• The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    Let's try again. Anyone who is going by their own definition of linguistic meaning and disregards mine, please raise your hand.

    Now, to anyone who has their hand raised: does your definition necessarily imply a subject?

    Also, if your definition doesn't necessarily imply a subject, are you just asserting without proper argument that meaning requires a subject, or that it requires subjective activity, which in turn requires a subject? Bearing in mind that simply including this as a premise in a valid argument doesn't resolve the problem at all.

    If this applies to you, then please don't just ignore me. Respond. It will be much more productive to bring this problem out in the open than to carry on the discussion as though we can take it anywhere meaningful.


    I suspect that what we may have here is a chronic case of talking past each other, with some participants making little-to-no attempt at addressing my argument on its own terms, and instead simply pushing their own problematic arguments with their problematic premises and definitions, without actually addressing the underlying problems.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    No. It's not.

    There are no examples of a correlation being drawn between language use and something else that do not include a creature drawing the mental correlation between them.
    creativesoul

    You can repeat it a million times, but it will still be a problem, unless you actually resolve the problem.

    First, the unresolved problem of ambiguity:

    a) I'm existentially dependent on my parents. If they had not conceived me, then I wouldn't be here right now.

    b) I'm not existentially dependent on my parents. They are both dead right now, yet I am still here.

    Which sense of existential dependence do you mean?

    If it's b), then we disagree, and since our disagreement is a result of your definition of meaning - which you refuse to let go of, even for a second - and nothing else, then it's a dead end with you.

    You merely define a subjective dependence into being, which is utterly trivial, and which can be done with just about anything, including a Creator, as previously demonstrated.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    I have not been doubting your ability to put together a valid argument!

    p2.All correlations are existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing such correlationscreativesoul

    This is the problem.

    You can repeat it a million times, but it will still be a problem, unless you actually resolve the problem.

    First, the unresolved problem of ambiguity:

    a) I'm existentially dependent on my parents. If they had not conceived me, then I wouldn't be here right now.

    b) I'm not existentially dependent on my parents. They are both dead right now, yet I am still here.

    Which sense of existential dependence do you mean?
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    Trying to parse the op:

    A mashed potato is a potato that's been physically modified.

    We can express (a very specific meaning of express) an orange to produce orange juice.

    Meaning can be expressed in language.

    Idealists think that mind is necessary for the existence of a thing.

    [the thrust of the post? I'm lost here]
    csalisbury

    Some people on the forum deny certain distinctions. They claim that a rule is the expression of a rule, or that an orange is the appearance of an orange. The opening post reinforces the distinction, and shows why it matters. They say things like all rules are expressed in language, and that there is nothing but appearance.

    The distinction, I think, can be expressed in predicate logic as P(x) and P(x, y). P is an rule, on the one hand, and P is a rule, and P is expressed, on the other.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    It's okay if your answer is that we can't point at meanings contra expressions of meanings, but if so, that's one important difference between meaning and potatoes or oranges.Terrapin Station

    Meaning, as opposed to the expression of it, is a bit mysterious, it seems, as early Wittgenstein thought.

    But things? Objects? Sure, we can point to them.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    Meanings? Wouldn't that answer be kind of uninformative?Terrapin Station

    What do you want from me? I just told you of the limits of language. Aren't you listening? What's the point of naming names, which you are more than capable of doing yourself. And it's a little difficult to gesture through text, don't you think?

    I'm not having you lead me down the garden path again. State your intentions. Make your point. Or don't bother.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    At what things?Terrapin Station

    Use your noggin.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    How many times do I have to repeat the point? Intentionally produced patterns are not the same as naturally occurring patterns; the former are semantically meaningful, and the latter are not. By your lights an ancient text was meaningful when produced, became meaningless when it was lost, and became meaningful again when it was found. This is nonsense thinking.Janus

    Yes, like the cup that keeps blipping in and out of existence when we observe it, then look away, then observe it again!

    It's the same dodgy idealist logic.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    That's true by definition, but it's also true of the pattern of waves on the ocean.Echarmion

    Excuse me? The pattern of waves on the ocean do not have linguistic meaning, which I've said countless times is the only kind of meaning I'm talking about.

    And no, it's not true by definition, it's true as a matter of logic. I didn't mean it as a tautology. It's like saying that if there was a being capable of swimming, then the being could go out swimming one day. There's a distinction between capability and possibility which you seem to be overlooking.

    And if someone did give meaning to the scratches? Would the scratches then be any different, objectively, than they were before?Echarmion

    In what sense? You're not being very clear. Physically? No. In terms of meaning? Yes, obviously. Having meaning is obviously different from having no meaning.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    Charming insightful reply...creativesoul

    Well, what do you expect? There's a reason we're losing patience with you, you know? Perhaps reflect back on your reply and consider what might have triggered such a reaction from Janus.
  • Philosophical Investigations, reading it together.
    Reply in messages.Banno

    No, certainly not. If you're going to publicly use what I said in my discussion, in this discussion, as an example of an alleged misunderstanding, then I'm going to publicly defend what I said there over here. At least unless you delete your comment here.

    PI points out how taking one way of using words and applying it in another situation leads to misunderstanding.

    Your thread is an excellent example, in that you are misled by an analogy with things - oranges and potatoes - into treating meaning as if it were also a thing.

    It isn't. But you showed Wittgenstein's point so clearly, I had to make use of it.
    — Banno

    The irony is that the misunderstanding is your own.

    First of all, let's be clear that it is not the case universally or in general that taking one way of using words and applying it in another situation leads to misunderstanding. But I don't doubt that it can, and that it does in some cases.

    Second, my intention was not to suggest that meaning was a thing in the way that a potato is a thing. That's not the fault of my analogy, it's the fault of your misreading of it. My analogy was about the logical structure of the language. It was about a distinction between, say, an egg and a boiled egg. This can be expressed in predicate logic as P(x) and P(x, y).

    The analogies just showed this in a more relatable way, with the use of familiar things, like potatoes and oranges, rather than jumping straight into a more abstract way of making the point. Clearly, you missed the point by a country mile, and naively thought that you could make an example of me here, and perhaps you even convinced yourself that I would let you get away with it.
  • Reality as appearance.
    I'll have to resume this discussion tomorrow, because there are household tasks to be done.Michael Ossipoff

    Define, "There are...".
  • Reality as appearance.
    1. I don't know how else to word this: You've directly observationally experienced (in a magazine, a tv show, a book of descriptive physics or astrsonomy, etc.) reports of the work of theoretical physicists.Michael Ossipoff

    So what?

    Either you or S. was saying or implying that what we hear about the world outside of your direct observational experience means that it objectively exists (whatever that would mean).Michael Ossipoff

    Not quite "what we hear" - which is a subjective wording - but besides that: yeah, so what? If you can't logically connect the two in the right way, then you don't have an argument.
  • Reality as appearance.
    We get what “objective” means, but you didn’t define objective “existence”. (…except in terms of itself).Michael Ossipoff

    You're kidding, right? Are you ever going to allow yourself to proceed past this disingenuous and feeble excuse not to address the real issue? Or are you going to forever play this game until people just grow tired and ignore you?

    As the basis for all that you know about the physical world.Michael Ossipoff

    But that's not relevant. What makes you think that that's relevant? The topic is not about the basis of our knowledge, but rather where we can take it. You're just missing the point.

    ...there are likely... to be rocks in other distant galaxies.Michael Ossipoff

    Yes, that's more or less what I said, minus all of your pointless qualifications which I edited out of the above quote for sake of clarity.

    There are rocks in distant galaxies. (That's not implying absolute certainty, so of course it's a matter of likelihood).

    I’ve already said that your direct observational experience (of scientific reports, in this case) is the basis for your indirect experience of more than you’ve directly observationally experienced.Michael Ossipoff

    What a convoluted way of wording things you have. Sheesh.

    No, I haven't experienced rocks in different galaxies in any way, shape or form. They're too far away. It would be physically impossible. And I haven't seen a photo of every single rock in every distant galaxy, and even if I had, that would just be an experience of photos, not of rocks. Photos of rocks are obviously not rocks, you'd just be equivocating.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    I thought that everything above this was a way of saying that you can't point at meaning, but your last sentence says otherwise. So what would we point at, where would we be pointing, etc.?Terrapin Station

    Why, at the things of course.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    Alright, that's it. Enough of this madness. Pack it in or I'll turn this car around and you won't get to see Mickey Mouse and all of his friends. The next person to crack a joke or lead me down the garden path will be washing dishes for the next three weeks! Am I making myself clear? :brow:
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    Apples and oranges often come in baskets together. Now sometimes they don't, but let's presume for the sake of argument, they do. So, now there's a correlation between apples and oranges, right? Agree, so far? Because I'm just building up to accusing you of saying apples are oranges...Baden

    :lol:
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    Exactly! When scholars attempt to decipher ancient texts, they examine patterns of repeating symbols or heiroglyphics to discover clues to their meaning, and painstakingly construct the meaning of the text. Interpretations can be wrong, at least in part.

    But that they could be wrong about the meaning of an ancient text indicates that there must be a right interpretation; so it follows that the text has meaning, even if we cannot discover what it is. In something which consisted in merely random marks it would not be possible to construct any interpretation.

    The fact that there are meaningful patterns in such texts is on account of their intentional nature. This is the salient difference between texts and naturally occurring patterns. Texts are intentionally produced and forever embody that act of intentional production; and that just is what we call 'meaning'.
    Janus

    We are on the same page. :up:
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    This is why I stressed that you were reading something into my comment that I wasn't saying.Terrapin Station

    If I was reading anything into it, it was so as to interpret you as saying something logically relevant, and not an utterly trivial tangent that has been a bloody waste of my time and energy. I was trying to apply the principle of charity.

    All I said was that I'd say that meaning requires something other than mere correlation. That wasn't code for anything else. I wasn't trying to be sly. There were a number of posts that posited meaning simply as a correlation. I was simply stressing that it has to be more than a mere correlation. Maybe sometimes we can just agree and not have to argue about everything.Terrapin Station

    Jesus Christ. I can't believe I got sucked in to that one! Isn't it charitable to assume that when people speak of a correlation, they're not speaking of any old random correlation, but one that is actually relevant and makes sense? Was it really worth trying to score such a superficial point? Go on then. Give yourself a pat on the back.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    If we're adding "logically relevant" to correlation, then it's something other than a mere correlation, no?Terrapin Station

    Well that now seems to be confirmed as a silly tangent. I've only ever spoke of correlation in a sense that is logically relevant to my argument, not correlation in any other sense that you could randomly pluck out of thin air.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    So, as I asked, what part of the second-to-last post of mine did you disagree with?Terrapin Station

    It seems ridiculous to me to say that just because dictionaries are in alphabetical order, and there are definitions in close proximity, that somehow the meanings would be mixed up. There's no logically relevant correlation as far as I can make out. The meaning of the word "dodge" wouldn't somehow have a meaning corresponding with a definition for a different word which just happens to be before or after it.

    The word would continue to mean what it did before. You haven't reasonably demonstrated otherwise.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    If you agree with all of that, the point is simply that correlation isn't sufficient for meaning, because otherwise you'd have to say that the meaning of "dodge" has something to do with 12-tone music composition.Terrapin Station

    No you wouldn't. That simply doesn't follow as far as I can tell.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    I agree, but I don't see any relevance to the point at issue in the rest of what you say there.Janus

    Neither do I, and that has got to be problem numero uno here. People keep losing sight of logical relevance. So much of what people have typed up and submitted has been a complete waste of time and effort.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    But no matter how you phrase the question, you are still talking about what people want to communicate. They can be long dead people, but we are talking about words (symbols) that are supposed to be understood by someone. Even if you differentiate between meaning and understanding, for something to have meaning it must be possible to understand that meaning.

    If it's impossible to understand the meaning, because e.g. nothing that speaks any language exists, how are words in a dictionary different from random scratches in a rock, or the pattern of waves on the ocean?
    Echarmion

    It's only impossible to understand in practice, not in principle. In principle, if there was a being able to decipher the meaning there, then it could be understood.

    The difference is obviously that random scratches on a rock have not been given a meaning, so there isn't one. There is not, and was never at any point, a this means that.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    I am following you. The problem remains that I do not see the supposed logical relevance, so please skip ahead.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    That's fine, but if so, and definitions in dictionaries, utterances about meaning, etc. are expressions of meaning and not the same as meaning,* is it possible for us to "point to" meaning (even if just indirectly or metaphorically or whatever) as we could point to a potato or orange? What would we be pointing at? Where would we be pointing?Terrapin Station

    As later Wittgenstein put it, "I cannot use language to get outside language".

    And as early Wittgenstein put it:

    "I can only mention the objects. Signs represent them. I can only speak of them, express them in speech I cannot".

    This is to run up against the limits of language.

    "What if there were something outside the facts? Which our sentences are unable to express? But there we have the things, for example, and we feel no desire at all to express them in sentences".

    It does not even occur to us that we should express things or objects in speech: we are quite content merely to express their names, that is, to refer to them, to name or mention them.

    "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself".

    It is a layer of reality that somehow lurks beneath or behind language. But yes, we can point and gesture, of course.
  • Philosophical Investigations, reading it together.
    For a curious example of analogies leading to misunderstanding, see s's The mashed is the potato.Banno

    Are you suggesting that they lead me to misunderstanding or others: those I'm critical of there? And what's this supposed misunderstanding?
  • Reality as appearance.
    Whatever you know about your physical surroundings is from your experience. Your experience is primary for your physical world and its "objective" things.Michael Ossipoff

    That they're objective just means that they don't depend on being experienced in order to exist. Nothing you've said there explicitly contradicts that. Saying that experience is primary suffers from ambiguity. Primary in what sense? What does that mean in this instance? It could mean a number of things. This is ironic for someone who constantly criticises others in this respect.

    That I know a whole bunch of things through experience doesn't mean that I don't know that there are rocks in other distant galaxies that I've never experienced. And that one claim, if justified and true, is sufficient to refute any idealism of a kind which denies this.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    Which is the same problem as what? (Seriously, I have no idea what the comparison would be to there).Terrapin Station

    Is it possible for you to provide me with a logical basis for your posited requirements for there to be meaning? Or have we reached a dead end? It just feels like I'm waiting and waiting here.

    So your point is that a correlation isn't sufficient for there to be meaning, because your unjustified posited additional requirement of an intentional association is true? And I should accept it as true, even though you haven't justified it? Why should I accept any additional posited requirements along those lines? Why shouldn't I just dismiss them? Why shouldn't they be cut out with Ockham's razor?
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    You're reading way too much into my comments about this part. Again, I was simply saying why a mere correlation isn't sufficient.Terrapin Station

    For...? (You still haven't learnt your lesson!). For there to be meaning, I take it. Which is the same problem, which still lacks a resolution.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    This doesn't evince a very good understanding of idealism.csalisbury

    That one wasn't specifically about idealism, actually. It was a more general point. But that claim came from a member of this forum, and I believe the specific philosophical jargon for the position he was advocating is mereological nihilism.

    But thank you for once again jumping to the conclusion that I have no idea what I'm talking about. Obviously I must not possess the intimate knowledge which you do, and have yet to earn my wryness. Please, good sir, leave me be so that I may continue this masquerade without being exposed.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    During feeding times, a mother duck can be very aggressive towards young males when her ducklings are little. I once watched one of them bite an adolescent male by the wing and get dragged about thirty yards. It was a tug-of-war. Quite funny to witness. The male was not at all alarmed, he had been through this many times before. Par for the course, so to speak. He showed no signs of being in pain. Rather, he simply walked at a slightly faster than normal pace dragging her along with him, while she was literally planting her feet into the ground in a failed attempt to pull him the other direction. She pulled and pulled against the grain, her feet never quite gaining traction...

    The funny part was that towards the end of the struggle between the two, he stopped where some food was and took a couple of bites before continuing to drag her a bit farther..

    He never missed a beat...

    She finally let go.
    creativesoul

    Are you sure that she attacked him because she was acting in defence of her ducklings? Maybe he was just bad at philosophy, and she lost her patience with him. :smirk:
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    Here's an idea. Anyone who defines their terms in a way that necessarily implies a subject, raise your hand. Next, anyone who has their hand raised, please stop doing this or leave the discussion.

    Or at least start preparing a damn good explanation for why you're doing this.
  • The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning
    If all we have is a previously unknown, never-before-seen, ancient text, then all we can be certain of is that that text was meaningful to the language community from whence it came.creativesoul

    And why was it meaningful to them? Because they gave it meaning.

    We cannot be certain about whether or not we - as interpreters - are drawing the same correlations between the text and other things.creativesoul

    We don't need to be. Undeciphered meaning is still meaning, obviously.

    Since all meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things, and all shared meaning consists of a plurality (within a community) of creatures drawing the same correlations between language elements and something else, then it only follows that we - as interpreters - cannot be certain that our correlations have the same content as the people from whence the writings came, because we have only the text.

    As a result, we have no way to falsify/verify that we've drawn the same correlations between that text and the corresponding content within the original correlations drawn by the users.

    That's an epistemological aspect.
    creativesoul

    And none of that is relevant to any of the questions I've asked. I haven't denied that there can be situations where there's an unknown meaning. I don't think that Janus has either. In fact, that was his whole point in bringing up the ancient text.

    I am of the position that there is no meaning without the mind.creativesoul

    A position you still haven't reasonably justified. The rest is just your question begging copypasta.

    I don't know why people think they're doing something of significance when they include their conclusion - what the debate is over - in their premise or definition. This can be done with anything, so it's trivial. I can do it with a Creator, as I showed earlier.

    All meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things, and the drawing of correlations is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing such. It only follows that all meaning is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations.creativesoul

    Of course it follows, because you're begging the question. But that's still a fallacy.

    All life consists of purpose, and the giving of purpose is existentially dependent upon a Being capable of giving such. It only follows that all life is existentially dependent upon a Being capable of giving purpose.

    And you don't ever seem to show any learning. You're still, for example, wording things in a way that I showed to have a problem of ambiguity with regard to tense. You're just copy and pasting the exact same text with the exact same problem.

    a) "All meaning consists of correlations [which are] drawn between different things".

    b) "All meaning consists of correlations [which have been] drawn between different things".

    Which one do you mean?

    You know, you wouldn't make a very good journalist. They're expected, wherever possible, to abide by a strict standard whereby they bracket in what would otherwise leave ambiguity whenever they quote someone. I can't see you managing well if you were tasked with that. I'm not even sure you understand the problem. It's either that you don't understand it or that you're deliberately ignoring it.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    "The less you understand, the better you listen."emancipate

    The less I understand you, the more likely I am to scold you for not being clear.
  • Reality as appearance.
    Maybe S. is trying to get this thread closed for the same reason? :DMichael Ossipoff

    Until you define all of those words, I have no idea what you're asking. So what you're asking must in fact be meaningless.
  • The Mashed is The Potato
    I didn't mean any ad hom. Anyway, what you call obscurantist might simply be a philosophers attempt at discourse, without the associations or baggage that comes with using traditional terms. Such as heideggers dasein for example. In such cases the difficulty of their language serves a purpose. Is this OK by you?emancipate

    Only if I agree that it's necessary, and I don't in your example. “What can be said at all can be said clearly”.
  • Reality as appearance.
    Well, he could try telling us what he means by "Exist", "There is..." or "Real", when he uses those terms with (supposed) absolute, objective, context-less, unqualified meaning.Michael Ossipoff

    And "photocopier"! Don't forget that one. He must define that term as well. Because I pretend not to understand what he says when he uses that term, and he simply must play along with me.
  • Reality as appearance.
    Fine. I'm talking about when they are so used. ...as when people in this thread say that this physical world is objectively existent.Michael Ossipoff

    No, that's a context. And people understand what's meant, at least roughly.

    We've been over (and over and over) that, in your previous thread that was closed.Michael Ossipoff

    True, but you keep respamming your copypasta without learning from your mistakes.