@Wayfarer

Space can't be a property of objects, because objects exist in space; the reality of space and time are presupposed by the apprehension of any objects whatever (my paraphrase. But I don't get the 'reductio' argument you've summarised.)

Sorry I just reread my original post and saw that I did not make clear which argument I am referring to. Kant was alluding to the absurd result of viewing space and time as properties that objects have in themselves.

Anyway, your explanation cleared everything up and both your posts were extremely helpful. Thank you!

I will definitely stick with it and read the Early Modern Text version more carefully.

@Wayfarer Thanks a lot! I am just starting out with high school philosophy and have never come across any of the above-mentioned terms so the quick explanation was really helpful.

Just to clarify this in context of the argument, why would space and time, if considered properties of objects, not be able to inhere in substances? Would their existence as properties not be the very definition of them inhering in objects?

In his reductio ad absurdum, Kant goes on to state that this view must also suppose that space and time as properties would have to exist even if all existing things (those to which they apply) were removed. However, how can a property exist without the thing to which it applies?

As I said before, the English version I am reading is extremely concise to the point of summarizing some of Kant's statements but, for this particular argument, I can not make sense of the German original either.

This is the link in case I did not explain it accurately. The argument is on the right side of page 39.

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf

Sorry if I am asking too much. I am just really confused about this section even though the conclusion of the argument makes sense.