If we are presented with a law, or an intersection of laws, that tell us how to differentiate between two acts with good consequences - but one is clearly superior due to the situation or context - isn't the intention just being displaced and projected onto a law or number of laws created by people that, if followed correctly, selects the best outcome based on a deficit of good consequences (its internalization dictates it must contribute to the maximum expected value, which implies that one outcome is preferable to another)? — ToothyMaw
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that when a rule is selected for internalization, the intention behind that choice would still follow (4) in your argument. That is:
4. Good intention requires a desire to bring about good outcomes — ToothyMaw
So, let's say there is a choice made between two rules, R1 and R2. R1 states: "One should keep one’s promises," and this would lead to 100 expected well-being. R2 states: "One should only keep promises made to those one likes," and let's say this rule only leads to 10 expected well-being. Then, at this moment of selection between R1 (100 good) and R2 (10 good), where they select R1 since it maximizes expected good, their intent would be like (4). And good outcomes are only the ones with the best consequences (from 8). Thus, a rule-consequentialist would be required to internalize R1 or they would lack good intention.
And if so, does the impartial defense of such rules not support the logic of my argument? — ToothyMaw
I have two comments on this. Firstly, I still think a rule-consequentialist following Hooker's theory would reject (4). Sure, the selection of the rules would be about maximizing consequences, but the intention behind following these rules would be something like "it is the most impartially defensible theory". Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. The reason for being a rule-consequentialist would be that it is the moral theory that answers these kinds of questions the best. Thus, when selecting rules, the rule-consequentialist should select R1 rather than R2 because R1 leads to more well-being, but the intention would be "follow the most defensible moral theory" rather than "desire good outcomes." I think this is different enough to maintain my original point.
However, it is possible that by denying (4) the rule-consequentialists actually abandons consequentialism. I'm not sure about this, but I know Peter Singer has criticized Hooker's theory for being a form of deontology, only being consequentialist in name. If that is the case, then it would be no problem that Hooker-style rule-consequentialists reject (4) since your argument isn't even about them.
Secondly, even if the argument holds for the rule-consequentialist and (4) remains in the way that it is projected onto the choice of rules, I don't think it would lead to an absurd conclusion compared with act-utilitarianism for instance. Each decision wouldn't be determined by maximizing the good, rather, a limited number of rules would be followed. Everyone can only internalize so much, and the more complicated the rules, the more costly to internalize. The cost of internalization would also be affected by the cost of going against human psychology. If the rules require one to live a life of self-sacrifice, then the cost of internalization would likely be impossibly high. The resulting rules would by that token be far less demanding.
ANOTHER THOUGHT
I hope I'm not bombarding you with too much stuff, but I had another thought. How do you think your argument applies to ethical egoism? It could be considered a consequentialist theory as the "best outcome" would be something like: "maximizes what is good for oneself."