How about the idea that our individual hypotheses designed to anticipate events are validated or invalidated by the way those events transpire, with the catch being that the events we compare our hypotheses with are themselves derived from our constructions?
— Joshs

That sounds like denying there is a territory being mapped by our minds/brains, and to me it would seem a little silly to believe there is no territory being mapped, and yet also believe that you are something other than a figment of my imagination — wonderer1

It is denying that knowing is direct correspondence , representing or mirroring between knower and world. Scientific and other forms of knowing, far from being the epistemological representing of a reality independent of the knower, is the evolving construction of a niche. We are worldmakers rather than world-mirrorers, whose constructions are performances that pragmatically intervene in the world that we co-invent , changing it in ways that then talk back to us in a language responsive to how we have formulated our questions. This discursive account accords with the postmodern philosophy of science that Joseph Rouse espouses:

“…the "objects" to which our performances must be held accountable are not something outside discursive practice itself. Discursive practice cannot be understood as an intralinguistic structure or activity that then somehow "reaches out" to incorporate or accord to objects. The relevant "objects" are the ends at issue and at stake within the practice itself. "The practice itself," however, already incorporates the material circumstances in and through which it is enacted. Practices are forms of discursive and practical niche construction in which organism and environment are formed and reformed together through an ongoing, mutually intra-active reconfiguration.”

Seems like a rather fatalistic view to think we can't know anything about reality independent of agreement with other people. Not to mention a little silly in light of the history of humans learning things, that we can to some degree look back and see. — wonderer1

How about the idea that our individual hypotheses designed to anticipate events are validated or invalidated by the way those events transpire, with the catch being that the events we compare our hypotheses with are themselves derived from our constructions? In other words, truth and falsity are relative to our constructed schemes, not some scheme-independent reality.

But the thing is, smoking is much less common now than it was 30 or 40 years ago.
— BC

I wonder if that has just been offset by vaping and now marijuana. That is, more alternatives. — Hanover

The key question is if rates of lung cancer are continuing to drop or whether they are starting to move in the wrong direction.

On the other hand affect without thought is not without significance, but is of no discursive significance. — Janus

If by discourse you mean language, isnt verbal discourse merely a formalized product of a more fundamental discursive process of inter-affection? And is there ever affect without thought? What is thinking if not construing on the basis of similarities and differences, and what is construing if not a way of being affected by events? Isnt the distinction between thought and feeling arbitrary and unjustified? When dispositions to act and acts themselves, being and becoming, feeling and intention, state and function, body and mind are treated as separately inhering states, then their relations are rendered secondary and arbitrary, requiring extrinsic causations to piece them together.

The question then is, what does affectivity "say" in the setting of being restored to its place?
— Astrophel

Affectivity alone does not say anything, it is just feeling — Janus

Reminds me of Heidegger's encapsulation of the long-standing Western attitude toward affect.

“Psychology, after all, has always distinguished between thinking, willing, and feeling. It is not by chance that it will always name feeling in the third, subordinate position. Feelings are the third class of lived experience. For naturally man is in the first place the rational living being.”

In opposition to this view, enactivists insist that cognitive and affective processes are closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world , and that affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As Matthew Ratcliffe puts it, “moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether theoretical or practical.”

Embodied theorists reverse the traditional scheme of prioritization of thought over feelings, by making affective inputs the condition of possibility of relevance and meaning in thought. It is through the feeling body that things show up as salient; an alteration in how the body feels is at the same time a shift in how the world appears and in how one relates to it.

As a solution, we are told that the mind cannot be reduced to matter, but if we introduce "form" into the equation, things are resolved. And this is where my total confusion begins.

If Jaworsky claims that it is logical to believe that a particle with 0 consciousness can form consciousness, how can he believe that a particle with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can create consciousness? — Eugen

For me the problem with Jaworsky’s model is the assumption that materiality, including such things as the nature of particles, can be separated from structural aspects, as if changes in structural organization don’t have any effect on what a particle is. As an example of an alternative to Jaworsky’s thinking, physicist and philosopher Karen Barad writes:

On my agential realist elaboration, phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of “observer” and “ob­served”; rather, phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components.” That is, phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata. The notion of intra­-action (in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata) represents a profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the “components” of phenomena become determinate and
that particular embodied concepts become meaningful.

Let me guess. That’s not the point of your issue with Jaworsky.

We neither live in a simulation nor a ‘real’ universe, if ‘real’ here means an environment unaffected in its meaning by linguistic and material interactions among humans and between humans and that world. We co-construct the sense of the real through social interaction as well as via individual perspectival practices. The real is enacted, not passively observed.
— Joshs

And yet what you don't know can still kill you — jorndoe

If you absolutely don’t know it, it can’t do anything to you because it has no existence from your perspective. How you know something determines the way you construe what it does to you.

It has recently been shown, rather convincingly [for me, at least,] that we cannot distinguish between living in a simulation and living in a 'real' universe. — Torus34

We neither live in a simulation nor a ‘real’ universe, if ‘real’ here means an environment unaffected in its meaning by linguistic and material interactions among humans and between humans and that world. We co-construct the sense of the real through social interaction as well as via individual perspectival practices. The real is enacted, not passively observed.

unfortunately the forum itself is not moderated,
— Darkneos

This site is moderated — Ludwig V

I believe @Darkneous was talking about
https://forum.philosophynow.org/
which, however, is also moderated.

only young people like Nietzsche's final period best — Srap Tasmaner

Which writings would you place within Nietzsche’s final period?

Do you accept the realism of the enactivist/pragmatist as having properly gone beyond Kant now? What we experience of the world is the self-centred reality of its affordances — apokrisis

yes, I think that’s right.

Kantian Transcendental Idealism is an outgrowth of Christianity. Do you think that people shouldn't outgrow Christianity? — wonderer1

They should. And realism should outgrow Kantian Idealism. But most forms of realism in fact haven’t outgrown it. That’s what the author I quoted meant when he said that Kant “lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality.”

He goes on:

“ On the standard view, idealism and realism are incompatible philosophical theo­ries. For Kant, however, they are not. He rather claims that transcendental idealism and empirical realism form a unity, i.e., only in combination they demonstrate that objects of external perception are real: Transcendental idealists hold that the objects as we represent them in space and time are appearances and not things-in-them­selves. This, according to Kant, implies empirical realism, i.e., the view that the rep­resented objects of our spatio-temporal system of experience are real beings outside us. “

Relative to the OP’s assertion that “this forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is”, I would make the opposite claim concerning Kantian Idealism. It is more popular among allegedly anti-Idealist empirical realists than they realize.

I wonder if you can assist me to better understand the issue of how language does (or does not) map onto the world and what the significance of this matter might be for philosophy. I have done some modest reading in this space but am curious what others think.

If we suppose that there no realist notion of language, what is it that language does when we attempt to describe reality? (I've generally held that language is metaphorical, but then what?) — Tom Storm

I would say that language doesn’t simply represent, describe or map onto a pre-existing world, it maps out a way to go on. When we use a word , it forms a bridge between the memory of our previous usage and the new circumstance that it helps to create. To name something is to help bring it into existence as this freshly relevant event.

It I say there is a cat on the mat as a real fact, I hope to get away with offering that single word “cat” and thus by implication eliminating every other interpretation you might have had.

There is no tank, or armadillo, or Empire State Building, on the mat instead. You can be sure of that. An infinity of alternative realities are being dismissed by my plain speaking realism. But by the same token, all those unactualised realities now seem confusingly like “actual possibilities” — apokrisis

It seems to me that when I say there is a cat on the mat,
there is more that must be understood besides a fact of the matter; namely the sense of the matter itself. Is what I mean by cat and mat the same as what you understand them to mean? This is especially pertinent if you deny that there is a cat on the mat. We might have to investigate to what extent what I intend to convey is compatible with the way you are interpreting my utterance. In traditional logical conceptions of the meaning of words, when a person employs a concept they have simply embraced a set of objects and ignored all others, the way a dictionary does.
But this isn’t how people use words. The actual use of a world creates a distinction not between it and an indiscriminate infinity of alternative realities, but between it and contrasting meanings that are specifically RELEVANT to the context in which the word is being used.

This forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is. The Philpapers survey says:

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Accept or lean toward: non-skeptical realism 760 / 931 (81.6%)
Other 86 / 931 (9.2%)
Accept or lean toward: skepticism 45 / 931 (4.8%)
Accept or lean toward: idealism 40 / 931 (4.3%) — wonderer1

One problem with this survey is that modern realism is itself an outgrowth of Kantian Transcendental Idealism.

“… “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism… Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality.” (Dietmar Heidemann)

There are of course other forms of Idealism than Kant’s, so you might want to specify what you have in mind.

Nietzsche had his own theories how the world functions. I think his extremely cynical views represent biologism. Or that the world becomes "fatally" ordered or disordered through the battle of strong and weak ones. — waarala

Deleuze, Foucault and Heidegger were profoundly sly influenced by Nietzsche’s ideas. None of them would label his views biologism. Instead, in their readinga he offers an overturning of Platonic metaphysics by placing difference as prior to identity.

But forgery and fakery are only possible if there is an original - so how does this all work? — Tom Storm

Why not forgery and fakery all the way down? As Nietzsche asks:

“Why shouldn't the world that is relevant to us – be a fiction? And if someone asks: “But doesn't fiction belong with an author?” – couldn't we shoot back: “Why? Doesn't this ‘belonging' belong, perhaps, to fiction as well? Aren't we allowed to be a bit ironic with the subject, as we are with the predicate and object? Shouldn't philosophers rise above the belief in grammar? With all due respect to governesses, isn't it about time philosophy renounced governess-beliefs?” – The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (1901/1967 Will to Power.)

Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.” (Difference and Repetition)
— Joshs

That's an interesting call to arms but I guess it's hard for most of us to apprehend how we can do this? Is it an act of will? Pardon my literalism but in glorifying the reign of simulacra, does my Picasso print become equal to the one hanging in the museum — Tom Storm

It’s not as act of will , it’s an act of insight, understanding that there is no such thing as an original. It’s only as a contrivance, a sleight of hand, an illusion that we refer contingent particulars back to propositional or axiomatic forms, universals, foundations. Ever see Orson Wells’ film ‘F for Fake’?

Lloyd Gleeson, who is one of the leading academics in this area, says in his most recent book Platonism vs Naturalism, that Platonism is philosophy, in that it delineates the specific questions and subject matter unique to philosophy as distinct from natural science. I don't expect that will win anyone over, though ;-) (See Edward Feser, Join the Ur-Platonist Alliance!) — Wayfarer

I’m with Deleuze here:

“The whole of Platon­ism is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between 'the thing itself' and the simulacra. Difference is not thought in itself but re­lated to a ground, subordinated to the same and subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.” (Difference and Repetition)

Are you arguing for some kind of moral relativism? Do you hold that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are norms some societies can morally advocate and enforce or what?

I can make sense of why men would selfishly cooperate to impose moral norms such as "women must be submissive to men". That is easy to understand. But making sense of it in terms of why they did it has nothing to do with its morality. — Mark S

Oh yeah, I’m a super-duper moral relativist. Which doesn’t mean I don’t believe that there isnt some sort of progress in moral behavior. What it means is that I don’t think that moral progress should be thought of in terms of the yardstick of conformity to any universal norms, whether religious, social or biological in origin. “ Women must be submissive to men” and “Homosexuality is evil” are immoral to the same extent as Newtonian physics, Lamarckism biology or Skinnerian psychology are considered inadequate explanations of the empirical phenomena they attempt to organize in comparison with more recent theories.

I suggest that labeling behavior as selfish or lazy is precisely failing to make sense of another’s motives. It’s a substitute for doing due diligence in understanding how things seemed to the person at the same that they acted.

"Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are common parts of traditional moralism. Now I can explain why people thought they were moral but since they contradict morality's function of solving the cooperation/exploitation dilemma, I know they are immoral. — Mark S

Did you come from a religious background by any chance? You don’t see the link between your wrapping this narrative in the cloak of science and religious norms of conduct?

Failing to understand why people’s attempts to get along with others fall short of your standards can lead you in one of two directions. You can either experiment with your construction of the puzzling and seemingly ‘immoral’ behavior of a group or individual until you come up with a more effective way to understand why it represented the best moral thinking for therm at the time, or you can blame them for your inability to make sense of their actions , slap a label of immorality on it and try and knock some sense into them. One can do this just as easily within a scientific as a religious justification. Instead of blaming the evil intent of an autonomously free willing subject, we blame forces outside of the control of the person, either inner demons like biological drives, instincts, incentives, or we blame social forces.

Ten people can enthusiastically agree on the importance of cooperation and the need to avoid exploitation, and yet each of them will construe the sense of these concepts in different ways, and your universalistic template for cooperation flattens and conceals those different senses. As a result, the behavior of some of those ten people may very well appear immoral to you.

What's your essential perspective on moral 'foundations'? — Tom Storm

I believe that moral reasoning originates in the individual’s attempts to make sense of their experiences of social relations, and at the core of this is the aim to anticipate behavior. Guilt is a key element of moral feeling, and the personal construction of guilt involves the assessment that we are responsible for a breach of intimacy or trust with another person or group. Culturally normative standard of morality are abstractions derived from these personal assessments. The belief in universal moral foundations is one way to try to explain how individuals end up alienated from others, but it is a kind of approach that makes morality dependent on blame, finger-pointing, the notion of culpability and reprehensiveness. I think this is an inadequate way of understanding behavior thar deviates from our expectations. One can have a morality devoid of blame , culpability and punishment, a morality not aimed at achieving conformity to norms but instead an ‘audacious’ ought that helps us to reconstrue what we cannot deny.

My central point has been that moral norms for bad cooperation are bad because they exploit others such as "women must be submissive to men" and "homosexuality is evil". It is bad cooperation because it acts opposite to the function of morality - solving cooperation/exploitation problems. Bad cooperation creates cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Harming children would usually be included under exploitation as bad behavior. For example, harming children to benefit others.

But if harming children is merely a side effect of having no moral regard for children, we can agree that is evil, but the reasons for being evil might better be found in traditional moral philosophy. Science tells us important things about morality but cannot tell us everything about morality. — Mark S

Does that satisfy you or does it seem to you that it is just repackaging traditional moralism in new garb, as if there is such a thing as “ universal morality” , or that claiming that evolution wires us to be cooperative doesn’t just push back the question posed by social norms into the lap of biology.
For one thing, it passes the buck on the question of why we desire to cooperate with each other. It’s because “Evolution told us to”.

The only person presuming that science tells us what we imperatively ought to do (the only person committing the naturalistic fallacy) is you. You alone are making this error.

I have repeatedly emphasized that this science, like the rest of science, can only supply instrumental oughts and is silent on ultimate goals. — Mark S

Apparently Hilary Putnam also makes this ‘error’. Putnam makes the argument that if the basis of our valuative, ethical judgements is an evolutionary adaptation shared by other animals then it is as though we are computers programmed by a fool ( selection pressure) operating subject to the constraints imposed by a moron (nature). Putnam says “One cannot discover laws of nature unless one brings to nature a set of a priori prejudices which is not hopelessly wrong.” And those prejudices cannot themselves be a product of blind evolution.

He concludes “Without the cognitive values of coherence, simplicity, and instrumental efficacy we have no world and no facts, not even facts about what relative to what. And these cognitive values, I claim, are simply a part of our holistic conception of human flourishing. Bereft of the old realist idea of truth as "correspondence" and of the positivist idea of justification as fixed by public "criteria," we are left with the necessity of seeing our search for better conceptions of rationality as an intentional activity which, like every activity that rises above the mere following of inclination or obsession, is guided by our idea of the good.
If coherence and simplicity are values, and if we cannot deny with out falling into total self-refuting subjectivism that they are objective (notwithstanding their "softness," the lack of well-defined "criteria," and so forth), then the classic argument against the objectivity of ethical values is totally undercut.”

y. We might be able to connect him with the science of 2070. — frank

Could be.

What an astounding assertion. Do they have any predictions about which century this update will be downloaded? — frank

Astounding? Not when it comes to biology, neuroscience or cognitive science

The newer naturalized models are already out there.Lynn Margulis’ work on symbiosis and the new synthesis updates biological thinking, and as far as physics is concerned, writers like Karen Barad, a physicist and philosopher, and Michel Bitbol, interpret quantum field theory in terms that move away from the old naturalism.

There's a problem with trying to go from Merleau-Ponty to any of the hard sciences. There's just no bridge from his observations about what we can and can't separate, and biology, or its scientific mother, physics. Science starts with a methodological naturalism where analysis is built-in. There's no roo — frank

Science starts from whatever metaphysics informs it at the time, which is why there is no such thing as ‘science’ as some specific methodology that encompasses all eras of empiricism. If there is no bridge between science and Mwrleau-Ponty, it is because the particular brand of naturalism that a science is in thrall to makes no room for Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Varela, Thompson, Gallagher, Petitot and others claim phenomenology can be naturalized
once we transform and update our thinking about scientific naturalism so as to accommodate it.

So there is a faultline in the human psyche that just isn't properly realised even within mainstream psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It is only in sociology and anthropology does this extra level of situatedness simply seem the bleeding obvious — apokrisis

Could you given an example from the work of a specific sociologist or anthropologist illustrating this extra level of situatedness missing from mainstream psychology? Can you think of any non-mainstream approaches in psychology that realize this faultline? What about embodied enactivist accounts that, following Merleau-Ponty, make intersubjectivity primary? For instance, Shaun Gallagher writes:

“…intersubjective (social and cultural) factors already have an effect on our perception and understanding of the world, even in the immediacy of our embodied and instrumental copings with the environment.”

I can think of no examples of metaphysics becoming science. — Janus

Metaphysics becomes science in the same way poetry becomes music or literature becomes dance, through a shift in modality of expression.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does — frank

You haven’t mentioned affect, emotion, feeling and mood. These are considered bodily by embodied approaches to cognition, and there is no consciousness that is devoid of affect. “Cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body states.”(Ratcliffe 2002)

t the interface of past and future is the present. I'm not clear what you are saying different? I think I have made the time difference fairly clear. A cat sits by the mouse hole waiting for a mouse; there is anticipation but it is now. there is memory, but it is now. Now there is the acorn, now there is a sound, now there is the acorn. Never do you get the story of the pursuit of the acorn, an interruption and the return to the acorn - that is the human narrative, and resides nowhere in the squirrel. — unenlightened

The interface of past and future is past, present and future together as an indissociable structural unity . If you try and split off the present from retention and protention, the present vanishes. There is never just this acorn right now in this moment for the squirrel. The present acorn is only what it is right now in the context of what it just was and what the squirrel expects it to be. This reaching into the past and future is inseparable from the immediate ‘now’, and makes it possible for living systems to be goal-driven anticipative sense-makers. This is a central principle of time consciousness in phenomenology. If memory and anticipation are ‘now’ for an animal, this is just as true for a human being.

A non-linguistic animal cannot form a narrative identity; they learn things - not to eat the yellow snow, but they never form the identity "I don't like yellow snow", they just avoid it when they see it. So they do not live in time, psychologically. they are always just here and now, with whatever they know, which is nothing of themselves — unenlightened

I would argue that a non-linguistic animal lives in the interface of past, present and future just as humans do. Watch a squirrel be interrupted in its pursuit of an acorn by a stray sound, and then return to its goal. This reorientation is only possible because animals interpret the present though a richly integrated web of memories that project expectations for the future The present ‘now’ is the interaction between this remembered history and anticipations that point to the future. It’s not that animals live more in the ‘now’ than humans, but the reinterpreted and reconstructed past out of which their anticipations deposit their ‘now’ is less complexly organized than in humans. But this is not solely due to linguistic narratives. Pre-linguistic infants are also goal-oriented anticipatory sense-makers. As far as self -knowledge is concerned, the self is just an ongoing correlation of events taking place in time. The idea of self as identity is just a construct, useful
for different purposes in different situations. For instance, correlating the changes in the position of perceived objects
in relation to the movement of one’s body produces the construct of self as body , as zero point of interactions with an environment A hawk has this pragmatic construct of self as bodily zero point. This allows it to maneuver so precisely in flight.

Here, Butler does not refer back to Foucault’s discursive formation of socially constructed shared pattern of thinking and behaving. Instead, she implicitly invokes the decisive role of the global digital medium. Accordingly, as Deleuze points out in ‘The Postscript of control society,’ we should discern the bits and flows of data that make up dividuals and data banks, always passing beneath the individual. The newest techniques of power permeate the patterns of desires, ideas, and imaginations that constitute our subjectivity and agency — Number2018

That’s interesting, thanks. So you think that Deleuze is in closer accord with Butler on this matter than he is with Foucault?

Foucault’s approach is quite different from Butler’s — Number2018

I know that Foucault’s approach is different from Butler’s. I was simplifying my argument to focus on a notion of discursive formations as thematically patterned structures or epistemes.

Foucault rejects the essentialist perspective on the source of power as an ultimate instance of rights, identity, intelligibility, or recognition — Number2018

I’m aware of this. While this is true of Foucault , it is not true of transgender activists influenced to some extent by Foucaultian ideas who nevertheless retain a rights-based political orientation. Again, my aim in this discussion is not a correct reading of Foucault but an explication of how current concepts of gender invoked by transgender activists and feminists have been influenced to an extent by Foucault and social constructionism.

my view of gender is actually much closer to the social constructionist approaches to gender of authors like Butler and Foucault than your cultural perspective is. Like me, they view gender in terms of a constellation of shared patterns of behaviors that bind communities.
— Joshs

Of course, but that's in full agreement with my definition of gender as well. Gender is socially constructed, and gender is often used as a binding or enforcement tool for behaviors that the particular culture desires people to act on — Philosophim

I thought your definition of gender was whatever someone says it is, because your view of social construction is randomly assigned behavioral definitions by individuals, or groups who wield power over individuals to force them to act in certain ways. Foucault wrote a book called The Order of Things. In it, he presented what he called an archeological model of modern cultural history, extending from the Renaissance to the Modern era, and dividing this span into three segments, which he called epistemes. Each episteme ties together ideas from a range of cultural modalities that includes linguistics, the sciences and economic theory. Specifically, the various cultural modalities within an episteme fit together as variations on a shared theme or logic defining that era.

As Western culture shifted its thinking from one episteme to a new one, all these cultural modalities were transformed as aspects of a unified pattern. For Foucault, the ideas that comprise an episteme are the result of power flowing through and between individual subjectivities. This power is not to be understood as being controlled by any group or individual to be wielded against others they dominate. “…power is everywhere not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere”. Power is not possessed by a dominant agent, nor located in that agent's relations to those dominated, but is instead distributed throughout complex social networks. Put differently, a culture produces its sciences and other forms of knowledge via a reciprocal interaffecting that incudes material arrangements and practices.

The key notion I want to emphasize from this summary is that for Foucault socially constructed knowledge and values are not imposed on a community by an individual or group wielding power and desiring that the community act a certain way. Instead, they form an integrated pattern of understanding with its own internal ‘logic’ not imposed by anybody in particular, and not in top down fashion but disseminating itself through a culture from the bottom up , as a shared pattern of thinking and behaving. As I pointed out earlier, this notion of pattern of experiencing shared by a community but not arbitrarily imposed on it by an individual or group is missing from your concepts of social construction and gender.

Should gender override objective sex division in society? Should a straight man be able to identify as gay even if they could never be attracted to another man? Should a man who wears a dress suddenly be recognized in society as a woman? Should be sister be labeled a man because she doesn't identify with what some people in America think a woman should be like? — Philosophim

I think we get into the same problems of stereotyping you pointed out in trying to distinguish objective from subjective with regard not only to gender but to the seemingly simple task of defining what it means to be attracted to someone on the basis of their ‘sex’. That’s why the alphabet of lgbqt keeps on growing and changing. We also have to include polyamory , incels and a whole boat of new delineations. According to those who argue that gender is a constellatory pattern or theme rather than independent behaviors, we are not attracted to another merely because of whether they have breasts or a penis, but how they manifest their sexuality via their gender behavior. For instance, I am more attracted to men who are in the middle of the spectrum than either hypermasculine or hyperfeminine acting men. Furthermore, I am not exclusively attracted to men, but the ones I am attracted to are more on the androgynous end of the spectrum. I think our culture is going to move away from using labels like gay and lesbian to refer to allegedly objective features of attraction based solely on anatomy.

Your question about how society should make decisions concerning how and whether to recognize the sexual or gendered categories people are claiming for themselves can be looked at from a pragmatic point of view:
what is the usefulness of doing so? How does society benefit? You might argue that it has been useful to offer legal protections for same-sex relations and partnerships because one is able to define and identify same-sex attraction objectively. We know there are significant segments of our culture who fit into this category, and denying them rights has social consequences. But as I suggested, the lines are being blurred between what is subjective and what is objective in this arena. Many now argue that the concept of psychological gender is no more subjective that what labels like gay and lesbian supposedly refer to.

This much I can tell you. It may not be practical for a community to make political decisions protecting the rights of individuals to behave in ways that that community considers to be the result of private whim or compulsion on the part of the individual, and does appear to belong to a larger pattern, constellation or theme of personality that all of us possess, each in their own way. In other words, if that community defines gender the way you do, as random, subjective whim, then that community cannot justify enacting new and special public protections for something considered to be a private choice like any other, for which the already-in-place protections for freedom of speech are more than adequate.

As with the gay rights movement, such protections will arise first from out of transgender, feminist and related communities themselves. The key terms in your questions have to do with recognizing and identifying. The trans, feminist and postmodern philosophical communities believe strongly that they already know how to recognize and identify something more than just private choice, whim , compulsion in what they call gender. A parent of a young biological girl who wants to dress like a boy, change their name to a boy’s name and ultimately transition surgically will behave differently depending on whether they grasp the concept of gender as inborn personality pattern vs random desire. In the first case, they will know what sorts of questions to ask and what sorts of behavior to look for to get a sense of whether their child is indeed transgender as opposed to just following trends of fashion.

This is why new protections are coming from these communities and the progressive urban environments that are sympathetic to them, and are being fought tooth and nail by conservative communities with no concept of gender outside of random private whim.

I want to make one last point. You have characterized gender as a question of nature vs nurture, and have opted to explain it as a social construct. It may have seemed that my disagreement with you rested on my claim for an inborn gender personality trait. But the essence of my claim rests not on nature vs nurture , objective vs subjective, but on the very attempt to understand gender or sexual into a split between objective and subjective. My argument is constructivist. Objectivity is a subjective and intersubjective construction. Even though my focus on this discussion has been on inborn patterns, my view of gender is actually much closer to the social constructionist approaches to gender of authors like Butler and Foucault than your cultural perspective is. Like me, they view gender in terms of a constellation of shared patterns of behaviors that bind communities. It is no accident that gender studies emerged out of cultural studies, which fed off of the work of French poststructuralists like Foucault and Deleuze.

science is backing away from naive realism to understand the world of abstract quantification. Epistemic method replaces ontic claims about what is "really out there".

To suggest information or entropy are then "the real thing in itself" is to completely misrepresent the scientific enterprise. They are not new terms for substantial being. They are part of the journey away from that kind of naive realism which deals in matter or mind as the essential qualitative categories of nature. — apokrisis

I’m curious if you’re familiar with the work of any of the so-called ‘New Materialists’, such as physicist and feminist philosopher Karen Barad, and what you think of them. They reject both naive realism and the exclusive reliance on discursive language and social construction among post-structuralists like Foucault.

if I believe that a gay person should act a particular way that has nothing to do with the definition of being gay, that's gender based on my culture. If I believe a schizophrenic should act a different way that has nothing to do with the definition of being shizophrenic, that's comparable to gender.

This is the exact comparison with sex and gender. To be gay, you must be a male who finds other men sexually attractive. That's it. Whether you like Lady Ga Ga or not is irrelevant. Whether someone believes that to be gay, you must like Lady Ga Ga or not is irrelevant. People's beliefs in how you should act, dress, etc as a gay man do not alter the fact you are a gay man. — Philosophim

When the term ‘gay’ because popular, it was seen by the general public as strictly a description of same-sex attraction and nothing else. When I recognized myself as gay, the term meant much more to me than this. It referred to my gender, not in the way you mean gender as an arbitrary whim or compulsion to exhibit some behavior disconnected from any larger pattern, but gender as a constellation of behaviors caused by an inborn perceptual setpoint. i think the rise of interest in the concept of transgender among the public is making up for the fact that terms like ‘straight’, gay’ , ‘lesbian’ and ‘bi’ that refer exclusively to who one is sexually attracted to are just the tip of the iceberg. As descriptors, they leave out what people are belatedly coming to realize constitute much richer aspects of gendered personality that just the fact of knowing who one chooses to sleep with completely misses , even though it is inextricably linked to these richer aspects of personality.

What you are advocating for is that someone's stereotypes, be it racism, sexism, classism, etc, should be the sole decider of one's objective identification — Philosophim

Let’s talk about stereotypes and sexism. I think you might agree that the concept of a stereotype depends on the association of a particular meaningful content with some aspect of someone’s behavior, and that content is treated in an over generalized way, forcing all sorts of differences into a single category which does not fit them.

Now let’s think about my previous discussion of perceptual setpoint and the terms I used to attempt to describe the patterns of behavior that I suggested are generated by the relative masculinization or feminization of setpoint.
As in the choice of any particular terms, my descriptors could easiliy lend themselves to stereotyping. In fact, I would argue that settling for any specific contentful terms , such as masculine and feminine, guarantee stereotyping.

But the reason that I introduced to you my notion of perceptual setpoint was not at all to assign and lock in place a certain set of concepts , a laundry list of specific behaviors that we must then force all of us into (masculinity means THIS set of traits and femininity mean THAT set of traits).
What I was trying to demonstrate was that gender, like many other personality traits or dispositions, is inborn and, while it evolves in its expression as we mature, has a relative stability over the course of our lives. In addition, while no two people share the same gender, there are close overlaps among elements of the larger community which make it possible for individuals with a particular gender to recognize themselves in a subcommunity and as a result feel a closeness to other members of thar subcommunity on the basis of overlapping gender behavior that they don’t feel with those outside of that subcommunity.

Th concepts that are key here are shared or overlapping patterns of behavior. The concepts that are not useful to me are specifically locked in descriptors of the supposed content associated with terms like masculine and feminine.

Discovering that one is on the autism spectrum can be tremendously empowering in two different ways. First, it ties together a range of behaviors in oneself that makes one different from the norm and unifies them. It thus allows one to understand one’s own self better and is thus liberating. Second, it allows one to discover an autistic community within one can not only feel ‘normal’ , but can politically empower one to question why autistism needs to be pathologized or ‘othered’ by the mainstream. Just as with concepts of masculinity and femininity, the definitions of autistic behavior and causation undergoes change all the times. Each era temporarily locks in its own assumptive vocabulary of autism, what it is, how it functions, what behaviors are associated with it and why. These are unavoidably forms of stereotyping, but each era’s stereotypes make way for the next era’s new
stereotypes.

My point is that one can make a distinction between an inborn, patterned , robust personality style such as autism or gender, and the specific stereotyped vocabulary used to nail down and label its behavioral features. The stereotyping labels are always slowly changing, without disturbing the underlying unified pattern.

So if I am agreeing with you that no stereotyped definitions of such things as masculinity and femininity can justify themselves, what is the value of my position? Simply this: it offers an enrichment of that ways we can understand ourselves as well as others. It can cause us to look for ways that the behavior of individuals and groups form personality patterns that better explain their motivations than isolated whim or compulsion. The goal is not to pigeonhole
others into categories based on already-formed definitions. It is to reveal a richer and more integral purposiveness in oneself and others as one interacts with them. I admire your attempt to protect the world from sexual stereotypes, but I think you’re throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Again, this is sexist. Plenty of men do not want to be a decisive commanding male to a soft yielding female. Your attraction or lack of attraction to a woman is based on her sex. I'm straight, and my same sex simply does not turn me on at all — Philosophim

It ain’t that simple. Why and in what way the opposite turns you on is connected with your personal perceptual setpoint
as well as cultural factors. How you respond to manipulation of the physical and behavioral femininity of your partner on a multitude of dimensions is a direct reflection of that setpoint. If I were to readjust your setpoint, you would be astonished by the thousands of subtle ways in which your comportment toward your world would change.

I would like to refocus the point back on this topic. Lets take a perfectly normal XY man who wants to dress up like a woman and play sports competitively with them for fame, glory, and money, and give me a valid reason why they should be able to based on acting like what they believe a woman should act like. — Philosophim

While I have many issues with the idea of allowing a biologically male body to compete among biological
female bodies, given the fact that you don’t appear to have a concept of psychological gender, I suspect this may limit your engagement on this issue.

Right, so you behaved in ways that are stereotypically associated with women in American culture. What about the straight boys who also throw like girls? Or adult men who do, but don't dare show it to anyone over fear of being mocked? Finally, does being gay mean you have to throw like a girl? Of course not. There are plenty of gay people who don't act stereotypically gay as well. — Philosophim

The concept of an inborn perceptual-affective organizational brain pattern assumes the generation of a wide constellation of behaviors that, as I said, define a community by being present in various proportions in each individual. That means that obviously there are exceptions to every behavior that is included in the constellatory pattern that is gender. For instance, does being schizophrenic mean you have to speak in word salad, or be a catatonic, or have paranoid delusions? Of course not. Does this mean that schizophrenia is purely a social construct, that each behavior associated with it is unique to an individual and there is no common explanatory brain process to tie together the constellation of potential behaviors connected with it, that there is no community of schizophrenics with an overlap of behaviors? Of course not. But this is your claim concerning masculine and feminine behavior. You can’t conceive of any vehicle , any brain process, that could produce a wide range of behaviors that we associate with masculinity or femininity, and tie them together on the basis of a single mechanism.

Let me talk a little more about this perceptual-affective style that is the source of the masculine-feminine spectrum. The terms I will use are sloppy and inexact, but hopefully they will convey the sweeping behavioral power and effect of how our brains are wired for perceptual sensitivity. Perceptual-affective style means the following: when you perceive a stimulus, there are a variety of different ways in which you can process it One’s brain can have a kind of perceptual sensitivity setpoint such that the most intense, actively changing aspects of a flow of stimulation are reinforced. Put differently, one seeks out this intense, rapidly changing rhythm of perceptual flow.

One is attracted to projects that involve lack of interruption and avoid the need for social give and take, because one’s intensity-attuned perceptual system loses patience quickly with having to listen to others. If one’s perceptual set point is at the other end of the spectrum, then the aggressive processing of intensely changing stimuli is not reinforced. On the contrary, one’s perceptual system is inclined toward a gradual processing of unfolding new stimulation. One is more inclined toward social interaction than solitary projects. One is also more prone to depression and fear than anger and hostility. The fact that the setpoint reinforces gradualness of perceptual processing over intensity manifests itself in how a person moves, how they walk, how they position their limbs , how they pronounce words and their inflection and emotional range. It includes how one responds to noise, light, color , touch. Every stereotype of the effeminate gay male has its basis in this setpoint and its effect on perception and action.

This is the basis of masculine ‘aggressiveness’ vs feminine hesitancy. All the exceptions one can point out don’t disprove the rule, which is behind the stereotypical differences between men’s work and women’s work, and why boys today are not thriving in school the way girls are. (It may also explain why there are more male autistic than female).

‘Women’s work’ , such as housework, needlepoint, raising children, jobs involving social and listening skills, focuses on tasks that unfold gradually, with intense and abrupt change minimized. Men’s work focuses on intensely changing activity and solitary competitive projects.
Men’s greater interest in physicalistic , non-romantic porn vs women’s preference for intimate eroticism is another manifestation of the difference in perceptual setpoint.
Attraction to the opposite sex is also connected with the way that masculine and feminine perceptual setpoint result in a complementarity , a yin and yang that completes male and female in a sexual relationship. The male is attracted to all the qualities in the female that are not strongly present in himself: emotive sensitivity and verbal expressivity, physical softness and yieldingness. The woman, for her part , delights in and encourages a certain commanding and decisive style on the part of the male. In this way, each gender role completes the other.

Many gay men have a perceptual setpoint somewhere between the aggressive masculine and the gradual feminine. This means they don’t crave softness and yieldingness from their sexual partner because they already posses these traits themselves. As a result, many gay sexual relationships are based more on a kind of ‘twinning’ than a yin and yang. What attracts each sexually is the mix of masculine and feminine in the other. Many gay men will tell you they are repulsed by the thought of playing the role of decisive commanding male to a soft yielding female.

The very real physical differences between the sexes meant certain outcomes for societal organization, and thus expectations, were more likely to happen — Philosophim

Physical differences between men and women fail utterly and completely as an explanation of a pattern of dominance of men over women repeated around the globe for millennia. It is the difference in perceptual setpoint between the masculine and the feminine brain that explains this behavior.
So what explains feminism and the many changes in the way young women behave today?This is not a matter of doing away with the perceptual setpoint, but of changing the way that cultural behavior expresses this setpoint.
Perceptual setpoint doesn’t dictate whether a person will become involved in extreme sports, risk-taking behavior or fistfights. It only shapes the style in which one particulates in such activities. This means that there are no activities or behaviors that are off-limits to women or men , and the sex-based compartmentalization of social roles that used to be pervasive will become increasingly rare. But the setpoint differences that define masculinity vs feminist will always be present underneath these cultural changes in behavior, even as they manifest themselves in more and more subtle ways.

It is a difficult area to discuss as it involves deviations from conventional ideas. It involves the concept of schizophrenia, which is conventionly not completely understood, but is rigidly considered a disease or disorder of the mind. I, on the other hand consider jt as Delueze might have, as all the individual, transcendant, dysfunctional, idealist, nihilistic, paranoid etc. functions of the mind which are discordant with organized society — introbert

I don’t know if this helps, but the concept of schizophrenia you’re looking for in Deleuze and Guattari is what they call schizophrenic process, which they distinguish from the schizophrenic as entity. The latter conforms to the conventional medicalized concept of schizophrenia as mental illness. The former is the basis of all human functioning in desiring production.

“ Schizophrenia is like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines, universal primary production as "the essential reality of man and nature." ( Anti-Oedipus)