Emanuel Levinas speaks of the desideratum than exceeds the desire, and the ideatum that exceeds the idea. He is referring not to an intellectual apprehension, but something intuitive, a relation with the radically otherness of the world that beckons beyond to eternity. — Astrophel

What Levinas misses is that this radical other isn’t something to be found beyond being, it is within the structure of being itself. Intention always intends beyond itself, but this not the ‘Good’ any more or less than it is the opposite of the good.

“By making the origin of language, meaning, and difference the relation to the infinitely other, Levinas is resigned to betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse. But the true name of this inclination of thought to the Other, of this resigned acceptance of incoherent incoherence inspired by a truth more profound than the "logic" of philosophical discourse, transcendental horizons of language, is empiricism. The profundity of the empiricist intention must be recognized beneath the naivete of certain of its historical expressions. It is the dream of a purely heterological thought at its source. A pure thought of pure difference. Empiricism is its philosophical name, its metaphysical pretention or modesty.”(Derrida)

I may relatively presuppose my bicycle is in the entry or on the street. If not one then the other. But that I have a bicycle I absolutely presuppose. If my bicycle is neither on the street nor in the entry, I may well then question where it is. Stolen? Borrowed by a friend? Left by me somewhere else and I forgot where? But the question if I have one never arises. And if it did then the enterprise of wondering where it is would be rendered nonsensical. — tim wood

This sounds more like a structure of propositional logic than a language game

Another application would be in religious language game, the question of the existence of God from a nonreligious person makes no sense in a religious game where the whole language is based around the usage of the word ,"God" . — Eskander

But the use of the word ‘God’ among the religious will
likely include doubt, since God would imply faith , which requires doubt.So I think the hinge proposition God likely includes all of this. Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game.

no essence, a free for all, no holds barred, law of the jungle, anything goes. In essence, you're right but so am I and so is anyone else. — Agent Smith

Are you saying that you believe Wittgenstein’s is a no holds barred, anything goes approach? A radical relativism?

the concept of correctness vanishes with the paradox "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." — Agent Smith

Wittgenstein solved the paradox for you:

“It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.”

Towards what? What is the horizon which beckons? — Wayfarer

There is no single horizon which beckons. Instead there is endless self-transformation, endlessly transforming horizons. The goal is to slip into the movement of sense, to avoid falling prey to stagnant themes or values. The ethic is in the fluidity of change, because this is where intimacy and meaning lies, not in any particular contentful notions of the good or the true.

Here's an edit of what I quoted above.

The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility. — ajar

Heidegger is talking about the inauthentic understanding of the future. But even here, frameworks of intelligibility aren’t stagnant. When I interpret a new experience by reference to such a frame , the frame is developed and articulated. That constitutes a kind of change within the frame , and of the frame. A variation within a theme is a kind of modification of the theme. This is crucial to understand with respect to Heidegger, because his entire project uniting affect and intentionality rests on the idea that the past that frames my present comes already altered by that present. That is what feeling is. That is also what understanding is. This is what Gendlin is arguing. In Gendlin’s work, there is no such thing as a past that just sits there influencing my present.

If inauthentic interpretation. is a plodding kind of self-transformation, Heidegger nevertheless considers this sort of change subordinate and derivative of authentic time.

“Discoverture’s authentic way of being is uncanniness , while the most common everyday mode of discoverture is concealment.”
"Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in everydayness. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and
ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon." "The publicness of the they suppresses everything unfamiliar.” (Heidegger 2010)

“Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence...Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in
his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment -being torn away in that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.” (Heidegger 1995)

“The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative…. To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing. "(Heidegger 1994)

That beings (essences) are produced by Dasein in the act of taking something as something is
not to be understood as intentional activity that ‘takes for granted’ a world constituting space of experiential possibilities that is not itself changed in the act of intending objects. For Heidegger the condition of possibility for Befindlichkeit , for a world constituting
space of possibilities, is that this totality of relevance be modified anew each moment in an act of bringing forth. Beings can only be produced because the foundation of their being is created anew as a ‘ground-laying’ every time we see something as something. The creative re-making of the ground is a pre-condition for the productive seeing of an intentional object.

“Every “foundation” in the sense we discussed comes too late with regard to the positing of the essence, because the productive seeing of the essence is itself a productive seeing of that in which the essence has its ground—a productive seeing of what its ground is. Knowledge of the essence is in itself a ground-laying. It is the positing of what lies under as ground“(Heidegger 1994)

temporality as transcendence and relevance.
— Joshs

Explain. — Agent Smith

From a paper I’m writing:

Eugene Gendlin writes:

“I propose an expanded model of time. Time does not consist only of nows.” Linear time consists merely of positions on an observer's time line. The positions are supposed to be external and independent of what happens. Linear time is an empty frame.““ The linear unit model of successive self-identical times is generated from the more intricate model of time.” (Gendlin
2012)
As Gendlin(1997b) argues,
‘The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to what is next to it...”(p.71)

Comparing Gendlin’s model of temporality with Heidegger’s, we see that for Heidegger also , the past,
present and future don’t operate as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence.

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment [my experience of something ‘as’ something], and on closer analysis it turns out to be time. And this being-ahead-of-myself as a returning is a peculiar kind of movement that time itself constantly makes, if I may put it this way.”(Heidegger 2010b)
The returning from a totality of relevance in the act of understanding something constitutes temporality not as a present object happening IN time but as temporalization.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is
in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”(Heidegger 2010)

Gendlin(1997b) echoes Heidegger’s unification of the components of time.
“The future that is present now is not a time-position, not what will be past later. The future that is here now is the implying that is here now. The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly functioning past.”“......the past functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in”(p.37

Thus, it makes sense to view Being in time; hence, Being and Time — Agent Smith

In this sense time is 'there' in the world as a being, as the sun as a triggering signification. — ajar

This would be the vulgar concept of time for Heidegger, time as measurement of things which take place ‘within’ time, which appear and disappear as an endless sequence of before, now and later. Authentic or primordial time( What Being and Time is about) , by contrast, doesn’t have to do with things that occur ‘in’ time, but with temporality as transcendence and relevance.

“What does it mean to be "in time"? This "being-in-time" is very familiar to us from the way it is represented in natural science. In natural science all processes of nature are calculated as processes which happen "in time." Everyday common sense also finds processes and things enduring "in time," persisting and disappearing "in time." When we talk about "being-in-time," everything depends on the interpretation of this "in”.” (Heidegger)

What needs to be corrected is the tendency to take personhood as fundamental rather than emergent. How can 'consciousness' have a meaning? (Well, a family of meanings.) (I think it does have such a meaning, that it plays a role or family of roles as a token within a community.) — ajar

Phenomenology doesn’t take community to be primary, but rather subjective perceptive on community. Community is experienced differently by each participant in it , and taking community as primary is incoherent.

The point was that this "story" is not explicit, therefore whatever story you imagine, it's not at all objective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh sorry, I didn't realize this was a school of art appreciation for acid trippers — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ve done a fair amount of painting. Any artist will tell you that the design of a painting explicitly directs the viewer’s
attention as a temporal unfolding. So the view may not recognize the story as explicit, but the creator of the art does.

As I see it, a Wittgenstein-adjacent view (and he was by no means the only thinker one could mention here) does dissolve the individual into the community, making language prior to sensation, making the community prior to the Cartesian ghost that dreams itself. (I think participate in language therefore I'm not an 'I' but (primarily) a 'we.') — ajar

And yet, for Wittgenstein the personalistic perspective doesn’t simply disappear into the communal whole. His approach is person relative, occasion sensitive and context dependent.

Like in my analogy of a photograph, or still painting, there is absolutely no objective narrative in that medium, because there is no temporal extension, regardless of whether it's a snap shot of an action scene, as a narrative requires temporal extension. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is nothing instantaneous about the way we encounter something like a painting. A painting tells a story that unfolds temporally as one’s gaze moves from one object to another within the frame, and then circles back after having formed bits of narrative to be embellished or reconfigured by further looking. The more we stare at a painting, the more it seems
to be doing and changing.

Given that a movie is a series of frames, it constitutes merely a more temporally extended version of what is already a fundamentally temporal affair.

suffering and joy, the two dimensions of our ethical/aesthetic world. Do these not tell us by their own natures that only one of these is "intrinsically" desirable? I tend to think suffering is an instruction: Don't do that! And it is not culture of principles telling us this. Kierkegaard was perhaps right: principles are limited formulations, superseded by something so mysterious we had to invent religion. — Astrophel

Nietzsche and Heidegger wanted to unravel the longstanding predisposition of philsophy to privilege presence over absence, affirmation over negation , pleasure over suffering. As such, they needed to deconstruct the Hegelian dialectic which Kierkegaard took into his own philosophy.

“Furthermore, we must ask what does the dialectician himself want? What does this will which wills the dialectic want? It is an exhausted force which does not have the strength to affirm its difference, a force which no longer acts but rather reacts to the forces which dominate it — only such a force brings to the foreground the negative element in its relation to the other. Such a force denies all that it is not and makes this negation its own essence and the principle of its existence. "While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside', what is ‘different' what is 'not itself' and this No is its creative deed" (GM I 10 p. 36).

“The dialectic proposes a certain conception of the tragic: linking it to the negative, to opposition and to contradiction. The contradiction of suffering and life, of finite and infinite in life itself, of particular destiny and universal spirit in the idea, the movement of contradiction and its resolution — this is how tragedy is represented.

For Nietzsche , however , “the negative is not present in the essence as that from which force draws its activity: on the contrary it is a result of activity, of the existence of an active force and the affirmation of its difference. The negative is a product of existence itself: the aggression necessarily linked to an active existence, the aggression of an affirmation. As for the negative concept (that is to say, negation as a concept) "it is only a subsequently-invented pale contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concept — filled with life and passion through and through" (GM I 10 p. 37).” (Deleuze)

“ The pertinacity of dialectic, which draws its motivation from a very definite source, is docu-mented most clearly in Kierkegaard. In the properly philosophical aspect of his thought, he did not break free from Hegel. His later turn to Trendelenburg is only added documentation for how little radical he was in philosophy.” (Heidegger)

Derrida comes to mind: The moment you think at all, you have a muddled or diffused event, and this "unstructured" way of designation is simply the "structure" of the way utterances work. Completely indeterminate when discussion turns to questions at the most basic level because determinacy itself is simply indeterminate — Astrophel

I wouldnt say for Derrida an event is muddled or diffused, but rather a structure composed of differences.

“I do not believe I have ever spoken of "indeterminacy," whether in regard to "meaning" or anything else. Undecidability is something else again. While referring to what I have said above and elsewhere, I want to recall that undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for example, discursive-syntactical or rhetorical-but also political, ethical, etc.). They are pragmatically determined.The analyses that I have devoted to undecidability concern just these determinations and these definitions, not at all some vague "indeterminacy." I say "undecidability" rather than "indeterminacy" because I am interested more in relations of force, in differences of force, in everything that allows, precisely, determinations in given situations to be stabilized through a decision of writing (in the broad sense I give to this word, which also includes political action and experience in general). There would be no indecision or double bind were it not between determined (semantic, ethical, political) poles, which are upon occasion terribly necessary and always irreplaceably Singular. Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics, but also of ethics and politics, "deconstruction" should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism.”( Limited, Inc)

Reading Michel Henry on Heidegger, I find, "The essence of revelation peculiar to affectivity and taking place in it is completely lost to Heidegger, confused by him with the essence of the ontological understanding of Being to which it nevertheless remains heterogeneous both in its structure and in its phenomenality." I think this is right — Astrophel

I think Michel Henry is coming from an older Kantian influenced religious tradition, and a s a result he is neither in a position to effectively understand Heidegger nor Husserl. What he does is try to turn Heidegger into Kierkegaard, and I see Heidegger as having moved quite a distance beyond the latter.

there is only one bottom line to all this, and it is not cognitive. It is affective — Astrophel

I think it’s a mistake to prioritize affectivity over cognition. It splits them apart, when in fact they were never separate.

It is close to Kierkegaard's insistence that when rational systems approach actuality, it is a train wreck, and Heidegger's ontology is, after all, a readable, rational presentation. — Astrophel

I would say instead that Heidegger’s project was dedicated to a deconstruction of rationality.

If we treat ethics as ethical ‘norms’ , then ethics, as justice, is itself inherently violent.

Personally, all this makes little substantive difference to me in as much as the moment I wake up I am in the only real world I have access to, whatever it is. — Tom Storm

Are you ‘in’ this world or do you form and re-form this world ( and yourself)?

I wonder that if in some way a phenomenological approach and its wholesale 'dissolution' of totalizing metanarratives is not in itself a form of metanarrative. Can one make the claim that what we experience are intersubjective agreements between localized communities of narrative (and the personal, subjective location), without this coming from a totalizing viewpoint? — Tom Storm

This is like the claim that when someone says there is no objective truth they are making a kind of of truth claim themselves. But this misunderstands what such perspectives as phenomenology are actually doing. Yes, they are making a claim, and yes that claim can be critiqued, but that doesn’t make it a meta narrative. It works differently than this. It is self-reflexive in it’s core, grounding intrinsicality in movement and transition. It isn’t claiming to do away with truth or objectivity , but to set these concepts in motion and talk about them from within this transit.

how can I interpret this in any other way than affirming that there are no (objective, if one wills) meta-ethical givens? — javra

And you believe there are such things as meta-ethical
givens, right?

What is the non-conditional good that is universally applicable to all value judgments that anyone can make ( — javra

All questions pre-suppose the conditions of their possibility. So your question pre-supposes the coherence of the idea of something being able to be thought that is beyond all conditions and contingencies, and it also assumes the coherence of the universal. But for phenomenology both of these notions are derived abstractions generated from a subjectivity that is radically contingent and temporal. To the extent there are universal structures for phenomenology they are empty formalisms holding no value content.

Very much enjoyed reading Thompson's Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, for example. Haven't yet read Husserl, though. Still, I've so far not found in it a satisfactory exposition of meta-ethics.And meta-ethics naturally addresses issues of value such as those we've been discussing. — javra

You mean you haven’t found in Thompson a satisfactorily meta-ethics?
I think the kinds of suppositions that would make a ‘meta’ useful or even coherent have been unraveled by phenomenological approaches.

Husserl's phenomenological reduction is like this: a method, not unlike meditation! — Astrophel

I wrote a paper comparing Varela and Thompsons’s approach to meditation to phenomenology. It’s titled A Phenomenological Critique of Mindfulness. You might find it interesting.

https://www.academia.edu/41670442/A_Phenomenological_Critique_of_Mindfulness

Mulholland also argues that Heidegger's complete body of work is sufficient to consider the project complete. Taylor Carmen leans that way. I do not disagree. — Arne

As you know , some argue that Heidegger’s ‘Kehre’ in the 1930’s was a decisive break with the direction of thinking Being and Time represents. For those writers the completion of his project amounts to a renouncement of his 1920’s approach. Others, such as Derrida, see a continuity between his earlier and later writings. For my part, I see the later writings as clarifications and further articulations of the earlier project , but found little additional enlightenment in Heidegger’s post-Being and Time work.

Your emphatic insistence notwithstanding, Heidegger defines being as ". . . that on the basis of which entities are already understood." — Arne

I’m not sure that qualifies as a ‘definition’ of Being in the sense of revealing the meaning of Being. Understanding Being in terms of temporality comes closer to the mark, but even here, Heidegger is not satisfied that a final ‘definition’ of Being has been achieved.

“Time, which is addressed as the meaning of Being in Being and Time, is itself not an answer, not a last prop for questioning, but rather itself the naming of a question. The name "time" is a preliminary word for what was later called "the truth of Being." “ Being and Time is on the way toward finding a concept of time, toward that which belongs most of all to time, in terms of which "Being" gives itself as presencing. This is accomplished on the path of the temporality of Dasein in the interpretation of Being as temporality.”( On Time and Being)

Eugene Gendlin

The relevant context of one can be the the irrelevant or absurd context of others. Who is to say which context is relevant. They are relevant, but relevance is a subjective notion. You can set relevance of pragmatic context apart, and give it an objective importance, but then you cut it off from the real context appearing in practice. — Raymond

Exactly. Heidegger’s point, which is also the argument of the phenomenologists and Wittgenstein, is that objectivity is a derivative product of subjectively determined contexts of relevance. There is no such thing as a ‘real’ context if that is supposed to mean a state of affairs or facts existing independently of those who subjectively experience them. We can form intersubjective agreement concerning subjectively formed experiences , but this is only a relative consensus. This is what scientific practice is all about.

If only the members of his party hadn't followed his advice! If only the idle talk of the Nazis had remained just that. Idle talk... — Raymond

You may or may not find the following interesting:

“Gandhi, Marx, Dilthey, Buber, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, McKeon, and many others taught me deeply. But so did three writers whose politics were highly objectionable to me: Jung, Dostoevsky, and Heidegger.

Jung offers deep and indispensable insights. I did not like knowing that Jung had said: "Hitler is the embodiment of the German spirit." The Nazis knew his views. Records show that they considered sending for Jung to help Rudolph Hess with his mental trouble.

Similarly, I had not wanted to know that Dostoevsky hated Jews, Germans, and Poles. He gave influential speeches in favor of the Panslavic movement. That movement was a direct cause of the Russian-French alliance and the World Wars.

What I heard of Heidegger's Nazi views made me decide not to read him at all. I read him when I was almost 40 years old. Then I realized that Heidegger's thought was already in mine, from my reading of so many others who had learned from him.

With these three we are forced to wonder: Must we not mistrust their seemingly deep insights? How could we want these insights for ourselves, if they came out of experience so insensitive to moral ugliness? Perhaps it might not matter if the insights were less deep. But they open into what is most precious in human nature and life. The depth is beyond question. The insights are genuine.

So one attempts to break out of the dilemma on the other side: Is there a way Nazism or hatred of other peoples might be not so bad? Could it have seemed different at the time? No chance of that, either. I am a Jewish refugee from Vienna, a lucky one to whom nothing very bad happened. I remember what 1938 looked like, not only to a Jew, but to others. I remember the conflicts it made in people. They could not help knowing which instincts were which. Many writers and ordinary people had no difficulty seeing the events for what they were, at the time.

So we return to question the insights again. But by now they are among our own deepest insights. We go back and forth: Nothing gives way on either side. Did these men simply make mistakes? We can forgive mistakes. A human individual can develop far beyond others, but surely only on one or two dimensions. No one can be great in more than a few ways. And silently to myself, when other Americans discuss and share Heidegger's view that to be human is to dwell historically as a people on a soil. How do my fellow Americans manage to dwell with Heidegger on German soil?

My colleagues read this in a universalized way. For us, in the Heidegger Circle, the human is the same everywhere in this respect, and equally valuable. Humans are culturally particularized, certainly, but this particularization is itself universal. Humans are one species. They are all culturally particular. This universal assertion holds across us all, and we see no problem.

Indeed, after 1945 Heidegger writes of the dangers of technological reason on a "planetary" level. But it is reason, which is thus planetary---the same universal reason he says he had always attacked. (Spiegel Interview.) Heidegger's planetary view differs from our more recent understanding of human universality. The difference has not been much written about, so there are no familiar phrases for it. For Heidegger there is no common human nature which is then also particularized and altered in history. There is no human nature that lasts through change by history. There is only the historical particular, no human nature.

Humans eat and sleep differently in different cultures. They arrange different sexual rituals, build different "nests," and raise their young differently. In an animal species the members do all this in the same way. Humans are not even a species. So, at least, it seemed to those thinkers who entered into what is most deeply human. To them, the deepest and most prized aspect of humans was the cultural and historical particular.

In our generation we easily and conveniently universalize the particularization. Not Heidegger. For him, what is most valuable is the necessarily particular indwelling in one people's history and language, on its land, and not another's. We change it without noticing, to read: any indwelling in any people's history is this most highly valued aspect.

it was Heidegger who pioneered a thinking beyond logical universals, beyond the thin, abstracted commonality categories. He pioneered the thinking which consists of situatedness (Befindlichkeit). He said that situational living is already an understanding. He said that understanding is always befindlich. "Understanding always has greater reach than the cognitive can follow." He called it "dwelling" (see Gendlin, Conference Proceedings, 1983). He also called it "indwelling" (einwohnen). He thought its more-than-logical creativity limited within historical soil and nation. To him non-rational meant non-universal.

But with his own books, and through Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and many others, it was he who opened the way to our kind of thinking---the kind that now dwells universally beyond the rational common---although it is only beginning to say how. To work on that is our problem. He contributed enough for one human.

Heidegger must be credited for a great share in that very development because of which we no longer feel the old either/or: either the deeply human historical particular with its political savagery and sadism, or the merely rational commmon.

It is partly the influence of his work in us, which now makes us unable to grasp how he could have failed to sense the nonrational universality of humans. Today, in Chicago, when we look at Louis Sullivan's buildings, the ones that created modern architecture, we wonder why he used so much granite. Why didn't he use just steel and windows?

To understand may be to forgive, but it is certainly not to excuse. Without pretending to lighten the horror, we need to understand why that tradition of thought also brought horror. Only so can we think through what we draw from our immediate past. Only then can we recover the other past, right behind that one. We need both, to articulate our own, non-rational universalization of human depth.” Eugene Gendlin

So only pragmatic engagement is relevant and make idle talk fully comprehensible? — Raymond

Pragmatic engagement isn’t something above and beyond idle talk as some sort of physical activity, it is the condition of possibility of idle talk and all other forms of language and experience in general. All experiences of perception and thought emerge out of contexts of relevance.

Seems like H expresses the same as science does. There is everyday experience. Conceiled (verdeckte) and hidden Daseins (the things that are there). The true Daseins (scientific reality) is clouded by idle talk. What is needed is an originary language talk, "ursprunglichen Ansprechens", the language of science. Idle talk obscures the true appearance of the world by imposing "herschende Ansichte" (non-scientific ones). — Raymond

Heidegger argues that the scientific language of logic-mathematical reasoning belongs to average everydayness as its theoretical expression. The ‘ real’ that empirical science reveals conceals as much as everyday comportment.
He would not claim that everydayness and idle
talk are untrue , only that they cut themselves off from the wider contexts of pragmatic engagement and relevance which make them fully intelligible.

I certainly think he falls short — Arne

Being and time. How's Dasein connected to time?
— Agent Smith

I have no answer to that question. I am generally confused by Division II of Being and Time — Arne

If I am confident I can reveal to you the meaning of baseball if I can explain to you hitting, pitching, fielding, and baserunning and I explain hitting and nothing more, then neither you nor I can claim to I have revealed the meaning of baseball — Arne

It sounds like the limitation resides as much with your comprehension as it does with Heidegger’s explanation.

I strongly encourage you to try and make your way through Division II successfully before you render judgement on how successful Heidegger was in dealing with the question of the meaning of Being in Being and Time, given the fact that his concept of temporality is central to the question of Being in general.

he uses the context of average everydayness to explain the elements common to every situation in which we find our self, i.e., we proceed based upon our attunement, our understanding, and our projected outcome. That is true all Daseins whether they be good, bad, short, tall, authentic, inauthentic. . . — Arne

But there is authentic and inauthentic attunement and understanding. Average everydayness is a mode of inauthentic attunement and understanding. It is not a categorizing of elements common to every situation, but a way of interpreting these ‘elements’ that is peculiar to average everydayness.

As I clearly stated earlier, "average everydayness" is the context Heidegger uses to explicate the basic structure of Dasein, i.e., the structure common to all Daseins regardless of any particular state of authenticity. — Arne

Average everydayness cannot be independent of any particular state of authenticity. On the contrary, it manifests precisely as a particular state of authenticity, the inauthentic mode of average everydayness. Authentic Dasein cannot comport itself toward beings in this mode , since it is the very nature of authentic interpretiveness that beings become irrelevant and insignificant to the mode of authentic Dasein. There is no longer an ‘average’ or an ‘everyday’ in the mode of interpretiveness of authentic Dasein.

As true as that may be, it is true for all Daseins regardless of their state of "authenticity." "Even in the mode of inauthenticity" is not the same as "only in the mode of inauthenticity." Surly you must see that. — Arne

Average everydayness is not a mere , generic reference to what we do day to day , it’s a description of a particular mode of interpreting ourselves in our relations to others in the world. His use of the word ‘average’ refers to the way that we think of our selves in generic , normative terms in this mode of inauthenticity. In the mode of average everydayness, as Das Man , we are closed off to what particularizes our own experience.

“Idle talk conceals simply because of its characteristic failure to address things in an originary way [urspriinglichen Ansprechens]. It obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by instituting a dominant view [herrschende Ansicht].”“Usually and for the most part the ontic mode of being-in (discoverture) is concealment [Verdeckung]. Interpretedness, which is speech encrusted by idle talk, draws any given Dasein into 'one's' way of being. But existence in the 'one' now entails the concealment and marginalization of the genuine self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Not only has each particular given itself over to 'one', 'one' blocks Dasein's access to the state it finds itself in [Befindlichkeit].”(Heidegger 2011)

I think Heidegger did indeed strive for clarity. What was being discussed was so mired in traditional words and concepts that it requires more effort to understand his language, but that's not the same as obscurantism. — Xtrix

:100:

Average everydayness is what Heidegger calls Das Man
— Joshs

That is incorrect. — Arne

To be more precise Das Man is the subject of average everydayness.

“Initially and for the most part, Da-sein is taken in by its world. This mode of being, being absorbed in the world, [average everydayness] and thus being-in which underlies it, essen­tially determine the phenomenon which we shall now pursue with the question: Who is it who is in the everydayness of Da-sein? …
In this kind of being, the mode of everyday being a self is grounded whose explication makes vis­ible what we might call the "subject" of everydayness, the they[Das Man].

Certainly other animals appear to have an understanding, be in a mood, and act with purpose. But we have no basis for presuming animals have their own individualized "ultimate for the sake of which" or that they are beings that question being.

Heidegger makes no claim that Dasein is unique to human beings and his views do not depend upon any such uniqueness. If it turned out that every Dolphin had their own "ultimate for the sake of which" or that Dolphins spent a lot of time questioning being, Heidegger wouldn't care. — Arne

Heidegger differentiates ‘life’ and ‘animals’ from
Dasein in the following way. Animals are poor in world.
They do not experience beings in the world , have no ‘understanding’ because not comportment toward things, only stimuli which trigger their instinctive drives. Thus animals have no Dasein. They ‘are’ but do not exist as being in the world.

Heidegger does not equate average everydayness with inauthentic existence. Average everydayness is the context that allows Heidegger to explicate the structure of Dasein. A Dasein living inauthentically has the same structure as a Dasein living authentically. And even the authentically living Dasein lives most of its life in average everydayness. They wake up, fall out of bed, run a comb across their head. . . — Arne

Average everydayness is what Heidegger calls Das Man, which is a comportment toward beings which is inauthentic. Inauthentic simply means that Dasein falls prey to beings rather than understanding its own being directly.

“But the average everydayness of Da-sein must not be understood as a mere "aspect. " In it, too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. In it, too, Da-sein is con­cerned with a particular mode of its being to which it is related in the way of average everydayness, if only in the way of fleeing from it and of forgetting it.”(BT Sec.9)

Having an understanding of the average everydayness of being human and an understanding of what it means to live authentically does not get us to the goal described in what is mistakenly treated as an introduction to Being and Time, the meaning of being. — Arne

I read Time and Being, Heidegger’s final statement of the meaning of Being in 1962, 35 years after the publication of Being and Time. Being and time ends with the following questions:

“The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Da-sein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?”

On Time and Being , he answers this question in the affirmative, with an addtional feature.

“Time, which is addressed as the meaning of Being in Being and Time, is itself not an answer, not a last prop for questioning, but rather itself the naming of a question. The name "time" is a preliminary word for what was later called "the truth of Being." “ Being and Time is on the way toward finding a concept of time, toward that which belongs most of all to time, in terms of which "Being" gives itself as presencing. This is accomplished on the path of the temporality of Dasein in the interpretation of Being as temporality.”

His 1962 work doesn’t add much to what he tentatively pointed to in Being and Time. “The ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of being is temporality itself.”

the primary subject matter of Being and Time is an explication of Dasein in its average everydayness. — Arne

In division two, Heidegger moves on from average everydayness to talk about authentic angst and time. So even though what you say is true, once we have finished the book, we know about both inauthentic ( average everyday) and authentic Dasein.

Being fond of the Classical Pragmatists, I may have a different idea of what constitutes philosophical topics than you do. — Ciceronianus

I’m curious. Would you consider the following to be an example of “let’s pretend”?

“…entirely honest, sincere and unaffected, because unprepense, meditation upon the Idea of God, into which the Play of Musement will inevitably sooner or later lead, and which by developing a deep sense of the adorability of that Idea, will produce a Truly religious Belief in His Reality and His nearness. It is a reasonable argument, because it naturally results in the most intense and living determination (Bestimmung) of the soul toward shaping the Muser's whole conduct into conformity with the Hypothesis that God is Real and very near; and such a determination of the soul in regard to any proposition is the very essence of a living Belief in such proposition. “

I suspect it might be something deeper than what you are suggesting. — Reformed Nihilist

Or maybe it’s something shallower than what I’m
suggesting. That is , if you look at the etymological history of terms like ‘certainty’ ‘absolute’ and ‘truth’ since the Greeks, you’ll find that the way people have understood them has changed continuously over time.

So a claim like “there has been a search for, a belief in, and a feeling of a need for absolutes in philosophy as far back as it is recorded” has to be filtered through these changing senses of meaning of such terms over the course of Western cultural history. For instance, today absolute certainty is connected with absolute
objectivity. But prior to Galileo, the meaning of subject and object were precisely the reverse of what they mean today.