• Why are More Deaths Worse Than One? (Against Taurek)
    I am not sure if you have read the original paper by Taurek, seems to me that some of your why's could be addressed by reading his original argument that this post concerns. By reading his paper, you will see why Taurek rejects the consequentialist rationale.
    Additionally, I believe a lot regarding the different theories and their beliefs on maximization are rather common knowledge, and not needed in further detail the beginning of the paper.
    Nonetheless, I see your frustration.
  • Why are More Deaths Worse Than One? (Against Taurek)
    Thanks, everyone, for your input. This discussion has been helpful.
    If anyone is interested, I find the linked paper by Tom Dougherty to be a rather persuasive paper on why the numbers should count.

    It has been a common belief for many of us that because of the moral indifference of the situation (that is, that all individuals are equally needy), it seems only rational then to look beyond the loss-to-persons and toward the loss-of-persons.

    This paper, in my opinion, does a good job of analyzing our intuitions towards saving the greater number without appealing to consequentialism. Ultimately, Dougherty looks at our rational want to satisfy as many of our altruistic ends as possible. He believes as moral beings, we have a certain moral attitude to want to do so. His paper then claims that we ought to satisfy as many of these ends as possible if we are to act rationally.

    This is a rather short and incomplete summary of his argument so I suggest reading the paper! It's a quick read!

    https://philpapers.org/archive/DOURNA.pdf