But there can be no reason for why is there something rather than nothing. And an explanation without a reason is no explanation in my book. So no other explanation is possible apart from 'no reason'. — Devans99

How do you know that there can be no explanation, given that your answer only works if we abide by your narrow interpretation, which we needn't do? That there is no cause is not necessarily that there is no explanation, so your argument fails. Your book isn't the only book. You still don't seem to understand that what you're doing is trivial in the bigger picture. You should actually listen to how other people interpret the question and take that into consideration. Otherwise, who do you think you're arguing against?

In the case of [1], I see your point, but I think my argument is somewhat explanatory in nature - can't be a reason because there was nothing before that is an explanation of sorts? — Devans99

It's not right to say that there can't be an explanation for why things are as they are, in the sense that there's something rather than nothing, just because they've always been this way. I can still ask why that is so, which is to seek an explanation.

I don't think there is necessarily an explanation which we know of, or which works as a proper explanation, but I still disagree with your argument.

Can you describe your interpretation of the question? — Devans99

It can be interpreted in a number of ways. I just gave you a plausible alternative interpretation where "reason" means "explanation".

But I believe the argument shows that there can be no other answer possible. — Devans99

Well that's dumb, because there is if you go by a different interpretation.

4. So the answer to ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ is ‘no reason’. — Devans99

All that really says is: "So the answer to ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ is ‘no reason’, so long as you abide by my very narrow interpretation of what the question is asking".

:clap:

I feel I did - if there is nothing 'prior' to something then something has no cause/reason. — Devans99

Well you didn't. I understand what you're doing. You just affirmed my analysis. The problem is that what you mean isn't always or necessarily what other people mean, so what you're doing here is actually trivial.

I think in this usage 'cause' and 'reason' are identical:

- is there a reason something existed
- is there a cause of something

Is asking the same question. — Devans99

Exactly, that was my analysis. Now address the problem I raised.

I think the reason for something must lie temporally prior to the something.

The thing that existed permanently must be timeless so beyond causation - there can be no prior - so no reason. — Devans99

You mean cause.

So you basically conflate "cause" and "reason"? The problem is that it still seems to make sense to ask why there is something rather than nothing if you think that there's an explanation, even if you think that there's no cause, and something has permanently existed. It seems to remain an open question.

It has negative connotations, but often unjustified. For instance people have criticised environmentalists and anti-slavery campaigners as 'do-gooders'.

The term is often used by people who have a vested interest in the continuance of a socially harmful practice to try to delegitimise those seeking to end the practice. — andrewk

Are we supposed to be talking about actual do-gooders or just 'do-gooders': those who get mislabeled as such?

There's the same problem here as in the discussion on political correctness.

Red Herrings won't do here. — creativesoul

Yes they will, because look, what's that over there?

And what, exactly, is in that box? — Bitter Crank

A generator. When Maybot is leaning on it, she's recharging.

It sits next to the plans to retake the colonies.

I'm quietly pleased I shocked you! — Isaac

:grin:

It would certainly be good to co-exist as your persistence compliments my interests. There's no better check of how the scaffolding works than to give it a good kicking, and you certainly deliver a good kick. — Isaac

With steel-capped boots! :grin::up:

That would be a very interesting discussion to have some time. — Isaac

Agreed. But you better not make me any more sceptical than I already am! I'm trying to build something, lol. Please don't collapse my scaffolding! :lol:

I'm a fairly thorough-going quietist, for me philosophical questions aren't about finding out what actually is the case, I'm actually very uninterested in what actually is the case. — Isaac

:scream:

Obviously models which are wildly out of sync with 'what is the case' are going to be next to useless, and so correspondence with reality matters, but it only matters to the extent that it makes the model useless. — Isaac

I'm slightly less aghast. But only slightly.

Anyway, all that is to say that what interests me here is how someone like Janus supports their argument, what the scaffolding looks like from my perspective on the ground. I have to ask "what's that piece there for?" and "why doesn't that bit actually support the thing it's supposed to be holding up?". People, in my experience, don't like questioning their own scaffolding, so if I want answers I usually have to be quite harsh in my persuit. — Isaac

Ah, okay. I get that.

But ultimately, no matter how harsh I am, it's his scaffolding I'm interested in, not the 'actual way the world is'. — Isaac

:scream:

Maybe that's not a very good fit for this site either, in which case I apologise for derailing the thread, but I hope the two approaches can co-exist. — Isaac

No, that's perfectly fine, in a sense. It is just that it is fundamentally different from how I see it. I agree with you only in part, and the other part is wildly different from how I see it. I'm a moral anti-realist, but not a metaphysical anti-realist.

I haven't yet read Janus say that we ought to adhere to these rules (without the accompanying if we want a harmonious society). — Isaac

I've argued that that's trivial in a strict sense, not generally speaking. I see it as trivial because we could agree or disagree over what we ought to do, or over the antecedent in the conditional properly ordered (the part about a harmonious society), disagree over the aim, or differ in what we want, because that leaves meta-ethics behind. It neglects it.

Maybe I've just missed it (or forgotten it). Possible in this meandering thread, but I'm currently reading his argument as saying that morality is a set of rules a culture creates (much like the rules of chess) and just as certain moves in the chess are objectively incorrect, by those rules, certain behaviours ae objectively immoral, by those rules. — Isaac

Okay, but then my point against that is that it rules out our morality determined by appealing directly to our respective guts. That doesn't count? It seems his position is far too rigid and narrow.

I don't rely on a rulebook, and like you have argued, and I have argued, there's a strong case against this. Imagine if we applied the rulebook method in a different time and place. That is a horrifying thought. That certainly counts as "doing morality", but to call that morality itself is strongly objectionable.

My understanding is that Janus wants to set aside certain statements which he considers of central importance, and that many others consider of central importance, like that murder and rape are wrong, but I question the assumed meta-ethical support of suggesting that they're anything other or more than exactly what I've said they are.

In Nazi Germany murder of Jews was commonplace and ordinary citizens were entirely complicit.
— Isaac

They had little choice but to be complicit, and it was not considered murder because the Jews were not accorded status as properly human by the Nazis; they were considered to be a disease to be eradicated. — Janus

That book I referenced earlier, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans And The Holocaust by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen.

I am not asserting normative judgements; I am saying that what is near universally valued and dis-valued reflects the reality of the human situation and is the only guide to working out what is generally right and wrong for human life. — Janus

First of all, thank you for engaging. :up:

I think that there's a massive problem with logical relevance here.

The first part of what you say, that "what is near universally valued and dis-valued reflects the reality of the human situation", seems logically impotent, although the "human situation" part is ambiguous, which is a bit of a problem. If this is just a descriptive fact about moral judgements, then okay, but we need to take it further to make it logically relevant.

The second part of what you say, as far as I can make out, is either descriptive and quite clearly false, or normative and irrelevant, depending on what you really mean. If you mean exactly what you said, that this is "the only guide to working out what is generally right and wrong for human life" then that's false, because, for example, Isaac and I have just been discussing our shared method of going by your gut. And if it's normative, in other words if you really mean that it should be the only guide, then that's missing the point.

Of course in actual situations there are moral issues which are not so clear cut; the underlying principle is the same, but it is not always so easy to determine right and wrong, and there is thus, especially in our modern individualistic culture, some diversity of opinion. But I don't think the general diversity, even on these more nuanced issues is all that significant. — Janus

Significance is the key word. I actually agree - or would agree - with you on much about this, at least under the right conditions. The exceptions to what you and I both judge to be the most important moral judgements, like that murder and rape are wrong, are indeed insignificant in important respects. Herd-morality is king in these respects, and my own morality doesn't clash with it. Herd-morality, in practice, or in a certain sense, dictates right and wrong. But it is extremely important to remember your history here, because it shows that this hasn't always worked out too well.

But herd-morality can never override my morality in any conflict, so ultimately my morality is king.

Where I would strongly disagree is if you assert meta-ethical significance. If you draw a logical link between the descriptive and normative on the one hand, and the meta-ethical on the other, such that you reach an unwarranted conclusion about the latter. The premises do not reasonably lead to the conclusion. It always seems to come back to, "Morality is herd-morality, so anything that differs from herd-morality is insignificant!", but that is begging the question. I reject your implicit premise, so the logical consequences of your premise are themselves irrelevant in the bigger picture of this debate.

I gave the example of abortion before, Virtually no one questions the sanctity of the individual lives of, if not everyone, then at least members of their own culture, so attitudes that are pro or anti-abortion turn on the definition. — Janus

Isn't that just suggesting something along the lines that we can find resolutions over normative ethical issues which are considered to be controversial, like abortion? Yes, that's true. We can go by some method whereby we accordingly reach a resolution. But that doesn't seem to say much if anything about meta-ethics, so again, it seems there's a problem of logical irrelevance.

This is the massive problem with what the Kantians here are wasting so much time doing. Like I said earlier, the categorical imperative is itself effectively a logical conditional or a demand, which is a giant problem in this meta-ethical context. Where has been the response to this? Granted, this was mostly directed at Tim, but it was made in public, and I suspect that it was read by multiple people, yet ignored or dismissed. Isn't it a giant problem in this context to merely say, "Well, IF you were to treat this as a universal maxim...", or to merely DEMAND that we act as though something were a universal maxim?

On the central issues there is little or no variance across cultures. If you think there is then give an example. — Janus

The problem again is logical relevance. If it isn't there, then why should I engage, except to point this out?

It doesn't have to agree with what I have said, but if you want to disagree then you should disagree with what I have actually said, and give good reasons why If you go off on a stupid rant. claiming that I am sounding like a "religious zealot, or some such shit, then I won't respond. If you genuinely want to discuss then you should be able to do so civilly without getting all defensive, and casting aspersions and so on. I don't think you realize how boring that it. — Janus

Yes, fair point, but you've been guilty of this sort of behaviour also. We should both try harder to avoid that kind of thing. On my part, I will try, at least with you, because I have more respect for you than I have for certain others. But it will have to be a quid pro quo thing.

And you know my stance on this sort of thing, I think. I am very capable of setting aside the pettiness, the insults, the ad homs, the things which don't really need to be said, but are said anyway. I am quite extreme on that, I think. It is against the guidelines here, but if you were to call me a cunt or a fucking idiot after every single sentence, I could still address whatever substantial point you made alongside that. It's about getting your priorities straight.




Also, I want to add following here, because I think it was salient:

I don't think that his claim would be a valid appeal to authority, because he's not actually appealing to an authority. They are an authority on herd-morality, not on morality. If you want to know about herd-morality, obviously it makes sense to consult the herd. — S

Dude, you don't even need to be getting into details like that, and I think that it's counterproductive. What that does is to play into his hand by shifting focus away from meta-ethics and towards normative ethics. The big problem here is that if we assume a shared normative judgement on the stuff you two are talking about, like murder, rape, and torture, then there's still the meta-ethical challenge of supporting his meta-ethical interpretation of these moral judgements. He hasn't reasonably met that challenge. Don't let him off the hook or allow him to lead you down the garden path.

Fuck, man, how many times? Murder, rape, torture, exploitation...basically anything which treats the other as means, and fails to recognize the inherent value of life. — Janus

That doesn't even begin to engage the challenge. Meta-ethics isn't about asserting normative judgements or the normative framework you use. And proper philosophical dialogue isn't about just asserting that your interlocutor fails to recognise something you ardently believe, but haven't proven capable of reasonably supporting.

Fuck, man.

Here's an idea. Maybe it's you that's wrong. — Isaac

No, no, no. That's impossible. He's a genius. It is Hume and the rest of Western philosophy who is wrong. They have utterly and miserably failed to distinguish between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. That which is prior to thought/belief isn't existentially dependent on language.

You're talking like a religious zealot. You keep repeating this belief without any justification.

What are these big central moral issues about which there is little variation within and across communities? You haven't answered any challenge to a single one yet.

It's all very well ignoring anyone who opposes your position, but this is a philosophy discussion site, not a personal blog. It's not here for you to just declare what you believe to the Internet at large, its here for you to engage with the views of others who may think differently to you. — Isaac

Yeah, it's gone down hill, unfortunately. I think this is actually far worse than when we were getting frustrated with people who were presenting criticism of a position based on misunderstandings of it. At least that was an attempt to engage.

I also don't think it helps that Janus is confused about what counts as relevant to the topic and what doesn't, given that he considers normative ethical points, like "a harmonious society is good" to be of relevance in meta-ethics, which is about morality itself. It is about statements like the aforementioned. You're not supposed to just be saying them.

Why so angry? Was it the "loser" part? — frank

I get very angry over false accusations regarding the things I care a lot about. I don't think I've ever resorted to such extreme flaming in my ten years as part of this forum and the old one, so congratulations.

That sounded sexist. Stop being a loser. — frank

What an offensive and idiotic thing to say. It was emotional whether she's a she or he. I'm not going to withhold that assessment just because she happens to be a woman or because people like you might jump to conclusions about that irrelevant fact.

Question to the UK members: was the prospect of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and the consequent risk of a return of the Troubles, highlighted in the referendum campaign as a likely consequence of leaving?

If not, surely that alone is sufficient reason to have a second vote, as it would be reasonable to assume that many people were not aware of that very significant consequence when they cast their first vote. — andrewk

It's definitely an extremely important issue, and it definitely seems to have been neglected. It's only a risk at this stage, although that in itself is very serious. But I hope with all of my heart that it remains nothing worse than a risk. I hope with all of my heart that it doesn't become a reality. This is actually the sort of thing which could spurn me into protest: the prospect of undoing the work that went into achieving relative peace.

Yes, me too. Again, this is kind of the point I'm trying to make here. If (not an if I would agree with) one were to say "morality" just is the rules set by the masses, and if one somehow took the edge off the 'mob rule' that would allow by claiming some notion of humanity as the universal belief, even then, one would have little by way of answers because the 'rules' thereby created would barely answer a single real question. Questions you and I could answer in an instant by consulting our gut. — Isaac

:100:

To be frank I've heard this apologetic spiel from you before. — Maw

It's definitely a pattern. It's like your thinking changes with your mood, @ArguingWAristotleTiff. I much prefer the sympathetic Tiff to the angry ranting Tiff. I would actually love to see more of the angry ranting Tiff if it was directed at the right target. Like, oh, I don't know, oil tycoons, say.

Riddle me this. Throughout this thread I've represented that some things are absolutely wrong, with reference to Kantian ethics to try to give some meaning to "absolute." And basically - if I've understood correctly - you and yours have beat that notion with a stick at every opportunity and then some. As if to say it just absolutely ain't so, but that moral propositions are simply expressions of personal preference - absolutely. I haven't seen where you actually wrote that it was all absolutely relative, but I'm comfortable affirming that "absolute" as at the apparent core of your relativity.

But it does seem to me a fatal contradiction. Maybe a relativist like you can get through the day without resolving the contradiction, but while that may have utility, it's not very honest.

So. Contradiction? Yes? No? If so, resolve it? Or is it personal preference all the way down, even into the deep abyss of self-contradiction? And if this latter, on what basis other then mere personal preference do you object to anyone else's beliefs? There's an answer to that, too, but it's unkind. But it's up to you to show that it's unwarranted. — tim wood

This objection is a slight variation in wording from your earlier objection, and it has been dealt with. But I will generously remind you of the answer.

As you know, I am a moral relativist. That means that I consider normative moral statements, like "Murder is wrong", to be true in a relative sense.

As you should know, I haven't committed to relativism more broadly. I actually just consider meta-ethical statements about morality to be either true or false in the normal way we treat such statements. There's no contradiction there at all. These are two distinct positions about two distinct types of statement.

This has been explained to you multiple times, by myself and by others. The real question is, why do you persist with this stuff? Is it that you just don't get it, or that you deliberately disregard the explanations? Either way, it makes you look bad.

I agree entirely with your successful refutation. Where I'm at odds is that if he had come back and said "in a racist society, racidm is morally" right" because that's what "right" means" - then, I think he would have had a reasonable position. We're free to define words that way and I'm not sure it would be too far from the way a lot of people use the term. They are just wrong about the behaviour of the they consequently advise. — Isaac

Yes, I agree that that would have been a considerably better response: bite the bullet, stick to your guns. That's better than handwaving and ignoring at least. But I think that that just doesn't feel right. And I prioritise what your gut is telling you here. It seems pretty damn wrong and crazy to appear to be siding against your own moral judgement with the racists and the slavery supporters by affirming that they're morally right in these scenarios. To me, that indicates a problem, even if only semantic. It's really weird not to give your own moral judgement priority, and say that they're wrong. I think he's like pretty much everyone else when faced with this thought experiment: he instinctively wants to say that they're wrong. But he can't do that without seriously undermining his broader position.

This is where I disagree with you (and I have a feeling disagreeing with you is going to be a lot more fruitful than disagreeing with my previous interlocutors). I think it is an erroneous appeal to the masses, not a fallacious one. I don't think it is fallacious to appeal to the masses (or any other authority) as to what is "correct" in certain circumstances. It is "correct" to move the Bishop diagonally in chess, and this is entirely because the consensus of chess players think that. It is incorrect to say 2+2=5, and this is entirely because the consensus of mathematicians define the terms that way.

What I think the appeal to the masses is here is erroneous. It is a mistake (given what the proponents claim to want) to use the opinion of the masses as a normative force to guide behaviour in that way. Diversity is good, innovation is good (I also trust instinct quite a lot too). Reversion to the mean stifles these things and so is a mistake. It ends up back with something I think you and I spoke about right at the beginning. People imposing their own cultural values as if they were objectively right. — Isaac

I consider it a very minor difference, if it is even a real difference at all, whether we say erroneous appeal to the masses or fallacious appeal to the masses. I agree that not every such appeal is erroneous or fallacious. When it is a consensus-based thing, it is more of an appeal to authority. I don't think that his claim would be a valid appeal to authority, because he's not actually appealing to an authority. They are an authority on herd-morality, not on morality. If you want to know about herd-morality, obviously it makes sense to consult the herd.

It is in this context I find the argument about near universality to be more fruitful to oppose than the one about absolute universality which would be required to prove objectivism (and which those on that side of the argument have so spectacularly failed to provide). — Isaac

It was clear to me from the start that Janus would put forward a position with more going for it than that of Tim, creativesoul, or Rank Amateur. I think that's likely true in general, whatever the topic.

My recent quarrel with him hasn't changed my assessment in that regard. The truth is, we aren't all intellectual equals.

The main reason why I'm keen to support relativism is not because of its ontological truth (as I've said before, "truth" is not such a big deal for me) it's because I think objectivism is harmful, and I care about avoiding harms (at least to those people I choose to care about). — Isaac

Interesting take on it. I'm very much with Terrapin in that it's first of all a disinterested approach about what's the case regarding morality, ontologically. But in addition to that, for me, it then becomes pragmatic in the sense of which interpretation is most useful or least problematic philosophically, and I argue that that's subjective moral relativism, in spite of the clear prejudice and misconceptions some people have about it.

If I didn't take that pragmatic approach, I would've stopped at error theory. I think we can actually order meta-ethical positions in terms of how sophisticated they are. I would roughly place dogmatic moral objectivism at the bottom, with error theory somewhere in the middle, and my pragmatic subjective moral relativism at the top.

I would place emotivism and error theory below my position, because the former is problematic in terms of moral truth-aptness, and the latter in terms of moral truth.

Nice analysis. :ok:

But I've shown the problems with such usage. It fails to work or adequately explain any incongruity when the herd-morality doesn't accord with an individual's sense of right and wrong. I have shown this with examples about racism and slavery, and he has proven unable to reasonably counter. At first he dismissed the thought experiment as impossible or unrealistic when it was about racism, then he decided to completely ignore it the second time around when it was about slavery. These are the last resorts of someone who can't think up a way out of the problem.

So presumably you believe that it's a non-opinion-oriented fact that "health and functionality are good" is reasonable, and you believe in general that "x is reasonable" can be a fact that in no way hinges on individual mental predispositions, habits, etc., right?

How would you attempt to support that? — Terrapin Station

Indeed, how would you support the claim that health and functionality are good in themselves, rather than conditionally so in accordance with our moral judgement?

It can't be done. Surely at this point we're justified in writing off such claims as unsupported.

Yeah, if everyone feels that murder is wrong then surely it's a fact that everyone feels that murder is wrong and that fact implies . . . exactly nothing else. — Terrapin Station

Bingo. It is odd to me how certain otherwise logical thinkers, who I shan't name, somehow end up at a different conclusion. We can add in a premise that if everyone feels that way, then it's objectively true that murder is wrong, but that is, as you rightly point out, a fallacious appeal to the masses, so that just won't work, and there should be more recognition from the other side of the debate that this just won't work.

It certainly doesn't imply that any individual should feel that murder is wrong (if some odd individual happens to show up at any point and not feel the same as the rest of us), or that anyone has things incorrect if they don't feel that murder is wrong, or anything like that. — Terrapin Station

Exactly. At best, it implies only a mere conditional, which is totally ineffectual if you don't subscribe to the antecedent in the conditional. At best, it implies something along the lines that, if this is your measure of judgement on right and wrong, than it will be right or wrong for you on that basis. That's totally consistent with subjective moral relativism, and no one has to accept that personal standard of judgement. One could simply go by a different standard of judgement. It's not as though there's a moral authority we can appeal to in order to settle this, or at least, this has not been successfully demonstrated, even after 60 pages worth of discussion.

Again, where is the recognition of this problem from the other side? Where are the attempted refutations? It seems we've reached a point where, for them, dogmatic bare assertions, handwaving, and flat out ignoring is the order of the day. What an abysmal state of affairs. This is a philosophy forum.

Wait, how would acquiring a list of irrelevancies help? Surely, all it would really say is things like, "I judge murder to be wrong!". Forget the list, we should all collectively be seeking a reasonable demonstration, or a proper response to criticism of attempted demonstrations! And no, not that murder is wrong, as we're supposed to be doing meta-ethics, not normative ethics, and especially not normative ethics over things we all basically already agree on.

That's very true, however, when it comes to topics such as morality, I don't believe that you can tell someone what is moral when the topic of morality is so heavily based on opinion. When someone criticizes you on the use of phrases such as "I think" and "I believe" it kind of defeats the purpose of a forum such as this. — nsmith

Okay, that's an interesting spin on what you said. Is that an indirect refernce to me? Reasonable criticism is encouraged in philosophy. It doesn't defeat the purpose of a forum such as this. On the contrary, it is very much in line with the purpose of a forum such as this. What's not in line with it, would be to indirectly refer to my criticism in such a manner without properly addressing it. I think that it's generally fine to use such qualifiers. I believe that there's generally nothing wrong with that. My specific criticism was only applicable in a certain context, namely with regard to moral statements, and when intended as an argument against subjective moral relativism. They support subjectivity by their subjective nature, so it would be self-defeating.

When I have all the facts, I'll make that leap to telling, but until then, it's nothing more than personal judgement. It's essential that those on a philosophy forum understand when they have all the facts and when they don't and until they have all the facts, they have no right to be telling anybody anything. — nsmith

Wow. That's astoundingly humble. @tim wood, @creativesoul, @Janus... did you hear that?

Guys, I've just come up with a brilliant new argument. Are you ready for this?

If you don't agree with my opinion, then we have nothing to talk about. If you don't share my opinion, then you're a stupid head. If you disagree, then I choose to close my eyes to any support you've provided. If you disagree, then you're a pervert. (Which makes you a pervert sociopath stupid head!).

And say something I'll agree with, or else I'll ignore you.

Nietzsche, free spirit, wouldn't have added a question mark. — csalisbury

:rofl:

Nietzsche, free spirit, probably didn't display OCD-like behaviour.