lottery or is struck by lightning, take your pick, the fact is the win or shock is actually unlikely and compare that to the event that you meet a child at a daycare in which case meeting a child is likely. In essence, the occurrence of an event supplies no information on the likelihood of said event. This perhaps is the heart of the issue in re the question which has come to be known, kind courtesy of Heidegger, as the fundamental question of metaphysics (FQOM).

This is interesting! Can you say more about it? — baker

There's nothing to it really. Some kind of morality/ethics must be in place for social organization, right? God entered the scene, so to speak, only after or, more accurately, only within long-established societies; it follows, does it not?, that morality preceded humanity's encounter with the idea of the divine. It's like saying "checkmate!" and then, with the same breath, announcing that you don't know the rules of chess.

Check out the link. — 180 Proof

"3.21 Like Zen koans which provoke a suspension of conceptual thinking, works of art in particular (and aesthetic experiences in general) prompt suspension of ego - what Iris Murdoch referred to as unselfing - by presenting sensationally or emotionally heightened encounters with the nonself which make it more likely than not for one to forget oneself for the moment if not longer.

3.22 Altruism - judging, by action or inaction, not to do harm to another - begins with learning and practicing techniques for forgetting oneself: unselfing: suspending ego. (Ecstatic techniques (e.g. making art.)) This is the moral benefit of art, but not its function.

3.23 The function of making art (along with morality & rationality (see 2.5)) is to help expand - develop - Agency, or to inversely limit its shadow: Foolery (see 1.1)"
— 180 Proof

Is it possible you could go a little more in depth here please? I find your view of Art, Aesthetics and Morality a possible point of interest for myself.

Especially in regard to the bold.
— I like sushi

3.21 says Aesthetics prepares us for Ethics and, in light of the preceding sections (statements 1.0-3.2), Ethics informs Aesthetics. E.g. Children begin learning 'right & wrong' through play and from bedtime stories (fables); Parents use games and storytelling to teach their children what's expected of them (good) and what they should avoid (bad). A dialectics, so to speak, of attention & intention.

3.22 says altruism can be learned and habituated by engaging in and making art because fully experiencing works of art (or nature in an aesthetic way) requires one to pay attention without intending to impose self-serving demands or whimsy of ego on the work (i.e. to move oneself out of one's own way, that is, to forget/immerse oneself); this 'attending without ego' is required in order to encounter an other as other, which is the sine qua non of altruistic judgment.

3.23 riffs off of 3.21 shifting the focus more explicitly to Agency the expansion of which is, I propose, the primary function of philosophy. To learn to reflectively inquire (e.g. making art) and reflectively practice (e.g. moral conduct) in tandem; to the degree these complementary exercises are habituated and optimized, Agency - capability for judging (see 3.11) - expands (and inversely foolery narrows (see 1.1, 1.12, 1.6)).

Any clearer? The references to other statements are included to help contextualize or build on earlier statements. Also, the highlit links embedded throughout making disparate implicit connections more explicit. I'm sure you'll tell me if that helps; I look forward to some elaboration on this "possible point of interest" of yours vis-à-vis my relation of aesthetics to ethics. My turn now to read your replies to the OP

The above post deals more about the link, if any exists, between ethics and aesthetics and I suppose that's something that can't be avoided if one believes that beauty is about "ego-suspension", the ego being, according to many ethical theorists I suppose, the stumbling block when it comes ethics and thus, I presume, the necessity to mention altruism as part of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics.

I, for one, am of the opinion that it's, in a way, quite the opposite in way that may strike you as weird. Consider the proposition that what you call "ego-suspension" beauty is actually the one in which one's ego can flourish and what you call "eye candy" beauty is the one it's easiest to lose oneself i.e. the situation is actually reversed - there's no suspension of the ego in "ego-suspension" beauty, in fact one's ego is consolidated through it and one truly submits or surrenders one's ego with "ego-fantasy" beauty. I may have misread the whole thing in which case you might wish to dispel my confusion.

Paraphrasing Iris Murdoch, [superficial beauty aka "eye candy"] facilitates ego-fantasy (or Id-fixation) and [deep beauty aka "sublime"] ego-suspension (i.e. "unselfing", which is her word).
— 180 Proof
Check out the link. — 180 Proof

The words are almost self-explanatory and they give me a fair idea of what Iris Murdoch and you are getting at. Perhaps it was a poor choice of words on Murdoch's part but "ego-fantasy"gives me the impression that "eye candy" ain't good for us and that we should make a conscious decision to go for and do whatever it is that Murdoch recommends with the "ego-suspension" variety of beauty. Thus my question to you - is "eye candy" not worth our appreciation, love, respect...worship even?

I'll read your link more carefully and get back to you but I would like you to respond to the above if you don't mind.

Check out the link. — 180 Proof

Give me a moment. Thanks.

It's what you called "superficial" as I wrote agreeing with you, Fool, in contrast to beauty that is "deep". And "eye candy" isn't derogatory, just deflationary, connoting a fleeting, if not trivial, or ornamental / cosmetic, quality. — 180 Proof

My bad. So what are your thoughts on the matter? Does "eye candy" measure up to your view of "deep beauty"? Are they the same thing or are they vastly different in nature - one, "eye candy", something to be suspicious of and the other, "deep beauty", to be sought after as if our life depended on it.

I think of the deep kind as "beauty" (and agree with you about the OP) but the superficial kind is merely "pretty" or "attractive" or "fashionable" or eye/ear-"candy" ... Paraphrasing Iris Murdoch, the latter facilitates ego-fantasy (or fixation) and the former ego-suspension (i.e. "unselfing", which is her word). — 180 Proof

I was considering the possibility that what you call, derogatorily I suppose, "eye candy" could actually be beauty of the deepest kind or if not at least an extension of it. If it is what I think it is then we must appreciate it, perhaps even study it in order that our mind can grasp what it till now only has a vague idea of.

I find it unhelpful to approach the subject of morality from a perspective that recognizes differences, big or small, in the moral codes of different peoples for the simple reason that it muddies the waters. I'm of course not saying that there are such differences, there are and that, like it or not, proves that morality has a subjective component. I'm more interested in or would suggest a shift in focus to the obvious fact that all peoples seem to have a sense of right and wrong i.e. morality, despite differences at the level of actual do's and don't's, is universal; in other words, peoples may differ on what exactly they believe is right and wrong but they all agree that there's such a thing as right and wrong.

It's kinda like a group of people who've never met, know nothing about each other, who come from different backgrounds, all agreeing that they should, together, host a dinner party (morality) but they disagree on the date of the dinner (differ with respect to what exactly they consider is good/bad).

In that sense then morality is objective for all agree that there's such a thing as morality. The differences that exist between morality of peoples can be pinned down to culture, religion, social factors, etc. and don't come as a surprise to anyone.

As for the nexus between god and morality, all I can say is morality necessarily had to precede god for it didn't we wouldn't have gotten to the point where we gave the matter of god any serious thought, granting evolution is true of course.

There are two kinds of beauty - one superficial but without the negative connotations of that word that our physical senses are attuned to and the other deep which only the mind can appreciate. Oddly, for some unknown reason, these two kinds of beauty don't seem to correlate with each other - what is beautiful to look at may be ugly when understood and vice versa. We could either curse our luck that this is the case for many a lives have been ruined for not realizing this or marvel at the immense variety of permutations the universe has to offer.

The analysis in the OP presents a choice not between these two kinds of beauty but between two kinds of "deep beauty" viz. fragmentation or wholeness, both decidedly affairs of the mind rather than of the sense. Despite what I've said in the previous paragraph, it is entirely possible that I've got the wrong end of the stick for "superficial beauty" maybe "deep beauty" yet to be understood i.e. the mind hasn't figured out the relation between or the equivalence of "superficial beauty" and "deep beauty" if such is true.

2 contradictory propositions : «it is impossible for the universe not to have existed» and «it was far more likely for the universe not to have existed» — Amalac

The best answer, given the circumstances, is "we don't know why there's something rather than nothing."

Is the question answerable i.e. what do we need to know to answer this question and equally important is it knowable?

The question seems to be specific to physical reality, the "something" referring to material objects. If so, science is the right person for the job of coming up with the answer; after all, science has spared no effort in staking a claim to the title of "authority on physical matters."

If that makes sense then you should know that Lawrence Krauss, physicist, science educator, has written a book titled "A Universe From Nothing" that's supposed to, in Krauss' opinion, answer your question. I believe Krauss' starting premise is that the total energy in the universe is zero. It must be mentioned though that his book has met with some criticism with other scientists, philosophers, etc. alleging that Krauss hasn't actually explained why there's something rather than nothing.

My personal opinion, for what its worth, is that we have to start from what is obvious viz. that something exists. There are two ways of looking at this undeniable fact:

1. That an event x occurs implies that x was liklier than not-x. That Stephen Hawking was given the Lucasian Chair Of Mathematics, that it happened, implies that it was likelier than Stephen Hawking not being given that honor - Stephen Hawking had what it takes to get that position. Likewise, that something is rather than nothing should mean that something was likelier than nothing.

2. If I flip a coin and I get heads, it doesn't imply that heads was likelier than tails - the probability of either is equal at 50%. Ergo, that there's something (I get a heads on a coin flip) and not nothing (I get a tails on a coin flip) doesn't mean that something is likelier than nothing.

That's as far as I could get.

Being attracted to something, anything is underpinned by a value judgment and invariably one likes what one thinks is better. Ergo, if you feel attracted to a particular race, it amounts to saying that that race is better and that's racism. You may prefer your own race over others and that's your run of the mill, garden variety racism but you may also like a race other than your own and that's auto-racism.

Would you describe yourself more as academic or creative? — scientia de summis

I don't know how to answer that question without being dishonest. Anyway, I describe myself as fairly curious but not to the point of being the cat that curiosity bumped off. Also, I've gone through university but wouldn't characterize myself as an academic.

What bothers me is that the thirst for explanations seems to be rather ancient, traceable back to prehistorical periods even and yet here I am in the 21st century devoid of any such feelings.

The simple answer to what was "before the Big Bang?" is "we don't know."

To answer your question though, I refer you to Pierre-Simon Laplace's reply to Napoleon's query, and I'm paraphrasing here, "where is god in all this?" which was, "I had no need for that hypothesis." The message is clear - God is not necessary for science. This may at first give us the impression that religion and science are at odds with each other but surprisingly no, this ain't so for God being unnecessary doesn't imply that God is inconsistent with science; in other words there's enough room in science for one more albeit unnecessary hypothesis viz. God. To sum up, God, as an aspect of our reality, doesn't break physics.

Explain something to me. I'm a bit worried about myself, seriously, because I've never had the experience that seems to lie at the foundation of theism viz. that desire, even desperation, to need an explanation for the universe. In short, the question, "why all this?" never crossed my mind. Is there something wrong with me?

It might be worth noting that there's another side to the problem of induction viz. the problem of generalization from a set of particulars - the black swan is an embarrassment to science.

As Atoms, so called indivisible elements by the Greeks, have been later discovered to be composed of still more elemental quarks, is it possible to move down to scales of smallness beyond quarks or is a dimensionless particle as small as it gets? — Proximate1

I was always and even now am quite disappointed about how the Greeks "got it wrong" because atoms are divisible into quarks as per current-best science. However, the Greeks would've been in error only if the atoms they were talking about are the particles science defines as atoms. The possibility remains that the Greek "atom" could actually be quarks and if these can be broken down into simpler particles, these. In short, the Greeks were right on the money about matter being atomic/particulate in nature.

Secondly, on the matter of continuous decomposition of particles whether quarks or something else, there are two ways things can turn out:

1. Particle physics will hit a wall i.e. we'll discover a particle that can't further be decomposed into smaller particles

or

2. Particles can be continually divided into smaller and smaller sub-particles but there'll come a point beyond which it'll stop making sense. A similar situation arises in the social sciences - we can divide society into communities, communities into families, families into individuals but then dividing further would mean going down into the level of organs, tissues, cells, molecules, atoms, quarks and social sciences at these levels is meaningless. Perhaps, if one is open-minded enough, the end of particle physics could be the beginning of______________(???)

Philosophy (and its history) for me means contemplating the variety of ways in which we are unwise (i.e. confused, perplexed, frustrated, oblivious, sleepwalking-through-our-lives aka "foolish") which are studied distinctly as Ontology, Axiology & Epistemology (prioritized by whatever schema (Metaphysics) is deemed most illustrative, or illuminating).

Is it, as I think it is, simply a ritualized homage to logic?
No. Logic is a by-product of philosophy (re: axiology). — 180 Proof

:up: :ok: I believe we're on the same page, more or less.

The principle of uniformity of nature: The future will resemble the past.

This apparently simple sentence is the foundation for the sciences. It would be great if we could prove it and the proof is: The future resembles the past

In short the argument for the principle of uniformity of nature goes like this:

1. The future resembles the past

Ergo,

2. The future resembles the past

That's a circulus in probando if there ever was one. This is the problem of induction.

It was a move from making shit up to making shit consistent. — Banno

:up: :ok:

It was move from making shit up to making shit consistent

You've misread what I wrote. More plainly then: claiming that philosophy hasn't proven anything is like claiming an unmarried man still beats his wife – my point is that philosophy, as I understand it, isn't in the "proving" business, Fool, any more than is music or religion. It's nonsense to blame P for what P does not endeavor to do. Anyway, when philosophy seeks to "prove" something it calves-off into one of the sciences, the production of which alone has made philosophy indispensable to culture and civilization. — 180 Proof

What then is philosophy? Is it, as I think it is, simply a ritualized homage to logic? Does philosophy merely consist of coming up with clever ways of creating worlds of ideas only so that we may have an opportunity to put to service our much-beloved logic? That seems to be the case and if so philosophers are like the person who invents nails because fae has a hammer and liked nothing better to do than use faer hammer.

You've misread what I wrote. More plainly then: claiming that philosophy hasn't proven anything is like claiming an unmarried man still beats his wife – my point is that philosophy, as I understand it, isn't in the "proving" business, Fool, any more than is music or religion. It's nonsense to blame P for what P does not endeavor to do. Anyway, when philosophy seeks to "prove" something it calves-off into one of the sciences, the production of which alone has made philosophy indispensable to culture and civilization. — 180 Proof

It's quite possible that I'm under some kind of illusion but can you name something philosophy has proved?

Perhaps I've misread you again but then that would mean philosophy is in the business of disproving things. If that's what you mean, I'm in full agreement.

Please don't talk about the sciences. As Islamic scholar Hamza Tzortzis said in a debate with scientist Lawrence Krauss, science is inductive and not deductive and so can't/doesn't prove anything at all. I can go easy on those who still feel science is capable of proving things and concede that it does but only under the condition that the "proofs" are contingent, liable to be overturned/modified in light of new evidence.

Agreed. But that's because they (when conceptually coherent and self-consistent) are noncognitive proposals (e.g. criteria, methods, aporia, speculative counterfactuals (i.e. gedankenexperiments), critiques, ...) and not propositions: that is, they 'suppose Y is true instead of X, then ...' rather than 'It is true that X is the case, therefore ... Z'. "Philosophical positions" express conceptual, or reflective, stances (for the sake of argument aka "ideas" rather than as dogmatic commitments aka "beliefs") with regard to the real but not determinations of what is or is not the case, which consist of truth-claims in need of truth-makers like the sciences or history. — 180 Proof

So you admit it then? Philosophy hasn't proven anything at all and it's simply an activity that involves the exploration of possible realities i.e. it's nature approaches that of math, assuming certain axioms and seeing what they lead to. The purpose of logic in all this is both to construct good arguments based on whatever axioms philosophers begin with and to come up with refutations and counterarguments for such. It's hard to deny that logic has been more effective in the latter role than in the former, more successful in bringing down than propping up philosophical "ideas." This suggests a rather uncomfortable truth viz. philosophy is synonymous with bad ideas; after all, not a single philosophical claim/idea/theory/hypothesis has survived an encounter with logic. I suppose we could say that the whole of philosophy is simply a tribute to logic for only logic emerges unscathed from the brawl between proponents of ideas and their adversaries.

But this expression itself presupposes logical truth – grammatical sense – in order to be intelligible either as a proposal or proposition, which therefore renders what you say here incoherent, Fool. After all, logic is just grammar in the most general sense (TLP, Witty). Thus, if, as the OP contends, "logic is an illusion" then ... :roll: — 180 Proof

I didn't say that there are no truths which would've made my statement self-refuting and thus incoherent. What I did say though was that philosophy hasn't made any contribution to our stockpile of truths. If we could take a before philosophy and after philosophy picture of our knowledge bank, it would be impossible to tell the difference. In short, philosophy hasn't added to what we know. To be fair though philosophy has proven itself as the one powerful tool in humanity's toolkit for fixing what are essentially delusions (believing falsehoods).

Delusion denotes persistent belief that a demonstable falsehood is true.

Atheism (however defined) is not a demonstrable falsehood.

And science, Franz, is defeasible, fallible, approximative, and incomplete; the only "illusion" is scientism which denies science's inescapable gaps & limits. Thus, your thesis (OP) makes no sense.

As for logic being an "illusion" ... :roll:

(Btw, I self-identify as a freethinker, but when pressed I'll often cop to 'anti-theist atheist'.) — 180 Proof

:clap: :up:

I applaud your overall outlook/approach to reality but if I'm not mistaken, despite the high regard for logic in philosophy, all that's been going on in philosophy since logic came into its own with Aristotle is disproof of belief systems, hypotheses, theories via refutation. I daresay there's not even one philosophical position that has been proved conclusively. In other words, logic seems to function more like a weapon designed for assault and is rather ineffective as defensive armor; very few ideas have ever run the gauntlet of logic and lived to tell the tale so to speak. This is not logic's fault of course for under the right circumstances, it can furnish irrefutable proofs but these are few and far between and that only if one is charitable enough to relax the rules.

Perhaps what I want to say is that logic is very much the MVP but its teammates are hopeless and a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Having logic on our side since antiquity has made no difference to humanity's collection of truths but it's saving grace has been/is/will be its wondrous ability to, in a manner of speaking, apprehend, put on trial, execute and bury for good falsehoods assuming people are in their senses which may not always be the case.

If my bird lays an egg in your garden, who does it belong to? — Franz Liszt

We can look at it from the perspective of necessary conditions. Can the egg be without my bird? No! Can the egg be without your garden? Yes! Ergo, in terms of necessary conditions, the egg is yours. My bird was necessary condition for the egg but your garden is a contingent condition. The egg would've been laid whether your garden existed or not but the egg would definitely not have been laid without my bird. Therefore, the egg is mine and not yours.

Another way to look at it is if we make the center of the controversy something undesirable like so: If my dog pooped in your garden, who does the poop belong to? I'm sure you'll have absolutely no doubt who the dog poop belongs to - me of course. :joke:

Two real people should hopefully clarify the matter with the possibility that they might also have the opposite effect and muddy the waters.

Megan Fox: Known for her beauty. Her identity is physical and even if she doesn't identify herself with her body, other people do and I'm sure the constant focus on her exceptional physical attributes rubs off on her and, I'm only guessing here, sooner or later she might begin to think of herself as her body.

David Chalmers: Recognized for the formulation of the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmer's is an intellectual figure and again people identify him for his mental prowess and not his physical attributes which are quite average by my standards.

To cut to the chase, people seem to excel, either through effort or by the vagaries of fortune, either physically or mentally - think chess and athletics - and their identities are fixed according to what they excel at.

Too, it's worth mentioning that men, some men at least, seem to be on some kind of knightly quest for beauty with brains and women, some of them, have been documented to be in search of brawn with brains. :joke:

The problem, as stated in the sorites paradox, is not being able to determine at what point a group of grains of sand becomes a pile. Whatever number one may choose that constitutes an image of when a group of grains becomes a pile - then one grain added, or subtracted, should "change" that image. But, it doesn't. The "image" of the pile remains the same whether a grain is added, or subtracted. It's not the math - it's the way our brain works in creating the image — Don Wade

I see. So, the image doesn't change despite the removal/addition of sand grains from the pile. Do you see any possibility of superimposing my take on the issue onto your image theory of the Sorites paradox?

As I mentioned, a pile even though composed of sand grains isn't about numbers for if it were then taking away/adding sand grains should make a difference to the pile. Ergo, a pile isn't about the number of sand grains and one way to look at it is your image theory. My own opinion is that a pile is a shape - a hill-like one resembling a bell curve - and this particular shape is retained in spite of changes in the number of sand grains in a pile. You could say that the image is a shape, both don't change even with a considerable increase/decrease in the number of sand grains.

I suppose it boils down to having multiple images for a "pile" of sand and removing grains of sand one by one simply switches between one of these images of a pile and another image of a pile, the result being the pile remains a pile despite grains of sand being taken away.

However, an intriguing point to note is that though we have multiple images for a pile of sand and even if all these images are piles, I feel that if asked whether all these images we label pile are identical?, the reply will be "no". It's like all of us are human but we're not identical to each other.

Too, it just dawned on me that a pile is about a certain type of shape, a shape that approximates a hill or mound. A pile is not about the number of grains of sand. Although physics might demonstrate there's a correlation between the number of grains of sand and the shape of the entire collection of sand grains, it's obvious that a very large number of sand grains need to be removed before a pile of sand loses its hill-like shape. In my humble opinion we make a similar mistake when we believe that the circular shape of a circle of people depends on the number of people in it. No, we can have a circle of 3 people, 4 people, 5 people, 6 people,.., n people.

Well, either a number can be expressed as a ratio of two integers or not. If it can be the number is rational and if can't be it's irrational. When there are only two choices, the fallacy of the false dichotomy can't be committed.

I like your solution. The "image" of a pile of sand is different from the "image" of a grain of sand. So then the reason why we refuse to accept that anything has happened to the pile of sand when we remove a single grain of sand is that to our brains, these two are different "images" or concepts.

It's kinda like how a human being isn't just the cells that constitute faer. We can't talk of altering the human by taking or adding cells - cells and humans, though the latter is made up of the former, are entirely different, in your words, "images".

That's as far as I could get.

Language is, at the end of the day, just a collection of words and a set of rules
— TheMadFool

...which is exactly what logic is, also.

And mathematics too, for that matter. — Banno

I suppose you're right but if I may say so unpacking "words" and "set of rules" for both language and logic suggests there's a difference between logic and language. In the case of language, "words" and "set of rules" are those linguistic features everyone is more than familiar with but in logic, "words" are entire propositions and the "set of rules" are those that have a bearing on how propositions are related to each other with the emphasis on how the truth/falsity of one or more propositions impact the truth/falsity of another proposition.

That said, it would be very interesting if there's a logical aspect to natural language by which I mean to put forth the possibility that language evolved for logic but not in the sense of a necessity for animals lacking symbolic language are fully capable of logic but in the sense that natural language augments logic. Does natural language bring to the table additional capabilities that enhance logic, make it more powerful?

By way of an answer to the question posed above, take a close look at logically problematic words, words that are vague and ambiguous, plus discourses, spoken, written, that contain inconsistencies. Don't these give you the impression that they were designed to, well, break us out of the oppressive confinement of logic?

Such an interpretation is probably me holding the wrong end of the stick but I remember this one time when I had to put this wooden block into a slot cut out for it and it just wouldn't fit. I almost gave up until I had an idea - I turned the block upside down, lo and behold, the block slid effortlessly into its slot - it was a perfect fit! :joke:

Considerations such as yours may be behind Wittgenstein's enlarged notion of "grammar". Both formal and natural languages - propositional logic and English, for example - are languages.

Early formal linguistic philosophy sort to render the vagaries of English into propositional form. This is the project of Principia Mathematica and Tractatus logico-philosophicus. It proved to be impossible, but along the way some extraordinary thigns were discovered.

Later formal linguistic philosophy accepted the place of natural languages, but sort to clarify the grammar buy presenting coherent and consistent translations in formal language. T-sentences and possible world semantics are examples of this.

The rough idea is that formal grammars can help us to recognise confusions in our common natural language - like your "I'm a man and I'm not a man".

The various tools of linguistic philosophy now fill the tool bag of most philosophers; at least the good ones. The OP is misguided to say that the linguistic turn is now over; it would be better to say that the linguistic turn is now so ubiquitous that it goes unnoticed — Banno

In my humble opinion, we should maintain a distinction between language and logic. Language is, at the end of the day, just a collection of words and a set of rules (grammar) on how to use those words all so that we can think in the broadest sense of that word.

Logic, on the other hand, is about how to think and comes with its own set of rules to be followed in order that we may craft arguments with the express purpose of arriving at truths implied by relationships between thoughts.

That said, it can't be denied that logic has its own language consisting of symbols with very precise meanings and instructions on how to use them correctly to cut through all the logically extraneous linguistic elements of discourse and zero in on an argument if there is one. However I still have misgivings about treating logic as just another language - there's more to it than mere words and rules on how to manipulate those words.

Viewed on end one sees a large metal ring but when viewed laterally one sees a length of coils of a large metal spring. The latter is a more complete description than the more parsimonious former description. Neither, however, are "wrong". — 180 Proof

:ok: :up:

I think parsimony isn't the only game in town though. Explanatory power which would include completeness also matters, right?

I don't get it. — Pfhorrest

You do. The clock hands start at 12:00 and after 12 hours it returns to 12:00. If I had checked the clock at 12:00 and come back after 12 hours the hands of the clock would be exactly where they were, at 12:00.

The simplest explanation: the clock hands haven't moved i.e. the clock is broken

True explanation: 12 hours have passed since you last checked the clock.

All I'm saying is that the concept of a greatest being leads to a contradiction - it's an illogical idea.

If God is the greatest being and God exists then God is like us in that respect, there being no difference between us and God which in different words means that God is no greater than us with respect to existence but that contradicts our basic assumption, the assumption that God is the greatest being.

Not to say that I don't pay taxes but I have no clue about taxes by which I mean I haven't read up on the rationale of taxation as a government policy.

All that I can say is that to oppose taxes seems to be irrational. What happens to all the tax revenue a government accumulates? It goes into essentials such as infrastructure development, maintenance, revamping, paying government employees, financing activities of national importance and so on. In other words, taxes are spent on the taxpayers and the "best" part is the tax-funded projects outlined above not only benefit the individual but also society as a whole and that too for generations to come. In effect the tax you pay is spent by the government on you. I see no good reason to feel like someone has stolen your money unless you want to admit that you stole from yourself.

The simplest hypothesis is that the clock is broken. Occam's razor could obscure the truth.

I don't understand why you're looking at from the law of the exluded middle angle and not getting right to the point - a contradiction follows from the notion of a greatest being. This contradiction has its roots in the obvious fact that a greatest being should lie outside all conceivable categories. God can't be, in a manner of speaking, in the same set as other things and both "things that exist" and "things that don't exist" classea have members, effectively shattering all hope of placing God in either because if we did God wouldn't even be great, forget about being greatest.

That said, I'm still not completely convinced by my own argument. Just wanted to throw it out there for you/someone to pick it apart if possible.

Argument A

1. God is the greatest being [premise]

2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]

3. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

4. God exists [assume for Reductio Ad Absurdum]

5. If God exists then God and I are equal in terms of existence [premise]

6. If God and I are equal in terms of existence then false that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time. [premise]

7. False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time. [5, 6 Modus ponens]

8. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time AND False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [3, 6 Conjunction. Contradiction]

9. God doesn't exist [4 to 8 Reductio Ad Absurdum]

Argument B

1. God is the greatest being [premise]

2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]

3. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and any time [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

4. God doesn't exist [assume for Reductio Ad Absurdum]

5. If God doesn't exist then God and married bachelors are equal in that both don't exist

6. If God and married bachelors are equal in that both don't exist then false that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time

7. False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [5, 6 Modus ponens]

8. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time AND False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [3, 7 Conjunction, Contradiction]

9. God exists [4 to 8 Reductio Ad Absurdum]


God exists and also God doesn't exist given that God is the greatest being. God, if God is the greatest being, is beyond words and beyond logic and if that is something then God is even beyond that.

I'll be eagerly waiting for when you find what is off then. — Amalac

Food for thought...

Definition of "conceivable": capable of being imagined or grasped mentally.

If god exists as an idea then god is conceivable. An ant, ping pong ball, a dog, etc are all conceivable. Ergo, being conceivable doesn't seem the right attribute that can put the required distance between lowly things such as ants, ping pong balls, dogs and a "...greatest being..." such as god. Hence, a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.

To continue along the same trajectory, imagine god is inconceivable but if god is so then god would fall into the same category as contradictions and again there's something which is, in a sense, "equal" to god and that can't be because god is the "...greatest being..."

Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.