Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy. — 180 Proof

There's a charitable reading of this. New metaphors confuse and offend. To test dead metaphors with a hammer is to do violence to common sense. One is outraged that another would dare question The Obvious.

Philosophy that does not challenge common sense (that does not make itself conveniently intelligible for today's busy consumer ) is indeed no longer philosophy.

Does this imply that the obscure is necessarily profound ? Of course not.

The profound is obscure but the other direction don't always work out.

Try starting with the problem of perception and epistemological problems of perception. — Michael

We can drop it if you want, but to me this is like quoting the bible to disprove atheism. Consider this quote:

The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like for a subject to undergo it (Nagel (1974)). Our ordinary conception of perceptual experience emerges from first-personal reflection on its character, rather than from scientific investigation; it is a conception of experience from a “purely phenomenological point of view” (Broad 1952: 3–4).

I'm challenging this framework itself.

I really don't understand why you keep talking about language. It just has nothing to do with it at all. — Michael

I'm trying to get us out of the realm of what's almost a paradoxical theology of should-be-ineffable-but-somehow-isn't 'Private Experience.'

Direct realism is a position regarding the nature of perception, not conversation. — Michael

The shift to semantic norms gives us leverage finally. What is perception ? I think Kant gets something right.

Intuition and concepts … constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Thoughts without [intensional] content (Inhalt) are empty (leer), intuitions without concepts are blind (blind). It is, therefore, just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible—that is, to add an object to them in intuition—as to make our intuitions understandable—that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise.

To apply a concept in a human way and not as a parrot might is to enter the inferential nexus. To perceive a dog as such is already linguistic.

Would also be interested in you translating this out of Heideggerese. — fdrake

:up:

Always a fair request, no matter the dense philosopher...

Like meanings and purposes, consciousness may not be something 'there' in any typical sense of being materially or energetically embodied, and yet may still be materially causally relevant. — Terence Deacon, Incomplete Nature

Why not 'materially' embodied ? Why not there as a dance is there ? 'Materially casually relevant' is hard to make sense of otherwise.

Like numbers, and natural laws. — Wayfarer

My objection is that we don't know exactly (do not agree, at the least) what numbers as opposed to numerals are. 'Law' is obviously a metaphor here, though its wax has cooled. We 'project' functions on measurements, postulate patterns from which we can derive implied observations, etc.

it looks like it's going from an interesting philosophical problem to a practical political and social one. — T Clark

I think artificial intelligence will prove or at least threaten to be a mirror for us.

I always appreciate pretty prose but your imagery to me, seems very old. I don't know if your last sentence in the above quote means that you in fact reject the misleading imagery that traditional human mythologies/religions have tried to peddle to us, so that the nefarious few can opiate the masses.
Perhaps you should take more note of the scientific KISS advice. Keep It Simple Stupid! — universeness

<smile>

An anemic mythology is one that's reduced to a minimum of metaphoricity. Note that you use 'opiate' as a metaphor, so that rationality is tacitly a kind of discipline which does not drug itself. I don't think it's necessary or even possible to avoid such tacit mythmaking and myth enacting. I was hinting in general that humanism is not crystalline and ahistorical.

I think Popper is wise on this. Science offers myths, but its myths are better than others because they are developed within a 'secondorder' tradition of criticism and synthesis. No idea is sacred except for that idea itself, that no idea is sacred. Because no idea is sacred and no metaphor is final, the system can endlessly fall forward and upward. Its (anti-)conclusions are just the least stupid (most comprehensive, most compact,...) ideas/myths so far.

That's interesting! I think I'd say boats -- as a metaphor for a tradition. Then there are boat builders of various kinds. — Moliere

:up:
Fair enough ! I joke about being a HegelBot because I focus on the most self-referential aspect of the world, trying to see our seeing, know our knowing. But others have to study particles and puppies and parabolas. Are all of the boats connected ? How about a fleet ?

I much prefer the maritime metaphor for terra incognita. — Moliere

Same here, very much so. It's about sanity and self-esteem. Even in evolution, which is historical in its own way, the little organism has to be coherent enough to make puppies, the keep the game of invention going. To me is what it means to be thrown. We can't fuck with all of the boat at the same time or we will drown. And if we need tools to work on the boat, we break off a plank or something to use as a hammer. Bricoleurs !

The bricoleur, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who uses 'the means at hand,' that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogenous—and so forth. There is therefore a critique of language in the form of bricolage, and it has even been said that bricolage is critical language itself…If one calls bricolage the necessity of borrowing one's concepts from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is bricoleur.
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/53180-the-bricoleur-says-levi-strauss-is-someone-who-uses-the-means

Would someone with little or no background in Heidegger understand this? — Fooloso4

This is the problem with rich, difficult thinkers. Background is everything. Imagine a rich kid in a poor neighborhood, trying to make sense of things, or the reverse. It's not this or that sign but an entire world of inter-refering significations. As Dreyfus might put, there are assumptions too deep for tears, which aren't even articulate, so that 'assumptions' is a metaphor for something 'stupider' like a competence.

One might assume that with the term 'care' (Sorge) Heidegger has human well being first and foremost in mind. That is not the case. — Fooloso4

One [ das Man ] may well assume such a thing, assuming also that B&T is trying to do the same kind of thing as Chicken Soup for the Soul. That is not the case.

Man seems to be of concern only in so far as he is the ventriloquist dummy of Being. — Fooloso4

So says one such ventriloquist dummy telling us how it is ?

We find in our struggle to talk about what is (including what 'is' is) that we must talk about that which wants and is able to talk about what is. We must appropriate the hermeneutic situation. Phenomenology sees the 'how' of our seeing, sees that seeing itself --- but soon discovers that 'language is an organ of perception,' that a sediment of interpretedness (stinky quilt of grandpa certainties) obstructs what might otherwise be (what we assumed was possible in our having been thrown into this contingent metaphysical tradition) a simple unbiased gazing at the world.

One stab at it: Dasein 'is' interpretation 'is' prejudice-confronting-itself 'is' time.

Historicity of interpretation, that's the ticket.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gadamer/#PosPre

*********
Gadamer redeploys the notion of our prior hermeneutical situatedness ... in terms of the ‘fore-structures’ of understanding, that is, in terms of the anticipatory structures that allow what is to be interpreted or understood to be grasped in a preliminary fashion. The fact that understanding operates by means of such anticipatory structures means that understanding always involves what Gadamer terms the ‘anticipation of completeness’—it always involves the revisable presupposition that what is to be understood constitutes something that is understandable, that is, something that is constituted as a coherent, and therefore meaningful, whole.
...
In this respect, all interpretation, even of the past, is necessarily ‘prejudgmental’ in the sense that it is always oriented to present concerns and interests, and it is those present concerns and interests that allow us to enter into the dialogue with the matter at issue.
...
The prejudicial character of understanding means that, whenever we understand, we are necessarily involved in a dialogue that encompasses both our own self-understanding and our understanding of the matter at issue (and there is, it should be added, an essential alterity that obtains even in those cases where our engagement is primarily textual). In the dialogue of understanding our prejudices come to the fore, both inasmuch as they play a crucial role in opening up what is to be understood, and inasmuch as they themselves become evident in that process. As our prejudices thereby become apparent to us, so they can also become the focus of questioning in their own turn.

Thrown as prejudice, thrown as projection.

How do we know other people are conscious? What standards do we use? Apply those same standards to AI. — T Clark

:up:

I'll also bump my pet theme. So often we don't seem to have much of a grip on what is supposed to be meant by 'consciousness.'

Getting something wrong about the tree need not be understood as nevertheless getting something right about my tree.

We can talk about the world and just be wrong sometimes.

Humans are able to reduce human suffering, so the antinatalist remains a boring defeatist imo. — universeness

Fair enough, and I'm not arguing for it, but this still sounds like optimistic progress narrative to me. I don't object to that narrative. I'm just making it explicit. A 'young' humanism is going to build a real heaven down here...or at least try. An older and maybe rancid humanism becomes more ironic and ambivalent, still faithful to rationality but not so sure that the species is going anywhere better.

There may still be great courage involved in holding that life has no inherent purpose, that we are here for a brief flash, then gone forever. There seems to be a comprehensive mechanism described in Terror Management Theory to deal with this elemental fear of meaninglessness and annihilation. — Tom Storm

:up:
Even little folks in peacetime get a taste this way of standing on the front line with clean pants (not shitting themselves, since we are talking psychoanalysis). It's an everyday heroism of not knowing, of maybe it being 'in vain,' with the courage to love and live anyway.

@Joshs
To me this speaks to one kind of sentimental populist reaction to offensive creativity:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm
...when instinctive philosophy follows the more secure course prescribed by healthy common sense, it treats us to a rhetorical mélange of commonplace truths. When it is charged with the triviality of what it offers, it assures us, in reply, that the fullness and richness of its meaning lie deep down in its own heart, and that others must feel this too, since with such phrases as the “heart’s natural innocence”, “purity of conscience”, and so on, it supposes it has expressed things that are ultimate and final, to which no one can take exception, and about which nothing further can be required. But the very problem in hand was just that the best must not be left behind hidden away in secret, but be brought out of the depths and set forth in the light of day. It could quite well from the start have spared itself the trouble of bringing forward ultimate and final truths of that sort; they were long since to be found, say, in the Catechism, in popular proverbs, etc. It is an easy matter to grasp such truths in their indefinite and crooked inaccurate form, and in many cases to point out that the mind convinced of them is conscious of the very opposite truths. When it struggles to get itself out of the mental embarrassment thereby produced, it will tumble into further confusion, and possibly burst out with the assertion that in short and in fine the matter is settled, the truth is so and so, and anything else is mere “sophistry” – a password used by plain common sense against cultivated critical reason, like the phrase “visionary dreaming”, by which those ignorant of philosophy sum up its character once for all. Since the man of common sense appeals to his feeling, to an oracle within his breast, he is done with any one who does not agree. He has just to explain that he has no more to say to any one who does not find and feel the same as himself. In other words, he tramples the roots of humanity underfoot. For the nature of humanity is to impel men to agree with one another, and its very existence lies simply in the explicit realisation of a community of conscious life. What is anti-human, the condition of mere animals, consists in keeping within the sphere of feeling pure and simple, and in being able to communicate only by way of feeling-states...

Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being? — Joshs

Do we [as time] do so ?

he introduction to Concept of Time notes that in Chapter 3, “Heidegger warns against the 'misunderstanding' that would summarize his view as: 'Dasein is in each case time'. — Joshs

IMV, this is like Hegel warning against thinking that pithy summaries (substance is subject!) can mean anything to today's busy consumer without them having to wrestle with the matters themselves. Dasein is in each case time is part of what he says, but it's just mumbo-jumbo and gossip to those who aren't serious.

Dogmatism as a way of thinking, whether in ordinary knowledge or in the study of philosophy, is nothing else but the view that truth consists in a proposition, which is a fixed and final result, or again which is directly known. To questions like, “When was Caesar born?”. “How many feet make a furlong?”, etc., a straight answer ought to be given; just as it is absolutely true that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of a so-called truth of that sort is different from the nature of philosophical truth.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm


One does not carry away a pocket full of Heidegger's theorems. Philosophy as fundamental ontology (a tautology) is a lifestyle or identity even which is endlessly on-the-way. I'd call it an ascending hermeneutic spiral, for one incorporates more and more in something that a jazz 'improvisation.' Riffs are repeated but also recontextualized, occasionally inspiring new riffs. So the music gets richer. The Onebot expands its metacognitive and affective vocabulary, finds deeper connections within what it already/only halfknows, ...

We must be careful in attributing exactitude to Heidegger’s discussion of time at this preliminary point in his career — Joshs

Sure. But for me anyway there's no Moment when the real Heidegger please stands up.

I suspect those who believe in such concepts most zealously are the most dangerous. — Joshs

the worst are full of passionate intensity...

RussellA perceives direct realists only indirectly: the direct realist in his head does not resemble the direct realist as it is in the external world. — Jamal

:up:

That's effing hilarious. I don't laugh out loud much, but that's just the twisted kind of thing that I enjoy. It's the kind of joke Nietzsche would make (which I hope you understand as a compliment.)

Direct Realism is the position that private experiences are direct presentations of objects existing in a mind-independent world, not that within social communities there are language games. — RussellA

This is how an indirect realism can't help misunderstanding what the direct realist is trying to say. Please don't take my playful bluntness for rudeness. These 'private experiences' are tooth fairies. The 'mindindependent world' is Candyland.

Direct realists understand that the world is not just language. Of course, my friend ! The point is to drag us out of a confused folk psychology from 1777 (or thereabouts) into an awareness of how this issue could even matter, which is to say socially, within the making and criticism of claims and inferences.

Look what we are doing now. When I talk about direct realism, I'm making claims about the position of direct realism. My claims are aimed beyond me to how we ought to talk about our world.

The Direct Realist says that our private perception of a tree is a direct presentation of something existing in a mind-independent world. — RussellA

Respectfully, the direct realist doesn't believe in pineal gremlins or private perceptions. The direct realist claims that talk about the tree is actually about that tree and not some obscure metaphysical entity that philosophers like to torture themselves with metalogically. <smile>

I can see a white and gold dress without saying "I see a white and gold dress". — Michael

Of course. That's the grammar of 'see.' A direct realist might say that you see the dress itself and not an image of the dress, and I'd agree.

But I'm trying to shift our talk away from 'folk psychology' and toward the application of concepts.
What does it mean for you to be convinced that you saw a gold dress ? What might you infer from that, even within the relative silence of a relatively internal monologue ? [ AI can read minds now.]

What's wrong with indirect realism ? How do I 'prove' that we don't see images of dresses rather than dresses ? I don't, because it's something like proving there is no God. Instead I try to make explicit how our claims about dresses are about dresses in the public world, the world, our world. I see talk about the tree not my image of the tree.

***
We can also make claims about interior images of dresses, but even here we it's as if every person has a tiny little room that only they can see into ---with that room being part of the world at large despite being behind a locked door. Our language is an all-of-a-piece inferential nexus. "No finite <isolated> thing has genuine being'

I suspect many who condemned Socrates to death sincerely considered themselves just and were considered by many fellow Athenians to be so. — Arne

:up:

Yes, indeed. And many can mouth the words 'justice' and 'truth' without caring much for either.

Heidegger’s concern is to uncover the presuppositions... — Joshs

:up:
Wittgenstein did this, offering a hint of what he was doing in passing. Heidegger not only did this but made his approach itself explicit. Philosophy is time, time is temporal.

from Kiesel ( in case it's helpful) about early H:

In fact, it was in this semester which inaugurated his phenomenological decade that he first discovered his root metaphor of the 'way' to describe his very kinetic sense of philosophy. Philosophy is not theory, outstrips any theory or conceptual system it may develop, because it can only approximate and never really comprehend the immediate experience it wishes to articulate. That which is nearest to us in experience is farthest removed from our comprehension. Philosophy in its 'poverty of thought' is ultimately reduced to maintaining its proximating orientation toward the pre-theoretical origin which is its subject matter. Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment, a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only 'formal indications' which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. It is always precursory in its pronouncements,a forerunner of insights, a harbinger and hermeneutic herald of life's possibilities of understanding and articulation. In short, philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression than a science. That phenomenology is more a preconceptual, provisory comportment than a conceptual science, that the formally indicating 'concepts' are first intended to serve life rather than science, becomes transparent only after the turn...
...
Philosophy is 'philosophizing', being 'on the way to language,' ways ---not works.
...
Life is sufficient to Itself, Ekhart already said. The trick is to get to this level and stay with it, thereby reaping the harvest of its self-expression. For factic life also gives itself in the deformation of the objectification, which must first be dismantled in order to get to its initial moment of articulation.

Not saying I agree with that very early approach, but it's fascinating. I love Brandom, who explicates carefully and systematically. But I want my philosophy to be alive and get at 'factic life.' It's not a toy for the shelf. It's the deepening of a sober joy, an endless pursuit of greater wakefulness. It's also a kind of worldrevealing poetry. Paintings and phenomenology teach us how to see.

An evasive response. All this was discussed earlier. I won't repeat it. Heidegger sings a siren song, the dark side of Doris Day, Que sera, sera, whatever will be will be. It is the acceptance of a future that was ours to see. — Fooloso4

Dude was an actual strong poet, same way Cantor was, inspiring the same crankish resistance to his offensive originality. To me you sound on this issue like an old maid at a church picnic gossiping about the hot young thing that got herself knocked up. The work doesn't need me to defend it though, so have at it. I think it'll outlast you.

And what do Heidi's "tool ... transparency" and "explicit worldhood" insights clarify philosophically? Maybe these insights are anthropologically or psycho-cognitively interesting ... but I think they are philosophically trivial (i.e. redundant with respect to e.g. (early) pragmatism). — 180 Proof

It depends on what you want to count as philosophy, I guess. To me it's almost tautological to call philosophy 'hermeneutical fundamental ontology.' Philosophy unfolds, makes explicit, appropriates the hermeneutic situation...

To appreciate and study time, one must genuinely ask: Am I time ?

This is from the Dilthey draft, page 60.

Am I softwhere ?

The Nazi connection is just a convenient post-hoc justification. — Joshs

In some cases that seems to be it. Nietzsche is often on that list too, and he's every bit as indulgent, it seems to me, a veritable mystic buffoon at times. But I fucking love Nietzsche...and my crazy boy Heidegger before he went rotten. And that windbag Hegel. And...

See above.

So what additional, clarifying insight does the cryptic "In-der-Welt-sein" offer? — 180 Proof

I don't think (?) early Witt discussed the 'transparency' of the tool in the hand, the way that tools exist. Nor did he make worldhood explicit. If you chunk both early and late W, then maybe you have something comparable to early H, but I still think there's good stuff that'd be left out.

What he actually says is that Being is time. Being is disclosed to Dasein in its way of understanding. — Joshs

I'm not saying you can't find this in one of the texts. Nor do I disagree. I will say that his earlier stuff was more experimental. There's not just 'one' readymade Heidegger, in other words.

Sorta-kinda. — Joshs

Nossir, exactly. "Dasein is time, time is temporal."

This is on page 20E of the McNeill translation of the [Marsburg] lecture The Concept of Time, which is affectionately known as the urB&T. I'm sure it's in the Dilthey draft too (same name, confusingly), and I'll give the location if I bump into it. Please note that, for Bard knows what reason, there are three valuable Heidegger texts titled The Concept of Time. (This is perversely fitting somehow, given the importance of the concept.)

Kojeve fuses Heidegger and Hegel and has quite a party with man as time as the concept existing empirically. He helped me see how Hegelian Heidegger is. Softwhere is my jam, friends. I'm on this.

In case it helps anyone, here's some more context for my interpretation of H:

Language is not merely a tool which man possesses alongside many others; language first grants the possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of beings. Only where there is language, is there world, that is, the constantly changing cycle of decision and work, of action and responsibility, but also of arbitrariness and turmoil, decay and confusion.
...
The one as that which forms everyday being-with-one-another...constitutes what we call the public in the strict sense of the word. It implies that the world is always already primarily given as the common world. It is not the case on the one hand there are first individual subjects which at any given time have their own world; and that the task would then arise of putting together, by virtue of some sort of arrangement, the various particular worlds of individuals and of agreeing how one would have a common world. This is how philosophers imagine these things when they ask about the constitution of the inter-subjective world. We say instead that the first thing that is given is the common world -- the one.

Then this is about the gossip we are thrown into, the gossip we mostly are. We are Poloniusbots with the potential to switch into Hamletbot mode if we can hear our superficiality. Polonius must realize that he's mostly a bot, suffer the terror of never having been, of having been lived by an anyone who was no one at all, a mere echo of what one says what one says. I claim that if you don't feel how thrown you are then you can't understand what's crucial in Heidegger.

What is talked about is understood only approximately and superficially. One means the same thing because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said.” “Publicness ” does not get to "the heart of the matter," because it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness.”

Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer. Discourse, which belongs to the essential constitution of being of Dasein, and also constitutes its disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk, and as such of not really keeping being-in-the-world open in an articulated understanding, but of closing it off and covering over inner worldly beings. “ “ Ontologically, this means that when Da-sein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as being-in-the-world-cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mitda-sein, toward being-in itself.”

Idle talk conceals simply because of its characteristic failure to address things in an originary way [urspriinglichen Ansprechens]. It obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by instituting a dominant view [herrschende Ansicht].”“Usually and for the most part the ontic mode of being-in (discoverture) is concealment [Verdeckung]. Interpretedness, which is speech encrusted by idle talk, draws any given Dasein into 'one's' way of being. But existence in the 'one' now entails the concealment and marginalization of the genuine self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Not only has each particular given itself over to 'one', 'one' blocks Dasein's access to the state it finds itself in [Befindlichkeit].

One is a bot.

The appeal to reason works because it is appealing. — Moliere

Nice.

We can think of reason as a network of semantic norms which is used on itself. Philosophy rationally articulates in an accumulating way what it means to be rational. Neurath's boat. We take most of these norms (meanings of concepts, legitimacy of inferences) for granted as we argue for exceptions and extensions to those same norms.

I don't recall reading anything that would make me think he was talking metaphorically. — Fooloso4

How does this fit with the past governing our self-interpretation? — Fooloso4

I'll show you this again, from the Dilthey draft. You can find a similar thing in the official version.


Being-there as being-in-the-world is primarily governed by logos…Coming into the world, one grows into a determinate tradition of speaking, seeing, interpreting. Being-in-the-world is an already-having-the-world-thus-and-so. This peculiar fact, that the world into which I enter, in which I awaken, is there for me in a determinate interpretedness, I designate terminologically as fore-having.

Dasein is history.
...
Dasein, whiling away its own time in each case, is at the same time always a generation. So a specific interpretedness precedes every Dasein in the shape of the generation itself. What is preserved in the generation is itself the outcome of earlier views and disputes, earlier interpretations and past concerns.
...
The wellspring of such persistent elements lies in the past, but they continue to have such an impact in the present that their dominance is taken for granted and their development forgotten. Such a forgotten past is inherent in the prevailing interpretedness of being-together-with-one-another. To the extent that Dasein lives from (cares about) this past, it is this past itself.
...
The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.
...
One has a timeworn conceptuality at one's disposal. It provides the fore-concept for the interpretation. The interpretedness of a 'time' is strictly determined by these structural factors and the variable forms of their realization. And it is precisely the unobtrusiveness of these factors --the fact that one is not aware of them -- which gives public interpretedness its taken-for-granted character. However, the 'fore'-character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been that jumps ahead, as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness. Guided by its interpretedness, expectant concern lives its own past.

We are thrown into dead interpretations, the cold wax of literalized metaphors mistaken for the given itself. We take as necessary what proves later to have been contingent.

Does he say that? Why not Being and Dasein? I would have to read it in context before saying more. — Fooloso4

Yes, of course. Yes, you would.

'Don't nazis suck' is just too easy to say. Of course they suck. It's the most banal self-flattery that I can think of. If you think even Heidegger's early work is contaminated, make a case. Or just air a petty prejudice as if you are paying alms. The world is running low on reasons not to read, not to think. Let's burn some books for Jesus and Apple Pie, boys !

:up:

Is there a connection between temporality and the Nazisms? Is it not what the future brought forth? Is it not something es gibt? — Fooloso4

Frankly, I find this kind of thing childish. I don't mind it personally, but it's weirdly just the kind of evasive gossip that Heidegger wrote about.

There is a direct connection between his concept of time and his acceptance of Nazism and its atrocities. He called it "hearkening to Being". — Fooloso4

Oh all kinds of interpretations are possible of course. To some people there's a nazi in every crevice, and not just at the library. But I try to tell people to go back and read the earlier stuff. Find me some Hitler in the Dilthey draft.