Exactly, statements are what true and false.
Any object that you can observe, can be described by statements completely, by making an innumerable number of them about the object, with respect to all other objects and you.
Agree?

I agree that existence is first, but an object is true if it exists, it exists if it is true.

Right, I just wished to pinpoint that we are starting from a point of no assumptions.

Now, we need to be able to talk about objects that we can observe. So we need to give objects some properties, like length, breadth and height etc. But, first they must have a common property for comparison. So we try and give them the property of truth first.

I am trying to define a true and false set, based on points in reasoning or logic.

Sorry, but could you tell at which point? I have been trying to simplify it.

The objects will have some common property for comparison. Let's call it truth.

We can now assign this property to any sentence that we can make.
The bottle is in front of me is True.
The bottle is at some distance is True.
etc.

Computers answer questions nonetheless. This isn't a Turing machine, just giving an analogy. This is informal logic, I think, and not anything related to formal systems.

No I did not mean to imply that axes can or cannot be arbitrarily assigned.
Every object has a separate now attached to it as a property.

But all these things are defined by arbitrary selection of frame.
Light doesn't exist inside or outside a causal cone, but rather occupies the dimensionless singularity where the rotation of one type of dimension becomes the other type. — noAxioms

Could you explain all of this in a little more detail. I would love to get to the bottom of this. Thanks.

I know the model is mathematically consistent. The interpretation is after all, built on top of the math.
That's not the point I was trying to make. Time CANNOT be defined for all the objects this way, because of mathematical restrictions. It would be counter intuitive to say the least, that a now is not defined for every object as well. So every theory, built upon this concept of time, will not have a now for every object, because time itself was not defined for those objects, and we are trying to build a theory of now from the current concept of time.

The problem with that specific definition is that time is not defined for light. Light has no frame of reference, and hence no time or space associated with it.

I see it as a fault with the model or the theory in relativity. A necessity when we apply quantitative stuff to qualitative concepts.

This definition/description does not seem to require causality?

By who? It's inadequate to define time. Plus distance is only applied for space. How are you defining distance for time.

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/already

already is a comparison.

No, there is no reference to now in "already occurred". As I said, you are deucing now from "already occurred", by saying that "already occurred" must be relative. It is not spoken as relative, it is spoken as absolute. So it is only with the addition of the premise that "already occurred" must be relative, that you produce the deductive conclusion that "all ready occurred" refers (indirectly) to "now". That is why you even admit that the reference to now is indirect. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is where you are making a mistake. The past you define as events which have already occurred.
Already occurred from where? From now.

Every definition is relative. There are no absolutes. In the end we assume something. Something as basic as truth(for example) and build on it.

Look what you are doing. You say that experience is of the past, and you could not differentiate between past and future if there was no now. So your conclusion of "now" is a logical conclusion derived from these premises. I experience past. There is future. Past and future are not the same. Your conclusion of "now" is not based in experience it is derived from deduction. What if there is no difference between past and future? Then your argument is not sound, and you cannot claim a "now". — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say it is based on both experience and deduction.

One does not negate the obvious on hypothetical grounds.
The way you are thinking of now, is the intersection of the past and the future.

Think of it like an experience creating the past, and giving us a continuous expectation of the future.
We experience now at all times, and it leaves a memory of the past.

No, past and future are not defined by now, you have this backward. "Now" is deduced from the assumed difference between past and future. If there is a substantial difference between past and future, then there must be a division between them. That division is called "now". — Metaphsician Undercover

The task is to define both now and time.
You have already defined now on the "past", and the "future".
This was your definition of the "past" and the "future".

Correct, the past refers to things which have already occurred, The future refers to things which have not yet occurred. — Metaphysician Undercover

already occurred indirectly refers to now. The complete sentence being already occurred compared from "now".
same with your definition of future.

So overall your definition is circular, because now depends on past and future, and past and future depend on now as well.
Circular definitions as you know are absurd.

This is just a way of looking at things that I find fascinating. This more or less a paraphrase of my interpretation of Heidegger (a difficult but extremely fascinating philosopher.) If any of this sounds good, I recommend his 80 page book The Concept of Time. — 0rff

I agree with most of what you wrote.
My main issue is with causality. I consider it an extra unneeded assumption, in the definition.

I will try and read the book. Thank you.

But let's say that we can make this idea clear. Then a new problem arises. There is no time for change in an instant. Let f(t) be the state of object. If we understand change as the non-equality of f(x) and f(y) at two times x and y, then clearly we can't put x and y in the same instant unless x = y. But then f(x) = f(y) and we don't have change. — 0rff

So there must be a minimum time taken for us to realize that now has changed, or the instant has changed.

The practical problems do not as such concern me. Mathematics fails to capture the full essence of some phenomenon, especially if the phenomenon is qualitative.

I apologize if the reply seemed meagre. It was all I could think of at the time.

We notice change. We seek change. We await change. The invention of abstract, scientific time comes fairly late in the game. We had to institute this time. — 0rff

I think is a good point. This is our limitation. It is hardly appropriate to ask the Universe as to care about it. The now simply changes and we notice it. At all times.

We notice that one moment at all times. The other moments are lost in the past. Anything that would attempt to define time mathematically otherwise, would be trying to capture that past.
At this point the role of the arrow of causality or arrow of time comes into account.

So, time currently can be said to be comprised of two factors, one now, the other causality.
I wish to point out that causality is not needed per se.

It is natural to think that when quantifying a qualitative phenomenon, somethings are lost in the process.

Regarding your earlier reply, where you point out that now could be a real number.
I think your approach is correct, but we are looking for continuity there. What way is there to know if indeed time is continuous, at all points, if all we can do is observe the now, and some data from the past?

I generally agree with your (paradoxical) formulation of time as the 'change in now,' — 0rff

It's not paradoxical.

No we experience now.
The experience is definitely of the past, but there would be no way to recognize the past from the future or anything else if now stopped.

You would only experience a singular moment.

You are still defining the past and future on "now". You'd have to define them on time, to define now, otherwise the definition is circular, if you are trying to define now on time.

Some details, on Richard Muller's new paper. It's not a theory, but a philosophy.
https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-opinion-of-physicists-on-Professor-Richard-Mullers-paper-%E2%80%9CNow-and-the-Flow-of-Time%E2%80%9D

Let’s start with the problem that the paper tries to solve. This is an old one (at least a hundred years old, and in various forms much older) and is often referred to as “The Problem of Time”. There are technical formulations of it that crop up in attempts to create a quantum theory of gravity, and there are also some very conceptual formulations, such as the form in which it’s brought up in the paper. There the problem is stated as follows

… we can stand still in space but not in time; time inexorably flows. The rate of flow depends on the velocity of the local Lorentz frame and on the gravitational potential. Yet this description of the relative changes in the rate of flow does not address the key disparity that time flows yet space doesn’t.

(Muller & Maguire, 2016 p.1)

That is, in the space-time framework in which we formulate General Relativity and similar theories, there is no “becoming” in which instants of time succeed one another. This misses an essential feature of time and as such, it is not clear that the mathematical representation of time is a complete one. Certainly (as Muller & Maguire note) a mere negative sign in the metric (the distinction between time and space co-ordinates in flat spacetime) does not capture this basic difference between our experience of time and of space.

Quoting from the link. I did not write this. It's too long to paste it completely here, I think.

Let's say an object has been defined under one assumption, vs an object defined under two assumptions, then you cannot define the first one on the second, because you cannot un"assume", something. It does not matter what math you put under the idea. He would not give an explanation of now, from assuming time on entropy/causality.

This is why, I think he's making a logical mistake.

I am not entirely aware of the rest of his theory, however, I will admit that. The topic has just piqued my interest, it might take me sometime to read all the stuff Prof. Muller has written.

Which, was one of my reasons of discussing it here. So I could perhaps know where to look next, and at what.

my interest was piqued when I heard Dr. Richard Muller, had formed a theory of now dependent on time, and I thought that it would be impossible to define now on time, because time had more assumptions in it. It would take a perfect model.

I think it's a philosophical mistake to do so. Time is currently considered one of the basic fundamental dimensions in the theory of relativity.

If now is considered as a division between the future and the past, then you'd have to define the "future", and the "past".

So you can only define it on "Time", or "Now". I argue that "now" is more fundamental, and "time" should and could be defined on it, instead of going the other way around, and defining "now", on time or other factors. It would be much easier to explain things, because philosophically, you have defined something on something more fundamental. Of course, it is possible to first define "time", and then find a complicated way of defining "now".

At the end of the day, any N number of hypothetical scenarios can happen with "time" or "now". But, suppose you have to answer both the questions. What is now? What is time?

You can only experience "now". So if "now" did not change, there would be no past or present.

Can this be considered as a proof for cogito?

The logic is impeccable, if doubt could have been adequately defined.

I apologize, I am clearly wrong. Rewording it seemed to clear it up for me. I just assumed, there could be a possible definition of doubt, which fit the criteria.

Quite an idiotic mistake to be honest. One I have made before, of not adequately defining terms before.

Tarski defines truth in terms of the notion of the satisfaction of a formula of LCC by an infinite sequence of assignments (of appropriate objects: subclasses of the universe of individuals in the case of LCC). He gives first a recursive definition and immediately indicates how to transform it into a normal or explicit definition. The recursive definition is this: an infinite sequence of classes f satisfies formula F if and only if f and F are such that

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski/

Perhaps it points to the same thing. Will give it a better read later.

It's not possible to remove the post however, correct me if I am mistaken.

Could you please read what I replied to Wayfarer? Maybe that helps in making the logic clearer. It's only circular if you have a binary truth and only one step. That doubt exists, but it is the minimum amount of doubt at each step. This has multiple steps, and the truth value differs as you look at a collection of self referential statements. Since one statement is made before the next statement, we can say that the preceding statement assumes the prior, and it's truth value is established only under it.

@All: I have edited my first post to accurately reflect what I meant. Is it correct?

Oh forget about proving my point for a moment.
It's just a exercise in logic for now. I am not talking about thinking for now. I have written other things for that.

Is the logic correct? What do you think? Assume that for a moment the words are well defined.

The mod, I did not want to spam, sorry.

At least pinpoint why it's absurd. It's not absurd. You are just assuming.

You are just repeating it can't be done. Why not?
Because it's simple to you that if you doubt, you are doubting.

But, I am saying if you doubt enough, you can also doubt that you are doubting. That does not imply that you are not doubting.
The two sentences are different.

There are simply levels of doubt.

So I am doubting is true.
I am doubting that I am doubting, is lesser true.
I am doubting , that I am doubting, that I am doubting, is even lesser true.

But all of them are true.
Doubting that I am doubting does not mean that I am not doubting. It entails both the possibility, of doubting and not doubting.

No, I am just presenting a self referential doubt.
One can imagine it in this Universe as well. I am removing all other elements, to make the presentation simpler.

Then, we do have an ultimate doubter to doubt. I just have to convince Descartes that his thought is doubtful.

You're giving a binary level. This is a recursion. I can always doubt the sentence under the recursion.

sorry, just a conversation with someone on stackexchange, I can link the question. But if he's right, then the definition is definitely valid. So not digging more.

I am not sure IF it's with the axiom of infinity or a weaker assumption of the same kind.

Truth in the object language depends on the metalanguage. And for truth in metalanguage, you form a bigger metalanguage and so on... at least as far as I was able to understand it.

But, why not man? There is no logical fallacy here. Just because Descartes said so?

Yeah, and showing that there is no logical fallacy in doing so.

Oh.
That prolixity is circular, someone must doubt something, but at the same time one can doubt that as well through a different level of doubt.
Both sentences can be true.

Yes, I know that I have to build a Universe around a subject, and state these sentences in a logical language.

I haven't done that part yet. But, apart from that, is everything solid?

What should I be congratulating myself for? (I do not get sarcasm very well sorry, if this is)
It's valid right?

Tarski's definition is valid and very accurate, under the assumption of infinity.

Alright. Thank you for answering all my other questions.
It's been a ton of help really!

Please do not take offense.

So a sentence in the object language, which one wants to show or define as true, has to hold in the metalanguage as well.

So there is no concept of truth in the metalanguage?

I am currently reading all that I can about this. Please allow me to come back with more intelligent questions.

Sorry if you took offense, over my comments on Tarski.

We wish to prove the truth of a sentence in the object language ( L ), but we use a metalanguage (M) to do so, the definition is based around terms used in the sentence of M, but without the notion of "truth".

The whole thing seems circular. I mean not the definition of truth, but the usage of the words in the object language and the metalanguage. Because, now the words in L are dependent on truth, and truth is now dependent on the same words M.

This is the paper I had found, and thought that it was widely known that Tarski's definition is circular.
http://www.sa-logic.org/sajl-v1-i1/06-Greimann-SAJL.pdf

https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/47018/how-do-you-define-truth?
Also, asking the same question here.

Hopefully, I understand it better!

And now you see why this "semantic" notion confuses me such.
It is not a definition as far as I know, but just a notion.
It's not well defined.

You were being sarcastic right? :P (when you said I knew more about this)