Oh, my...you know exactly how I'd respond...and you did not want that response. — Frank Apisa
Grow some balls. — Frank Apisa
That is not correct.
We do not define god the same way.
Stevan Davies. The savior is not a celestial being brought to earth; the savior is a capacity of the mind, and the savior’s journey from above is actually one’s own journey from within.
John Lennon. It seems to me that the only true Christians were the Gnostics, who believed in self-knowledge, I.E. becoming Gods themselves, reaching the Christ within, the light is the truth. Turn on the light. All the better to see you my dear.
Regards
DL — Gnostic Christian Bishop
If you're not talking about anything named God then what the hell are we even talking about?
"Let's start a thread using this word, but then say that we're not talking about anything using this word." How stupid is that? — Terrapin Station
That's the way it is. — creativesoul
It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing.
— Mww
About this no argument from me! — Janus
And I think you've got me crossed-up with terrapin and S. They believe, and have made plain in this thread, that all moral judgments are strictly, merely, relative, matters of personal preference. — tim wood
<sigh> as we laboriously lay down some kindergarten-level material: There are different senses of the term opinion. — Terrapin Station
Is moral judgement founded in those 'moral emotions' or are those emotions occasioned by moral judgements? — Janus
You haven't said yet what "more" than personal preference moral judgements are according to your understanding. I could also ask what more than personal preference, according to you, are the 'moral emotions" you cited here. — Janus
Terrapin uses the term "personal preference". Are you prepared to say that 'individual moral judgement' is anything more than personal preference? Terrapin apparently doesn't believe it is anything more. If you think it is more, then what does that "more" consist in? — Janus
So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral [RELATIVE TO THEM] — creativesoul
:brow: — creativesoul
So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral? — creativesoul
So-called relativists... — tim wood
(Why or how they severally arrive at that is an interesting question, but I am not here asking that question.) — tim wood
So the question: is this a fair summary of the relativists' view on this thread? — tim wood
I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency.
— creativesoul
Ok. Promise has it, sure. Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.
We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.
What does existential dependency mean to you?
— Mww
Existential dependency is a relationship between different things. When something is existentially dependent upon something else it cannot exist prior to that something else. When something exists in it's entirety prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. That's a rough basis/outline of the paradigm. The simplicity is remarkable. The scope of rightful application... quite broad.
In the context of this conversation...
There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise. A difference that can only be discovered by understanding existential dependency. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former. The former existed in it's entirety prior to the latter.
Voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match one's words is what one does when making a promise. That is determined wholly by a community of language speakers who understand the crucial importance of the role that trust and truth play in interdependence. The preceding two statements report upon and/or take account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to my account of it. It is about promise making. It is a report about what has happened, what is happening, and barring an extinction event of humankind, will continue happening.
Saying that one ought keep their promise is about what has not happened.
It's not about approval/disapproval of how the world was promised to be changed, or what was promised to be done. Rather, saying that one ought keep their promise is about the reliability, dependability, and/or trustworthiness of the speaker. Such character traits are crucial for the survival and over-all well-being of interdependent groups.
A complete lack of trust is unsustainable. — creativesoul
If you could kindly point out where these have been shown to be faulty? — Devans99
I agree with Devin99 on this. — christian2017
Some things no matter how seemingly illogical will always exist. As long as matter exists there will be measurement (assuming there is a being that can make measurements such as a bacterial organism or a human). Bacteria have sensors and thus make judgements and pseudo measurements on their surroundings. — christian2017
Well the 'something' must logically contain the first cause. The first cause is the explanation for everything else so my substitution is valid. — Devans99
I know precisely what that means.
An uncaused, timeless, first cause.
I have given 3 valid arguments for this position. — Devans99
If the 'something' in 'why is there something rather than nothing?' is the first cause... — Devans99
IE A first cause. — Devans99
Please say why are they not equivalent. — Devans99
1. The argument in the op: can't get something from nothing so something (IE the first cause) must have existed always. — Devans99
The questions "why is there something rather than nothing" and "why is this something the way it is" both are equivalent to asking "What is the explanation for the First Cause?". — Devans99
But the First Cause can have no explanation; there is no cause of the first cause; no reason for it. The first cause has to be timeless and thus beyond causation (else we end up in an infinite regress). — Devans99
When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday. — creativesoul
Hume has been refuted. — creativesoul
You also conflate belief and truth, but I do not expect you to see it. Keep on riding shotgun with one who does not care about truth. Confirmation bias feels good. — creativesoul
Hating with passion.... :fire:
S, have I told you lately what a beautiful person you are? :flower: — ArguingWAristotleTiff
For me, in the ethical context, to be right simply means being effective in promoting what nearly all of us want; to live in harmony, and being wrong simply means being defective in promoting it. — Janus
I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done. — creativesoul
I'm always baffled by what could possibly motivate someone to argue against these... some of the simplest utterances to understand. Very young children know exactly what making a promise means. It's a convention, no doubt. — creativesoul
As I see it I have already elaborated ad nauseum. What could be gained by further elaborations? It would just be more repetition of the same. I don't need to justify my viewpoint to you unless you can show that it could be thought to be inconsistent with its own presuppositions in some way.
I haven't claimed your viewpoint is internally inconsistent; but I have claimed that it is, along with Terrapin's, inconsistent with a general phenomenological account of human life and hence inadequate and I have given my reasons for that contention. You don't have to agree, in fact I doubt you will ever agree, so I have little motivation, beyond a general respect for you, to respond at all, since there is no way to prove which of us is right given that we will interpret the evidence differently.
As I said if you want to focus on some specific points I have made that you disagree with and you lay our your reasons for disagreeing then I will respond, provided I judge that you haven't distorted the point in order to disagree with it. — Janus
I admit that the use of "follows" is off-putting, particularly given the brevity. — creativesoul
Don't we all "talk about what we want to talk about"? Whether something is or is not relevant to a whole field such as meta-ethics is largely a matter of interpretation; it will depend on your founding assumptions and problematics. If we both want to talk about the same kinds of things then there is a chance that we could have a fruitful discussion. I don't think I have done you any more injustice to you than you have done to me; the way I see it is that perhaps we have done each other the injustice of talking past one another.
But that would only be an injustice (i.e. morally wrong) if both our aims are to have a free discussion with full acknowledgement of, although not necessarily agreement to, each other's founding assumptions and problematics. That said, if you want to enumerate some definitive points I will attempt to address them. — Janus
I don't understand why you single this out. If exploiting others equals exploiting ourselves that will be so on the basis of some facts about human nature. I could say the same about murder, rape, torture and so on, too. — Janus
Be truthful, because it is only you that does that sort of thing.
The rest of us have mirrors for that. :smirk: — Sir2u
Also I think it is an ethical truth that if you exploit others you also exploit yourself.
— Janus
That is moving more in the right direction. Talking about whether there are any moral truths, and if so, in what sense they are moral truths, and how they are known to be so, is meta-ethics. So these are the kind of follow-up questions which you should be addressing. — S
Judging from your last reply you continue to totally misunderstand what I have been saying, and it seems that our interpretations of what ethics consists in are too divergent to allow for any productive discussion; so I think I will leave it there. — Janus
