"indirectly intended" I'm not sure I understand how someone can indirectly intend something.

Yes, you really do. But to appreciate the argument -- the argument is not that the illusion is what seems to be the case to you, rather, some may argue that the illusion is that we actually do have those choices.

due to "counter-predictive mechanisms" built into the deterministic thesis we can never know our own future no matter the computing power, that is so even if one accepts determinism as true.

"And some amoralists or nihilists who think its all "just one damn thing after another" "

Here is an argument:

If determinism is true, then there is no morality.
If determinism is true, there is no morality because it would not be just to hold someone morally accountable for actions that are outside their control.
But this is a moral reason for saying that 'if determinism is true then there is no morality.
Therefore, there is morality.
Therefore, determinism is false.

Why is that the answer? Why is it easy that the other answers are wrong? What if the twig was the intent? — noAxioms

It doesn't matter what the intent is, it matters what object has objectively been contacted by Midas' hand.

How did Midas not touch the forest? — noAxioms

I thought you said Midas touched a twig, not a forest. Why do you think the entire forest becomes golden? By this logic, wouldn't literally everything on Earth become golden when a twig is touched. I don't understand your reasoning here.

Midas touches a twig. What turns to gold? The twig, branch, tree, forest? — noAxioms

That's an easy one; it would be the tree in its entirety that turns to gold. Not the branch nor the forest, for neither of these are standalone things like the tree is, unless the branch is broken off the tree.

I have to admit my perplexity towards the question you are asking. Am I understanding you to be saying that you are unsure of whether trees are "things" or "objects?" Or that rocks may not be "things" or "objects." Is that your view noAxioms? Because I think the physical basis for the object "this tree" would just be the tree itself. Or is your view that trees are only trees by convention?

forget it

Go ahead, explain fully what you meant, not just in-a-nutshell.



Okay, so explain it to me in terms of chemistry and physics, I can wait.

I do not understand the purpose of your line of questioning. Then again, I am not sure that you do either.

Interesting perspective Benj96. So you mean something like, if I had enough knowledge about, say, dark energy, maybe that would fill in the blanks about abiogenesis? I am not so sure. I think someone on the forum said this already, but life seems categorically, discretely, quantumly different than non-life; a difference that does not seem explicable by physical mechanisms, no matter the complexity.

James Tour has enumerated the known issues that need to be solved for non-living to produce living (in theory although perhaps not in entirety). That is not to say that solving those issues would result in a living organism, or that such problems can even be solved, practically speaking, in a lab.

Okay, that is fine with me, my point is, and this is what I take to be the central issue, something living, however you define it, emerges from the combination of atoms, and that is very strange, one might even say, as I have, miraculous.

Can you clarify whether you think there is a difference between living and non-living things, and what you take that difference, if any, to consist of?

"atoms and molecules follow the rules" yep, agree with that, I just think they are also ruled by a further principle, namely, the organism of which they are a part.. even though they can't act contrary to the atomic and molecular rules that govern them.

But I think you and I just disagree as to whether the atoms and molecules could behave differently were they part of a living organism.

That is not the central issue/mystery anyhow.

your mother never said that, nobody ever said that, except you just now.

Or put another way, living or non-living is the relevant context.

The way atoms act is a function of the context they are in in any case, without a distinction between living and non-living being what makes the difference — wonderer1

I agree that context matters, although I would also disagree and say that whether living or non-living makes all the difference.

yeah I see what you are saying, the chemicals and reactions and atoms, maybe they did not change their course at all so that living is physically, and in terms of process and ,functionally identical (combination aside) to non-living. Still, the central issue remains that there is something there that is alive that is composed of those atoms, chemicals, and of which those reactions are a part. That is the mystery.

Atoms still do what they do, but what they do is ordered by the activity of the whole organism.

I would not say the atom itself acts differently, but the entire organism acts in a way that it would not act were it dead. The atoms, by extension and as parts of the organism, act differently than were they part of something dead.

by "combination of particles" I mean a cell and I do believe cells are alive though not conscious (like plants). And I am not sure if atomic activity would change, perhaps atoms that are part of living things act differently.

In any case, my main point is that those atoms are now part of a living thing even though they have merely combined in some arrangement. To borrow a word you used earlier, that is incredible.

I am trying to comprehend not just the probability of the event, an event that as you say is quite unlikely, in addition, I am trying to understand how some combination of particles under such-and-such conditions goes from non-living to living. It seems almost Frankenstenian although I think the better word is miraculous. You agree?

And even if we did have all empirical facts and could reproduce life in a lab, it would still be a weird thing for life to arise there, in my opinion, and the occurrence of that life may not be something we "caused" even though we put all the ingredients together.

But surely such empirical facts and laboratory analysis would help us explain the Fermi Paradox.

Or maybe we can "work backwards" from the probability of life - given the Fermi paradox - to determine the conditions that would give rise to a "natural" occurrence of life?

So how is it that inanimate chemicals can form a living thing. And when does one call a living thing conscious? — Benj96

When I consider abiogenesis as a "natural" explanation of where life comes from, it seems to me that for some combination of particles to be the recipe for the first lifeform would just be a miraculous occurrence, even if and especially if, one excludes a supernatural explanation. Does anyone have perspective of it or an alternative theory? I am open to a "natural" explanation for life's origin, I'm just not sure an account can be given in natural terms without any miraculous occurrences.

I'd like to respond to a few comments you stated and also ask the following question:

What will we take to be a sufficient and adequate explanation of a given phenomenon?

I'll give an example: let's suppose there is a storm. Now, you want to say, look, that's not Zeus being angry, there's a perfectly natural reason behind the storm. Okay, sounds good. You'll say, the storm happened because water evaporated and condensed around dust particles in the sky, these further condensed into a cumulonimbus cloud, and, after a bit more condensation and perhaps some atmospheric electrical activity or something, the storm happened, lightning and all.

Then I say, "okay Bob Ross, I think that's a good explanation, but what is it that explanation is supposed to answer?" And you'd say something like, "it's the water cycle, it explains the storm." Then I'd respond, "ah, okay, that's good and well, but what about this water cycle - does it have an explanation also, or is it without any kind of explanation and is explanatorily fundamental?" I am not sure what you would say. Perhaps you would say, "well if it's a phenomena, then it must have an explanation." The explanation of the water cycle is...[Earth's gravity] [the accumulation of liquid water on the surface of the planet] [the electro-magnetic activity of the magnetosphere] [etc.]." But then suppose I were to pry further and say, "very well, and what explains those?" And this process may go on until one of us is either out of knowledge or out of patience.

Now this explanation either proceeds on infinitely, or it has a starting point. If it proceeds infinitely, I am inclined to regard that as a most unparsimonious account of reality. If on the other hand, the explanation terminates somewhere, it either terminates in something natural or not. If it terminates in something natural, I will agree with you that this naturalism is most adequate, complete, sufficient, and all-around a great explanation. But if it terminates in something not natural, then I think I will have to stick with my original supernatural suppositions.

however, for me, I mean 'a member of nature'. — Bob Ross

Okay, as in plants, animals, people, rocks, and so on and so on, these are the natural members correct? Tell me again how laws fit into that ontology?

It seems perfectly plausible that 'laws' are behavioral patterns of how things relate to one another, and perhaps they are fundamental or derivates of other natural things. — Bob Ross

I don't think laws can be derivative of natural things, otherwise they would be ordered by the natural things not the other way around, right? In that case, we would have to regard the natural laws as being more fundamental.

Seems contradictory to me to say that the same Nature is both orderly and disorderly.

Question: Does naturalism explain the phenomena it purports to? I guess what I am asking is: what does naturalism say requires an explanation, and does naturalism succeed at explaining what it says requires explaining? Similarly, would you mind expounding the Naturalism Thesis?

Side note: it seems to me that if we talk about laws, we must talk about a lawgiver, although you seem to disagree with this.

I would not say that what you have said implies nature's negation. On the other hand, I find what you have said to be coherent, even though I disagree with the naturalist thesis.

Perhaps I was wrong to suggest that nature is both orderly and disorderly.

I see, so nature has two parts then: a lawful part and a non-lawful part, and it is the lawful part that orders and arranges the non-lawful part. And in that case, nature is both orderly, having a lawful part, and disorderly, having a non-lawful part that is ordered by the lawful part. But a thing cannot be the opposite of what it is. What are we to make of this puzzle?

A part of nature indeed - however, if these laws are just nature or a part of nature, it is difficult to see how they could order nature. See what I mean?

For instance, if there is a shovel buried in the ground, and I was like, "I need that shovel to dig a hole here" and you said to me "well just use that shovel to dig it out" then I would be puzzled, it cannot be used for the task that we have appointed to it because it is embedded in that which we are trying to apply it to.

I take a materialistic stance w.r.t. to the nature of both access and phenomenological consciousness. I believe they can be explained through physical processes that we already understand. The usual argument against such a stance is that it leaves an explanatory gap - that consciousness "feels" a certain way that cannot be explained mechanistically / representationally / reductively / and other variations on the theme. — Malcolm Lett

I think consciousness is constituted by physical processes, but then I also think the explanatory gap is reputable. I do not see why these two views are at odds. I think Chalmers believes consciousness is constituted by physical processes but (to my knowledge) he also proposed the explanatory gap. So again I am not sure what is at stake in denying an explanatory gap.

Can you say how physical processes would explain consciousness? That is, can you bridge the explanatory gap?

I am assuming you mean objective purpose, and I think a naturalist could just say there is a purpose embedded into the evolution of nature: a law, or set of laws, that provides Telos overtime. No need to add God into the equation. — Bob Ross

I am confused when you use the term "embedded" in this context. Is the law you refer to a part of nature or is it outside of nature? If it is a part of nature, how does it order nature?

Relativist, same question.

What about questions like: What is my purpose? Where do I ultimately come from? Why do bad things sometimes happen? What is justice, or love for that matter? Can naturalism explain these questions in a satisfying way? I think supernaturalism gives some answer, if not a complete answer for every question.

interesting point. Why exactly not walk into a wall - what is the reason not to?

This question sounds sillier than I mean it.

I guess my point is, doesn't pragmatism always assume some goal or make some kind of commitments?

I think you are conflating the validity of formal logic with the validity of the cogito in particular.

One can maintain that cogito is valid.

Proving it is another matter.. if you don't get it you don't get it.

Maybe there is a distinction to be made between the capacity to doubt and the capacity to be certain. So I can doubt "I think therefore I am" and yet it is also a proposition I can have certain knowledge about (though not simultaneously both). Or, does certainty imply an impossibility to doubt?

I think I have some idea of what Corvus and Beverley are objecting to in the statement "I think, therefore I am." They are objecting to the "I," which is presupposed in the assertion. Perhaps Corvus and Beverley would endorse a proposition that did not include "I" such as the proposition "there is thinking happening." Perhaps they would even endorse the proposition : "there is thinking, therefore something exists." But then we can be certain of two things 1 there is thinking, and 2 something exists.

1. I think.
2. If I think, then I exist.
3. Therefore I exist.

This is my understanding of the cogito in argumentative form. Do you object to premise 1 or premise 2?

So since "it is raining" has truth table values of true and/or false then it could have been false, even though the proposition is true. Is that what you are saying?

what if it really is raining. Is the proposition still invalid?

Consider the proposition "it is raining." Will you regard that proposition as valid or invalid?