The fact that the mathematical existence of noncomputable numbers follows from the rules of standard math, doesn't imply that any noncomputable process is instantiated in the real world. — fishfry

What do you mean by instantiation? Remember that everything, E-V-E-R-Y-T-H-I-N-G, has to be simulated if the universe is and irrational numbers that are non-computable do exist in the same sense as the numbers 1, 2, 0, 1/2, 0.3333... exist and so must be coded in but that's not possible for to do that would require a program of infinite size that for that reason can't be finished. If so how can the program be executed? The universe is not a simulation.

How can you even say "reality could be simulated by a sufficiently complex program". How can that sentence make any sense? — Semiotic

Haven't you played video games? Haven't you heard of sim games? Video games are simulated realities and if you pay close attention, the do a mighty fine job of capturing real-world physics. Simulating the universe isn't, as far as I can tell, a question of IF but only of WHEN. Have look at what Nick Bostrom (1973 - ) has to say about reality being a simulation.

What is being assumed here? That a physical computer can generate a "universe" within the computer system itself? And that from within that universe (the computer) a universe could be created that looks like our universe? That is an extravagantly loaded set of assumptions to make about the world. Think about that means in terms of the potential infinity of it. If the universe is a computer simulation, then that means within the universe that the computer exists is itself caught up in its own simulation, ad infinitum. At which point does someone finally admit, "this is too stupid a claim to take seriously because it fails to evoke the sort of feelings that normally make someone take existence as a serious subject." — Semiotic

I don't get why you're putting up such a resistance to what is an idea that's both old and pops up regularly in philosophical discussions: Plato's allegory of the cave, Zhuangzhi's dream argument, Descartes' deus deceptor, the brain in a vat thought experiment; simulated reality is nothing but the modern incarnation of this nearly 2000 year old idea. It's still alive and well for the simple reason that people haven't been able to refute it and that says a lot in my world.

Feeling wise, nothing in me is released or produced by the slipshod idea that I'm in a computer program, because the philosophical dead end it creates (infinity) necessitates a being in another world controlling the program. It fails to accept that there is an unknown metaphysical principle which exceeds all human contemplation, and that whatever humans can known about this Other, all we have to rely upon are the the forms of the world itself. This is the typical and anthropologically common way human beings experience Nature: as a metaphor of some vaster Being. The computer idea fails to evoke the sense of magical "participation mystique" that the normal human relationship between self and world evokes. — Semiotic

Google Nick Bostrom's trilemma and take a second look at what I've said. I've been looking around for good movies that are coming out in 2021 and The Matrix 4 is scheduled for release - that got me thinking about this whole simulated reality idea. If you give it some thought, the possibility that reality is a simulation actually provides more mystique than knowing reality is a WYSIWYG deal. The sense of mystery, the possibility that there's more to this universe than what we perceive through our senses and analyze with our minds, are central themes of all human endeavors that revolve around the pressing matter of the meaning of life which encompasses the relationship between us and the universe at large.

What you seem to be underemphasizing is the possibility that the idea of a computer simulated reality is really your bodies need to make sense of this existential awareness of self and being but within the terms of what you presently value as a self i.e. according to the logic of computers and programming. In this situation, you have naively failed to realize the deeper reality of metaphor, itself reflecting the ontological situation of a superior Being communicating Itself to a being within itself. Why is this idea typically spurned? Because the traumas and pains - particularly the myriad times you've felt shame in your social existence as a self - that have occurred within your development as a person prevents you from experiencing the connection i.e. the feeling, that ordinarily exists between the self aware organism and the universe itself. — Semiotic

I don't know what you're on about. All I can say is if reality were nothing more than what we currently know or think we know it is then where's the fun in that? Unfortunately, it seems, for someone who's extremely fond of mysteries and hidden secrets, I've shot myself in the foot by proving, in my own small way, that there's nothing beyond what we're immediately aware of. So :sad: Reality isn't a simulation and there's nothing behind the curtains if there are any curtains at all.

It's funny that you talk of metaphors and then dismiss the idea of a simulated reality because if reality were a simulation you'd expect more metaphors and more interesting ones at that - coders are known to leave clues to their identity in hidden rooms, secret levels, easter eggs, and whatnot.

:ok:

Pegasus exists only in fiction; as do, according to some, noncomputable numbers. — fishfry

That doesn't refute my argument for everything, including fiction, has to be coded if reality is a simulation and if noncomputable irrational numbers exist in fiction, that too requires to be coded and we run into the same problem of a program that's got to be infinite in size and that means it'll never be finished/completed and so can't be compiled/translated into an executable file. Reality can't be a simulation.

:up: Carry on, if you don't mind my saying so.

incongruous emotions — Jack Cummins

Is it really incongruous or is there a deeper meaning to laughing when sad and crying when happy? You should look up Heraclitus (the weeping philosopher) and Democritus (the laughing philosopher) - both did so after, what I presume is, having understood what life - the same thing - is all about.

Will get back to you in a while. Thanks for your comment.

Well, I am glad that you replied really, because it was during a reply to you about the idea of Biblical idea of the unpardonable sin that I caused the flood. Of course, I realise it was my fault alone, my sin of carelessness and I am lucky that my mum has a sense of humour.

But generally I think that tragedy and comedy are part of the human condition. I also have to admit that I have a bit of a dark, surrea lsense of humour and I once had a manager who totally misconstrued me playing around with the lion on my keyring, who I called Leonardo. — Jack Cummins

I'm just sharing my thoughts with you. To be frank, there are more reasons to cry than to laugh but have you seen beauty pageants? What's the reaction when the pretty girl in high heels and a flowing dress wins the crown? Tears flow down the cheeks and the mouth curled into a lovely, breathtaking, smile. What's that all about? Then there's this other image that keeps flashing across my mind - a middle-aged woman who's lost her entire family in some tragedy which I can't, for the life of me, recall laughing hysterically. What's up with that?

I don't know if Anselm of Canterbury was a medieval-era philosopher but check out his ontological argument. No one, till date, has been able to refute it but it proves something that people have a difficult time buying into viz. the existence of god.

God is a comedian playing to an audience too afraid to laugh — Voltaire

It's better to be laughed at than to be cried for — TheMadFool

Should I, can I, laugh now?

Since no one is going to listen to you unless you have an argument or, at least, an attempt at one, mistakes can be of the following types:

1. Having unjustified assumptions in your argument. I've been watching videos on youtube on what some refer to as self-evident truths, truths that need no argument to prop them up but I'm deeply suspicious of such claims. However, if one asks that some prropositions to be treated axiomatically then I don't mind it for axioms are essentially propositions that, if made explicit, are of the form "assume to be true the proposition that..." and that's completely legit as an exploratory maneuver.

2. Errors in logic and these can take the form of cognitive biases, formal and informal fallacies. You can look these up on Google.

3. A different kind of mistake is the inconsistency or contradiction in a belief system. The logic is impeccable, the propositions are axiomatic but the propositions are inconsistent or contradictory.

4. The last and the one mistake that I fear the most is what Wolfgang Pauli (1900 - 1958) was said to have accused a young physicist of committing, "you're not even wrong".

The phrase is generally attributed to the theoretical physicist Wolfgang Pauli, who was known for his colorful objections to incorrect or careless thinking. Rudolf Peierls documents an instance in which "a friend showed Pauli the paper of a young physicist which he suspected was not of great value but on which he wanted Pauli's views. Pauli remarked sadly, 'It is not even wrong'." This is also often quoted as "That is not only not right; it is not even wrong", or in Pauli's native German, "Das ist nicht nur nicht richtig; es ist nicht einmal falsch!" — Wikipedia

:chin: It must count as a really sad day for the person who couldn't even make a mistake, forget about getting it right!

1. The perceiver (noticer) of the mental image (X)
2. The mental image (sensations and thoughts)
3. That which can produce a mental image (The world and X itself)
— TheMadFool

This is basically representative realism, similar to that of the British empiricists, Locke, et al. — Wayfarer

I didn't know that. Thanks!

In all of this, you're assuming the independent reality of (let's call it) the sensory domain. From the practical point of view, that is perfectly sound. But from the viewpoint of philosophical analysis, it is the very thing which has to be called into question. And that is by no means an easy thing to do. — Wayfarer

I've touched upon this elsewhere - can't remember where exactly. In line with Cartesian thought and the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, the only certainty that's available to us is our own consciousness (cogito ergo sum), the external physical world might very well be an elaborate illusion created by our consciousness. This, I feel, is the strongest argument against physicalism for physicalism can't get off the ground and claim a justifiable existence unless we can established that the physical world isn't a consciousness-generated illusion. Thanks for reminding me.

No matter how often you say it, it's still bollocks. An illusion is 'an error in consciousness', so can only occur in a conscious being who is capable of making a wrong judgment. A camera could never suffer an illusion. Many people have of course already said this about Dennett, but as he's a 'moist robot', he just keeps going, like Terminator. — Wayfarer

As is obvious, I have to reconcile what I said above with my affirmation of Dennett's claim that consciousness is an illusion. First things first, the only thing we're 100% certain of is our consciousness and your refutation of my argument that consciousness is an illusion is Cartesian in spirit.

As far as I can see, the entire quarrel between physicalism and non-physicalism hinges on one crucial point - the existence/reality of consciousness itself. After all, the debate revolves around proving consciousness to be physical or non-physical. If Dennett can prove consciousness is not real or that it's an illusion it would be the ingenious removal of the most beautiful woman on earth, Helen of Troy, from the then Greek world - there would be no Trojan war, no debate between physicalists and non-physicalists.

If consciousness is an illusion it would severely undermine non-physicalism because the only thing they have to go on - the certainty regarding the reality of consciousness and what follows, the uncertainty of the physical world - vanishes into thin air. As you can see, the reality of consciousness is a bigger deal for non-physicalists than physicalists because non-physicalists would be approaching the issue from a Cartesian deus deceptor point of view but for that consciousness has to be real.

That said, I would like to discuss consciousness with the aim of finding out what it actually is. The wikipedia entry on consciousness states that it's - at its core - awareness but, the follow-up question is, what is awareness?

Let's look at an example. Suppose a John says that he's aware of something, say a golf ball, on a table. It only means that John is aware of the mental image - the internal reflection - of the golf ball. This is the basic scheme of awareness of the external world and also of the self, John himself. The awareness in John's awarness of the golf ball is what consciosuness is.

Suppose the mental image of the golf ball is A1. John is aware of the golf ball because he's aware of A1 and the awareness in John's awareness of A1 is what consciousness is. That means to be aware of what consciousness is John needs a mental image of consciousness that he can then become aware of. Basically, John needs a mental image of the awareness of the mental image of the golf ball, call this A2. For John to become aware of consciousness, John needs to be aware of A2 i.e. John needs to be aware of awareness (consciousness) and that can only happen if John has a mental image of awareness (consciousness) in order that he can be aware of it.

Sounds simple, right?

Not so! The problem is that John claims that he's aware of A1 and that means he must know, beforehand, what awareness is but he couldn't have known that for the simple reason that his awareness of awareness (awareness of A2) is premised on his awareness of A1.

I present below a conversation between John and I:

John: I'm aware of A1 (the mental image of the golf ball)

Me: Good for you. How do you know that you're aware of A1?

John: I know because I'm aware of A2 [the mental image of the awareness of A1 (the mental image of the golf ball)]

Me: You can't be aware of A1 unless you're aware of A2 because awareness of A2 tells you what awareness is and you had to know that before you can claim that you're aware of A1.

John: Right.

Me: But you can't be aware of A2 unless you're aware of A1. Awareness of awareness is only possible if you're already aware.

John: Correctamundo!

Me: So, to be aware of A1 you need to be aware of A2 (you have to know what awareness is before you can claim to be aware of anything) and to be aware of A2 you need to be aware of A1 (to be aware of awareness, you need to be first aware)

John: Right, again.

Me: So, you need to be aware of awareness to know what is awareness (before you can be aware of anything you need to know what awareness is) and you need to be aware to be aware of awareness (before you know what awareness is you need to be aware)

John: That's correct.

Me: That's a vicious circle if there ever was one. Let me make the circularity explicit:

1. To be (claim that you are) aware you need to be aware of awareness
2. To be aware of awareness you need to be aware

Since, awareness = consciousness, you can't know what consciousness is or, if one follows Dennett's footsteps, "consciousness" is an empty word for it doesn't mean anything at all and so, in his words, consciousness is an illusion.

@Wayfarer

people failing to see the gorilla — Mijin

I read up the gorilla experiment and it's an intriguing phenomenon to say the least. What's relevant about this experiment to our discussion is something that bothers me too.

Back in my college days I remember some of my friends doing their own funny little experiments on unsuspecting people and one of them was opening the eyes by gently tugging the eyelid up of sleeping colleagues. For sure, since the eyes were intact and healthy, an image did form in the retina of whatever was in front of the "subject" but, of course, the image didn't register (the "subjects" of this experiment were asleep) i.e. the "subjects" weren't conscious. It seems, from this fact, that the mere formation of an image in the eyes doesn't qualify as consciousness.

The image, of course, plays a key role in consciousness but, in and of itself, doesn't quite do the job of describing consciousness. There's something missing in the sleeping person who has faer eyes open - there's an image on faer retina but there's no consciousness. Let's call this missing piece of the puzzle X. I'm tempted to equate X with the soul or some other non-physical entity but kindly note that it can be a state of arousal of the physical brain. To keep things simple, let's call X the perceiver (of the image) and avoid commiting ourselves to any metaphysical position.

Coming to the gorilla in our midst, people didn't see the gorilla not because there wasn't an image of the gorilla in their retina - obviously there was - but because X (the perceiver) failed to notice it.

It's quite obvious then that there's something - we've labeled it X - that's scanning the mental image, understood in the broadest sense possible, and looking for points of interest. So, yeah, there's the perceiver (X) we have to reckon with in consciousness and the mental image simpliciter is only half the story.

Nevertheless, as I've repeatedly said, consciousness is, now acknowledging the necessity of an X, when we get down to the nitty-gritty, a confluence of X and the world outside or the X itself and that takes place at the level of what I've described as mental images.

X, by itself, though capable of becoming aware is not conscious unless there's a mental image it can be aware of/to. The world/X itself can't participate in consciousness unless there's a mental image, again, to be aware of/to. The mental image itself can't be part of consciousness unless there's an X that notices (gorilla) it.

In summary, there are three pieces to the consciousness puzzle:

1. The perceiver (noticer) of the mental image (X)
2. The mental image (sensations and thoughts)
3. That which can produce a mental image (The world and X itself)

In terms of my camera analogy, what a camera lacks is X, the perceiver, capable of examining the image on the film or the image sensor and noticing what's in it (gorilla).

Consciousness in such a setup is the phenomenon that can be described as one or both of the following:

1. The perceiver (X) perceives the mental image and X has the ability to scan the mental image and notice (gorilla) whatever.

2. The perceiver (X) bypasses the mental image and is aware of the world and itself in an immediate, direct, deeply intimate, visceral sense. To my reckoning this is what mysticism and esotericism is all about.

As you can see, there's been a shift in my position (thanks to the two of you for that). That a mental image, alone, constitutes consciousness is untenable. Consciousness requires the perceiver (X) to notice the mental image as a whole or parts of it as the case may be. This is what awareness - the essence of consciousness - actually means.

Observe how the perceiver (X) has now assumed a critical role in consciousness. The existence of a camera unequivocally proves that we can replicate mental images (think in the broadest sense of images) with high fidelity in the form of photographs of the world and of the camera itself with a little bit of ingenuity of course. The matter of the world or the camera itself is, ergo, moot. However, what's missing in the camera is the X, the perceiver, that which can go over the images on the film/image sensor and notice (gorilla) stuff in it.

What all this means is simple. We need to do an overhaul of consciousness as a concept. For clarity I would like to reiterate my take on the Consciousness Trinity as I like to call it:

1. The perceiver (noticer) of the mental image (X)
2. The mental image (sensations and thoughts)
3. That which can produce a mental image (The world and X itself)

The underlined part, X, is that which current science and technology can't create or have been in only a rudimentary, narrow, sense.

Consciousness must then be about X, the perceiver noticing (gorilla) the world or itself via mental images and this is what's meant by awareness. The world itself is out there - nothing much to comment on it - and the mental images that we form of it have been, more or less, artificially reproduced in the various gadgets that populate the modern era. In other words, to put it simply, consciousness is, at its core, about the perceiver (X) noticing (becoming aware of), not the [mental] images (modern gadgets are up to the task), nor the world (it's a passive component of consciousness).

We've finally reduced the entire consciousness business to,

1. X, the perceiver of mental images
2. The mental images themselves

All the action that we believe is consciousness (awareness) takes place where these two come together. X becomes aware of the mental images = consciousness [assuming you're not a mystic]

We can, for the moment, set aside the matter of the nature of X and focus our attention on awareness for that's the essence of consciousness. What exactly is this awareness (X being aware of the mental images)?

To get to the bottom of this puzzle, I suggest we do a little thought experiment. There's a person Y who's aware of an object T. Let's analyze the logic behind Y's claim that fae is aware of T.

Me: How do you, Y, know that you're aware of T?

Y: I am aware of T because I have (seen T) the mental image of T.

Me: How do you know you're aware of the mental image of T? [consciousness as per what we've discussed enters the stage here]

Y: I'm aware of it because I'm aware of it. That's all there is to it. All there is the awareness of the mental image.

Me: Ok. So, you, Y, is/are telling me that you're aware of the mental image but you don't have an explanation for it?

Y: Yes

Me: How do you, Y, know that you're aware of T?

Y: You've already asked me that question and I've answered it.

Me: Yes, I did ask and you did answer but I'm intrigued by how you have an explanation for the awareness of T but no explanation for the awareness of the mental image of T.

Y: I don't know what you mean.

Me: When it comes to T, the mental image of T satisfies the criteria for awareness, right?

Y: Yes.

Me: Well, then mental images of mental images should also satisfy the criterion for awareness of mental images, no?

Y: I guess so....it looks like right to me.

Me: Well, then, if that's the case, mental images are awareness. After all your awareness of T was based on a mental image of T and from that it follows that having mental image is awareness itself.

Y: Hold on! Not so fast! Actually I'm aware of T because I'm aware of the mental image of T. The mental image, by itself, doesn't quite cut it, you know. There's the awareness that you've not taken into account.

Me: I see. So, 1) you're aware of T because you're aware of the mental image of T and 2) you don't know how you're aware of the mental image of T, you're just aware of it and can't comment any further?

Y: Yeah! That's more accurate.

Me: Ok. According to you there's thing we call awareness, it seems to be sticking point in our discussion, and that it describes the interaction between you and the mental image of T. Am I right?

Y: Yes.

Me: But of course, as you yourself admitted, you don't know how it is that you become aware of the mental image of T. Correct?

Y: Yes.

Me: Am I correct then to say you're unaware of how you're aware of the mental image of T?

Y: Yes

Me: What would aid you in your quest, if it is one you'd choose, to become aware of how you're aware of the mental image of T?

Y: I don't know. Any ideas?

Me: Well, a mental image of T helped you in becoming aware of T. That should be a big clue, no? If you had a mental image of your awareness of the mental image of T, it should do the trick in my humble opinion. Am I making sense?

Y: Hmmmmm...

Me: It appears that there are two important facts here: 1) your awareness of the mental image of T satisfies the criteria for awareness of T and 2) you're not aware of how it is that you're aware of the mental image of T.

Y: Ok

Me: Ergo, a mental image of the awareness of the mental image of T is what's needed for you to become aware of how it is that you're aware of the mental image of T.

Y: Yes. That seems to be the case.

Me: But then the problem now has taken on a different character for how are you aware of the mental image of the awareness of the mental image of T? Awareness of another mental image of course and then my question would be how are you aware of that mental image? Another mental image one has to be aware of, so and so on, ad infinitum.

Y: So?

Me: If you claim that the mental images aren't awareness itself and that awareness is something else, above and beyond mental images (to become aware of), it leads to an infinite regress of mental images necessary for you to become aware of what awareness means/is.

That being the case you have two choices, 1) accept, since an infinite regress occurs, that you're actually unaware of what awareness means and if that's true, how could you say anything is aware, and by extension, that anything is conscious (awareness=consciousness) OR 2) accept that mental images, by themselves alone, is awareness and if that's the case cameras too, because they have counterparts of mental images on the film or on the image sensor, must be conscious.

If, however, you assert that we're consciousness and the camera not, you're drawing a distinction where there's none and so, as Dennett said, consciousness is an illusion

Sorry for the overly long post. I was doing this on the fly.

You mean a coffee cup being "destroyed" to become a doughnut? — jgill

Oh, so when a species goes extinct it isn't really destroyed, because if we track all the matter that composed the beings of that species it is all still there somewhere, the species is still here guys we just have to apply a combination of reflection translation and rotation to see it.

When we destroy an ecosystem we don't really destroy it it's OK guys, we just apply a combination of reflection, translation, and rotation to it.

Seriously ... — leo

To both of you

Here's the deal as far as I can tell.

What is transformation?

Transformation describes one thing becoming something else with the proviso that there be a continuity, in some sense, at some level, between the thing and what it changes into. For example, ice transforms into liquid water and liquid water into water vapor - there's a change in state (solid/liquid/gas) but the substance (H2O) remains the same. This is the essence of what transformations are.

What is creation/destruction?

Creation is, as I mentioned earlier, the bringing into existence of something and destruction is, again as I mentioned before, the removing from existence. All in all, creation/destruction can be represented by the simple formula, existence <--> nonexistence where "<-->" means "to" in both directions. As you might've already noticed, there can be no such thing by way of a continuity between nonexistence and existence and ergo, creation/destruction can't be transformations.

That out of the way, let's look at your examples:

1. A house becoming rubble is as much an instance of destruction as building it is an act of creation and we know a house isn't created for the simple reason that both 1) the raw materials that went into constructing the house changed in form only but 2) the raw materials remained the same at the level of substance which is basically what transformation is and transformation isn't/can't be creation/destruction.

2. A species going out of existence satisfies the criteria for transformation because there's been change - no sane person could deny that - but there's also a continuity in substance between the extinct species and the environment. It's not the case that the extinct species is now nothing or that the extinct species, during its heydays, came from nothing, these being necessary for speciation and extinction to qualify as creation/destruction.

3. The coffee cup and the doughnut is what I was alluding to when I recommended studying it to make sense of the difference between transformation and creation/destruction but the coffee cup is an odd creature because the coffee cup and the doughnut are topologically identical and it just doesn't make sense to point at the same identical object and claiming a transformation has taken place.

Well, the notions creation/destruction are intimately tied to existence/nonexistence. The received opinion is that when something is created, it's brought into existence and when something is destroyed, it's removed from existence. On the other hand, transformation is when one thing becomes something else. The label destruction doesn't apply to a house collapsing into rubble because simple geometric transformations can be applied to the house to yield the rubble - a combination of reflection, translation, and rotation is what describes the house becoming rubble. You might also want to take a look at topology.

observe all instances of the class — fdrake

Yes, thanks again. You're right on the money.

Note: Being neither valid nor invalid = Being both valid AND invalid

Here's a scenario which might clarify the scenario.

Argument A

1. X% of Americans own a phone
2. John is an America
Ergo
3. John owns a phone

Assume two people are involved in this argument, S1 and S2. S1's accuracy regarding X% is the nearest whole number such that if X% >= 99.5% he considers X% = 100% and if X% < 99.5% he rounds it off to 99%. S2, on the other hand, has an accuracy correct to the 1st decimal place and so for S2, X% >= 99.95% is X% = 100% and X% < 99.95 is X = 99.9%
Now, suppose X% is 99.94%. For S1, X% becomes 100% and argument A becomes valid but for S2, X% is only 99.9% and argument A is invalid.

Assuming the premises are true, the argument A is, depending on the accuracy in the calculation of the percentage, both valid and invalid. It appears that an argument being neither valid nor invalid is equivalent to it being both valid and invalid.

Another example of an argument being neither valid nor invalid, with true premises and a conclusion that can be either true or false will use the same template as above but the entire argument will be made explicit.

1. IF (99% of women who have an abortion feel relief 5 years after an abortion AND Sarah is a woman) THEN Sarah will feel relief 5 years after an abortion

2. 99% of women who have an abortion feel relief 5 years after an abortion AND Sarah is a woman

Ergo,

3. Sarah will feel relief 5 years after an abortion.

As you can see this is the true form of the argument, perhaps all arguments are of this form. It's a combination of a deductive argument with an inductive argument.

1. The deductive part is valid (modus ponens) and the inductive part is invalid (even if the premises are true, the conclusion true or false)

2. The premises are true for both the deductive and inductive parts

3. The conclusion is either true or false.

:chin:

Thanks for the clarification. :up:

I want to ask you, is it possible to craft a deductive argument with the following characteristics:

1. Neither valid nor invalid

2. Both premises true

3. The conclusion is either true or false

???

By the way...I've made a huge mistake. I deleted the offending posts.

It's not the case that inductive arguments are neither valid nor invalid. They're all invalid.

What about so-called conservation laws in science. You know, those that say "matter/energy can neither be created nor destroyed". Perhaps you need to look at the world from the perspective of transformation which doesn't contradict the conservation laws scientists have discovered after, I'm guessing, painstaking research. In short, what you've been looking at as creation-destruction is actually, at its heart, just transformation.

My personal opinion is that induction differs from abduction. Abduction is what I've come to understand as inference to the best explanation (IBE).

As far as I can remember,

Induction: The argument is probabilistic (the premises are supposed to increase the odds of the conclusion being true)

1. Arguments from analogy

2. Statistical arguments

3. Arguments from authority

Abduction: The best hypothesis for a given set of observations

Suppose we've made 3 observations and come up with two explanatory hypotheses X and Y. X explains two observations but Y explains all three. Choosing hypothesis Y is abduction.

del

del

You're missing the point. I present below what is a scenario that's so common in our lives that it's both baffling and shocking that anyone would be required to narrate it to make a point.

John: Where have you been lately, Jane?

Jane: Oh, here and there, nowhere special except...there was this restaurant with a funny looking sign on its door.

John (intrigued): I see. What was this "funny sign"?

Jane (pulling out here mobile): My brother and I were looking for a place to eat when I saw this [pointing to a photograph] on the door of a restaurant. Isn't it funny?

John (looks at the photograph): Hahahahaha...I've been there too...Hahahaha...It is a funny sign that! Hahahaha

Had the camera not been faithful to what the eyes see, neither would Jane have pointed to the photograph and nor would John have recalled being there. The image in our eyes is identical to the image in a camera.

You did say something important though and I've been giving it some thought but it's not taken a definite form in my mind. I'll remember to invite you and @Wayfarer to a conversation if anything interesting comes up.

C is misleading at best. — Mijin

First, look at your phone's or computer's screen. Then, if you're on a phone, take a screenshot or if you're on a computer, use the PrtScrn button. Is there any difference between what you saw and the screenshot and the image you get with the PrtScrn button? No! I rest my case.

You do know this is a philosophy forum, right? Not a home electronics or photography forum, right?

Because the question here is not about what photographic images are or how cameras work. You keep saying that 'an image in a camera is identical to an image in a mind.' Now there's a philosophical issue with that assertion, that really has nothing to do with the workings of cameras. But I won't try to explain it further at this point, because I don't think it will be understood. — Wayfarer

It is, right? If it weren't the very purpose of cameras becomes moot. Why have them at all if they aren't or can't be faithful to the eyes? Since the image in a camera and one in our eye are identical to see a difference between them must mean that difference is illusory.

For the sake of clarity, consider the following argument,

C = image in camera, E = image in the eye

C = E means the image in the camera is identical to the image in the eye

"~" means not or is false that

1. IF consciousness is real THEN (C is not consciousness AND E is consciousness)

2 If (C is not consciousness AND E is consciousness) THEN ~(C = E)

3. If ~(C = E) THEN cameras, ceteris paribus, don't faithfully reproduce what the eyes see.

4. Cameras, ceteris paribus, do faithfully reproduce what the eyes see

5. ~~(C = E) [from 3, 4 modus tollens]

6. ~(C is not consciousness AND E is consciousness) [from 2, 5 modus tollens]

7. Consciousness isn't real OR Consciousness is an illusion [from 1, 6 modus tollens]

This claim is false — Mijin

Read above.

Worlds of difference. A camera image is either chemical emulsion if it's old-fashioned film, or patterns of pixels if it's digital photography. It's arguably not even 'an image' until it's recognised by an observer; cameras don't recognise images. An image is not an image to a camera, because no camera is capable of intentional action or interpretation.

Let me ask you a counter question: do you know what an 'ontological distinction' is? Do you know why it might be argued that there is an ontological distinction to be made between devices (which are constructed by humans) and sentient beings? — Wayfarer

I forgot to mention this to you but when I talk of images, whether in a camera or the mind, I refer to the finished product - the final output as it were. The physical processes/chemical reactions on an image sensor/film and the purported neural processes of vision, both, eventually become images that, if the same object is being photographed or looked at, are indistinguishable from each other. Kindly note the fact that the alleged neural processes that are involved in seeing aren't things we are/can be aware of to my knowledge - they take place outside our consciousness - and so the difference you're talking about - that the processes in photography and that of the eye are not the same - are irrelevant insofar as consciousness is concerned.

As an illustrative analogy, consider how we buy the things we need for our home - a microwave, TV, bulbs, etc. - these items are bought/consumed only after the manufacturing process is complete. There's an entire chain of processing that have to be completed before these items hit the shelves - mining the raw materials, transporting them to the manufacturing centers, treating them chemically/physically, putting them on an assembly line, etc. - but, for better or worse, we're not involved in them. We only see/handle the end product of all these processes.

The same with the mind. There maybe many neurochemical steps that go into vision, hearing, taste, etc. but we're not, as far as I can tell, aware of them. All we're aware of is, as I've been saying, the finished product.

The problem for those who feel that there's such a thing as consciousness is that the image in a camera is identical to the image in our eyes and by extension every kind of perception (states of awareness) - whether of the external world of oneself - must be identical to one that can be replicated in a non-human sense as for example in an instrument or, if we're clever enough, in a robot. This being the case, to see a difference between human awareness and non-human awareness can only be an illusory difference for the simple reason that they're identical. This illusory difference is what we've labeled as consciousness. Consciousness is an illusion.

Again, what image in your eye? As I mentioned upthread, there is lots of reason to doubt that a single image mapped to the world exists anywhere except on the retina*.
A hell of a lot of processing of image components happens within the neurons of the eye, long before it gets to the brain, and those pieces appear to be separately processed on different sections of the visual cortex. Meanwhile, a huge number of neurons feed back to the eye, because what we see is also in large part a function of what our prediction and categorization engines are expecting to see based on the past data.

* And even in the case of the surface of the retina, the cells do not fire synchronously, so even there there is no image corresponding to a single time slice of reality. — Mijin

Please read my reply to Wayfarer

I always know that someone is about to handwave consciousness, because they focus on awareness.
Awareness is the low-hanging fruit. A good description of awareness, that makes testable predictions, would indeed be incredibly useful, but it would be a foundational step in understanding consciousness.

Instead the tendency with people like Dennett is to throw out some explanation for awareness that they find plausible, and imply that solves the much harder problems of consciousness because reasons. — Mijin

Awareness is the cornerstone of consciousness. If it weren't then there would be no difference between you and a stone - again the same difficulty of seeing a difference (consciousness) that, as per your own claim, isn't there rears its ugly head.

Bad argument - cameras are not aware. Consciousness is an attribute of conscious organisms - devices including cameras, computers and telescopes are no more aware or conscious than are bicycles, abacus, or mirrors. None of them are sentient. So a camera image and a mental image are worlds apart - that's without even mentioning the fact that camera images are created by humans in the first place. — Wayfarer

Is there any difference between the image in your eyes and the image on a camera's image sensor? Before you answer that remember a camera is defined as a device that records events/people/places. What good is any kind of recorder if it isn't faithful to the actual things it records. In other words, if instead of your eyes, you had a camera, the image would be identical. You have absoloutely no reason at all to say the image in your eyes is consciousness and that in the camera is not. Consciousness then is a difference that is unreal. Consciousness is an illusion, Dennett has, for better or for worse, hit the nail on its head.

That said, I recall trying to offer an exploded-view of the phenomenon of consciousness. It's as below,

1. X, the thing capable of awareness

2. Y, the thing that X can be aware of [includes the external world and the internal world, X itself]

3. X becoming aware of Y, consciousness.

4. In my humble opinion, X = the brain = the camera

5. Y = the world = the brain (self-reflection) = the camera (selfie)

6. X becoming aware of Y = the image in the eye = the image on the camera's image sensor

Pay close attention to 6. The image in the eye = the image on the camera's sensor. There's absolutely no difference between the two. So, if anyone does claim that there's a difference - consciousness - that difference can't be real. Consciousness is an illusion.

For those who are interested

It seems that my assertion that there's nothing by way of a shared characteristic that runs through all that there's in the universe is incorrect or, in my defense, incomplete. The lack of a unifying principle in the universe is only so in a qualitative sense and, if you give the matter some thought, it becomes quite obvious what it is that's common to all that the universe contains, quantity.

The mathematical concept of a set is a collection and that's all there is to sets. Unlike classes/categories, sets don't need to make sense i.e. there's no necessity for there to be a pattern among its elements/members.

Set A = {x | x is is a state which borders Alabama}

Set B = {"writer", 234, { }, $}

Set A does have a (qualitative) pattern - there's something that's common to all its members and this is what a category/class is.

Set B, on the other hand, has no (qualitative) pattern - there's nothing in common to all its members but only in a qualitative sense. Nonetheless, if you look at it quantitatively, "writer" counts as a 1, 234 counts as another 1, { } also is 1, and last but not the least $ is just another 1. The oneness of set B's members is what's common to all its members. The universe is like set B - if you use qualitative properties they all end in contradictions but if you use quantitative properties, you'll see a unity to the universe that isn't available to someone unacquainted with numbers.

Set theory was developed by the great Georg Cantor who, some say, was obsessed with infinity and even believed that God is to be found in the infinite. Anyway, below is a particularly interesting take on Georg Cantor's use of the greek letter Aleph for infinity:

Aleph or Alef (א), is the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet and the number 1 in Hebrew. Its esoteric meaning in Judaic Kabbalah, as denoted in the ancient theological treatise Bahir, relates to the origin of the universe, the "primordial one that contains all numbers." — Wikipedia

In short, the much-talked-about The Nameless in Taoism is, under this reading, what in set theory is the set that contains everything - the Universal Set. I wish the story of Taoism ended here, on a good note but, alas, this just isn't the lucky break we were looking for. Russell's paradox turns the notion of the Universal Set on its head, in fact it precludes the very existence of the Universal Set. The little sliver of hope there I thought I saw turned out to be nothing more than a mirage.

To get to the point then, it's impossible to reduce Taoism's The Nameless - interpreted to mean the whole - to a category i.e. it's impossible to find a unifying principle that ties all there is into a neat little box.. Neither quantity nor quality (is there anything else?) does the trick.

:chin:

The Quasimodo Syndrome: We can recognize beauty (good) but we, ourselves, are ugly (bad). Oh, the Irony!

Quasimodo sneaks out of the cathedral during the Festival of Fools, where he is crowned the "King of Fools" and meets Esmeralda, with whom he falls in love — Wikipedia

What human has been tricked by Siri into thinking it was person? — Marchesk

The point isn't whether anyone has been tricked or not but that all that's necessary is to be tricked.

Sure, a human being or several could encode in the computer a capacity to emulate human speech, like Siri. But Siri can’t pass for a human being. It cannot pass the Turing test. — Olivier5

You underestimate Siri.

How about 4: I'm conscious, I don't know about the desktop — khaled

That would be the following:

2. Both you and the desktop are conscious

OR

3. You're conscious and the desktop is not conscious

Desktops don't feel pain, — Marchesk

As I said, what it is that we're aware of is of zero importance. All that matters for consciousness is awareness.

The camera has been designed on purpose to capture an image close to what your eyes would capture. The colors, the focale, etc. are designed to render faithfully human vision. But the cellphone doesn’t actually perceive anything by itself. Otherwise it would comment on what it sees, like you can do. — Olivier5

I fear you're missing the point of what consciousness is. Consciousness is all about awareness - a certain entity is conscious if and only if it's aware of its environment and itself and what we call awareness is simply the formation of mental images in our minds, and that's precisely what happens inside a camera. To then say we're conscious and the camera not can mean only one thing - consciousness isn't real or, as Dennett puts it, consciousness is an illusion for the simple reason that to say so is to see a difference in what are identical things - such differences can't be real. Consciousness is an illusion.

As for passing comments, a standard issue desktop can be installed with a program that can do that. Does that mean the desktop is now conscious? We have three choices here:

1. The desktop and we aren't conscious
2. Both the desktop and we are conscious
3. The desktop is not conscious but we are conscious

Since both the desktop and I can make comments, the correct choices are 1 or 2 - either both or neither are conscious. It can't be that we are but the desktop not - to think this would be to see a difference that isn't there. The received opinion is that this difference is consciousness but, as I said, this difference isn't there, isn't real - consciousness is an illusion.

Even if we say this is the case for vision, it doesn't work for pain and other conscious sensations. The massive focus on vision in these discussions can be misleading. Consciousness is more than seeing a red apple. — Marchesk

What's different about pain? Pain is essentially temperatures, pressures, and chemical concentrations that go beyond the threshold of tolerance. This means that they too are, all said and done, "images" of the world taken using other sensory modalities. The point is it's not the character of the awareness that's important, it's awareness, by itself, alone, that's the key to consciousness.

I doubt it. I couldn’t decipher the source code of a jpg file if my life depended on it. A cellphone couldn’t see anything or hear anything around it; it just records bits in a way that can help reconstruct images and sound. — Olivier5

You'll hopefully forgive me for using what are loaded terms but unfortunately it can't be avoided. It appears the first people to have made contact with the mind came to certain conclusions that somehow found their way into the words they used to describe the mind and what goes on with it.

Two things I want to say

1. I'm talking about the finished product - the final output - of whatever processing that goes on wherever it does go on. The image of the world in our eyes is identical to the image of the world in a camera's. If that were false, a camera wouldn't be a camera. A camera records events and that's another way of saying the image in the camera should be a faithful reproduction of actual events/places.

2. The fact that you can't decipher the 1's and 0's in a digital image is irrelevant. The camera can't do the same in re your eyes too. Does that mean the images are different? No! That's all.

See here

If consciousness is an illusion, who is the illusionist and who is the audience? — Bitter Crank

If I may offer my views...
The brain is being fooled into thinking that there's something more to the mental image, image in the broadest sense of that word, in our minds, an additional factor as ir were, over and above the image. If this weren't true then why would the brain think a camera's awareness of the world and itself in the form of an image is not conscious? However, there are no two ways about images being nothing more than images. In other words, images, mental or camera-based, are identical. The notion of consciousness is, at its heart, claiming there's a difference between mental images and camera-images but we know there's none. Ergo, consciousness - the purported difference in identicals - can't be real. Consciousness is an illusion.

But surely reflective awareness must come into the picture. You speak of 'images of the world and the self', but I am not sure that we can divide self and world so easily. Surely this distinction of it is made is itself dependent on consciousness. — Jack Cummins

Suits me. Truth be told, insofar as all that we have in, what we call, our minds - a mental image - is concerned, there's no difference between the self and the not-self; both are, all things considered, mental images. The contents of the mental images are not the same but both are mental images.

The problem is that you are still aware when asleep. You wake up suddenly to loud noises. How could you do that unless you were at least partially aware? Are you conscious while dreaming?

Is consciousness just an experience, or does the experience have to have some causal connection with the world outside of the mind, i.e, the experience is in some sense about the world? — Harry Hindu

Well, it may make sense to describe sleep as a state of partial awareness but the fact remains that there's a difference between sleep and awake states. When awake, we're aware of the outer world and of the inner world of, what people call, the self at a level (sleep is partial awareness) not seen in sleep. All I can say at the moment is that this difference in level of awareness between being asleep and being awake can't be ignored or should be given the attention/importance due to it.

You inquired whether "...the experience (of consciousness) is in some sense about the world"? and, as Dr. Lanning in the movie I, Robot (2004) says, "That, my friend, is the right question".

Consciousness is, at the end of the day, awareness - this awareness has myriad forms, from awareness of awareness to simply awareness of a fly buzzing around in the room. The bottomline is that consciousness is awareness whatever form that awareness may take. The catch is that to be aware, there has to be something we can be aware to, right. This is where the world and, let's not forget, the self, comes in - the world and the self are, as we all know from experience, legitimate objects of awareness. Ergo, I can say with a fair degree of confidence that "...the experience (of consciousness) is in some sense in part about the world"

Returning now to sleep as it seems relevant to your question, it's quite clear that when we fall asleep the sensitivity of our senses are reduced - as you mentioned only loud noises arouse us - and that amounts to basically blocking all sensations from the world and no sensations translates into nothing to be aware of.

Hand in hand with this sensationless state comes the shutting down of all thought processes (dreamless sleep phase) and what this means is nothing about the self to be aware of. Thus, the sensationless and thoughtless states in sleep, together, become the occasion in which, even if there exists something that's, capable of awareness, there's, quite literally, nothing to be aware of and there's no consciousness, or if that seems difficult to swallow, at least no consciousness comparable to that of the waking state.

When you think of it a bit more, you realize that what the camera and microphone record are just bits. 0/1. Those bits are recorded so that the images and sounds can be recreated for someone to experience them.

0’s and 1’s are very different from what I see — Olivier5

The difference you're alluding to here is contingent and not necessary. There's no necessity that the mental image of the world and ourselves not be in binary code (1's & 0's). If you don't believe me, look at an object with your eyes and then look at a digitial picture of that object. Can you tell the difference between the object's image in your eyes and the digitial picture? Our eyes are essentially cameras but, of course, you knew that. By mental image I mean the finished product as it were - the final output of all the processing if there's any processing involved to begin with because that's what we're aware of and consciousness is all about awareness.

Ah, how wonderful it is to be a self-assured fool. Everything is crystal-clear, and no question requires more than two seconds of contemplation. — SophistiCat

I'll take this as one of the best pieces of advice I've heard in a long time. It strikes a chord in me because mea culpa! Thanks! :up:

To all of the above-mentioned folks:

After turning things over in my head, I've come to the conclusion that there are three important aspects to consciousness (awareness of the world & the self):

1. X, the thing that can be aware [Us]
2. Y, the thing we can be aware of [The world or even X]
3. X and Y meet, Image in the eye. X's awareness of Y

Consider now a camera,

4. C, the camera that can capture an image
5. P, the object which can be photographed [The world or even C using a mirror or a fancy flexible lens]
6. C and P meet, Image on the image sensor. C's awareness of P

I'd like to request that the reader kindly remain within the confines of visual experience for the sake of simplicity and too, experiencing the world and the self with all senses can be extrapolated to.

Suppose X looks at a flower (F) and C take a picture of it. The image that forms in X's eye [X meets F] is identical to the image that forms in C's image sensor [C meets F]. Yet, we say that X meets Y [X's awareness of F] is consciousness and C meets F [C's awareness of F] isn't consciousness. There's no difference at all between X meets F and C meets F - both are identical images - and so, if one believes X meets F is consciousness and C meets F is not, consciousness isn't real. A difference between identical objects, here consciousness, must be an illusion for to be identical means there are no differences. Hence, consciousness is an illusion.

Everything depends on what a friendly disposition is. It involves high moral standards i.e. deep knowledge of right and wrong. Granted that a dying star spells total annihilation but advancement in technology, if you go by how it's played out on earth, seems to occur in tandem with a better understanding of morality. Advanced civilzations facing such a disaster would, I think, prefer to initiate a knowledge transfer operation between their now doomed planet and other civilzations to ensure these others don't meet a smiliar gruesome fate rather than conduct an interstellar/intergalactic invasion of other worlds.

The camera is not aware of anything in the way you are. — Daemon

Let's look at it from another point of view. At any single moment in time when you think of yourself as conscious what exactly are the contents of your mind? You may be out on a walk by the seaside - you see the waves, you hear the gulls, you feel the light breeze, you smell the salty air, you take a sip of the drink in your hand and taste whatever it is that you're drinking and you think how lucky you are to have the time to relax like this. I've covered all the bases in this description of you having a good time insofar as awareness is concerned - there's nothing else you can add to it. These different kinds of awareness (of the external and the internal) come together to produce what is, at the end of the day, an image of the world and yourself in it.

How different is this image from that captured by your phone's camera of the world and itself through a mirror? Can you tell the difference between the sights and sounds in the video recorded on your phone and your experience of them? Apart from your experience being in your head and the recorded video being on your phone's memory, there's no way to distinguish between the two - the surf, the gulls, the sunset if you were lucky enough, everything would be exactly the same between you and your phone's camera. I've left out the other senses because current technology doesn't allow me to paint a realistic picture of all the senses in action. However, if technology can record sights and sounds, there's nothing holding us back from replicating the other senses too. That out of the way, just take note of the fact, in a basic, but adequate to make the point, sense, your phone's camera can record both the world's and its own sights and sounds and that's exactly what's in your or any other person's mind when you/they are conscious. In essence what you call consciousness - seeing and hearing (limiting you to your phone's existing capabilities) the world and yourself - is something your phone's camera can do and does do. If you have difficulty in accepting this, I want to ask you a simple question, "what if your so-called consciousness were transferred to your phone's camera?" What would be different but limit your answer to vision and hearing as even the most advanced phone's aren't exactly bodies with full sensory and motor functions? What you'll see and hear will be exactly what the camera records through its lens and microphone but now you'd be referring to what hasn't changed in any way - the images and sounds in the camera - as consciousness and that's what in my, and probably Daniel Dennett's, book is seeing something that isn't really there and that's what an illusion is. Consciousness is an illusion.

What I find interesting is how Daniel Dennett's claim, if he did indeed make that claim, that consciousness is an illusion squares with the notion of philosophical zombies.

If physicalism is true then, philosophical zombies are supposedly impossible and here Dennett's asserting that we're all philosophical zombies which would mean that physicalism is false. Has Dennett shot himself in the foot? Not really. After all, the difference between philosophical zombies and normal people requires consciousness to be real i.e. it can't be that "consciousness is an illusion". If "consciousness is an illusion" then the discussion ends there - there's no such thing as consciousness to begin with, ergo, what's the point in entertaining thoughts about situations where its present or absent. Since philosophical zombies no longer make sense the p-zombie argument for non-physicalism is shot to pieces. In fact, non-physicalism, itself predicated on consciousness being real, becomes meaningless. The odd bit is even physicalism (at least as it relates to mind) becomes nonsensical because as per Dennett, "consciousness is an illusion" and if that's the case, the whole business of proving consciousness is physical is an absurdity. Perhaps Dennett is under the impression that physicalism is the default position and, to my reckoning, he's not wrong; after all, the only reason why non-physicalism is still around, alive and kicking as it were, is consciousness, the belief that it's real and our near-complete ignorance regarding its nature.

Dennett's tactic reminds of the time when I saw, as a child myself, two other children fighting over a toy - both wanted it - and they had come to blows over it. An adult intervened and the clever solution was...to promptly remove the toy from the scene. The toy having disappeared, the two children stopped fighting.

However, what does Dennett mean by "consciousness is an illusion"?

Here's what I think Dennett means...

The definition of consciousness, I'm going to use here is awareness of the external world and also of oneself. It's quite obvious that this is what is meant by consciousness by most folks as when these don't occur e.g. when one is asleep or in a coma, we're said to be unconscious.

Imagine now a camera set up in such a way that it captures images of the external world and also of itself with the help of a mirror placed strategically. It's turned on and images of itself and the world are formed inside it. This camera is, in every sense of the word, aware of both the external world and also itself which take the form of images that form inside it, behind the lens.

Compare this camera to what we call consciousness. At the end of the day, consciousness is ultimately, at its core, an image of the world outside and of the self, what we call awareness is just that.

In essence, what we call consciousness is analogous to the images that form in this camera - both being, all things considered, states of awareness of the external world and of the self. However, most of us who don't know any better would, I presume, never say that this camera is conscious but would not hesitate at all in thinking of ourselves as conscious. That means the following must be true:

1. The world and the camera itself take the form of This camera's images. Not consciousness!
2. The world and the person faerself take the form of Mental images. Consciousness!

But 1 and 2 are identical in that both are awareness of the external world and of oneself. Ergo, to think that there's something extra - consciousness - when it comes to what are basically mental images just like the images in this camera is a mistake. Since this camera and us are identical in the sense that both operate in terms of images of the world and of the self there can be no difference on which to make the distinction consciousness and not consciousness. So, to claim that we possess consciousness and this camera not can only mean that consciousness isn't real or, in Dennett's words, consciousness is an illusion.

I would argue that really we don't have a definition of what is 'physical — Wayfarer

Therein lies the rub.

Matter, energy, and the laws that govern them are treated as physical. They are known to exist because they're percievable.

How can we define physical.

Since perception through our sense and instruments is the only channel open to the outside world, the definition of physical must be based thereof.

So, it must be that perceivable implies and is implied by physical and this definition of the physical can be decomposed into two statements,

1. Perceivable implies physical
2. Physical implies perceivable

Of these two statements, 2 can't be rejected by the physicalist because it's true that all that's physical (matter, energy, and the laws that govern them) is perceivable

Coming to statement 1, rejecting it means,

3. To be perceivable and To be non-physical

We know that the following statement has to be true,

4. To be perceivable implies To exist [perception here includes all procedures to rule out hallucinations]

Combining 3 and 4, we get,

3. To be perceivable and To be non-physical
4. To be perceivable implies To exist
5. To be perceivable [From 3 Simplifcation]
6. To exist [4, 5 Modus ponens]
7. To be non-physical [3 Simplification]
8. To exist & To be non-physical [6, 7 Conjunction]

Statement 8 is non-physicalism which essentially states that something non-physical exists. This follows from rejecting statement 1 and so the physicalist can't reject statement 1.

What does the physicalist now have to make the case for physicalism viz. concluding that To exist implies To be physical?

1. To be perceivable implies To be physical [can't be rejected by the physicalist]
9. To exist implies To be perceivable

Rejecting statement 9 would mean the following statement is true,

10. To exist and To be unperceivable

Combining 10 with statement 2 we get

2. To be physical implies To be perceivable [remember this can't be false]
10. To exist and To be unperceivable
11. To be unperceivable implies To be non-physical [2 Contraposition]
12. To be unperceivable [10 Simplification]
13. To be non-physical [11, 12 Modus ponens]
14. To exist [10 Simplification]
15. To exist and To be non-physical [13, 14 Conjunction]

Statement 15 is precisely what non-physicalism is viz. something exists and that something is non-physical. Ergo, a physicalist can't reject statement 9. To exist implies To be perceivable.

Now what statements can't be rejected/denied by physicalists?

1. To be perceivable implies To be physical [can't be rejected by the physicalist]
9. To exist implies To be perceivable [can't be rejected by the physicalist]

An argument for physicalism now begins to emerge,

1. To be perceivable implies To be physical
9. To exist implies To be perceivable
Ergo
16. To exist implies To be physical [1, 9 Hypothetical syllogism] [This is physicalism]

However, we know one other statement is true,

4. To be perceivable implies To exist [perception here includes all procedures to rule out hallucinations]

For the moment assume statement 9 is true and doesn't require proof and that statement 1 needs proof

The physicalist argument then made explicit is the following,

1. To be perceivable implies to be physical [4, 17 Hypothetical syllogism]
4. To be perceivable implies To exist
9. To exist implies To be perceivable
17. To exist implies To be physical [necessary to prove statement 1] [This is physicalism]
Ergo,
16. To exist implies To be physical [1, 9 Hypothetical syllogism] [This is physicalism]

As you can see, the conclusion [physicalism 16] is contained in the premises [physicalism 17]

Begging the question OR Circular argument.

Sorry but I can't make it any shorter than this.

Dude first you deny my analogy on spurious grounds, and then you try and play it back at me in garbled form. No thanks — unenlightened

Physicalism is a theory about our universe. It's an attempt to describe the universe as accurately as possible. In other words there's pressure for physicalism to correspond to the facts/truths of our universe and that's just another way of saying, physicalism can't be arbitrary - it's not a case of anything goes as you seem to be implying.

That, sir, is the thesis of atheism, that reality is not the way it is because the inventor said so. But it is not clear to me why it would make a difference even if it is true. Chess is real, whether it was invented or evolved, and the rules are the rules, whatever you may think. — unenlightened

You're missing the point. The rules and board setup of chess are indeed arbitrary and the universe could be too whether a creator exists or not. However a theory of the universe is like a particular strategy a player adopts in a game. Just like how chess strategy must be in accordance to the rules, a theory of the universe (physicalism is one such theory) has to be aligned to the rules of the universe. A chess strategy can't be arbitrary and a theory of the universe can't be arbitrary. If you do that i.e. use arbitrary strategies in chess and whimsical theories for the universe, in chess you'll be disqualified and in the universe, it'll be worse as you'll face vigorous, even deadly, opposition at every turn.