<---doesn't for a second believe that anyone here is actually using "correct" to simply descriptively refer to what's conventional, with no hint of a prescriptive connotation to it. — Terrapin Station

The correct answer to the question "Is 2 + 2 = 4?" is "Yes". What's prescriptive about that?

You're right. He assumed that I'm claiming the word "chair" has only one correct definition. He somehow ignored my main point which is that the word "chair" has a number of correct meanings (one or more) and a number of incorrect meanings (again, one or more.) The exact numbers are irrelevant. Even if I did make a claim that there is only one correct definition of the word "chair" it's irrelevant.

I think you're mistaken.

Any good dictionary (essentially a record of existing usages) will give at least 6 different meanings. — ChrisH

That's true. Maybe I can correct myself by saying that's one of several correct meanings of the word?

I'd take issue with your claim that you've given "the correct meaning". It's 'a' meaning but not the only one in current use.

New usages may even emerge in the future. These new usages, in my view, wouldn't be incorrect. — ChrisH

It's important to understand what the other is saying before one proclaims that what they are saying is true or false.

Specifically, it's important to understand what it means to say that a word is being using in a way that is incorrect. What it means is that the word is being used in a way that is not used or that was not used by some group of people at some point in time.

"Word W is used incorrectly" simply means "Word W is used in a way that is different from the way that it is used or was used by some group of people G during some period of time P."

Nowadays, when people use the word "chair" what they mean is "a separate seat for one person, typically with a back and four legs". In the future, the definition might change, but when I say that this is the correct definition of the word, what I mean is that this is how people use the word nowadays.

I agree that most of everything Terrapin says is absurd, but I think there's a confusion between understanding chair as a nominatum (the thing named) and chair as nominans (the name 'chair'). Qua nominans, yes, to understand what a 'chair' is requires a community of users who use the word in that way, etc etc. Qua nominatum, you need a great deal more than that, including all the stuff I mentioned regarding the grammar of chair (used for sitting, moveable, etc). I only insist that we can't treat the two nomen separately, and its only at the 'shallow' level of the nominans that one can argue about individuals vs groups and so on. — StreetlightX

In other words, it's one thing to study the word "tree" and another to study physical objects that can be represented by the word "tree". I am pretty sure most people here are aware of this distinction, so I would claim that no confusion is taking place. (Notice also how I didn't use a single Latin word to express myself.)

I believe this thread is about words and not about things that can be represented by words.

With respect to 'correctness', that's also a poorly posed notion. Concepts are neither correct nor incorrect, but rather useful or not useful, felicitious or infelicitious. A horseshoe is neither correct nor incorrect, and it's simply bad grammar to consider it so, the kind of thing one corrects in grade school. They are however, more or less suited to their purpose, a better or worse response to the problem and constaints around keeping a horse's hoof from wearing out. — StreetlightX

There are correct and incorrect definitions of words. For example, the correct meaning of the word "chair" is "a separate seat for one person, typically with a back and four legs". Hardly disputable.

If you say something like "I use 'correct' so that it refers to 'a puppy'" that's easy to understand, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

It's easier if people speak the same language. The more you use existing words in your own way, the more difficult it becomes for others to understand you (and also, the more difficult it becomes for you to understand others.)

Right. So in this case, "correct/incorrect" is just descriptive, where it's the same as "conventional/unconventional." It has no prescriptive weight on your view? — Terrapin Station

If you want to be understood and if you want to understand others then you should use words the way other people do.

The idea wasn't that you were necessarily saying this generally. In this case, the norm/convention is correct because? — Terrapin Station

Because when you say that someone is using some word incorrectly what that means is that they are not using that word the way most people do.

Definitions/descriptions are different than meanings on my view. — Terrapin Station

The meaning of a symbol is the set of all things that can be represented by that symbol.
The definition of a symbol is a verbal or non-verbal description of its meaning.

So yes, I am inclined to think that they are two different things.

The meaning of the statement "Person P is using word W incorrectly" can be described using an equivalent statement such as "Person P is using word W in a way that most people don't".

You just said that what it "means" to say that word usage is correct/incorrect is that the word usage is the same as the convention/not the same as the convention.

So on your view, what it is to be correct is to be (the same as) the convention. Is that not right? — Terrapin Station

No. The word "correct" does not mean "in accordance with convention". The word "correct" is far more abstract than that. It means "free from error". What kind of error? Well, that's determined by context. The word itself does not specify it.

The degree to which a usage of word is correct or incorrect is determined in relation to some convention. So yes, in this particular context, correct / incorrect is the same as conventional / unconventional. But that does not hold generally. In other contexts, correct / incorrect has nothing to do with conventional / unconventional.

Okay, so then the convention is correct, no, and differing from the convention is incorrect? — Terrapin Station

I am not sure I know what it means to say that a convention is correct or incorrect.

There's a need because I don't consider that meaning. — Terrapin Station

You don't consider that (what that?) to be . . . what?

When someone says "Person P is using word W incorrectly" what that means is "Person P is using word W the way most people don't".

That's the meaning of that statement.

You can disagree with that i.e. you can think that that is not the meaning of that statement.

What it "means" is that they're not using the word conventionally/a la common usage, right? — Terrapin Station

No need for scare quotes. That's exactly what it means to say that someone is using some word incorrectly -- it means that the person is not using the word the way most people do.

Are you insane? I'm not failing to understand your irrelevant points. It is correct per my usage, and per common usage, and per a matching interpretation from you. Any mismatched interpretation is incorrect. That's how the rest of us use the words "correct" and "incorrect" in situations like this, and you haven't provided any sensible reason for refusing to use them likewise. All you've done is express an irrational unwillingness to join in, due to some childish aversion to the notion of conformity, which to you is some sort of bogeyman. — S

Well said. You made me chuckle (:

What it means is that the manner in which you use the word "chair" does not correspond to the manner in which English speaking people do. — Magnus Anderson

And norms/conventions are correct because? — Terrapin Station

Where did I say that conventions are correct?
Or that they can be correct?

I merely explained what it means to say that someone is using words incorrectly.

By this I mean what does this lead us to believe about a persons values and beliefs, mental state, their stance on life and so on. — Andrew4Handel

Suicide Note by Mitchell Heisman
https://legacy.gscdn.nl/archives/images/suicide_note.pdf

You wouldn't be gaining anything by deviating from the norm here. — S

Since the purpose of language is to communicate, it makes no sense to deviate from the norm. By deviating from the norm, you make it difficult for others to understand you and for yourself to understand others.

It's not conformism if you want to be understood.

So, in other words, if you use "chair" to refer to bicycles, you're not incorrect, but if you say, "Most people use 'chair' to refer to bicycles," you are incorrect . — Terrapin Station

If you use the word "chair" to refer to bicycles you are using it incorrectly. That's a fact.

What's important to understand is what it means to say that you're using the word "chair" incorrectly. What it means is that the manner in which you use the word "chair" does not correspond to the manner in which English speaking people do. That's all there is to it.

On the other hand, I have no idea what it means to say "If you use "chair" to refer to bicycles, you're not correct". That does not look like proper English to me.

The only time the consensus opinion is relevant and not fallacious is when we want to know what the consensus opinion happens to be — Terrapin Station

And that's precisely what we want to know when it comes to the correct meaning of words.

You can use language any way you want, but since the purpose of language is to communicate, it's in your best interest to use it the way other people use it. Unless, of course, you do not want to communicate but to obfuscate.

Words do have true and false meanings but only in relation to certain language.

The correct meaning of the word "chair" in English language is "a separate seat for one person, typically with a back and four legs" and this is determined by consensus (clearly not the case of argumentum ad populum.)

Every statement that says that some portion of reality is such and such has truth value i.e. it is either true or false.

After all, truth is a belief that corresponds to reality.

Even statements that merely express one's personal preferences have truth value: either one has the stated preferences or one does not.

"I like cake" expresses a personal preference of mine that I either have (which would make it true) or that I don't (which would make it false.)

The real subject of this thread then is concerned with language i.e. what moral statements actually mean.

According to emotivists, moral statements express no more than one's personal preferences. According to me, in most cases that is not true.

When most people say "Killing people is wrong" they are not merely saying that they don't want people to be killed. Rather, they are saying that society cannot survive if people kill each other.

In most cases, "X is wrong" is equivalent to "X is something that would make it difficult or impossible for us to attain our goals".

Yes. Anything else implies murder is not wrong. Any takers on that? — tim wood

"Murder is wrong" is a statement that is either true or false only if you assume that it has truth value. If it does not then the statement is neither true nor false. So you're wrong.

It is this assumption that is the subject of this thread.
What have you done to prove its validity?

I don't say that you can't reason once you've stated your preferences. — Terrapin Station

The point I am trying to make, which you seem to disagree with, is that most moral statements aren't mere expressions of one's personal preferences.

For example, in most cases, when someone says "Lying is wrong" they are not merely stating that they do not like to lie. Rather, what they are saying is "If I lie I won't be able to attain my goals".

In most cases, "Lying is wrong" is equivalent to "If I lie I won't attain my goals". (This means that moral statements do have truth value.)

I wouldn't actually say that that is a moral statement because it doesn't express whether it's right or wrong to lie or end up in heaven, or whether one should or should not lie or end up in heaven. — Terrapin Station

That's true. The statement is not a moral one. A moral statement would be something like "Lying is wrong". The above statement tells you how the universe works (in the form of "The surest way to make Y happen is to do X") but it does not tell you whether lying is right or wrong. So I stand corrected.

However, I would still argue that most of our moral judgments are not based solely on our personal preferences (what we like and what we dislike) but also on how the universe works.

In most cases, we decide whether a given act, such as lying, is right or wrong by:

1) choosing a goal: do we want to go to heaven or hell?
2) understanding how the universe works so that we can do what is necessary to do in order to attain our goal (what happens when you lie? what happens when you tell the truth? what happens when you keep quiet?)

If lying is precisely that which is necessary to do in order to attain our goal, then we say that lying is right. If it is precisely that which we must not do in order to attain our goal, then we say that lying is wrong.

My beef with emotivism is that it claims that moral judgments are based solely on one's personal preferences.

That's not true.

Here's a moral statement:

"The surest way to end up in heaven is by not lying to other people."

When we try to simplify it, we get something like:

"Don't lie!"
(Because you'll end up in hell if you do and you don't want to go to hell, don't you?)

It's a false statement but that's irrelevant. What's relevant is that it has a truth value. In reality, it is either the case that when you lie you go to hell and when you tell the truth you go to heaven -- or it is not.

The fact that people want to go to heaven is irrelevant.

Most moral statements are like that. I am not saying that every moral statement is like that, even less so that every statement -- moral or not -- is of that sort. I am simply saying that most moral statements are in fact statements about the way the world outside of the thinking subject works.

As to the question itself, "Is X wrong," I do not see therein any reference to opinion. — tim wood

Whenever you ask someone a question such as "Is X Y?" you are asking for their opinion. If I were to ask you a question such as "Is Socrates a man?" I would be asking for your opinion (which could be right or wrong.)

Terrapin's opinion happens to have no truth value because it is a mere expression of his personal preferences. When he tells you that murder is wrong all he's saying is that he doesn't like people to kill each other. The only way you can disagree with him is by claiming that he's lying about his preferences .e.g. by saying "No, dear Terrapin, you are lying, you don't mind it when people kill each other!"

The real problem with emotivism is that it's making a claim that EVERY moral statement is merely an expression of one's personal preferences. That's simply not true.

Terrapin's moral statements might be nothing more than mere expressions of what he likes and dislikes but my moral statements are not.

Given where we've been, your answer is deeply disingenuous. You're not asked for your opinion. To my ear, you've been asked the equivalent of, '"is two and two four?" And you've answered, "yes, in my opinion." — tim wood

You did ask for his opinion. And his opinion is that murder is wrong. Maybe you wanted to ask him a different question, a question such as "Is murder objectively wrong?" But you did not. At least not clearly. And asking him such a question would lead you nowhere. What would you do when he responds with "No, murder is not objectively wrong"?

By refusing to say murder is wrong, Terrapin is in effect saying that it is not the case that murder is wrong. — tim wood

If what you asked him is "Do you agree that murder is wrong?" then he did answer your question, his answer being "Yes, murder is wrong".

Even if he did not answer your question that wouldn't mean (as you seem to be claiming) that he does not think that murder is wrong.

No answer != negative answer.

Terapin is right in the sense that some of the moral statements are nothing more than expressions of one's personal preferences. In some cases, saying "Murder is wrong" means no more than "I don't want people to be murdered". But in many cases -- in fact, in most of the cases -- moral statements aren't mere expressions of one's wants, desires, goals, etc. Rather, they are expressions of what someone thinks is the best thing to do in order to maximize chances of attaining certain goal. In most cases, what "Murder is wrong" means is "If you want human species to survive for as long as possible, don't kill other people". Such statements DO have a truth value.

It's really as simple as that.

There is also another problem with maximizing happiness and reducing suffering because the consequences may not be achieved and yet the deeds may still be noble and good. Consider a firefighter who tries to save a baby but fails in the end. He hasn't reduced any suffering in the end but the act was clearly moral and good. — Wittgenstein

It's moral and good because people think it's better to try and fail than to not try at all. In other words, they think that if you make 10 mediocre attempts that you will be successful at least once (you'll save at least one baby) whereas if you try to make sure that every single attempt of yours is a successful one you will never make an attempt which means you'll fail 0 times and succeed 0 times (i.e. you'll save zero babies.) Although not apparent, moral decisions of this sort are still guided by projected consequences.

A moral statement such as "It is wrong to kill" in the majority of cases means "If you want to maximize your chances to attain certain goal G then you must not kill other people". Such a claim can either be true or false. So the answer to your question is yes, moral statements do have a truth value.

In some cases, such a statement might simply mean "I don't want people to kill other people not because I want to attain some other goal but simply because I don't want that sort of stuff to happen". Such statements express a goal that is not subordinated to any other goal (an end in itself) as adopted by someone. Such statements, it is true, have no truth value.

But most moral statements aren't of that sort.

No - that’s still a choice. — Possibility

Don't focus on the word "want". Focus on the word "ought" and the fact that the sentence is a perfectly legitimate English sentence.

You ought to eat something within a period of one month if you don't want to die.

Quite often, people leave out the large chunk of that sentence and simply say "You ought to eat something". This creates an illusion of an ought statement that has nothing to do with one's wants.

An ought statement is merely a statement of what is the best thing to do in order to maximize the chances of attaining certain goal. That's the definition of an ought statement. Given such a definition, an ought statement that has nothing to do with goals is a logical contradiction.

But being hungry for a month isn’t the same as “I am hungry - I ought to eat.” When you equate an experience of hunger with impending death, and view death as unacceptable, then you are heading into moral territory - you resent/reject reality. The reality is that hunger is a normal experience of living, and that death comes to everyone.

Just because most people don’t want to die, does not eliminate death from our reality. When we accept this reality then there is no ‘ought’, there is no morality - there is simply a capacity to choose.

There will be ought statements, and yes, there will be morality, even if you accept -- and most people do accept -- that death is a part of our reality. Most people know they will die and most people know there is nothing they can do to prevent it from happening. Nonetheless, oughts and morality exist. Naturally, since the two aren't connected.

So in the case of the powerful man killing the person who might expose him, my gut reaction is 'no he really shouldn't kill them.' What is that should? It's there. It's different than the other shoulds and oughts you mentioned (which are 'hypothetical', in Kantian terms.) It's not that he shouldn't kill them because [x].It's just like, man, he shouldn't kill them (categorical, in Kantian terms.) Two things : You ought not do that because... And : you shouldn't do that, period. — csalisbury

If you want people to be alive and happy, you ought not to kill them or otherwise cause them suffering. In Kantian terms, that's still a hypothetical imperative, don't you think?

You may not be motivated by survival (your own or that of a collective) but your "oughts" are of the same kind as those of other people.

They both exist, and if you follow any hypothetical ought (you ought to do this because...) for enough steps, it will always bottom out in a categorical one. — csalisbury

Sounds like something I said elsewhere:

↪Baskol1 At the top of every hierarchy of goals there is a goal that is chosen freely in the sense that it is not chosen in order to attain some other goal. The choice of such a goal is certainly regulated by external factors (by the so-called nature) but it is not regulated by internal factors (such as your other goals.)

So if you don't want to die in a month, you better eat something. And if you want to eat something, you better think of ways to find food. Say you decide you want to buy some rice (I don't like rice but that's what came up first.) So if you want to buy some rice, you better find a shop that sells it. And so on and so forth. That's an example of a hierarchy of goals. At the top of that hierarchy is a goal -- to be alive in a month. You chose that goal independently from any other goal. You don't want to be alive in a month in order to attain some other goal . . . you just want to be alive in a month. It's an arbitrary choice mediated only by external factors.

No other goal is telling you it's best to be alive in a month. You might as well just choose to not be alive in a month. Most people don't because they can't -- the need to remain alive is too strong. — Magnus Anderson

There's a hierarchy of goals and at the top of that hierarchy there is a goal the choice of which is not determined by another goal.

Goals are not "oughts" and the goal sitting at the top of the hierarchy of goals is not a categorical "ought". "Oughts" are merely statements that tell you what's the best thing to do in order to maximize your chances of attaining certain goal. They can be true (you ought to stop eating junk food if you want to be a good athlete) or false (you ought to be obese if you want to be a marathon runner) but they cannot be categorical -- they are always hypothetical.

Suppose your master goal is for every living being on the planet to be alive and to be happy. This is a master goal because it is not mediated by any other goal. You don't do it because of some other goal. That's not an ought and certainly not a categorical ought. That's just a goal. Now, you say "Humans ought not to kill each other". That's an ought -- a hypothetical one. You say that because if people kill each other people will suffer and die -- which is something you don't want to happen.

The OP was saying (as far as I can tell) that the world IS a certain way. “Ought” statements are a wishing of how people want it to be. At least some kinds of “ought” statements are therefore delusional. — Noah Te Stroete

Right. So what he's saying is that unrealistic expectations (i.e. expecting things to be the way they cannot be) are delusional. I agree with that. However, the language he's using to express such a simple, tautological, thing is rather convoluted, don't you agree?

It is a delusion in the sense that it need not be the case that there are “ought” statements. Other animals don’t seem to have them, and if the universe is completely deterministic, then saying how things ought to be is a form of delusion. It is denying how things must be. — Noah Te Stroete

There are "ought" statements, that's pretty evident. Animals don't have statements because they don't have language -- they don't speak. As for the universe being deterministic, even if it is completely deterministic, it does not mean that "ought" statements have no value. (I have no idea what it means for "ought" statements to be a delusion.)

I am not sure what you're trying to say. I am not trying to criticize morality. I am simply saying that:

1) saying that one ought to do something or that things ought to be in some way is not necessarily a sign of resentment

2) morality is not a delusion

That's it.

It amazes me that you honestly believe any experience of hunger is a sign of impending death. — Possibility

It means you will die if you eat nothing within a period of one month. That's hardly disputable. Of course, you won't die if you eat nothing for a week, but if you eat nothing for more than 30 days (or whatever the actual number is) you will die. The choice to eat is connected with this fact. Yes, we eat in order to be able to successfully carry out certain tasks but we also eat in order to remain alive (i.e. to avoid death.)

Neither of these is an ‘ought’, because an ‘ought’ is not a choice. When you transform a choice into an ‘ought’, this is a sign that you resent having to experience hunger at all. — Possibility

You ought to eat something within a period of month if you don't want to die. That's an ought. Again, hardly disputable. What's strange is the claim that every ought -- which means this one as well -- is a sign of resentment. That's clearly NOT the case.

If you can get away with it -- yes.

It's not a good idea to kill other people if you want to cooperate with them. And it's a good idea to cooperate with other people because you can't survive on your own. So that's why one should not kill another person.

"I ought to be this", but what if you just aren't? Should we feel ashamed because we don't uphold the principles of some external moral doctrine? — st0ic

You mean, what if you can't be what you ought to be? Nothing. Just accept that you can't be that thing. An ought merely establishes what is the best thing to do if you want to maximize your chances of attaining certain goal. So if you want to be physically fit, you ought to eat properly. That sort of thing.

First of all, don’t get ahead of yourself: experiencing hunger does NOT mean I will die. — Possibility

If you're hungry it means that if you don't eat something soon you'll starve to death. You have two choices here:

1) try to find food so that you can stay alive
2) accept death

So what one ought to do? Notice that either choice would count as an ought.

The idea put forward is that every ought is a sign of resentment (maybe even ressentiment?) So whatever you choose, you're being resentful. Which is rather odd, don't you think?

The alternative is accepting the reality that hunger is a part of life, something we can experience many times in our life and even for a prolonged period of time without dying. That is reality as it is. — Possibility

Yes and choosing not to be hungry (by eating) is not a sign of resentment.

Having said that, dying is also a part of the universe that we tend to reject/resent in favour of a world that doesn’t and cannot exist: one where we don’t die. — Possibility

And that's not necessarily a sign of resentment either.