Only within a taken-for-granted , unquestioned set of normative presuppositions concerning the nature of the real can empiricist notions like proof and validation be considered as definitive. A metaphysics is the basis of the intelligibility of truth and falsity, not the product of empirical ascertainment of truth and falsity.

So the truth of what you just wrote only holds within the context of taken-for-granted, unquestioned presuppositions? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes , if I were to claim what I wrote as a truth , rather than as an invitation to try on for size a particular way of thinking about matters.

First principles seem eminently questionable. It also seems eminently possible to put forth first principles that can clash with reality — Count Timothy von Icarus

But the reality they clash with is already contaminated and interwoven with the schemes of understanding represented by the principles themselves. We will only ever know reality as constraints and affordances that are responsive to our schemes.

The issue of betrayed trust is sort of besides the point. A person can utter an obvious falsehood without intending any deception, and our senses can also deceive us. The point is that notions of truth and falsity are prephilosophical. Obviously, such things are context dependent. One cannot be told false statements outside of some sort of social contact, but that broad context is also universal to the human experience.[/quote

You seem to be thinking of truth in terms of correctness , a match between what seems to be the case and what is really the case. This assumes that what is the case maintains its sense over time such that we can compare the ‘real’ with the seeming. Formal logic is based on putting into symbolic form this assumption concerning objects that they retain their original sense independent of the continually changing ways we are interacting with them and with each other. In the case of a lie, the breakdown of trust is not peripheral to the ascertainment of truth. What is perceived as a deliberate falsehood by one party may be the result of a difference of interpretation. And in the case of a deliberate lie, it is assumed by the lying party that that they will not be understood as they wish to be understood. In other words, the lie is an attempt to compensate for a breakdown in shared values, goals and understandings. You might counter that i. the case of Grug and Ugg, their breakdown in trust doesn’t negate that there is a basic fact at stake, but I would argue that even the seemingly simplest and most straightforward example of a factual situation involves a change of the sense of meaning of what is at stake , and thus a change in the interpretation of what is the case. This is what the later Wittgenstein was trying to teach us about how language doesn’t just act as a connector better subject and object, but always refreshes the sense of what an object is in the very act of using words. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So as a separate subject from physics, metaphysics would have to talk about whatever is inside the circle of metaphysics and outside the circle of physics — Lionino

What do you think about the placement of logic outside the circle of metaphysics? What kind of logic are we talking about here ( Continentals use the term in a much broader way than Analytic philosophers) , and what aspect of logic could be considered superordinate to metaphysics? There has been much written in recent years on the dependence of formal logic on certain kinds of metaphysics presuppositions.

If Grug tells Ugg not to eat the last mammoth ribs, goes to get fire wood, comes back, finds the mammoth ribs gone and mammoth grease and bits of ribs hanging from Ugg's beard, and Ugg tells him "I did leave the ribs," Grugg's judgement that this is false doesn't rely on metaphysics. I would say rather than truth appears to be one of the things metaphysics and epistemology must explain. That statements might be true or false is a basic fact of the world to be explained. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is it that makes a state of affairs true or false, that makes basic facts of the world what they are to us? Is it something separable from language , or is it only within the premises set up by language games that what is or is not the case can reveal its sense to us? What must already be understood between Ugg and Gregg, and in what way, in order for them to share the notion of violation of trust that applies here? And is not this understanding formed on the basis of contextual interactions between the two actors, rather than the facts pre-existing their co-determination of what is at issue and at stake?

I mean, this really depends on what you mean by "proven." Certainly, some metaphysical theories might be shown to be contradictory via actual proofs, but in general they get shot down in a more abductive manner. You can't prove that Ayn Rand's Objectivism isn't good metaphysics with an abacus, but you can certainly make very good arguments that it's fatally flawed — Count Timothy von Icarus

Only within a taken-for-granted , unquestioned set of normative presuppositions concerning the nature of the real can empiricist notions like proof and validation be considered as definitive. A metaphysics is the basis of the intelligibility of truth and falsity, not the product of empirical ascertainment of truth and falsity.

For Husserl, the real objects whose constitution Sokolowski wrote about are themselves idealities

Would it be fair though to say that such a project requires positive metaphysical assertions that they might be either rejected or granted a stay of execution? I — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ate you suggesting that a metaphysical scheme is the kind of thing that can be proven true or false?

The philosophy of mathematics is a rich area.

(1) Unfortunately, cranks, who are ignorant and confused about the mathematics post incorrect criticisms of the mathematics, from either a crudely conceived philosophical or a crudely imagined mathematical perspective. That calls for correcting their misinformation about the mathematics itself. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I agree with your points. I just meant that this particular thread doesn’t seem to be getting beyond the correcting of wayward mathematical assumptions in order to deal with the philosophy. I might add that even at the level of securing consensus concerning ‘standard’ mathematics there is likely to be more disagreement than many might expect, perhaps due to the inseparability of philosophical presuppositions and mathematical principles.

↪Rob J Kennedy A collection of semantic games — some based on reality and empirical observation, others based on fantasy — Lionino

And empirical observation isnt grounded in any kind of presuppositions of the sort that Collinwood is getting at , a mesh of implicit, pragmatic relevance relations that make what we observe intelligible to us in connection with our larger goals and purposes?
Collinwood seems to be borrowing from Heidegger, who uses the example of a hammer to demonstrate how we come to know objects. The hammer as a persisting thing with attributes and properties is secondary to, because derived deom our actual use of the hammer in goal oriented activities. And this use is itself inextricably bound up with a larger totality of relevance relations between us and our world. As Thomas Kuhn showed with respect to scientific knowledge, these larger relevance relations define what is recognized as evidence of the real , and informs all our observations. Such superordinate schemes of interpretation, or paradigms, are what contemporary philosophers mean by metaphysics.

Sure, we know that at least a world exists, the world being our mind. But we do not know whether there is an outside world (brain in a vat), that is usually what people talk about when we say the world exists or not. — Lionino

Isn’t that like saying that we know an organism exists but we dont know if the organism’s environment exists? If the organism is a self-organized system of exchanges with a world, then any line we attempt to draw between inside and outside is arbitrary. This is the way psychologists are beginning to think about the concept of mind. The mind is not the brain, it is the reciprocal interactions among brain, body and environment.

I said math and philosophy have different way of doing things — Corvus

They certainly do, which is why I’m wondering what a thread on mathematics is doing on a philosophy forum.

It could be that Rawls only citation is Hegel - but unless he's specifically trying to elucidate Hegel in his own work, I can't rightly justify a reading-acorss — AmadeusD

I’m not sure how easy it is to differentiate between being strongly indebted to and influenced by a philosopher in one’s work on the one hand, and ‘trying to elucidate’ a philosopher in one’s work on the other. Isnt this merely the difference between an implicit and an explicitly articulated overlap between Rawls and Hegel? If I tell you I am strongly indebted to the work of Kant, and you then claim that Kant’s work is non-philosophy, then it seems to me you're indirectly invalidating or failing or understand an aspect of my own work.

But whether I take him to be X level of successful in his work shouldn't reflect his influences unless they are seriously direct influences (i.e he was writing about Hegel in his career generally — AmadeusD

…a consistent reference to the Hegelian political philosophy appears in the last writings of Rawls. Only there does Rawls mention his intellectual debt to Hegel. Indeed, the last part of the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy is devoted to Hegel. These lectures are the last that Rawls gave in Harvard in 1991. In this last chapter on Hegel, Rawls stresses the criticisms Hegel directed at the ‘atomistic’ liberalism of social contract theoreticians and declares that he fully shares the judgement of the author of the Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 1821). According to Hegel, this form of liberalism ‘fails to see ( . . . ) the deep social rootedness of people within an established framework of their political and social institutions’. Rawls does not hesitate to stress also: ‘I see [Hegel’s] as an important exemplar in the history of moral and political philosophy of the liberalism of freedom.

If Rawls stands on his own, and works Hegel into reasonable insights, that's his success, rather than Hegel's. The Dialectic might be really useful for working through potential legal ramificati — AmadeusD

I understand. It’s just that, for whatever it’s worth, I imagine Rawls protesting vigorously to your characterization of Hegel’s thinking as non-philosophy. I guess how much this matters to you depends on in how high of a regard you hold Rawls’s judgement on such matters.

As i take it, you are very much a thinker of the left where writings of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Zizek and continental philosophy, generally, have a fairly high status. We're just running in dissimilar circles intellectually, I think — AmadeusD

This is an interesting point, because I see Hegel as a dividing line between political conservativism and today’s progressive liberalism. Andrew Breitbart articulated a similar position:

“A line was becoming clear. Marx and Hegel had paved the way for the Progressives, who in turn had paved the way for the Frankfurt School, who had then attacked the American way of life by pushing “cultural Marxism” through “critical theory.” In the middle of his popular memoir, the American reactionary editor Andrew Breitbart offers a critical appraisal of so-called “critical theory.” As he reflects, “The Frankfurt School thinkers had come up with the rationale for radical environmentalism, artistic communism, psychological deconstruction of their opponents, and multiculturalism. Most of all, they had come up with the concept of “repressive tolerance,” aka political correctness.” Here Breitbart reads a paralyzing structure in what he labels as “critical theory,” pointing to it as the source for the dangerous utopian imaginaries of the contemporary left. In this reflection, critical theory seems to promote a paralysis of thought, limiting discourse by foreclosing the speech of the right.

But as a lawyer, do you also reject the ideas of legal
scholar John Rawls, who was influenced by Hegel?

↪Joshs Of course - at the expense of not telling the truth — Banno

Can one put into question the notion of god’s eye truth without that questioning itself being assumed to be oriented by a god’s eye perspective?

The way I see it, these paradoxes show in a nice way how all truth is an idealization.
— Apustimelogist

Trouble is, that's just an idealisation. — Banno

One can deconstruct idealizations without one’s deconstruction itself being an idealization.

You are saying that Hegel’s work is not philosophy?
— Joshs

Very much so. It is an attempt at philosophy by a theosopher — AmadeusD

I appreciate that Hegel’s mode of thinking is profoundly alien to what you are used to, but I’ve been involved in studying, writing and publishing philosophy most of my adult life, and although Hegel is far from my favorite philosopher , I consider him to be without question among the greatest thinkers of the modern era.

it seems to me you are jumping through hoops to validate your own political prejudices — Lionino

Let’s talk about your political prejudices because, tbh, that’s what I’m really interested in here. What do you think of the value of Marx, Antifa, wokeness, intersectionality and other current interests of the political left?

After going through the first 15 episodes of the Cunning Of Geist and scanning all of Spirit in hte last three months, I have to agree. Whether its philosophy is debatable, at best. — AmadeusD

You are saying that Hegel’s work is not philosophy?

I will argue that at a political and ideological level Heidegger's work can be seen to bear a close relationship to the so-called Conservative Revolution, an intellectual movement that rejected both bourgeois liberalism and communism, and called for an authoritarian nationalism and a spiritual renewal of Germany. — Mark Cameron

One can’t begin to unravel Heidegger’s political beliefs without mastering his massive philosophical ouvre. Richard Wollin tried to turn Heidegger’s philosophy into a 1930’s style right wing screed after utterly failing to understand his work. Are there conservative elements in his thinking? Yes, but they are intertwined with ideas whose political implications are far removed from both conservativism and liberalism.

Αs far as I know, he was never a professional philosopher. Other than that, I stand behind what the SEP says; he is better described as a sociologist (pseudo-science) and activist rather than philosopher.
In a sense, couldn't we call Richard Dawkins a philosopher? Yet he is much better described as a biologist. — Lionino

This is what I got from the SEP:

Karl Marx is often treated as a revolutionary, an activist rather than a philosopher, whose works inspired the foundation of many communist regimes in the twentieth century…However, Marx was trained as a philosopher, and although often portrayed as moving away from philosophy in his mid-twenties—perhaps towards history and the social sciences—there are many points of contact with modern philosophical debates throughout his writings.

Marx wrote the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. “The Manuscripts provide a critique of classical political economy grounded in the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach.”
Compare this with Dawkins, who never formally studied philosophy and didn’t directly incorporate the ideas of philosophers into his approach.

The prominent philosophers that we know consider Marx to be a philosopher are those that care about him, that is engage with him. Philosophers that draw from Marx are a very small section. — Lionino

Do you think that Marx is a philosopher?

Heidegger was conservative, wasn't him? And isn't him one of the namesakes of philosophy after Hegel? — Lionino

I don’t consider Heidegger a conservative.

I would call him someone who doesn’t understand philosophy
— Joshs

I doubt NDT understands much. Regardless, he is not conversative — on the contrary, he goes with whatever the current news-approved opinion is — and he consistently denies philosophy — Lionino

I didn’t say he was a conservative. One doesn’t have to be conservative to misunderstand philosophy.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is often treated as a revolutionary, an activist rather than a philosopher
— SEP — Lionino

The question is whether there are any prominent philosophers who dont consider Marx to be a philosopher, and the answer is no.

Like all popular movements, conservatism has its philosophy deniers, but I’m not sure what it would mean to call conservatives philosophy deniers. — Lionino

I’m not calling conservatives philosophy deniers , I’m calling conservative philosophers deniers of the validity of post-Hegelian philosophy.

I would not call NDT a conservative — Lionino

I would call him someone who doesn’t understand philosophy. This was true of Stephen Hawking as well, but not Heisenberg or Bohr.

Despite claims of the contrary, "woke" derives at least half from the Frankfurt school, of Marxist basis. Some believe that Neo-Marxism is antithetical to religion, especially Christianity; it may be so, but for me Neo-Marxism is the polluted sea of modernity where the river of Christianity leads to, one is the conclusion of the other. Victimism and disingenuity is a core tenet of both. — Lionino

The Frankfurt school is a pretty big tent, including figures
as diverse as Adorno and Habermas. Wokism dips into certain aspects of neo-Marxism, including Gramsci, who is closer to classical Marxism than someone like Adorno. Like all popular movements, wokism has its zealots, but I’m not sure what it would mean to call Marxism and its progeny disingenuous. Its philosophical contributions have been acknowledged by many 20th and 21st century schools of philosophy. The only ones rejecting the philosophy in toto are conservatives , who generally haven’t ventured past Kant in their thinking. For them all the troubles, or ‘disingenuousness’, begin with Hegel.

How exactly is this line of inquiry helpful? Can you explain?
(Leaving aside how such a calculation should even be possible.) — baker

It’s purely selfish. Im just trying to make a connection between Lionino’s reference to Hunter Binden as a ‘child toucher’ and his views on climate change.

"Climate change" is a platitude of a phrase, "anthropogenic climate change" is not; climate is undeniably changing, as it always has been. The only debate is how much has been caused by us, — Lionino

Ok, I’ll bite. How much do you think has been caused by us?

For one, the skeletons in my closet are not from kids I have touched — Lionino

Are you referring to this?

The conservative radio host Wayne Root claimed without evidence in a tweet shared tens of thousands of times that Hunter Biden's laptop contains videos of him sexually abusing Chinese children.

Right, pictures of a guy smoking crack are sensationalistic news. — Lionino

No, impugning the ethics of a family you’ve never met shows your eagerness to spread the hyped up gossip spun by the media circus rather than respect the complexities of real families. Although you do redeem yourself a bit when you add that Biden

comes across as a good dad that really loves his son, and his advanced age surely stops him from taking a strong stance about his son, a completely lost soul. — Lionino

I understand that Biden chose to put himself, and thus his family, in the public spotlight, but do we the public have to leer so shamelessly? Arent you a little embarrassed babbling about a stranger’s crack problem? Why don’t you share the skeletons in your own closet with us? I’m sure we’d LOVE to hear about them.

↪Joshs
Since he's a former president he would actually know quit a lot that he couldn't tell. — Mark Nyquist

A very wise man, indeed

↪Joshs
I think Trump went to the University of Pennsylvania maybe Wharton School of Business. . — Mark Nyquist

Sure did. 55 years ago. What do you think he would say about the faculty there now?

“We spend more money on higher education than any other country—and yet they’re turning our students into communists and terrorist sympathizers of many, many different dimensions,”

I'd like your opinion too. Or anyone's.

Fact check.org is out of the Annenberg school, University of Pennsylvania....from memory. — Mark Nyquist

Well, since I’m not partial to conspiracy theories and I dont believe in the Deep State, I think they’re fine. But fyi, mentioning a major U.S. university in conjunction with a news source is a non-starter for a Trump supporter.

Without adhering to Plato's purely spiritual and the good as purely spiritual. — Vaskane

Don’t forget Deleuze’s dogmatic image of truth, gifted to Western philosophy by Plato.

↪Steven P Clum
Are you familiar with Factcheck.org or Politifact?
If so do you have an opinion on these organizations? — Mark Nyquist

I can’t believe you’re seriously asking him this.

I tune into Fox, Huffington Post, Breitbart, realclearpolitics, and NBC news throughout the day in an effort to garner a mean understanding of what is going on in the world — Steven P Clum

If I had to watch any news outlet throughout the day I’d end up shooting myself. I grit my teeth just to glance at the headlines online for a couple of minutes. I dont think being a news junkie today is good for anyone’s mental health. It’s designed not to inform but to provide a 24 hour source of sensationalistic entertainment, and all this is doing to viewers is instilling hostility, resentment and contempt (kind of like the vibe I’m getting from the OP).

yep

Don't forget that his son is a crack-addict and a kid-toucher, and Joe Biden covers up for him. It is revealing of the family's ethics, and consequently of people who support that whole circus. — Lionino

Or perhaps it is more revealing of your susceptibility to sensationalistic ‘news’ reporting, the circus you’re supporting by repeating their garbage.

Most people can't read Nietzsche. Reading Nietzsche without having first read Kant, Hume, Plato and the pre-Socratics is like watching 2001 A Space Odyssey without having learned how to count. — Lionino

These may help you to read him (they didnt particularly help me), but to understand what he’s critiquing you may want to familiarize yourself with Hegel, Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard.

Most gun related crimes committed in this country use illegally acquired guns. As of 2010 more than 50,000 guns were smuggled into this country every year. — Steven P Clum

There’s always more than one side to every story.

Ask a cop on the beat how criminals get guns and you're likely to hear this hard boiled response: "They steal them." But this street wisdom is wrong, according to one frustrated Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agent who is tired of battling this popular misconception.An expert on crime gun patterns, ATF agent Jay Wachtel says that most guns used in crimes are not stolen out of private gun owners' homes and cars. "Stolen guns account for only about 10% to 15% of guns used in crimes," Wachtel said. Because when they want guns they want them immediately the wait is usually too long for a weapon to be stolen and find its way to a criminal.

An intriguing passage, but even if atoms are not the supposed ultimate indivisible particles of atomism, they are also something more than a subjective fiction. — Wayfarer

What Nietzsche means by fiction is a bit tricky. He can’t mean false as opposed to what is truly real, given his assertion that nothing lies behind appearance. What he means by fiction is the claim of scientific facts to some sort of status that transcends their condition of possibility in contingency. What makes this thinking of atoms a fiction, then, is not that it isn’t a useful construct, but that it conceals from itself that as a construct, it is historically contingent, and subject to wholesale transformation of its sense via the movement of paradigmatic change.

On a side-note, do you think Nietzche's 'will to power' can be traced back to Schopenhauer? — Wayfarer

Nietzsche’s concept of will to power is a critique of Schopenhauer’s notion of will.

There are still harmless self-observers who believe in the existence of “immediate certainties,” such as “I think,” or the “I will” that was Schopenhauer's superstition: just as if knowledge had been given an object here to seize, stark naked, as a “thing-in-itself,” and no falsification took place
from either the side of the subject or the side of the object… Philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most familiar thing in the world. In fact, Schopenhauer would have us believe that the will is the only thing that is really familiar, familiar through and through, familiar without pluses or minuses. But I have always thought that, here too, Schopenhauer was only doing what philosophers always tend to do: adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice.

How about the 1927 Solvay Conference in Physics as the mother of all paradigm shifts in modern science and philosophy? I say it marks the boundary between the Modern and Post-Modern periods — Wayfarer

Darwin’s work made possible American Pragmatism, psychoanalysis and Piaget’s genetic epistemology, among other innovations. These ways of thinking are grounded in the understanding of unidirectional time as a fundamental organizing principle. Physicists in 1927 still tended to see time as irrelevant to physics ( and many still do). This was because their thinking was more consistent with Kant than with Hegel. Physics is just now catching up with post-Darwinian thinking. Then of course there’s Nietzsche, who wrote this 40 years before the Solvey conference:

“Physicists believe in a “true world” in their own fashion…. But they are in error. The atom they posit is inferred according to the logic of the perspectivism of consciousness—and it is therefore itself a subjective fiction. … And in any case they left something out of the constellation without knowing it: precisely this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center of force—and not only man—construes all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, according to its own force— They forgot to include
this perspective-setting force in “true being”—in school language: the subject.”(The Will to Power)

I don’t get it. Paradigm shifts in science are not ignored, couldn’t be by definition actually, so what’s wrong with the logic of my submission, exactly? — Mww

You said “ Maybe nothing more than who is still the more referenced, after the longer time.”

As overthrown scientific paradigms from earlier eras fade from memory, they will become referenced less and less. Just as in philosophy, Aristotle, Plato and Kant get all the attention , the first two as the founders of Western philosophy and the latter as the founder of modern philosophy, Aristotle, Euclid and Pythagoras get the attention for founding the logic-mathematical basis of science, and Galileo and Newton are credited with the grounding of modern science. But we no more ignore all the philosophical paradigms between the Greeks and Kant, or after Kant, than we do all of the scientific paradigms other than those associated with the Greeks and Newton. Is all modern philosophy just a footnote to Kant? No more so than Kant was just a footnote to Leibnitz, or Spinoza to Descartes, or Descartes to Aquinas.