So in the case of the M&M experiment, Einstein would claim that there was no length contractions nor time dilations involved because there was no different inertial frames to measure.... — Gampa Dee

The length contractions in Fitzgerald's theory is the same as that in Einstein's special relativity - they are both Lotentz transformations. The difference is that in Fitzgerald's theory the frame of reference of the ether was a privileged frame of reference in which light traveled, while Einstein showed that the ether was not needed in the theory and that the frame of reference can be any inertial frame of reference.

To put is more simply:

According to Fitzgerald: Light traveled in the ether frame of reference. This frame of reference was moving relative to an observer on Earth. Lorentz transformations can be used to explain length contractions due to the observer and ether being in different frames of references.

According to Einstein: The ether is not needed in the theory. Length contractions due to Lorentz transformations are observed when the observer is in a different inertial frame of reference to the experiment, but this is not relevant to the M&M experiment as both the observer and experiment are in the same frame of reference.

The problem is when you say, "It has to actually be true" you have to answer the question of, "How do you know it is true?" You cannot. If you can, feel free to do so. But if you cannot, then you cannot state that knowledge has truth as a necessary pre-requisite. Otherwise you say we know nothing, which is again, the abandonment of epistemology. — Philosophim

I agree with you on this. JTB theory does not explain how the word "knowledge" is used by people, hence it is a poor definition. I think it becomes even clearer when analyzing the verb "to know."

Keeping in mind the truth in JTB is independent of what I think about the matter, then according to JTB:

If I say "I know I am sitting on a chair" I am saying effectively saying "I believe I am sitting on a chair, I have justification for that belief, and it is true regardless of what I think about the matter"

But the last part of that sentence makes no sense. What I say when I utter the words "I know ..." is linked to what I think about the matter, it cannot be independent of my thoughts.

I think there's merit in Rawls thought experiment. The only thing I wonder about it is that it doesn't teach morality so much as use self-interest as an organising principle. — Tom Storm

I see a similarity between the physical and moral example I gave, in terms of how we go about learning abut the world. I stand on the side of a pond, looking at a partially submerged stick. It appears to me the stick is bent. I come up with a theory that water bends sticks - a theory that explains what I perceive.

However I can do better. I can move around and look at the stick from many different angles, from under water, I can feel the stick with my hands, etc. I can then come up with a theory that explains what I perceive from all these views, which is refraction.

I would say the theory I came up with from many views (refraction) is superior to that I came up with from one view (water bent the stick).

Similarly, I can consider whether an action is moral from my viewpoint, and come up with a moral theory to explain this. However, if I were to consider the same action from everyone's viewpoint, then I would come up with a superior moral theory that just my viewpoint.

In both cases, perhaps the view from many viewpoints is a superior view to that from only one viewpoint.

In neither case am I teaching physical or moral behavior, rather in both I'm trying to understand physical and moral behavior.

I see you completely ignored my question on Snell's law. In the case of water and mirages, does light not behave as according to Snell's law?

It always behaves according to Snell's law. Even in the case of water and mirages, it is behaving as per Snell's law, as we correctly understand it. It is not misbehaving or playing tricks. It is not violating Snell's law.

Do you understand Snell's law? If you did you would understand mirages and refraction is just normal behavior of light.

That's an enticing frame. It would seem, however that when it comes to a simple object like a stick this could make sense. But how does one apply this to more complex notions of truth in human life - morality, politics, art? Is it possible to see every possible perspective and how does one unify this, or not? How many possible perspectives are there and does truth become meaningless when it is prodigiously multifaceted? Thoughts? — Tom Storm

Yes you ask some probing questions. I might reply in more depth when I have the time to think it over, but a quick reply to one of the question you asked.

In terms of morality, this could be seen as a an extension to Rawl's veil of ignorance. Instead of not knowing your place in society, you have the perspective of every place in society. That which you would do if you had the combined perspective of everyone in society, is the moral thing to do. Just food for thought.

That tapwater fact that reality is given perspectively seems to imply this. What can we even mean by 'seeing around all perspectives' to get reality 'pure' ? It's like seeing a spatial object from no perspective at all, absurd. — plaque flag

I agree that seeing something from no perspective is meaningless and absurd. I do find something interesting in the different claim that objectivity is seeing something from every perspective. Now I am not claiming that this the answer to finding an objective perspective, because i am not sure it is. But I think exploring this avenue is somewhat useful and may reveal something.

In another thread I was debating about how a stick that is partial submerged in water appears bent in one direction from a particular perspective. Is the stick actually bent? Well we could move around to the other side of the pool and now the stick appears bent in the other direction. Interesting. We could jump in the pool and look at the stick with one eye out of the water and one eye inside. We could feel the stick with our hands so that we are not only "seeing" with out eyes.

Is it not the case that the person who sees the stick from all those perspectives has in some way a better understanding of the stick than the person who only sees it from one perspective?

Extending this, I put forth the following bit of speculative thinking. If a person were able to see the stick from every possible perspective (humanly impossible I know), then the combination of all those views, is the objective view.

Again, it depends on the context, science is more gray than most think. Especially in biology. Like I said you don't understand it as well as you think. — Darkneos

Give a precise example of where light does not behave according to Snell's law when passing from water to air? Can you give such a context? I doubt it.

It is clear who doesn't understand what they are talking about, and it is not me. But maybe you can explain your position in detail rather than just repeating that I don't understand?

That’s just not true. Refraction can sometimes be a trick like with water. That is also well understood in physics. I’m thinking you don’t get this as well as you’re making it out — Darkneos

There are no tricks in physics, I have no idea what you are talking about. Light changes direction at the boundary of two medium, given by Snell's law. It always behaves correctly according to Snell's law. Always.

There is no trick that happens sometimes.

In a sense it can be a trick of the light depending on the where — Darkneos

Refraction is never a trick. It is simply the way light behaves when moving from one medium to another where there is a change in wave speed. This is well understood in physics, there is no trick, just the normal behavior of light.

There is no stance, it's really just the brain. That fact is more or less solved at the moment and I am well aware of refraction hence it's not the brain's fault but the light playing tricks, like it sometimes does. It's the same for a mirage. — Darkneos

Refraction is not a trick of light. It is light behaving correctly as we understand it does.

No it is behaving wrongly because it appears bent when it isn't. It has nothing to do with the intuitive interpretation of the light, hence why it's an optical illusion. — Darkneos

Then I suggest you read up on refraction. Light is behaving correctly as we understand it when it redirects at the boundary between water and air. The light is not misbehaving.

It is our consciousness (or brain depending on your stance) interpreting the redirected light as a bent stick that is causing the confusion.

It actually does contradict what we know, you know need to know how light works to know that's an illusion. This is just wrong and we know the water is fooling us by "bending" the stick. — Darkneos

The light traveling from the stick to our retina is behaving as we know it should according to physics, when a stick in the water appears bent. It is not behaving wrongly. It is only our intuitive interpretation of this light that causes confusion.

Hrm!

Well, that wasn't as hard as I thought then. Unless there are lingering doubts out there.

But how do you make that move, maybe? If I were to tell someone in a conversation about democracy "look we understand one another, we're just disagreeing on conventions" -- how do you make that disagreement into a productive disagreement rather than the termination? — Moliere

Just to clarify my thoughts - if we understood what it is each other is saying, but disagreed on the word to use to represent the other's views, that is a disagreement on social conventions. Here we can continue the conversation once we understand in detail what each other means behind the word.

If we disagreed on the underlying concept itself, then that is a disagreement that might be about social convention or not, depending on the specifics. The continuation here would be specific to the underlying issue - a moral philosophy discussion, or a scientific discussion, etc.

An example of the second type above - If you think our political system should be such that everyone votes directly on each policy, while I think we should elect officials who then vote on policies.

An example of the first type above - Whether we should call your system, my system or both "democracy"

To disagree, after coming to understand one another, on definitions is to disagree upon social convention. — Moliere

Yes, I agree with this.

I suspect it does not happen. And I suspect vervet monkeys never mistakenly make the wrong warning call, i.e. misspeak. (On a related note, I believe they only call out "snake" is they believe there are other monkeys nearby to warn; it would also be nice to know if they ever mistakenly call or keep silent, but that's a side issue.) But there's no point in guessing and the world is a surprising place. — Srap Tasmaner

I wonder if small isolated societies misunderstand each other as much as we do. For example the isolated Amazon tribes. I would guess (and it is a guess or intuition) that they rarely misunderstand what it is they are saying, for the simple reason that they are likely to all share common definitions, values, world-views, etc.

Maybe the question is -- is there a time when a definition is true? Can we insist that a particular meaning is true of an utterance? Then the disagreement is about the meaning itself rather than, or perhaps also in addition to, disagreeing upon what we should strive for (or whatever it is the dispute is over). — Moliere

My stance is that within social conventions, yes a definition can be wrong as defined within those social conventions. Different social groups may define the word differently (different dialects, slang, technical jargon, etc).

Outside a social convention, no.

Let's take "socialism" -- I'm not sure I could write a dialogue demonstrating, but maybe our experiences with this word could suffice?

What does "socialism" mean?

There's more than one definition that people would offer, even among those who'd say they are socialists.

And there's a strange mixture of misunderstanding and half-understanding and pop-understanding along with more precise understandings of the meaning of socialism. — Moliere

This is I think a good example of what I suggested as elaboration. The multiple people who say "socialism" misunderstand what it is the others are saying. If instead they each communicated a couple of paragraphs explaining exactly what their view of socialism is, will this not reduce the misunderstanding?

Those people may still disagree on which detailed view is the one we should strive for, but that is then not a misunderstanding of meaning, but a disagreement (in the vein you talked about).

Thanks I will have a look

I find it interesting how many materialist/physicalist accounts of the mind assume the very thing they are explaining. This is often called a "hidden dualism" and amongst other things, I take this to mean that the dualism is "hidden" from the arguer. — schopenhauer1

I think most materialist/physicalist accounts are that of a form of materialistic monism, or physicalism, that rejects dualism altogether. The claim is that there is only one kind of thing - and that is the physical. Someone with such a stance would say your mistake is in trying to talk of the physical and mental as two different kinds of things.

This claim might be right or wrong, but I don't think it is a claim of hidden dualism.

I am unconvinced by this clam as it appears to me that the mental is categorically different to the physical, even if we are able to perfectly map the mental to the physical (individual neurons firing).

Just to be clear, I'm not pissing on science. I love science.

But I've got some experience with math and physics (went to school for that kind of thing, also computer science), and to me it seemed that people all too readily settled for a very 'local' semantics. It's presumably because of the specialization of knowledge. Everyone is afraid perhaps to speak outside their little yard. The positivist boogey man will get them ? — plaque flag

Absolutely, I'm not suggesting you are pissing on science.

As a first point of call, what I hope to get to myself, is a place where an understanding of science is self consistent.

Imagine a guy called Luke. It is fair enough if Luke takes after Feyeraband and it is fair enough if he takes after Popper. However I hope that whichever he takes after, he stays true to the assumptions underlying it. If Luke adopts Feyeraband but also believes strongly that many theories are pseudo-science, then I find that self contradictory. The same is true if Luke adopts Popper and believes there is no such thing as pseudo-science. And so on.

So I actually have less qualms if someone is scared of the positivist boogeyman, as long as they are consistent with such a position. I also have less qualms if someone isn't, as long as they don't invoke the positivist boogeyman when it suits them.

None of this is towards you or any particular poster here, but rather an overall theme I have seen as someone with a science background who is interested in philosophy.

I really don't personally mind if you are sold on the wonders of phenomenology, but such a statement suggests that you haven't much looked into it. Correct me if I am wrong, and I don't intend to be rude. — plaque flag

I certainly wouldn't classify myself as an expert on phenomenology, I have a shallower understanding than that. Quite possibly you have a better understanding than I do, so I welcome your views.

Phenomenology is methodological, but from my shallower understanding the method is different to that of science.

Take my quote from Einstein in my earlier post. Using a phenomenological method, having interviewed many people who have that same experience, one may come to the conclusion that time is indeed slower when you put your hand on a hot stove and quicker when you are spending time talking to someone you find attractive. This is saying something about time.

While a scientist would reject that notion and conclude that it says nothing about time. Instead you should put a clock in both scenarios and measure time that way, regardless of the experience.

Now a phenomenologist may ask "what is it the clock is doing?" and that is a valid question where the phenomenologist and scientist may share a good discussion.

So science and phenomenology share much (the last paragraph above), while also having methodological differences (the previous two paragraphs).

Am I along the correct track?

We definitely value predictive power, but I'd say that semantic robustness (an intensely developed clarity) is another genuine value that can't be quantified. — plaque flag

Agreed, semantic robustness is valued in science.

People can talk to one another and get a sense of others' development in this dimension on this or that topic, so it's not entirely subjective. It's just messier than physics. Like Husserl, I was a math guy before I got into phenomenology. We all learned the math without bothering to talk about what it all meant. Which statements were justified was clear enough, but what those statements really meant was hardly addressed. Ontology is so squishy and 'just opinion,' right ? [Ah but that's an ontological claim...] — plaque flag

Where I see a divide between phenomenology and science is in the method. Science (I would say all sciences) requires a level of methodological robustness that is not required by phenomenology.

You can talk to people in a mall about experience and write a book about it in free form, and this book may be well received in phenomenology circles. But you will find it harder to get that published in a scientific journal. However if you set up a questionnaire that you asked a selected representative sample in the mall, where in addition to verbose answers they also rated parts of their experience on a numerical scale, you are likely to find it easier to get that published in a scientific journal. It would also help if you performed a statistical analysis of the responses.

There is also a rationalist approach to science that in places contrasts with phenomenology. Take the Einstein quote:

"You put your hand on a hot stove for a minute, and it seems like an hour. Sit with a pretty girl for an hour, and it seems like a minute. That's relativity."

I would say experientially there is truth to that. However if he had published that as part of a scientific theory on time, it would certainly not have been accepted as science.

So while I think there is a large phenomenological aspect to science, I think there are important differences too.

Perhaps the scientific method can be partly described as a from of shared instrumental phenomenology with predictive power.

It is not pure phenomenology - just because you experience something, that is unlikely to simply be accepted as science. However if many people experience the same thing, and it can be methodologically ordered into a theory that explains the shared experiences, we see the start of what we might call science. If we then use instruments to record whatever it is that we experience, it becomes even more likely to be accepted as science. If this theory can be used to accurately make predictions (eg in experiments), then it comes even closer to what is accepted as mainstream science.

There is some truth to that - other things being equal the simpler theory is often preferred.

Either science is unique in some way — as many claim, and which I myself believe — or it isn’t. If it is, what makes it unique? The scientific method? That’s also been claimed, and I don’t agree with it. — Mikie

What is it you think makes science special, that is not the method? Could you elaborate? It seems to be from other posts that you have criteria that you use to evaluate whether a theory is science (the word evidence pops up a lot), what is this other than part of a method?

So is it intentionality that makes something scientific or pseudo-scientific? You clearly have a criteria to divide science and pseudo-science, so a limit of science is right there at that divide.

In order for a person to call something pseudo-science, they must first know the limit of science, to know that the pseudo-scientific theory lies outside the limit of science.

Well, we can start with the fact that there’s no credible evidence whatsoever for their claims or their beliefs. There’s very little evidence that manipulating vertebrae has any significant health benefits (beyond placebo), for instance. There’s no evidence that the positions of the planets have any demonstrable effect on human beings. And so forth. — Mikie

Ok, so just starting with your first paragraph, it seems a dividing line for science:
- Science requires evidence (material evidence? naturalistic assumptions? etc)

Does that not start to answer your OP? The scientific method requires evidence.

To answer the question in the OP "Does anyone still believe a “method” of science really exists?" - I would say you do believe such a method exists, and you use such a method to demarcate science from pseudo-science, including in many posts in this forum. In particular you think that materialistic evidence is an important part of the scientific method, and if there is a theory where the evidence does not support it, you are inclined to dismiss that theory as not scientific. Am I somewhat close?

I am not trying to be facetious or antagonistic, I'm sorry if it comes out that way. I think this is a great idea for a topic.

But what exactly are the pseudo science interests and how do they differ from science interest? And does the answer to that not also answer to a demarcation of science?

Am I correct in saying you are:
1) Unsure about the limits of science
2) Sure that there is pseudo-science
3) Pseudo science is not science

It seems that if 2) and 3) are true, then you are sure of at least some of the limits of science.

If I say theory X is pseudo-science because of a and b, then I am saying a and b are indicators that something is not science.

I don’t think sweeping, abstract claims can be made. You have to look at specific, real world examples. So, are horoscopes pseudoscience? Yes. Is chiropractic a pseudoscience? It depends - but mostly, yes. Is creation “Science” pseudoscience? Yes. And so on. You can demonstrate each fairly easily. — Mikie

I guess my question is why are horoscopes pseudoscience? Is it because of the method they use to come up with theories? Is it because of something else?

And the same question for the other things you called pseudoscience. There is some reason you call these pseudoscience, something that distinguishes them as not science. What is it? The answer to that question will provide a perspective on the line dividing science from not science.

As I've mentioned before, I think that the boundaries of our scientific understanding have expanded beyond the limits of convenient observability in space and time. Hence experimentalism has been replaced by modeling and simulation. Science has become much more of an architectonic pursuit. However this is itself a danger, because pseudo-science can also cloak itself in the garb of architectonic. Hence the confusion of the modern world. — Pantagruel

This is interesting because in the same paragraph you are unsure about the limits of science, while also worrying about pseudo-science. But does your worry of pseudo-science not suggest that you have some criteria to demarcate science and pseudo-science, at least roughly and intuitively if not concretely?

This may serve as a good starting point to understand the demarcation of science - what makes one theory science and another pseudo-science? Is it in the method used?

And does it exhibit a clear benefit in developing minds the way that science does in developing technologies? Is such a progressive evolution even happening at all? Presumably we are continuously becoming "more" than we were. As the nature of the world we inhabit expands along with our scientific awareness of it, our adaptation to the world must also proceed. — Pantagruel

Yes it does. It gives people tools with which to explore their beliefs, views, values, underlying assumptions, etc in a way that science alone can't. While science indeed gives us a tool to explore the world in ways philosophy alone can't. Both are needed.

Perhaps Philosophy pertains uniquely to the "value" sphere, as it is so commonly contrasted with science. Is there an ethical correlate to the scientific method, whose application can be seen to have fostered the development of the most enlightened minds? — Pantagruel

Yes. It is the old is/ought divide. Philosophy is uniquely useful on the ought side.

Where did your beliefs about cars come from? You didn't develop your beliefs in a vacuum. At some point you saw a car, or were told about cars, or interacted with cars. — Sam26

Or imagined it or dreamed it?

Yes my belief in this specific example would be because of actions, but I don;t think it is necessarily so.

Try peace and prosperity. — Vera Mont

Absolutely, that would be great.

But which comes first? Peace and prosperity or better communication? I don't see peace and prosperity if people struggle to communicate with each other.

I don't think that's what he meant. I think PhilosophyRunner meant that often when people talk they assume that their words will be interpreted as they interpret them, from their point of view, with all of their assumptions. Sometimes people recognize the need to spell out those assumptions, but often they don't. Philosophy is obsessive about spelling out assumptions -- witness you here bringing up nominalism -- but ordinarily people aren't, hence @PhilosophyRunner's suggestion that understanding can be improved by what he calls "elaboration," which I take to mean people spelling out their assumptions, their point-of-view. That's all. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes that's exactly what I mean (in a thread about meaning).

I was not suggesting nominalism in particular. Rather I was suggesting that people in political discussions elaborate and explain their world views in detail, explicitly state their assumptions and question them. There would still be much disagreement, of course, but the disagreement would be specific to where the divide actually is, rather than a sledgehammer of a disagreement that seeks to simply smash the other side.

Today Peter and Mary will shout at each other "Your views are disgusting, I want justice" while tomorrow maybe they will have a debate about Peter's nominalism and Mary's moral realism which is their actual divide. A better world would be one where people disagree with scalpels and not with sledgehammers.

I also think you monkey example is an interesting one:

"A sense of fairness has long been considered purely human -- but animals also react with frustration when they are treated unequally by a person. For instance, a well-known video shows monkeys throwing the offered cucumber at their trainer when a conspecific receives sweet grapes as a reward for the same task."

All those monkeys share a sense of fairness, but disagreements may ensure.

Should the monkeys get equal food for equal tasks? Should they get their preferred food for equal tasks (even if that is different). Should the monkeys that are hungrier and/or malnourished get more food for the same task? Should weaker monkeys get the same food even if they do not complete the same task? Should older monkeys get the same food even if they are unable to complete the same task? etc.

Those may be discussion points that would ensure in a discussion around monkey politics. What are the worldviews underpinning different stances for those questions? What common ground can be found, and what specific disagreements are there? What assumptions underline those different stances?

However what we are more likely to see in political discussion today is a slogan by one side about fairness, and a counter slogan form the other side about fairness. And that is lamentable.

There is an element of that when disagreement is over some fundamental concept, like the equality of citizens or what the cardinal sins and virtues are. In that kind of situation, words like "right" and "justice" and "value" have the same linguistic root yet represent different ideas. — Vera Mont

You are correct here, however I will add a caveat.

When people use these words in the context you describe, they are often being taciturn. When person A says "I want justice," they really mean "I want justice in line with my values and my worldview." When person B says "I want justice" they also mean the same. Of course, if persons A and B have different values or worldviews, then what "justice" looks to them is different. However I would put forward that the problem is not a misunderstanding of the word, rather that the word is being used as a short form for more than just itself. Simple elaboration clarifies the misunderstanding.

I am interested in figuring out a framework for people with different politics, values, etc to communicate effectively with each other, and I see this as one of the biggest stumbling blocks.

Another example in politics that I see all sides throw at one another - divisive. People will say "X is being divisive." However the way this is often used actually means "X is being divisive and I want them to come in line with my values and worldview, and I refuse to move towards them or meet halfway even if that will solve the divisiveness because I find their values and worldview deplorable."

A lot of misunderstanding can simply be solved by elaboration. One thing I like about this forum is the elaboration, it certainly helps healthy discussions.

I suggest you read up on inertial and non-inertial frames of reference. I think your misunderstanding stems from not knowing the difference between them and treating both as if there is no difference.

There's definitely a relation between individuals and beliefs, this seems obvious. However, I would go further, viz., beliefs are relations between individuals and certain types of actions. Individuals show their beliefs by what they do (actions). So I can express that I believe that an object X is a car by using a proposition. I can also show my belief in cars without using language, by getting into the car, working on the car, changing a tire, etc. It's the conscious individual that gives life to a belief in relation to the world. — Sam26

How would you explain belief where there is no action? If I take a trek into the Amazon rain forest, where I perform no actions relating to cars (don't speak about cars, don't get into cars, don't see cars, etc) I do not stop believing in cars.

So, now we have 2 accelerations; one is negative, the other positive. What do we do at this point?
If we have two cars having velocities of v1 and –v2(since it is going towards v1), relative to the road, what will the observers within the car measure the relative velocity between themselves?
It’s not going to be v1 – v2, but v1 + v2....I see the same problem for the two accelerations. — Gampa Dee

There you have done an excellent job, and now have acceleration from an inertial frame of reference. Great. You wanted the acceleration, now you have them.

Then you try to move that to the frame of reference of the earth and of the rock, at which point Newton's laws are no longer valid. This step is wrong. You can change the coordinate system, that is fine, but when you change it so that the origin is an accelerating body, Newton's laws no longer work correctly.

To use your car example, I am standing on the pavement not accelerating. I see one car (A) moving accelerating at 3m/s2 towards my left and another car (B) accelerating at 5m/s2 towards my right. That is simply the acceleration of the cars. It is meaningless (from a classical mechanics sense) to then add these up and say car A is accelerating at 8m/s2 from the point of view of the car B. Neither car is accelerating at 8m/s2. Car A is accelerating at 3m/s2 and car B at 5m/s2.