How important do you think it is that all people must do this? based on my op question:
Do you think that preparing people for such, would do more harm than good? — universeness

This is a psychotherapeutic question. It’s like the difference between progressive desensitization to overcome a phobia vs exposing yourself to the frightening event without any prior preparation. The first method can moderate or eliminate the terror, the second can amplify it.

t do you have any suggestions as to how we all might better deal with the notions of horror/terror/fright, when they are used to manipulate us in such powerful ways? — universeness

Sure, deepen and widen your perspective on the issues that are liable to trigger such emotions. In particular, immerse yourself in the perspectives of those who perpetrate acts that elicit these feelings, so that they become more intelligible and predicable to you.

On an opinion-swapping Philosophy Forum, when amateur philosophers pretend to pontificate on material Physics, they are doing Science without the Matter, and Math without the Numbers — Gnomon

I would never weigh in on the content of empirical assertions by physicists and characterize my opinions as philosophical. I can only claim a philosophical stance when I remain neutral in this regard, that is, when I am careful not to offer any opinion on the veracity of facts generated within physics, and instead focus on the pre-empirical presuppositions grounding the way questions are posed in physics.

A recent (Oct 13) on-line essay by someone called Lincoln Michel, titled, The Vocabulary of fear, describes the difference between horror and terror as:
“Terror is the feeling of dread and apprehension at the possibility of something frightening, while horror is the shock and repulsion of seeing the frightening thing. “ — universeness

Like a lot of approaches to affect, emotion and mood, this definition doesn’t get beyond circularity. Terror and horror are related responses to a frightening event. But what is fright in itself, apart from the obvious fact that it is produced by something one is afraid of, something perceived as harmful or dangerous, something that makes us want to run away from it? Positing an evolutionary mechanism is not much more illuminating, since it just ignores the experiential
structure of fear in favor of a arbitrary reductionist causality.

A fundamental point about the category of affects which includes fear, anxiety, terror and horror that needs to be brought out is that these emotions result from an interpretive assessment of events. Specifically, we become afraid when an impending event threatens us with the chaos of comprehensibility. It isnt the potential of physical damage in itself that we fear for its own sake , but our lack of predictive control over the implications of this harm.
For this reason fear, terror and horror are relative to our preparedness for making sense of a situation.

Philosophy as physics without the maths. — Banno

:100:

However, if we can choose which life (or which portion of a life) we experience, then we do have free will—we are free to select in advance what we shall experience — Art48

We don’t choose a whole life or even a portion of it. What we choose is a scheme of understanding that we place over events in order to try and make sense of things. Those schemes dont tell the events how to affect us, they act as wagers that events will unfold in a way that bares a reasonable resemblance to how our schemes anticipate their unfolding ( the most important of these events being the behavior of other people) . If the flow of events validates our constructions of them by being relatively consistent with our expectations, then our schemes has staying power, and avail us of intimate connection with others.

Nevertheless, we are always having to make adjustments to our schemes, sometimes only minor repairs but other times major overhauls when we find ourselves in the midst of an emotional crisis. Despair, confusion and massive anxiety are all signs that our scheme is no longer working for us and we are faced with a major reorganization of our constructs. The only way forward from here involves much experimentation and trial and error until we arrive at a new construction that does a better job of making sense of things. We change the past only by reinterpreting it, and meet the future halfway by anticipating it. Time travel will produce little benefit for us unless we are prepared to reconstrue what we experience.

Someone who experiences a horrible life is akin to someone who chooses to watch a horror movie. — Art48

We choose to watch horror movies not to suffer, but rather to learn from the events of the film from a safe distance in order to gain a measure of mastery over our fears. For most people, what makes their lives rewarding or horrible is closely tied to how they manage to understand and relate to the behavior of people who matter to them over the course of their lives. Our most fundamental sense of who we are is dependent not just on how we see others, but on our reading of how we are seen through the eyes of others. Our choice of schemes of understanding is crucial here. If our framework does a poor job of seeing the world from others’ perspectives, then we will constantly suffer from anger, alienation, blame and poor self-regard.

I don't think the primary motivation has to do with "happiness," per say. The whole premise of the Experience Machine is the it will make you happy, and yet people turn it down. I suspect that people are skeptical of the Machine because it means being heavily determined by that which lies outside us. It lies outside us and we have no way to learn about it.

It's a lack of freedom then, not a lack of pleasure or happiness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am linking norm-based goals, purposes and motives with anticipatory sense-making, and the latter with pleasure and happiness. Happiness is just another way of talking about successful anticipatory sense-making in relation to prior schemes of expectation, even though we still tend to think of our emotions as arbitrary drives cut off from reason. This sense-making is our overarching motivation in life.

it also seems that states of affairs must precede knowledge of them. If I am to know I am mad, I have to be mad; if we are to discover a new superconductor, it needs to be able to act as a superconductor. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why not think of ‘knowledge of’ states of affairs as a kind of interaction with the world that co-produces what it represents? Our questions about the world are always loaded questions, projecting our presuppositions into states of affairs. And the answers the world gives us are responses to those loaded questions, communicated within the grammar of our formulations. Whether those states of affairs validate or disappoint our expectations is a function of their role within the intersubjective discourse of science, including the way our apparatuses of measurement define and organize phenomena.

Honestly, I'm surprised no one has proffered up: "if it tells you how to do everything you want and satisfies inquiry then it is telling you the truth." You could simply object to the supposition that it really lies to you. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I thought that’s what I had done by arguing that if the knowledge the book imparted to you proved its value through your successful anticipation of many subsequent events in your life, then it is true for you. But notice that my reply deconstructs the Cartesian metaphysical assumptions embedded in your hypothetical about the ‘real’ and the ‘true’, the simulated and the actual. Rather than thinking these notions in terms of correspondence between subject and independently real objects, it defines the truth and the real on the basis of the ongoing success of our construals of the world in making sense of, predicting and ordering, in a harmonious and coherent way, the continually changing nature of the flow of new experience.

how do we ever know when we've reached bedrock?

But, per Hegel's more fallibilist system, maybe the point is in going beyond the given. In never settling. All questioning is itself, "moments in the Absolute," after all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Bedrock isn’t defined by what is independently ‘real’ in itself, apart from us, but by what makes sense to us in as harmonious a way as possible relative to our ways of construing the world. This bedrock of anticipatory understanding is an endless struggle, because the goal is nether out there in the world nor inside of us, but in the reciprocally re-adjusting coordination between the two.
The point of desire and freedom is not settling for the pain and suffering of meaning incoherence and confusion. Of course, we only ever ‘settle’ for such conditions of being when we believe that the alternative forms of construing available to us would make the world appear even more incoherent to us. On the other hand, we generally settle for whatever guide for proceeding through life allows us to make sense of it in an open-endedly harmonious and robustly flexible way ( a way that WORKS pragmatically in our lives). And why shouldn’t we, since a flexible approach is a creative approach that has built into it the continual possibilities of self-reinvention?

"You wake up in a lab, in a new body. The doctors tell you that you had voluntarily plugged into a machine that would simulate a life for you, a better life. All your friends and family, those are part of the simulation. They wake you up every 10 years and ask you if you are satisfied and if you want to go back, then wipe the memory of waking from your mind if you do go back."

The question is, do you wake up to the "real world," or go back. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The reason most choose to wake up is that they buy into the matrix metaphysics of a Cartesian ‘real’ world. If reality is assumed to be some independent thing in itself, then surely our ‘simulated’ happiness is a cheap knock-off of the real thing, depriving us of a richer, deeper, more meaningful quality of experience. This is how most of is were taught to think about the real and the true. It doesn’t occur to us that experience is neither invented (simulation) nor discovered (empirically true reality), but an inextricable dance between the two. The creepiness of your hypothetical does not derive from the power of science but from the power of a certain pervasive mythos of science.

Is there anything more you can say about this process? What do you think is the connection between one person making a book 'work' and another not? Is it a mixture of factors like socialisation, values and personality? Are our anticipatory selves (for want of a better term) built and rebuilt by our ongoing relationship to the world and how we are socialised? — Tom Storm

Our social environment certainly provides opportunities we can draw upon, as well as constraints limiting what we can make of our world, but I think most of what affords or constrains creative movement is located on the subjective side of the self-world hinge.

This book will answer any questions you ask of it to your satisfaction. It can tell you how to do things that you want to do well enough to get them done, and it will also explain phenomena to you such that you are happy with the explanations — Count Timothy von Icarus

Will it satisfactorily answer questions like: ‘Is there a god? What is the meaning of life? How do I achieve happiness in life?’ If so, then it isn’t just a book you’re taking about, it’s my interaction with unfolding events in response to what I read. A book may say any number of things I initially find wonderful and revelatory, but it will have no effect on my life until I put this knowledge to the test in terms of determining how well it allows to me to anticipate events over time. Only that will determine their relative truth or falsity for me. Knowledge isnt static factoids, it is a way of navigating through life in a fashion that makes the unfolding flow of events coherent, consistent, familiar, integral.It is events as they confirm or disappoint my expectations which decide the relative validity of my conceptions, not the in-itself content of a book What one is exposed to in a book is only a small ingredient, a starting point or catalyst , for that process. If a ‘lying’ book inspires me to make sense of actual experience in the world in a way that is useful and predictive for me, then that book was my source of bonified truth.

That is, even if his system made him really happy, if reason then convinces him that it wasn't true, that there was indeed a higher good he had missed, then he'd want the higher good. He might feel conflicted about it, many philosophers have felt conflicted about having to abandon cherished positions, but there is a powerful way in which reason is able to bowl over and reorder all our desires.

A good example might be the person who loses their faith. Their highest goal was previously to please God. They organized their life around this, spending hours in prayer each day. And yet they no longer believe in God and so no longer think "pleasing God" is truly a good. Now, no matter how much all their other desires might want to lead them back into a "fool's paradise," here they are, in the crisis of faith. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What’s important to point out here is the distinction between determining that one’s previous belief is not true, and happening upon a new value system. In the former case, one goes from belief to doubt within the same value system. In the latter case, one can continue to hold one’s previous belief to be true within the context of the old value system that makes it intelligible. But now one has constructed a new value system that offers a new compass of belief and doubt within a new arrangement of intelligibility that is not simply more true than the previously believed truth. Rather , it is akin to changing the subject, transforming how the phenomena matter to one. It can’t simply be said that the new system is ‘better’ than the previous, as if one could use the same criteria of relevance and ‘goodness’ as the old system to compare it to the new one. This doesnt mean that the old and new frameworks are utterly incommensurable. One could argue that both are true, both offer valid and useful ways of going on in the world, but that one prefer one over the other on the basis of aesthetic considerations. or that the old model did its job so effectively that its technologies put one into different environmental circumstances that require a new model to navigate. The point is that the criteria of goodness and truth change as a result of the way that each value system alters our relationship with our world. The fact that knowledge is the construction of a biological niche means that we are always in the process of reevaluating what is at stake and at issue in conceptual normativity, which is both different and more fundamental than issues of belief and doubt.

This is certainly a popular position. It seems to be somewhat Sam Harris' position in The Moral Landscape when he argues that morality and values can be objectively understood and grounded in science rather than relying solely on religious or subjective beliefs. The core idea being that "human well-being (desires)" should be the benchmark for evaluating moral principles, and that scientific inquiry can help identify objective moral truths. Skinner has a similar position — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is not Nietzsche’s position, though. Scientific inquiry involves the establishment of a discursively normative value system, a regional ontology, which produces the criteria for empirical ‘ oughts’ (what is valid or invalid, true or false, within a particular paradigmatic configuration). What does it mean to ground values in a system (science) whose very intelligibility is based on those values?

In this, all three also seem close to Hume, who argued that, “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them [by figuring out how to get what our appetites want.]" — Count Timothy von Icarus

When Nietzsche talks about drives, affects and values, what he has in mind is not ‘blind’ passion alien to reason, but configurative patterns that prescribe ways of anticipatively interacting with the world. For Nietzsche, what our drives want is to be able to assimilate the world according to the schematics they lay out. Reason and logic are developments of this schematics. What is reasonable is what is relevant, and what is relevant is what matters, an affective criterion.

Nietzsche's whole revaluation of all values collapses into petty hedonism if we know or suspect some sort of higher good -- a good we ourselves recognize or fear we fail to recognize -- but then continue on in our current mode of being "because it's easier" or "good enough." This is exactly the sort of behavior Nietzsche spends a lot of time attacking — Count Timothy von Icarus

The aim of the revaluation of all values is not to settle on some final or ultimate value system ( a higher good) but to stay in tune with the act of value posting itself as a means of not getting stuck in any particular value system. One could say that the ‘highest good’ is the continual movement from one normative conception of the good to another. Notice that this highest good is devoid of value content in itself.

Would we plug into the machine?

Tough question. A common concern I've heard here is that, if you plug into the machine, all the people you know and care for miss out on you. Thus, choosing the machine is precluded because of what it does to others. This could be fixed by supposing that, per your choice, everyone goes into the machine. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Machines don’t produce value, they are devoid of meaning in themselves. What they achieve is only understandable by reference to meaningful desires and purposes that must be accessed independently of the meaninglessly calculative functioning of the machine in itself.

Reason is obviously crucial to promoting both knowledge and freedom. And, because we can always question more, always go beyond our initial beliefs and desires, it doesn't seem to me that reason can be merely another desire. Doubt is not a desire. Further, reason is able to apprehend the abstract ideal of "the best" and search for it. In this, it seeks to transcend what it currently is and become more in an outwards search. This is, in important ways, an overcoming of desire, not simply a form of it. It is true that it is a desire for truth, but it's a desire grounded in what is beyond us, in a way other desires are not — Count Timothy von Icarus

Doubt derives its intelligibility from within a system
of desire-values. The kind of reason-based questioning you’re advocating doesn’t go beyond a value system, it is in service of one. We must not only go beyond our previous beliefs, but also beyond the norms within those beliefs have their sense as true or false, certain or doubtful. In short we must change the way things matter to us.

Surely, science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science… . To do science, one must ensure that their question is specific, and aspires for an answer that is specific, measurable, testable/verifiable and repeatable — Judaka

I think the key term here is ‘measurable’. Specifiability, verifiability and repeatability are not exclusive to science, but the requirement that the objects of study be mathematizable has long been considered to be a prerequisite for empirical investigation.

If we conceptualize the universe as a single process, as opposed to a set of discrete objects, does this dissolve some key questions over free will at determinism?

This seems to be the case to me if we also allow that the "laws of nature" are not external forces that cause the universe to evolve in such and such a way, but are rather merely descriptions of the intrinsic properties of the universe. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe I’ve been enclosed in my particular philosophical bubble for too long, but when I see a fundamental inquiry into the nature of things begin from “the universe” as its starting point, I can’t help but associate it with notions like flying spaghetti monster. Shouldn’t concepts like universe be left as later constructions rather than as starting suppositions for basic philosophical questions?

The point isn't that we become free in supporting the society we already have, or even the society we want to have, but that we become free in supporting the evolution of the society that produces the most freedom. And since individuals' freedom is deeply interrelated, this means freedom for all. This, IMO, has sort of been lost in modern philosophy. There is way too much focus on fighting conformity, cutting against the grain, etc. Sure, that's important, but it cannot be an ends in itself. In Nietzsche, it is an ends in itself and in this it becomes a self defeating ideology if applied at the social level. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Shaun Gallagher, in his latest book Action and Interaction, has a chapter on justice which incorporates ideas from Hegel, Frankfurt and Honneth, while giving more emphasis to its basis in intersubjectivity.

Gallagher writes:

“Justice, like autonomy, is relational. I cannot be just or unjust on my own. So an action is just or unjust only in the way it fits into the arrangements of intersubjective and social interactions.” “Justice consists in those arrangements that maximize compound, relational autonomy in our practices.” The autonomy of the interaction itself depends on maintaining the autonomy of both individuals. Justice (like friendship) involves fostering this plurality of autonomies (this compound autonomy); it is a positive arrangement that instantiates or maintains some degree of compound relational autonomy.”“Accordingly, although one can still talk of individuals who engage in the interaction, a full account of such interaction is not reducible to mechanisms at work in the individuals qua individuals.”

A key aspect of justice is the recognition of the other:

“As reflected in the definition of interaction, in interactional dynamics recognition depends on autonomy and is undermined by reification; that is, treating the other as an object observed from a third-person perspective. At the same time, individual autonomy diminishes without social interaction; and interaction doesn't exist if the autonomy of any of the participants is denied. Interaction, autonomy, and recognition dissipate in cases of slavery, torture, or terrorism.”
“ As the enactivist approach makes clear, a participant in interaction with another person is called to respond if the interaction is to continue. My response to the other, in the primary instance, just is my engaging in interaction with her—by responding positively or negatively with action to her action. Although research on primary intersubjectivity provides a detailed model of elementary responsivity, it may also be useful to consider Levinas's analysis of the face-to-face relation in order to explicate what this research tells us.” “…according to Levinas, the face-to-face relation primarily registers in an ethical order: the other, in her alterity, is such that she makes an ethical demand on me, to which I am obligated to respond…In contrast to Heidegger who might speak about a system of involvements that constitute the pragmatic world (characteristic of secondary intersubjectivity), Levinas describes a direct embodied encounter with the other.…the failure to enact that transcendence [recognizing the alterity of the other], as when we simply objectify or reify the other person, is also a possibility of relational contingency.”

I believe instead that the ethical dilemma we face is not that of recognition vs reification, self-transcendence vs self-interest, the arbitrary conservative thrust of the lure of the familiar vs the compassionate embrace of otherness. When we seem to fail to recognize and maintain the other‘s autonomy this is not a retreat into self but, on the contrary, an experiencing of otherness which is too other to be intelligible. For Gallagher justice is maintaining the autonomy of the other, as if one first glimpses this autonomy and then decides not to honor it. But the other's autonomy can only exist for me to the extent that I can integrate it intelligibly within my way of life, which is itself the ongoing production of a collaborative community. The failure to coordinate harmoniously among competing realtional intelligibilites results in the appearance of injustice, as though there were an intention on the part of one of the parties not to recognize an aspect of the other.

However, it is not autonomous content that we strive to maximize, but intelligible process, and intelligibility is ontologically prior to the actions of an autonomous subject who recognizes or fails to recognize others. When there is disagreement between the victim and the alleged perpetrator about whether an injustice has indeed been committed, who determines, and how is it determined, that someone is closing off another's affordance space and eliminating their autonomy? If it is intelligible ways of going on that are being protected, then from the vantage of the ‘perpetrator', what is being excluded, closed off and eliminated is not a particular content (the other's affordances) , in the service of reifying one's own autonomy. On the contrary, the aim is to exclude from a system of practices that which would render it nonsensical and deprive it of coherent meaning. In other words, from the vantage of the so-called perpetrator, the practices of exclusion and elimination are in the service of rendering justice by preventing the degradation of meaningful autonomy in general.

As Ken Gergen(1995) states:

“... groups whose actions are coordinated around given constructions of reality risk their traditions by exposing them to the ravages of the outliers. That is, from their perspective, efforts must be made to protect the boundaries of understanding, to prevent the signifiers from escaping into the free-standing environment where meaning is decried or dissipated. In this sense, unfair or exclusionary practices are not frequently so from the standpoint of the actors. Rather, they may seem altogether fair, just and essential to sustain valued ideals against the infidels at the gates.”

As far as I know, Deleuze never applies the term community regarding his theory of desire. For him, the concept of ‘a society of selves and a society of desires that manifest a relative ongoing thematic unity' would display a return to a process of identification, — Number2018

No, he uses words like collectivity, collection, mass, population, multiplicity, a band, a peopling, a group.
I’m aware that the plane of immanence is a virtual dimension on which conceptual personae and concepts are created via connective synthesis, inclusive disjunction and conjunctions of intensities. Concepts subsist of relations between heterogenous series rather than unification by identity or representation. I’m sure we can agree on the distinction between the smooth and the striated, the molecular and the molar, the rhizomatic and the arborescent, the body without organs and the clothed body, the virtual and the actual, the subject group and the subjected group.

Nevertheless , the reason I use the expression ‘thematic unity’ is that concepts on a plane of immanence resonate, “and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: an unlimited One-Al, an "Onnitudo" that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane.” The plane of immanence is diagrammatic and fractal, making possible a point of view and problematic field that produces , via linkages between heterogeneities, a sort of non-totalizing thematic distinguishing the concepts of one philosopher from another.
“In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers on the same plane?”

It's control over desire (as a whole) to the extent that a person is deciding as a harmonized unity. Nietzsche isn't wrong to point out the problem of one desire simply acting as a tyrant over others, although he fails to extend the nature of this problem to social relations between people far enough IMO. He sees clearly how a person, as a whole, isn't free if one desire simply lords over the others like a tyrant, but then fails to see how the human tyrant becomes unfree through his tyranny in the interpersonal sphere, how power and the role of Lord becomes a trap — Count Timothy von Icarus

Deleuze’s Nietzschean-inspired model posits assemblages of desiring elements which produce what he calls a plane of consistency. This plane creates relational connections within the person , and a point of view or perspective, without any overarching synthesis. There is no one self, no one overarching desire, but a society of selves and a society of desires that manifest a relative ongoing thematic unity throughout its changes. Tyranny and power are not properties of individuals, they are manifestations of affects circulating though a culture , from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Subjects are produced by the way power circulates though a community.

Even if we accept Nietzsche's description of the will as a "congress of souls," we can still suppose that some congresses are more harmonious than others. This is the difference between the person who does a chore they don't like because they have been forced to, because they do not want to be punished, or because they do not want to hurt the feelings of another, versus the person who does a chore they don't like because they have decided that it must be done and is "better," in a holistic sense. This second person is acting out of a positive duty thay they desire as part of their identity. This is the fire fighter who fears a burning building as much as anyone, but who wants to rush in on another level, because he wants his identity to include his duty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seem to making a leap here from harmonization of desires to normative ethics as altruism. For Deleuze, the consistency of personality is produced as a relation between heterogeneous differences( desires, affects). This society of the person is constantly changing in small ways, exposed to an outside that is not only outside the person, but beyond the cultural norms. And yet we have a tendency to. get ourselves stuck in repressive, conformist social structures that each of us participate in and perpetuate. Altruism for the sake of the repressive goals of a social structure is a kind of selfishness. That is, a being caught up in a stagnant idea of the social self.On the other hand , recognizing that the ‘self’ is always naturally reinvented in the direction of new values, which are neither simply the result of cultural inculcation nor a solipsistic ‘selfishness’ points one in the direction of a robust ethic of altruism.

A "full" freedom requires that we have control over our desires. This is where Frankfurt's distinction between first order desires "I want to x" and second order desires "I desire that I should want to x," is key. We can also have negative second order desires, i.e., "I want to not desire x," e.g., when a drug addict wants to be free from the desire of their addiction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this control over desire or just being at the mercy of one desire over another? Since you mentioned Nietzsche, I thought I’d quote him on the issue of will and desire:

The fact] that one desires to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not stand within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor does the success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us . . . While “we” believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about the other; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence [or violence] of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.

There is no struggle of reason against the drives; what we call “reason” is nothing more than a certain “system of relations between various passions,” a certain ordering of the drives.

Then you point to the way in which desire leads to injustice. I think there is a connection, and it is one Nietzsche profoundly misses (or rather refuses to address). If we have people with reflexive and negative freedom, people who have self control, means, and freedom from constraint, they might still desire to do things that deprive others of their freedom. What is missing in Nietzsche but present in Hegel, Honneth, etc. is a conception of "social freedom," as the ways in which desires are harmonized such that they don't conflict. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What writers like Deleuze and Focault get from Nietzsche is the fundamentally social nature of drives. Because our drives are inextricably bound up within a larger community, the essential question for them is not how to harmonize individual drives to achieve social ethical norms, but how we ever manage to resist those normative chains that bind us.

The impulse toward the community is itself a drive, in competition with the other drives: we never leave the domain of the drives. The drives never exist in a free and unbound state, nor are they ever merely individual; they are always arranged and assembled, not only by moral systems, but more generally by every social formation.

…the fundamental problem of political philosophy is one that was formulated most clearly by Spinoza: “Why do people fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?” The answer: because your desire is never your own. Desire is not a psychic reality, nor is it strictly individual; rather, your drives and affects are from the start part of the social infrastructure.”( Dan Smith)

Hierarchy is the natural way we organize society, and is the only way to organize modern society. What alternatives do you suppose? No leaders? No elites? No social structure? — ButyDude

I highly recommend The Dawn of Everything by anthropologist David Graeber and archeologist David Wingrow. Their exhaustive look at the anthropological and archeological evidence led them to this conclusion:

Time and again we found ourselves confronted with writing which simply assumes that the larger and more densely populated the social group, the more ‘complex’ the system needed to keep it organized. Complexity, in turn, is still often used as a synonym for hierarchy. Hierarchy, in turn, is used as a euphemism for chains of command (the ‘origins of the state’), which mean that as soon as large numbers of people decided to live in one place or join a common project, they must necessarily abandon the second freedom – to refuse orders – and replace it with legal mechanisms for, say, beating or locking up those who don’t do as they’re told.

As we’ve seen, none of these assumptions are theoretically essential, and history tends not to bear them out. Carole Crumley, an anthropologist and expert on Iron Age Europe, has been pointing this out for years: complex systems don’t have to be organized top-down, either in the natural or in the social world. That we tend to assume otherwise probably tells us more about ourselves than the people or phenomena that we’re studying.Neither is she alone in making this point. But more often than not, such
observations have fallen on deaf ears.

It’s probably time to start listening, because ‘exceptions’ are fast beginning to outnumber the rules. Take cities. It was once assumed that the rise of urban life marked some kind of historical turnstile, whereby everyone who passed through had to permanently surrender their basic
freedoms and submit to the rule of faceless administrators, stern priests, paternalistic kings or warrior-politicians – simply to avert chaos (or cognitive overload). To view human history through such a lens today is really not all that different from taking on the mantle of a modern-day King James, since the overall effect is to portray the violence and inequalities of modern society as somehow arising naturally from structures of rational management and paternalistic care: structures designed for human populations who, we are asked to believe, became suddenly incapable of organizing themselves once their numbers expanded above a certain threshold.

Not only do such views lack a sound basis in human psychology. They are also difficult to reconcile with archaeological evidence of how cities actually began in many parts of the world: as civic experiments on a grand
scale, which frequently lacked the expected features of administrative hierarchy and authoritarian rule. If there is a particular story we should be telling, a big question we should be asking of human history (instead of the ‘origins of social inequality’), is it precisely this: how did we find ourselves stuck in just one form of social reality, and how did relations based ultimately on violence and domination come to be normalized within it?

That sounds right. I like Rahula's What The Buddha Taught, and I imagine the state you describe as the goal. This is a kind of auto-affection or self-luminosity. Feuerbach also, in his own words, sees and says this. — plaque flag

But this thinking all rests on the supposition of a purely ‘neutral’ attention that can be separated off from any intentional objects being attended to. But there is no such thing as neutral attention. To attend to something is already to intend it, to desire, to will. Attending is a biasing.

The idea of the mind reposing, awake and alert, in the sheer ‘luminosity' of consciousness (its quality of non-reflective and open awareness), without attending exclusively to any particular object or content, is a form of desire and intentionality in that in simple self-reflexive awareness, it is at every moment relating to a new object (its own changing sense of non-objectifying awareness of the arising and passing away of temporary forms), and being affected, disturbed, by it. Disturbance, desire and dislocating becoming is prior to, that is, implicit but not noticed in ‘neutral' compassionate awareness. Becoming is the restless anxiety of desire, striving, motivation, and the ground of all attention, affect and valuation. Primordial awareness is from moment to moment a new way of being -affected-by the world, and thus, what ever else it is affectively in its particular and contingent experience of ‘now', a kind of uncanniness.

I think the most charitable way to read it is as gazing on The Unchanging with adoration. Or feeling oneself in a sort of divine stasis, having temporarily become The Illuminated One — plaque flag

I think feeling is central to many of the modernizations of meditative practice. Non-judgemental , non-intending bare awareness of being is supposed to be connected with the feeling of unconditional, intrinsic, spontaneous compassion and benevolence, peace and fundamental warmth toward the phenomenal world, concern for the welfare of others beyond mere naive compassion, joy and of the mind, etc, and this is a kind of auto-affection or self-luminosity. It all rests on the supposition of a purely ‘neutral’ attention that can be separated off from any intentional objects being attended to.

A question that might be asked is whether this is true by definition --- whether we tend to understand 'Being' [the truly real ] precisely in terms of constant presence. If so, is this a bias ?
I'm of course not the first person to speculate in this way. I bring up a famous issue. Much of radicality of Being and Time is perhaps in its claim or suggestion (according to some) that being is time — plaque flag

Heidegger analyzes how Nietzsche’s Eternal return makes use of this notion of Being as constant presence to turn it against itself via time as a continual passing away. Eternal return of the same is the same by being Willed as always different from itself.

“…the answer Aristotle gave to the question of the
essential nature of time still governs Nietzsche's idea of
time. What is the situation in regard to time? In being,
present in time at the given moment is only that narrow
ridge of the momentary fugitive "now," rising out of the
"not yet now'' and falling away into the "no longer now”
Nietzsche conceives time metaphysically as a succession of punctual‘nows’.
“This passing away is conceived more precisely as the successive flowing away of the "now" out of the "not yet now" into the "no longer now."… Time persists, consists in passing. It is, in that it constantly is not. This is the representational idea of time that characterizes the concept of time' which is standard throughout the metaphysics of the West…. in all metaphysics from the beginning of Western thought, Being means being present, Being, if it is to be thought in the highest instance, must be thought as pure presence, that is, as the presence that persists, the abiding present, the steadily standing "now.

To modern metaphysics, the Being of beings appears as will.” In Nietzsche’s will to power, will is that which is present to itself as what is.
“Among the long established predicates of primal being are"eternity and independence of time. Eternal will
does not mean only a will that lasts eternally: it says that will is primal being only when it is eternal as will….The primal being of beings is the will, as the eternally recurrent willing of the eternal recurrence of the same. The eternal recurrence of the same is the supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that eternally wills its own willing.

What is in time is what recurs in the eternal return. Only because Nietzsche thinks of time in terms of the traditional metaphysical notion of ‘in-timeless’, the sequence of present nows, can he posit the eternal return as the endless presence (Being) of the willing of itself.
…will is primal being only when it is eternal as will. And it is that when, as will, it eternally wills the eternity
of willing. The will that is eternal in this sense no longer follows and depends on the temporal in what it wills,
or in its willing. It is independent of time. And so it can no longer be affronted by time.
The will is delivered from revulsion when it wills the constant recurrence of the same. Then the will
wills the eternity of what is willed. The will wills its own eternity. Will is primal being. The highest product of primal being is eternity. The primal being of beings is the will, as the eternally recurrent willing of the eternal recurrence of the same. The eternal recurrence of the same is the supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that eternally wills its own willing.

For the mystic time and change would not really exist and this is because they have seen beyond it. The clock still ticks but what is truly and ultimately real is unchanging. This would be Being, not the personal experience.of a being.

The word 'reflexivity' implies some sort of dualism so I'm not sure it's relevant here. I may be misunderstanding what you mean but it. — FrancisRay

I’m aware that the classical understanding of the ultimately real is the eternally unchanging. My argument is that the idea of seeing beyond time to some sort of awareness or reality is incoherent. To be aware is to change. Pure anything , including pure timelessness, is not Being but the definition of death itself.

t I am more interested in how the boundary is formed; the 'dash' between organism and environment. You say, "the organism interprets..." and one assumes therefrom that the environment does not interpret. So there is an action before the act of interpretation, which is the act of self identification, that has to happen for there to be a separate world to interpret. — unenlightened

Most of our living is social, and our cultural environment is reciprocally interpretive. In the agential realism of Karen Barad and Joseph Rouse the non-human environment also interprets. Not everything for them has to lead back to a perceiving subject. They are perfectly happy to imagine a world without humans or animals in which each aspect of it interacts with other aspects in an agential way. That is, material interaction always takes place within configurations of mutual affecting that lend to all phenomena an intrinsically interpretive character.

Concerning the idea of organismic self-identification, on the one hand, one would have to say that the ‘self’ of the organism is not something locked within the borders of the physical body or brain, but is instead the ongoing and continually changing patterns of activity produced by brain-body-world reciprocal interaction. On the other hand, the organism part of this body-world interaction is characterized by a certain operational closure or asymmetry with respect to the world. Merleau-Ponty describes this ‘boundary’ as a ‘flesh’ of the world or chiasm, a kind of reciprocal exchange. One would have to imagine a self which continually comes to itself from the world, reinventing itself through this exposure and yet maintaining a certain integrity or style of being through these changes.

. The idea of the eternal now requires the idea that we can transcend the experience-experiencer duality. As you seem to say, if we cannot do this the idea makes no sense.

We never experience the pure present. There isn't time to experience it. But we can be in it. This explains how yogis can sit for weeks without moving. They are not experiencing the passing of time. — FrancisRay

Is such a sitting yogi having an experience of anything while they claim to not experience the passing of time? There is a tendency to confuse the conventional measurement of time
via clocks and time itself. For instance, the concept of time dilation in physics is typically described as a slowing down or speeding up of time because clocks slow down when accelerated. But a more slowly ticking clock is not the same thing as a time moving more slowly. Most fundamentally time is not like motion, to be sped up or slowed down. Time is the nature of the changes in what we are involved in. If we are immersed in a flow experience, the consistency and coherence of that kind of creative unfolding will be experienced as a speeding up or stoppage of time, because we normally pay attention to a clock and it’s meaningless movements when our task is interrupted, or when we are distracted and bored.
In short , where there is no time there is no experience. The mystical and religious notions of pure unchanging reflexivity, of awareness without intention, fail to recognize that such notions of pure identity rely on fundamental difference. The only pure ground is already a repetition. It is the repetition of difference in itself.

Perspective seems to correspond to the form of the rock; the rock has a form, and that gives rise to any subject necessarily having a particular perspective on the rock. Whereas the 'affect' of an organism is the internally generated sense of its own being. The yeast cell defines itself and delimits itself as sugar in, CO2 or Alcohol out.

A subject locates itself as an entity, and its perspective arises from its location. But such a definition of self is necessarily permeable and incomplete. It's affect is its response to its environment as well as its response to itself. ( — unenlightened

The enactivists look at subject-object, organism-environment this way:
The organism interprets its world, but not by representing it, not by attempting to match an internal model with an external reality. Instead, perception is grounded in sensory-motor interactions with the world. We know by doing, not by representing. Organisms know their world by building a niche out of it and interacting with this niche. Whatever aspects of that world are irrelevant to the goals and purposes that are defined by organism-niche interaction are invisible to that creature. So all living systems, through their activity within their niche, continually define their world via what matters, is significant and relevant to their continued functioning. The organism ceases to be an organism as soon as it loses this goal-oriented integrity and unity of functioning. Affect in its most basic form is simply this normative, goal-oriented organizational a priori. To perceive a rock as an object with properties such as weight, size and shape is to first construct such idealizations as identically persisting object number, magnitude, extension and measure. In other words, mathematics, logic and empirical science are human-created environmental niches that guide the way we interact with our world. They are affective value systems, through which we normatively determine correctness or incorrectness, truth and falsity in relation to all the features of rocks and other value objects experienced from within our constructed niche.

We are self-aware as a unified whole - perception of shape, colour and movement appear to us as a unified whole (or gestalt) even though the sub-systems of the brain which process these are separate. Neuroscience hasn't identified the particular brain system that provides for this unification. It's called the 'neural binding problem' and is recognised as a scientific validation of the hard problem of consciousness… current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience. — Wayfarer

Enactivists disagree with Chalmers belief that we dont have a way to explain the unification of consciousness or subjective experience empirically. For instance, Evan Thompson sees affectivity as the unifying glue.

Rather than being a collection of pre-specified modules, the brain appears to be an organ that constructs itself in development through spontaneously generated and experience-dependent activity (Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997; Quartz, 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, 1998), a developmental process made possible by robust and flexible developmental mechanisms conserved in animal evolution (Gerhart & Kirschner, 1997).”

“Douglas F. Watt (1998) describes affect as ‘a prototype “whole brain event”', but we could go further and say that affect is a prototypical whole-organism event. Affect has numerous dimensions that bind together virtually every aspect of the organism—the psychosomatic network of the nervous system, immune system, and endocrine system; physiological changes in the autonomic nervous system, the limbic system, and the superior cortex; facial-motor changes and global differential motor readiness for approach or withdrawal; subjective experience along a pleasure–displeasure valence axis; social signalling and coupling; and conscious evaluation and assessment (Watt, 1998). Thus the affective mind isn't in the head, but in the whole body; and affective states are emergent in the reciprocal, co-determination sense: they arise from neural and somatic activity that itself is conditioned by the ongoing embodied awareness and action of the whole animal or person.

Although the physical and energetic coupling between a living being and the physicochemical environment is symmetrical, with each partner exerting more influence on the other at different times, the living being modulates the parameters of this coupling in a way the environment typically does not. Living beings, precisely because they are autopoietic and adaptive, can “surf” environmental events and modulate them to their own ends, like a bird gliding on the wind. Interactional asymmetry is precisely this capacity to modulate the coupling with the environment. If we lose sight of this interactional asymmetry, then we lose the ability to account for the directedness proper to living beings in their sense-making, and hence we lose the resources we need to connect sense-making to intentionality.”

“One of the basic propositions of the enactive approach is that being autonomous is a necessary condition for a system to embody original intentionality and normativity. Unless the processes that make up a system constitute that system as an adaptive self-sustaining unity, there is no perspective or reference point for sense-making and hence no cognizing agent. Without autonomy (operational closure) there is no original meaning; there is only the derivative meaning attributed to certain processes by an outside observer.”
(Thompson 2001)

How does phenomenology explain the existence of disagreement between people? And how does it propose that disagreement be resolved? — baker

Husserl puts the emphasis on empathetically understanding the other from within their one perspective.

“The human being lets “himself” be influenced not only by particular other humans (actual or imagined) but also by social objectivities that he feels and apprehends as effective objectivities in their own right, as influencing powers. He is afraid of “the government” and carries out what it commands. He views such and such individuals, for instance, the police officer, etc., as representatives of the government only; he fears the person who is an official representative. The customs, the church, etc., he feels as powers, too. Seen from the objective perspective of the historian and sociologist, human beings are real and, among them, such and such interconnected relations exist, such and such social objectivities exist, etc. And the task is to describe this in general, concrete and, where possible, in comparative terms, to describe the factual connection, to delineate universal class-concepts and rules, etc., just as in any morphology.

If the community of humankind is to be described historically in concreto in its becoming and in its dependence on other communities (for even the social objectivities have their “causality”), then the objective of an understanding of the inner connections requires that one immerse oneself so deeply in the consciousness of the respective individual human beings, so as to be able to exactly relive their motivations. One must immerse oneself so deeply that one brings to “givenness” their interpretations, supposed experiences, their superstitious fantasies, by means of which they let themselves be “influenced,” let themselves be guided, attracted, or repelled. The “real connections” consist in this: Under given circumstances such and such notions, etc., were (“understandably”) evoked in human beings, whereby such and such reactions were motivated in them, which in turn determined the course of their development.” (Basic Problems of Phenomenology)

but I favor an inclusive approach. It's all real. Confused daydreams are real, and they exist in the style of confused daydreams. All entities are semantically-inferentially linked in a single nexus. Language is directed at the one common world. — plaque flag

You’d like Deleuze’s approach. He distinguishes between the virtual and the actual. Both are real; the virtual is the problematic field within which actual events arise and disappear.

I'd rather say physics doesn't need to make metaphysical suppositions. It has banished metaphysics to a different department. Physicists often stray into metaphysics and sometimes hold strong views, but when they do they're no longer doing physics — FrancisRay

I’m not talking about sitting down to write a treatise with the word ‘metaphysics’ in the title. I’m talking about the presuppositions , usually unexamined, that make it possible to do any kind of science. Thomas Kuhn understood this. Think of a scientific paradigm as a kind of metaphysical frame. Physicists may think they have banished metaphysics, when all they have done is banish a certain strand of metaphysical thinking and substituted for it another, even more insidious one , which they are so far from recognizing that they have convinced themselves they have somehow escaped from history.

we do not experience time. It is a fiction created from memories and anticipations. This is what Husserl means by saying time is stretched. It has to be stretched in order to create the illusion that we are experiencing it. — FrancisRay

I would say it is the pure present we only experience as a fiction , and that, most primordially, the only thing we do experience is the tripartite structure of time.

The study of appearances is physics and the natural sciences and the the study of their origin and true nature is metaphysics and mysticism, so I'm not sure how phenomenology could be defined as a distinct subject. The boundaries are always going to be messy. . . .

I wonder if we all agree on the definition of phenomenology, since all those I've seen are quite vague. . — FrancisRay

I would say physics is the study of appearances as filtered though a particular set of metaphysical suppositions, what Husserl calls objectivist metalhysics. All science is doing metaphysics, but implicitly rather than explicitly. Heidegger would say that the notion of ‘appearance’ of a world before a subject is itself grounded in a particular metaphysical presupposition. A perhaps you can see, Im defining metaphysics as a set of grounding presuppositions guiding any domain of culture.

Husserl shows that (the 'experience' of ) time is stretched. There is no pointlike now, except as a useful mathematical fiction (the glories of R). But the gap between the so-called experience of time and time itself is also a fiction. 'Time in itself' is silly talk, 'decadent' metaphysics without an intuitive foundation — plaque flag

Yes, which is why I think Heidegger’s critique of internal time consciousness as a metaphysics of presence is a bit unfair to Husserl.

The point is that phenomenology is exclusively concerned with observable phenomena or appearances and has nothing to say about the origin and essential nature of phenomena. Thus it is defined as being free from any claims concerning existence. It doesn't stray onto metaphysics but is a non-reductive approach. Nothing wrong with this but it cannot produce a fundamental theory — FrancisRay

This doesn’t seem to be true for the founder of phenomenology:

Our monadological results are metaphysical, if it be true that ultimate cognitions of being should be called metaphysical. On the other hand, what we have here is anything but metaphysics in the customary sense: a historically degenerate metaphysics, which by no means conforms to the sense with which meta­physics, as "first philosophy", was instituted originally. Phe­nomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all "metaphysical adventure", all speculative excesses. (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations)

To bring latent reason to the understanding of its own possibilities and thus to bring to in­sight the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility—this is the only way to put metaphysics or universal philosophy on the
strenuous road to realization. It is the only way to decide
whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy—that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature— whether this telos, then, is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations * and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not
rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its entelechy. ( Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences)

The 'pure witness' is, in my view, anonymous being, more like a clearing or the light that shines on the scene of development. Or really just its being there. Just its happening.

FWIW, I don't think babies are able to think of being in this world, but I think we practiced concept-mongers understand their awareness to be awareness of the world. — plaque flag

Yes, indeed.
The personal ego is itself an idealism in that, rather than leading us back to the apodictic self-othering, subjective-objective becoming of temporal constitution, the psycho-physical ego is itself a product of constitution, via self-apperception. When we complete the epoche by abstracting away this self-apperception, we arrive at the primordial stratum where there is as yet no ego, but there remains the unitary flow of subjective temporal processes. “At the beginning of its development, the subject is not an Object for itself and does not have the apperceptive unity, "Ego."”(Ideas II, p.361)

Husserl argues that “As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the function which can be adequately grasped therein.”(Ideas II). Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. “...the ego which is the counterpart (gegenüber) to everything is anonymous. “ This suggests that for Husserl, the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity.

The world is never the same 'twice,' and yet I am describing the world, as predictably infinitely novel. Concepts have a relative stability that makes our conversation possible. — plaque flag

Husserl’s genetic method begins with an ego-intentionality which we imagine as preceding the constitution of any regularities in experience. At this point there isnt much to determine that there is something like ‘the’ world, if this is to indicate a realm of recognizable regularities, patterns and meaning. So what sort of process is required to turn a chaos of meaningless flux into the meaningful, stable patterns that would justify calling what we experience ‘the’ world? The flux would certainly need to make itself amenable to the construction of simple predictable groupings of some sort or other, but this is still a far cry from a world of stable objects that the subject can interact with. One would have to imagine that the subject progressively synthesizes out of simpler correlations more and more complex ones. In Heidegger’s terms, the subject creates a ‘worlding’. If this is an entangling of subject and world , it is one in which what the world brings to the correlation is subordinated to the requirements of recognizability and similarity.

“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness [in the same person] by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth)

Right, but it isn't just translation. We'd need some sort of very good predictive capability — Count Timothy von Icarus

Predictive capacity is already implied in the philosophical approach. Translation proceeds from a philosophical mode of anticipation into a conventionalized mode of prediction, which in today’s sciences means mathematisizing the objects of study i order to build apparatus for the purposes of calculation and measurement. This doesn’t make the scientific version more precise than the philosophical , it merely swaps a deeper philosophical notion of precision for a shallow instrumental idea of precision.

The "hard problem," is the problem of explaining how consciousness arises and how it produces its subjective qualities through a scientific theory that has the same rigor, comprehensiveness, and depth as any other of the major scientific theories we are familiar with (e.g., explanations of cellular reproduction.) If that's sort of answer you're looking for, this sort of framing isn't going to help you.

Phenomenology might help us find an answer to the hard problem, or it might tell us that the answer we want is unattainable, but it can't answer the problem because the problem is about explaining the subjective elements of consciousness in the same sort of language/model that we use for explaining how a car works — Count Timothy von Icarus

So by way of circular reasoning, if we define science as a conventionalized philosophical language, then the philosophical solution to the hard problem only becomes a scientific solution once we translate the former language into a more conventionalized form. Kind of like what enactivist psychology and neurophenomenology have done with phenomenology.

….