It seems that the self is bound up with consciousness. We are only a self in terms of consciousness which is our relationship with the world. — EnPassant

I doubt that the self can be equated to consciousness because within a framework that entertains the possibility of souls, there are periods (between lives) that we're not conscious and yet we still believe the self exists. Also, what about children, infants - they're conscious but they need to attain a certain age before they pass the mirror test.

Not quite sure that works TMF. Which is simpler... a running laptop, or a laptop in sleep mode?

The answer is kind of a matter of taste, but it also doesn't really matter. Granting that the laptop in sleep mode is simpler, the running laptop nevertheless is physically distinct from it. What you require for an argument against physicalism is that there is a distinction between the conscious brain and a p-zombie, but that said distinction is not a physical one. So if e.g. a person who is awake is more complex than a person who is asleep, but the person who is awake is physically distinct from a person that is asleep, then the distinction cannot be used as an argument against physicalism. — InPitzotl

A laptop in sleep mode is simpler of course and that actually proves the point that given a certain level of complexity, a simpler stage/state is a given. The same logic applies to asleep and awake people.

I don't have to draw the distinction between awake and asleep because my argument is specifically about consciousness as we understand it (awake) vs a p-zombie (behaving exactly like an awake human being).

There may be something in this. But it ignores the essence of ethics: pain and pleasure, suffering and bliss. This may fit into a causal matrix in our general affairs, but they are not mere causal events, reducible to the principle of sufficient cause. I mean, that screaming pain from a spear in your kidney, how can causality explain this? It is, after all, that pain which is the essence of the ethical prohibition NOT to inflict it on others, or yourself. All ethics has this feature: no pain, pleasure (of some kind or another) at stake, then no ethics! — Constance

I haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about. My point is simple: causality is about cause and effect and ethics is just an extension of causality given an ethical twist with the assumption or inference that we're autonomous (free) agents.

Sorry, Fool, but this is painful. Aren't we defining complexity with abandon here? — Caldwell

Explain yourself first.

It's my supicion, well-founded or not (you be the judge), that the entire story of ethics and the self, rides on the simpler notion of causality. An event takes place and instincitvely we seek a cause. This desire to pin down a cause transforms into an ethical dimension while the cause itself is rendered by the mind into a self, a self that's treated as an autonomous, free agent.

There seems to be asymmetry that needs to be made explicit: we don't need a reason to live as much as we need one to die. It can be said that the default state of our existential switch is set to live, live as long as possible. In other words, living is not so much a choice as it is a compulsion and that being the case, your question becomes meaningless. We don't choose to live, we live and that's that.

So an elephant is more complex than me because it has tusks? — fishfry

Good attempt but tusks are nothing more than overgrown teeth.

A true contradiction that I connect with is: I'm living & I'm dying. I'm living because here I am typing on my phone & I'm dying because, with each passing minute, I'm approaching my death.

:monkey: Emoji

I think I am editing my life all the time. I am busy looking for data and the experimenter seems to be AWOL. Sometimes, it feels like life is all snakes and ladders, mazes and knots. — Jack Cummins

Well, AWOL is better than KIA.

This is an awful formulation, a Plantingian Modal OA is much better and even those are hard to defend (albeit I accept it). — Elliot Fischer

Could you expand a little?

Silly. That's like asking which is "simpler": a black & white photograph of X or a color photograph of X? What difference does the 'conscious/not-conscious' distinction make to the brain as such? — 180 Proof

What's silly about it? A black & white photograph is simpler than a color photograph. More parts, more complex. Less parts, less complex.

I edited my title — Jack Cummins

I edited my life :rofl: under duress :rofl:

experiment — Jack Cummins

Life, it seems, is half an experiment (as of now that is) because 1) all the data is available for collection and analysis but 2) the experimenter (our creator?) is nowhere to be found.

You're basically claiming p-zombies are impossible and Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, the second component of his theory of identity, is controversial to say the least.

All women are, for better or worse, out or my league. I think women want the same things men want. Further, I'm reminded of the question, "do minds have gender?" which makes your question moot.

1. Why do planets orbit the sun?

Gravity.

2. How does gravity do that?

It bends space

A causal argument has, among other things, two components viz. an explanation (why?) and a mechanism (how?)

Aren't you drawing a distinction without a difference? I mean an image of a boabab tree in a giraffe's mind and the word "boabab" in a human's mind are semantically identical. You wouldn't, for instance, say that "water" and "aqua" and a picture of a glass of water are different in any significant sense, right?

Starting with "physicalism is true", you can't reach the above conclusion unless you assume that humans have a non-physical consciousness — Kenosha Kid

Sorry but I remain unconvinced by your objection. Please bear with me. Which is simpler, a brain or a conscious brain? Doesn't matter if it's physical or not (no petitio principii)?

What about mutes, especially those with congenital total speech deficits? Are you saying what I think you're saying?

So giraffes can't think since they have no vocal cords? :chin:

A physical system is more complex if it has more parts, yes. But the argument you refer to relies on their being some non-physical element to human consciousness such that, if p-zombies existed, they would not have it. This is why Elliot is right when he says:

But this seems kind of like question begging does it not?
— Elliot Fischer — Kenosha Kid

I beg to differ. Look at the p-zombie argument:

1. IF physicalism is true THEN p-zombies are impossible.

2. P-zombies are possible

Ergo,

3. Physicalism is false

Argument for premise 2 above:

4. IF a normal human being is not just possible but real THEN p-zombies [being simpler] are possible.

5. A normal human being is not just possible but real

Ergo,

6. P-zombies [being simpler] are possible [premise 2]

Whether consciousness is physical or not, it can't be denied that something simpler has to be possible if a more complex form has been actualized. In other words, I haven't assumed that consciousness is non-physical in the argument for premise 2. No begging the question fallacy has been committed.

Now, I'm no physicalist, But this seems kind of like question begging does it not — Elliot Fischer

How so? I didn't assume that p-zombies are possible. I simply worked my way to the conclusion that p-zombies are from the fact that if a certain level of complexity is real, it must be that a simpler stage/state along the way has to be possible.

You have raised some pertinent points and the first one to consider is that my mathematical example of arithmetic and calculus
vis-a-vis simplicity/complexity falls short of the mark.

Secondly, coming to the matter of a measure for complexity/simplicity, all I can say is that I'm not saying anything that isn't part of the existing framework of knowledge:

Google definition of "complex": consisting of many different and connected parts..

It must be that, from the "many" in the definition, the more components there are, the more complex something is. Ergo, a human, possessing consciousness in addition to a physical body, must be more complex than a p-zombie which is only physically identical but lacks consciousness. If I have a dollar, I must surely be in possession of cents; after all 1 dollar = 100 cents.

That we have reason to believe a number of less complex physical structures have consciousness suggests to me that p-zombies may not be possible after all. — Possibility

That consciousness is subjective precludes the inference of its existence in others. My argument works within a solipsistic framework.

Kindly go through my reply to fishfry.

Where is a line of demarcation? — jgill

Indeed. The notion of a p-zombie is closely related to computer processing. Computers do respond to external stimuli given they're equipped with the right kind of sensors. This may be taken to be the equivalent of a p-zombie's behavioral repertoire insofar as awareness (consciousness) of the external world is the topic of discussion.

Too, a p-zombie will pass the mirror test just like a normal human being can and does. The assumption that we're working on here is that consciousness can be deduced from behavior. Solipsism, although for very different reasons, says "no".

Determinism can be true only if everything has a cause but the belief that everything has a cause is based on inductive reasoning but inductive reasoning falls short of the the level of certainty required to keep determinism afloat. All Europeans believed that all swans were white until Australia happened, proving my point about the flaw in inductive reasoning.

cannot be observed — alphahimself

You seem to have hit the nail on the head there. Consciousness is, for each and everyone, wholly a first person experience, information gathered thence serving as a benchmark for deducing its presence beyond the self.

If so, the problem is are we sure that what we believe are the physical correlates of consciousness are really that? Does a man walking into a bar imply that he's thinking about having a drink? Not necessarily, right? If so, how deep does the rabbit hole go? If behavior can be incongruous with thoughts, can it also be that behavior can occur in the total absence of thought?

Are p-zombies possible?

I'm going to argue that they are and it goes like this: Take into account the fact that if the complexity of calculus is real and actual then the simplicity of arithmetic too is real and actual i.e. a certain level of complexity implies a lower level simplicity. Since p-zombies are simpler (they're lacking consciousness) than normal humans, they should be possible. It follows then that physicalism is false.

Since science, as of now, is limited to the physical, current scientific paradigms won't be able to explain consciousness.

authority — Edy

I picked that word because you seem to identify masculinty with it but, in my experience, women too covet authority; I'm sure the female section of the multitude of prisons that dot the landscape of many countries can vouch for me.

I suppose we can dispense with the assumption masculine = authority then and ask the question that lies at the heart of all our problems, "when is it too much and when is it too little?" The question of course presumes that a compromise between two sides, a golden mean between two extremes is the right way to think, speak, act, and live. Is it? It reminds me of the story of the two monkeys who were bickering over how they should share a watermelon. A third monkey came along and volunteered to help...by eating the part of the watermelon that was causing the disagreement. The story ends with the third monkey's belly full and the quarreling duo with nothing to eat. Is there a moral to this story? Maybe, maybe not.

:up: :ok:

What I want to draw your attention to is that duality is qualitative in charcter by which I mean they're non-mathematical e.g. when Heraclitus and Laotze spoke of opposites like hot and cold they took them to be distinct from each other - they were literally poles apart for these two thinkers.

Only in the mid-1800's did scientists demonstrate that hot and cold are simply perceptual correlates of a single underlying phenomenon, to wit different levels of kinetic energy of the molecules in objects; this, to my knowledge, requires quantification (of kinetic energy of molecules) i.e. from a mathematical standpoint, hot and cold are kinda sorta unified as one; in other words, the duality hot vs cold is an illusion. I suppose by the same token all dualistic concepts or the so-called opposites are just a matter of being at different points on a discrete/continuous mathematical scale.

First off, I'm neither attacking nor defending a side on the matter of outlawing Moslem women's dress code. What I do want to convey is the glaring inconsistency in allowing Christian nuns to wear their choice of clothes [clothes that bear an uncanny resemblance to the Moslem chador] and then taking umbrage at the Moslem chador. The fact is the former doesn't upset us because we believe it's considered a sign of virtuous piety. Moslems too consider the chador as a garment for virtuous women. Shouldn't we then extend them the same courtesy we do to Christian nuns?

Either that or condemn the Christian nuns' habit too as a deplorable mark of oppression.

I am certainly not suggesting that you think that people should be treated as objects. From what you have written in your many posts it would not make sense.

However, I do feel that you are dismissive the whole aspect of psychological truths in fiction. Just because people in fiction have bodies doesn't mean that fiction can be understood in that way. What I think you are doing is applying the philosophy of reductive determinism to fiction and literature, and this misses the whole purpose of most novels. — Jack Cummins

Well, for all I know I could be holding the wrong end of the stick here. I'm simply considering the possibility of an underlying quantitative (mathematical) structure to the universe. To be frank, I don't quite understand why you chose fiction to make your point. As far as I can tell, fiction seems kinda out of place in the discussion if only for the reason that the brains creating and absorbing fiction could be quantifiable i.e. fiction (creating/encountering it) could simply be, for instance, concentrations of certain neurochemicals (chemistry) and if not that they could simply be intricate electrical (physics) phenomena.

Do they?

I've a tree poppy in a pot outside. It's about 60cm high, so it's not a tree, yet. It will apparently grow to a height of a couple of metres. Is it a tree or a shrub? Does that make its name wrong?

Its name is useful. I can ask Wife where we should plant out the tree poppy, and she knows what I'm on about. I can order another one from the supplier by asking by name. But I could not offer a definition that would sort tree poppies out from other poppies or shrubs.

The supplier and my wife might have talked about Romneya coulteri, a name which perhaps has a suitable definition in some archaic botanical source. But we don't.

Indeed, if you look around you might notice that folk get by for the most part without "a definition, sentiment or meaning held in them that is mutually understood by the collective".

This is one of the odd things pointed out by Old Wittgenstein. It seems that words can be quite useful without previously agreed on definitions.

It's the use that is important — Banno

A couple of points:

1. I'm sympathetic to Wittgenstein's point of view that there are clear instances of words being used in such a fashion that precludes the identification of an essence to them. In such cases then, the best course of action would be to abandon philosophical projects that depend on there being a unifying theme to the various ways in which a particular word is used - it would all be in vain. Under these circumstances, the most reasonable way of doing philosophy would be to study words, thus concepts, within the context (form of life/language game) in which they appear.

However,

2. For Wittgenstein's theory of language games, it's necessary that there isn't a single case of word misuse. Words would be used correctly, without any possibility of error - all that's needed to prove this would be to show particular language games that given words are participating in. So, when I use the word "god" as a Christian, it has a meaning within the language game of Christianity and when I use "god" as a Buddhist, I would be talking about something else entirely because the language game for Buddhism is a different ballgame.

This doesn't make sense. Why?

A word can be misused only if the meaning intended for one language game is transposed into another language game. However, how would we determine such errors if not the case that there are definitions, even if the definitions are confined to particular language games. In other words, though meanings of words differ with the language games they take part in, the meanings within each language game has to be based on an essence.

Red color. How is it a relation? Surely it is related to electromagnetic wavelength of about 650 nm. But what is red about number 650 itself? Or about a wave function? — litewave

Red = 650 nm wavelength in the electromagnetic spectrum. Red is a quantity or in different words, the quantity 650 nm (wavelength) is perceived as redness.

Quantity is a relation, it means how many things there are. Or if you meant to say "once a relation is in place, quality automatically enters the picture", I agree. There can be no relations without non-relations (qualities) and there can be no non-relations (qualities) without relations. — litewave

This is where there's a subtle difference between you and me. Relations and non-relations can be put under the rubric of, for lack of a better word, relations with non-relations having a value of 0% and the strongest relation having a value of 100%

But fiction isn't just about objects. It's about people and their psychological truths. To just view the people as objects would be a very flat level of understanding the whole scope and meaning of literature. Even if you think of the romantic relationships it would be a mistake to think that this is just about beautiful bodies, because so much is about the emotions. — Jack Cummins

You're barking up the wrong tree. Sorry. I don't view people as objects in the sense that they're to be treated inhumanely. In saying that people are objects I mean that they are, all said and done, material in nature.

:rofl: :up:

:up: will check that link

Fiction can't be translated easily into shapes. I know that it written in alphabetical shapes but it would be absurd to try to quantify it in this way. It involves stepping into the mythical perspective and this involves specific meaning for different individuals. Individuals are likely to approach it differently according to their personal experiences. I don't think that it would be possible to quantify the whole realm of storytelling at all — Jack Cummins

Firstly, because you haven't provided me a concrete case of a real-world object that can't be quantified, let's exclude all the elements in fiction that are borrowed from reality.

That leaves us with only the completely made-up elements in fiction. Interestingly, we come to the realization that fictional things are simply uninstantiated combinations of real objects e.g. a unicorn (imaginary) is a horse (exists and quantifiable) and a horn (exists and also quantifiable) and ergo, by extension, unicorns are quantifiable

The better explanation is from Sartre. It's about people, rather than things. You find yourself here in the world, but without an identity, without an essence (a word I would not use outside of exegesis). You must make choices , and as you proceed with these choices your identity, your essence, is created.

Hence, you first needs must exist, then you choose who you are.

Existence precedes essence.

It's the core of existentialism, and contains a truth that is well worth taking on board. — Banno

:ok: :up: Thanks

I wonder though how Kierkegaard or Sartre can talk of people without there being an essence to people - the word "people" wouldn't refer to anything sans an essence that defines people.

Perhaps they do acknowledge that people, as a class, have an essence but both take a step further and mirable dictu they discover that whatever that essence is, it doesn't limit the acquisition of an added layer of essence that makes an individual stand out as a one of a kind.

Ever encountered Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance by any chance? This question is at the centre of that book. — Wayfarer

As luck would have it, I'm currently reading that exact book - I'm on the 30th chapter and, to be honest, I find the book a challenging read. Anyway, below is what the Wikipedia page on Quality (philosophy) has to say about Robert M. Pirsig's book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance:

In his book, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Robert M. Pirsig examines concepts of quality in classical and romantic, seeking a Metaphysics of Quality and a reconciliation of those views in terms of non-dualistic holism. — Wikipedia

The key concept (non-dualistic holism) in Pirsig's book has been underlined for your convenience. Take the dualistic notion that lies at the very foundation of all life, to wit hot vs cold: it's said that life found a home on this watery-rocky planet we call earth for the simple reason that it's neither too hot nor too cold thus allowing life-giving and life-sustaining liquid water to exist.

Take a closer look at what hot and cold are. From a dualistic point of view, they're distinct from each other - opposites, yin and yang as it were - but physics (science), the paradigmatic case of the mathematization of the universe, unites these two dualistically distinct qualities under one banner viz. temperature. What our ancient forefathers thought were two separate qualities (hot vs cold) turns out to be simply variations in one same quantity (temperature).

Given the above, it would seem that Pirsig would've made a convincing case for non-dualistic holism had he resorted to mathematics i.e. he should've chosen quantity over quality to make his case.

Quantity directly relates to mass, Quality relates to the components that make up a mass. — Peter Paapaa

I was turning the matter over in my mind when it dawned on me that unlike colors which are simply different wavelengths of light, there are some aspects of human experience that can't be explained in terms of quantity. Take for example the emotions of love and anger; the former is modulated by oxytocin while the latter by adrenaline. These two emotions are effects of two different biomolecules, the difference between these biomolecules irreducible to mere variations in quantity. In other words, love and anger are qualitatively different; however, the intensity of these emotions probably are just a matter of the concentration (quantity) of the respective biomolecules. All this under the assumption that biochemists and physiologists are correct of course.

Perhaps if we dig a little deeper and get down to the level of quarks, even emotions can be translated into quantity - the number/mass of quarks in a given biomolecule. I wonder if biochemists and physiologists have ever thought along these lines. Gestalt? Possibly. At this point I'm taking a tentative step outside the borders what is known to science (and me).

There is, obviously, such a thing as quality. Why deny the obvious? But to my mind, the qualitative has always been a matter of judgement. A subjective factor that relates to the purposes I intend for the object.

For example; there are two loaves of bread in my fridge. One is stale and the other is fresh. Which is the better quality? If I want to make a sandwich - the fresh bread is better quality. But if I want to make bread and butter pudding, the stale bread is better. (And it really is - stale bread will retain its structure, whereas fresh bread turns to mush.)

The quality of the object is not inherent to the object, but to the suitability of the object for my purposes - and is therefore, a matter of judgement. It's like Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, a terrible book, but just the right thickness to level my bookshelf. In that regard, it's the best book I've got. — counterpunch

To construct an item with structural integrity, an engineer must first consider a material’s mechanical properties, such as toughness, strength, weight, hardness, and elasticity, and then determine the size and shape necessary for the material to withstand the desired load for a long life — Wikipedia

All the characteristics (underlined) that define structural integrity are quantities.

Too judgment requires quantification to determine whether better or worse for "...purposes..."

Reality consists of relations and non-relations. Quantity is a type of relation and quality might refer to non-relations. Ontic structural realism says that there are only relations - relations between relations between relations etc. I think it's ok for there to be relations between relations but relations would be undefined if they were ultimately not grounded in non-relations. Relations and non-relations are inseparable, so it's no wonder that a quality like color is related to a relation like the wavelength of electromagnetic waves. — litewave

Name a quality that can't be/hasn't been viewed as a relation. Nothing springs to mind. I'm approaching the matter from the position that once a relation is in place, quantity automatically enters the picture

I think that quality is a concept which extends into all areas not just maths. However, I think that it goes beyond beauty. This can be superficial and quality is about depth as well. The most obvious example that comes to my mind is if someone wrote a philosophy book, written in the most exquisite language but lacking in sufficient knowledge would it have quality? Certainly,I would see it as rather lacking.

Obviously, the idea of quality has some kind of subjective criteria. For instance, certain literature is viewed as literary fiction. I know many people who find this fiction rather pretentious. I have mixed feelings and read some of this but can see that it is not necessarily of better quality than some fiction which is not ranked as literary fiction. So, I would say that the whole idea of quality is about certain standards, which are socially constructed. — Jack Cummins

I'm going to focus my reply on subjectivity. Both you and @counterpunch have raised the same point. Do you have any good reasons to come to the conclusion that subjectivity somehow isn't quantifiable? Name something which you think is subjective and non-quantifiable (can't be translated into numbers (arithmetic) or shapes (geometry)].

S.K. merely means 'that one is' manifests (i.e. embodies, becomes) 'what how who & why one is'. In other words, it's vacuous – fallacious – to reify (unsound) "ratiocinations" like Bartricks does. — 180 Proof

I still feel something's wrong with the idea that existence precedes essence. I admit that from a certain angle it does look like there are no qualities that define a human and each individual, in Kierkegaard's terms, defines faerself. However, when he says, "man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards", "man" in this sentence can only be understood in terms of man's essence - those qualities that set man apart from the rest and provide the contrast necessary for man to, well, stick out in the crowd so to speak.

I couldn't bother but I'm glad you did — 180 Proof

Well, I'm trying to wrap my head around this issue with little progress. What does Soren Kieriegaard mean by existence precedes essence? I know or am under the impression that his statement is supposed to be understood in the narrow sense of being about human nature but then it makes sense only if it does so in the much broader sense of existence coming before properties, essence being nothing more than a constellation of properties.

Existence, to my knowledge, supervenes on properties and by extension essences. In other words, we understand existence in terms of properties, essences (unique set of properties) and if so Soren Kierkegaard's existence precedes essence, understood in a wider ontological context doesn't add up.

For instance, how do we know that a stone exists [as a physical object]? By discovering properties unique to matter [by finding out the essence of matter]. Without an essence we can work with, nothing can be identified as existing independently for there are no properties that could be used as a contrast against the background (other things). What I'm trying to say is Kierkegaard's statement, against the backdrop of ontology itself, is self-contradictory - he simply can't talk about humans without an essence as a toehold and then, with the same breath, he denies it all.

And that point is? I honestly have no clue. — khaled

Never mind.

This knowledge is not deducible even to a perfect logician, if he is not given premises it can be deduced from is the point. Which is why a perfect logician is not omniscient. — khaled

While it's commendable that you're approaching the matter with intellectual rigor, such a strategy is unhelpful to our discussion. I'm being a bit, more than a bit perhaps, loose with the terms I'm employing. If you find that not to your liking, sorry.

So could your omnipotent God cause entropy to decrease? If he can't even do that (bring about a theoretical possibility but a technical impossibility) then what kind of God even is that? He/She/It wouldn't be able to do any more than a sufficiently rich and intelligent person with a lot of time and resources, and I struggle to call people like that omnipotent Gods. — khaled

Time 5,000 BC
X: My idea of god is of a being capable of doing things in ways that defy all natural explanation
Y: As for me, god's omnipotence is a matter of knowing how the universe works and working, as they say, within the system
X: Can your god make flying chariots (planes/helicopters)?
Y: ...

Just around the corner is vastly different from omniscience. No amount of infallibility will allow you to deduce the current population of earth for example. Or what I’m thinking of right now. You need premises and an established body of empirical observations for an infallible logician to be useful in the least. Which is, again, vastly different from an omniscient person who would know exactly what I’m thinking of right now without requiring any extra data (because omniscience is precisely possessing all the data there is and will be) — khaled

Your objection brings to mind a Buddhist story. A great competition was held between clairvoyants and logicians. The challenge was to determine the color of an unborn calf. The clairvoyant went first, closed his eyes and became aware of the unborn calf's forehead, it was white and so he declared "the unborn calf has a white forehead". It was now the turn of the logician. He knew that unborn calves in a fetal position would have their tails curled up with the end resting on the forehead [assume this is true] and realized that the unborn calf's forehead wasn't white but its tail was and announced "no, the unborn calf's head isn't white but its tail is". They waited for the pregnant cow to give birth to the calf; lo and behold out emerged from the cow's womb a sprightly young calf with a white tail, just as the logician had said the calf would be. You may need to make adjustments to the story but not so much as to miss the point of this story.

False. Some effects could be impossible to produce in practice but not in theory. For example: reducing entropy. It is technically possible for every atom in the room you’re in right now to move in such a way so as to go to a corner and become a lattice and you would suffocate. But the chances of that are astronomically small. And there is no way to artificially produce that effect without increasing entropy elsewhere.

But an omnipotent person would just be able to command that to happen. An omniscient person would only know that it is extremely unlikely, and that there is no artificial way to produce it and so would not be able to produce it or hope for it.

Or a simple example: A perfect logician cannot bicep curl an airplane when asked to and given no prep time. A God can.

An even simpler argument for why omniscience doesn’t lead to omnipotence is if it did then omnipotence would be obsolete. It’s like saying “Khaled is a being with brown eyes, who also has eyes”. The latter follows from the former and so requires no mention. — khaled

I notice that you have a different idea of omniscience and omnipotence; your take on it is superheroish in a Superman sense - abilities that a being possesses that defy explanation in terms of what is known - but the version of omniscience and omnipotence I subscribe to is also superheroish but in a Batman sense - abilities explicable within the existing framework of knowledge. The situation is very similar to lighting a cigarette with a match or a lighter - the end result is same although the match and the gas lighter are significantly different from each other. That's all I can say.

My take on the is/ought issue is that there are two facets to it:

1. The is/ought problem: Killing is an undeniable fact - predators kill their prey, sometimes in gruesome ways. "Therefore" we ought to kill.

2. The is/ought solution: Killing is an undeniable fact. "Therefore" we ought not kill.

Hume was concerned with moral arguments that have as a premise a known fact about our world and drawing from it, as a conclusion, a normative moral injunction. The normative injunction must, if the reasoning is to make sense, be an affirmation of the known fact i.e. if the known fact in question is x, the normative injunction has to be do x. This is the is/ought problem.


The is/ought solution, however, is an entirely different story. Morality has its roots in a general dissatisfaction with how the world is. Isn't that the very reason why there's an ought, all oughts being nothing more than expressions of our discontentment with the is, the status quo.