Your post is fascinating and compelled me. I am inspired by it to read Locke, beyond my stumbling through Anthologies. Thanks for that.

My comments are likely unorthodox and perhaps of no interest. I don't need to pursue them. But I reiterate my interest in reading on.

Yet surely leaves are an "innate property of oaks," no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is it not more simple to recognize this is a problem which only exists in our constructions and applications of the meaning we're trying to discern? Leaves are innate to oaks. That seems to be nothing but innate. However, innate could mean something like the extremely habituated construction, so habituated it seems innate.


See directly below,

we might say that even babies show they understand some seemingly "innate" ideas. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's a place where we can see that what seems innate is just what fits the pre-fab construction. Babies may show they are aware-ing their natural environment. A smile triggers a smile naturally. That response is innate. There is no understanding using concept/idea. There is no idea. But as for once babies start understanding idea, my guess would be they have already assimilated very basic constructions. That is understanding.

If the type of enviornment that allows a human being to survive (or perhaps "develop normally") is of the type that it always produces certain ideas, then it would seem fair to call those ideas innate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not learned on Locke. But you have definitely inspired me. So far, I agree with Locke.

In our current environment we cannot escape ideas, aware-ing has been displaced by Mind and its constructions. So you might as well call it innate.

But homo sapiens had to exist in our organic condition in evolution but before Mind had "overtaken" it with ideas. There, the truly innate would have been front and center. No preoccupation with idea: everything innate.

Now it's ideas all the way down. But I say Locke is right. They're ideas; thus not innate.

And I don't know if my understanding of innate, as in aware-ing independent of Mind, is reflected as Aristotle's "potency" and his stages of "actuality" being the constructions-then-projections of Mind, but that too is fascinating.

read the paragraphs beginning here. — Wayfarer

Why does it sound to me like K is saying, like the Body is an idea uniquely arising to the Subject, so to is the will; both ultimately, "explanations" a Subject must necessarily construct to make "sense of itself".

That object which was initially unknown became “apple”, hence to say that object is unknowable, is a contradiction. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, never becomes anything at all, so can be said to be, and remain, unknowable. — Mww

Yes, and I meant "unknowable" as to the "in itself". Though, as you said, Apple "becomes" knowable. It is only in its construction/projection.

The thing-in-itself is not mediated, — Mww

Yes. I'm mixing terminology. It is not mediated. Hence "in itself." What I mean to say is even the noumenal, though they seem to have an existence before or independently of our constructions, are constructions.

because logic cannot be independent of our constructions, — Mww

Yes

This seems to mistreat appearance as “what it looks like” when it should be “when it makes its presence felt”. — Mww

Yes, understood.

key to the 'noumena' issue is Kant's criticism of the rationalists including Liebniz and Descartes, both of whom believed the existence of God could be proven by rational principles. — Wayfarer

Ok. Good to know that context. Makes even more sense.

Viewed in that light, and resisting the urge to 'peek behind', I think it's quite a reasonable idea. — Wayfarer

Yes, I see and agree it is reasonable.

Thank you

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? — Mww

First, this is currently where I'm settled. And it goes without saying, I speak without authority.

We shouldn't have noumena. Noumena, only seemed to Kant et. al. to be unknowable. But their "thing in itself" is as unknowable as that of an apple. Both are known already mediated, and there is no inherent difference in what they are in our experience. Yes, noumena are not apparent to our five (conventional to western) senses, but they are no less representations to our 6th/7th senses, image-ing/inner feeling. Though I will be corrected, loosely, I note, Vedanta based philosophies recognize these.

And regardless, any concept, including logic and reason itself, I think are part of the world mediated/represented (I like constructed/projected). "We" as in the particular form human Mind took, constructed logic no more or less than it constructed apple. And what these two are independent of our constructions are equally not knowable.

This should not reflect the hypothesis, but the best and quickest way to illustrate here is, if it arises in thought or our form of "conscious experience", it is a representation even if there is no corresponding object. So God, Souls, and Meno's triangle, are not unmediated realities that exist independently of our representations. They are "learned" constructions.

Another way to illustrate would be to turn to what is not projected, the "really real," so called because real is already a projection (as is really real, but...). It is necessarily unspeakable. I think whether you're an apple, a soul, or a human, what you really are is meaningless to ask because meaning too is projection. What you are remains in being it; not knowing it. We ask because it enhances the experience of constructing knowledge; not because it brings us anywhere close to uncovering real being.

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses. — Mww

Is that a settlement he necessarily reaches given his empirical approach? That is, is he saying, What things are, I cannot know, so I can only express positions on them as appearances, and for those representations based upon other than appearance, I will infer only from observing their effects?

Or, is he saying reality is its effects? I.e., even if I could access Truth as knowledge unmediated, I'd say reality was the affecting. If it is this, it sounds more like Schopenhauer's Will being that which drives all activity of being. And perhaps Kant just stayed clear of that (at least in his critique of pure reason).

I could be wrong but, I don’t think Schop makes the distinction between Thing in Itself and noumenal. For schop Will is Thing itself is Noumena… — schopenhauer1

I agree. That was me extrapolating.

How do we distinguish between the unknowable and the really unknowable? — Mww

Fair question. Deliberately, yet recklessly, I created the category "really" unknowable.

My thinking emerges from these very categories I have been grappling with, in some "points" intersecting across philosophers, in other places, divergent only superficially, in still others, clearly divergent.

Currently (admittedly, possibly plain only to me), I see "across the board" the phenomenal/representational as mediated reality; the noumenal as still mediated reality; though posited as unknowable because its constructed source is ambiguous; that which remained unspoken of by Kant, and referred to as The Will by Schopenhauer, as really real (though neither philosopher made compelling arguments for how they described/why they "ignored" it.)

we understand that thing still remains as it is in itself. — Mww

Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself". — schopenhauer1

Does anyone know the historical first instance of this "need" for an "in itself?" Assume it is not intuitive. Was it Plato's forms and/or this anamnesis? Was it pre-socratic? If so, what form did it first take.

It seems to me that this "in itself" is a hinge by which opposing views cannot reconcile which way it closes.


ADDENDUM: I.E., why can't "concept" which have no objective appearance be habituated constructions shared and reconstructed such that initiation into Culture/ Language means input with that data.

the only realism is empirically conditioned, as opposed to that pseudo-realism which is technically only logical validity, — Mww

Direct reality”, then, reduces to a metaphysical non-starter. — Mww

a universal, from which follows that this form of the real, first, belongs to reason rather than sensibility, and second, is real only insofar as without it all a priori cognitions become impossible. — Mww

Ok. Makes sense for Kant. But seems either extremely honest or extremely convenient. I tend to think the former. I.e., noumena is unknowable enough; he won't even touch that which really is unknowable.

Fascinating on a few levels. Thank you!

and yes, I meant parable. But it felt like W. thought he was being Zen "koany"

:up: Much comfort in the Simpsons. A refuge against suffering.

but it's by a great deal more than just 'language', it runs a lot deeper than that. — Wayfarer

Ok, I can see that in his "misuse" of the koan.

Wow. That bad eh? It is funny that I bypassed him. Hah! Maybe there was a reason. Too funny. Anyway dont worry. I'll be grappling with Schopenhauer for centuries!

Witt had it right and we now have to dance around figuring out the right interpretation of the great Prophet" seems to be what's being criticized here.. Or part of it is that... — schopenhauer1

Right. No I was honestly admiring W.s statements, but would never go so far as to stop at W. I was being ironic.

Having said that, ironically, am now inspired to look further into W. I don't know why I very quickly bypassed him in my recent pursuit.

It's an exact parallel — Wayfarer

Do you know if W was being deliberate; as a matter of fact? As "homage"? As a deliberately confusing inside joke?

Hah. Seriously? I genuinely found it compelling. Again, I'm clearly a novice. Explain if you wish. Otherwise I'll keep a more critical eye out.

he had a tendency to use past philosophers simply as leverage for his own thought. Maybe all of these pieces of the puzzle fit together in an obvious way. Maybe he was self-absorbed. — Leontiskos

I know little about W's life; you are likely right he was self absorbed. To produce so much from inner reflection would create a fixation.

Could also be a legitimate way to produce more novel ideas. Since ultimately philosophy is in the activity, it must never conclude. I recognize the advantages of advancing within the restrictions of conventionally accepted pathways. The "problem" with everyone doing that is that it obviously restricts philosophy, an art which must remain active, even its audience must become artists.

Given that (if you accept it generally) if once in a while a philosopher, rather than logically following ideas and expanding upon them, is simply inspired to pursue certain unforseen paths, that might be a blessing to philosophy unattainable in the conventional
ways.

Maybe because no one underdtands (or accepts) — 180 Proof

That was excellent. Wittgenstein answers the question. The rest of us are too busy embarassed by or ignoring the answer.

For Kant, I believe, this could be many objects, a plurality of various objects. However, it cannot be known, what, if any, "being" stands behind empirical understanding. It is "X" for lack of better term for Kant. For Kant as well, it is only a concept that is gotten to by negation. It is the "not-empirical thing". — schopenhauer1

Yes that is clear to me now. Thank you.

For Schopenhauer, he thinks he can go "beyond Kant" by not just proposing that there are "things-in-themselves" behind the empirical, that we can never know (X), but rather, we CAN KNOW and very INTIMATELY what X actually IS.. and that is a monism, Will.. The very fact that we have an "inner being" (subjective experience) is for Schopenhauer proof that Will exists as this double-aspected thing that strives. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and this is also finally clear to me. S. goes beyond K at "disclosing" that "non empirical" with a "higher" status in the scheme of reality. Whereas K settles upon not accessible to knowing; S says it is the Will, the very "drive" of all being(s).

I don't think he is actually identifying the subject as Will. — schopenhauer1

I would be surprised if he was. I would think tge "Subject" belongs to representation, that "double" part of Wills "double aspect."

But finally, is therefore the most ultimate reality for S the Will? Or is there a Being of all Beings which is merely manifesting as the Will?

it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t. — Mww

Ok. Thank you. You have put me on track re Noumena.

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that?

Kant was an admitted dualist — Mww

What were the "opposing" "realities" in his dualism?

Freud, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, alluded to the ID as the wellspring of desire and arousal. — Shawn

Oh. Would Schopenhauer have seen the Will as Freud's ID?

If so, there is nothing redeeming in us at the root? But where does reason or rationality fit in?

Buddhanature is not any kind of entity or thing, but the latent capacity for enlightenment — Wayfarer

Understood. So for Schopenhauer there is nothing like Brahman or another monistic ultimate reality besides Will which is more like a drive? Sorry, that's what I was wondering.

then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something — schopenhauer1

Right. Words are inevitably problematic. All the more so when I do not share your knowledge of the technical. Projections is misleading. Here's an oversimpified description of the process. Representations are constructed by the Body to trigger feelings and actions. The feelings and actions are real but we are attuned to the representations as though they are real.
In the spirit of further oversimplifying, one time, hypothetically before thd hypothetical emergence of mind, the brain would construct a representation of a tiger when a certain twig snapped to trigger the Body to run. Mind is a universe of such representations.

it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know. — schopenhauer1

It might. If I am stretching, then it would. If I am not, that it resolves the cannot know with the answer, well "know" is not a category of truth anyway, that's why it can't be known.

not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later. — Wayfarer

Ok. Ive never considered that for Schopenhauer, yet I sensed he wasn't a Buddhist Scholar or anything even for his time. But maybe from what you've made clear, he was well versed given the resources.

Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why. — Wayfarer

Ok. Yes. You are correct to clarify. I originally "brought" his "will" into a category with Being recognizing I wasn’t being true to Schopenhauer but neglecting to be clear.

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive?

the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether. — schopenhauer1

That is definitely the most Reasonable view. You cannot achieve anything outside of the phenomenal because there is no refuge in so called reality. The two are inextricably one. Thus, enlightened necessarily is enlightened as to the predicament, and willing (deliberate use) to carry on as unattached as possible (ironically using that very willing to detach from willing. A problem I see resolved differently).

But we share in the pith of it. Wu Wei.

I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out. — schopenhauer1

:up:

it is that it is "double-aspected" — schopenhauer1

And I would see that ("double-aspected") as an "aspect" of the projections, rooted in a primeval structure, difference. Because Mind exploded once difference became habituated into real consciousness*, we have this problem to grapple with in the first place. Not this but that is recognized as the root of the projections (representations) by Vedanta/ Mahayana (I can't speak of Theravada) and Western philosophy.

What is the "nature" of this will/representations dichotomy? Right? You say "double-aspected" which is consistent with Schopenhauer and, I might concede conventional reasoning. It applies the autonomous requirement of difference. Not this but that.

I too necessarily employ the structure difference. I say there is only will, like you, but the second aspect is does not beling tobthe will. The second is Fictional (illusion) because it is projected, and it isn't what anything else is or has ever been. It is truly new and other. But has no enduring structure, just empty signs in motion triggering feeling, action, sky scrapers, nuclear bombs, and this very dialogue.


*(I'll use the language I'm familiar with. Know that I am aware of their "flaws" within the context of this discussion)

Will literally IS the illusions. — schopenhauer1

Hard pill to swallow...hence the squaring of the circle. You may be right, more universally than just this.

still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. — schopenhauer1

One thing for sure, it can't be accomplished using the tools of the "illusion" no matter how entangled with the will. Right?

also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation — schopenhauer1

Totally agree. I thought I was framing it in a way conceding to an orthodox view. Causation is misapplied. (But there is the added problem which I concede that this applies not just to applying "cause" to any relationship with Reality, but to everything expressed, rendering all of this moot.)

Whence the illusion? — schopenhauer1

This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).

I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real.

Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same. — schopenhauer1

I get why ultimately they must just be Will (I have in mind, none of the nuances peculiar to each philosopher. Most basic: will=ground of being; representation=those projections emerging there"from").

But.

Is it possible to conceive of the projections (phenomena/mind/becoming) as epiphenomenal, ultimately not "real;" and so, there is ultimately only one, but the projections are nevertheless

1) existent (though fleeting and empty, like shadow paintings)
2) effective against the real. Like a Fictional story can cause one to really cry. It effects reality while maintaining its status as Fictional
3) avoidable, or at least, tune-out-able by a process of attuning to the Will (drive for survival) without attention to the projections (desire and suffering)
?

Genius poor guy.
15m — frank

No doubt

Not exactly, look at our conversation right above: — schopenhauer1

Below is from your conversation above. That is the very point I "think" I am concerned about. Seems to me I should pause again. :smile: Sorry.

But then when one is "denying the Will", is one employing "higher Will" to deny the "lower Will"? And then this starts to unravel... And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it. — schopenhauer1

For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirvāṇa. — Wayfarer

Sorry Wayfarer, I just noted your reveal. Thank you. And I see that you might note (not unlike Gnoman) that The "division" is not ontological, between Will and Suffering, but rather a "choice." Suffering does "emerge out of" the Will, but one might "attempt" to "avoid" it by negating the will.

I would only suggest that negating the will (ground of being) does seem impossible (as Schopenhauer the forum member has been pressing with kindness). It would make more sense if the "resolution" to suffering is negating the projections which (I believe to be) its "locus."

But things are more clear now in that I understand where I diverge.

One analogy I've found for Schopenhauer's 'will' is the Buddhist 'tannha' (craving or thirst). — Wayfarer

Ok, if that's the case, then definitely he places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being).

As to why his line of philosophical history separates them, I would have to understand what you mean exactly. — schopenhauer1

I mean to say, for me the two categories summarized as X and Y are ontologically(?) separate. The one being, "Being", the other being a modified "reality" mediated or projected solely by the emergence of human minds. If I am mistaken, and for all of these philosophies, X and Y are indivisible (I.e. suffering cannot be isolated to Mind or resolved in being, independent of mind), then why are they consistently spoken of as if one is the ground of being and the other projections of Mind?

The Noumenal ding an sich is also the idea of a Phenomenal object, as represented in a mind — Gnomon

Ok. Here I see the distinction from what I'm proposing. At least for Plato and Kant. But what about Schopenhauer?
If K and P were not positing two "realities" one being, the other becoming, wasn't Schopenhauer?

I see from further in your reply, likely not. As for the "two realities" I'm observing, as you suggest, these might be two ways to "choose" to view the one reality?

Hmm.

Thank you to all three, for helping me understand.

Despite my efforts, and the generous input of others in this thread and otherwise, I have yet to properly grasp (or abandon) what I believe to be something basic. So I will present it as simply as possible below for the consideration of anyone not yet worn out by my repeated efforts.

Where below am I naive or inconsistent?


PLATO
Forms(X)-->Particulars(Y)
KANT
Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y)
SCHOPENHAUR
Will(X)-->Representation(Y)

ALTERNATIVELY
Being(X)-->Becoming(Y)
[Body]-->[Mind]*
[Living]-->[knowing]*

While there are seemingly significant qualifiers differentiating each beyond nuances, is it not true that the following can be "extracted" from the "root" of each (i.e. before the differences emerge)?

Y is the "ground" where difference, therefore, meaning, therefore, desire, therefore, suffering is "constructed." This ground is mediated reality.

X is the "ground" where there is only the will to survive. No difference, etc., therefore no constructing suffering. This ground is direct reality.

And if X and Y are indivisible, inseparable, and not "two" distinct "grounds," why does this line of philosophical history separate them?


*is it "Body-->Mind"/"Living--knowing" which is "problematic"?

As soon as the thing-in-itself is presented to sensibility, it is no longer -in-itself, it becomes a yet undetermined thing -in-us, and we can intuit, thus represent it as phenomenon, subsequently experience it and know it as a certain thing. S, on the other hand, wants all things as representations of will, which removes the very construct of representation from the cognitive system itself. Under these conditions, and in anticipation of Kant’s concept that no knowledge is at all possible for that without representation, we find the thing that was unknowable because it wasn’t representable, now is the very representation that was formerly unavailable to us. — Mww

How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses? — Mww

Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. — Mww

:up: :up:
Thank you!


:

if we know our will indubitably, and if it is possible to make the will, as it is known, to represent what K stipulated as unrepresentable, then the thing K said we couldn’t possibly know, just disappears, and with it the entire Kantian epistemological dualism. — Mww

Unless the thing K said we couldn't possibly "know" we simply "are". Knowing belongs to the representations and it cannot "know" (represent) the present and real. What we are independent of the representations, the human being as a present participle. As in, not becoming, so not accessible to the becoming, the knowing, only accessible by being. We already are exactly that.

Admittedly neither orthodox to Kant nor to Schopenhauer.

To try to validate it in the "Eastern" context of Schopenhauer, Tat Tvam Assi. Ultimate Reality? You are that.

Anyway. This is a thought and I don't intend to pursue it. But I am interested in your thoughts, if any. I found your brief assessment to be excellent.

Will is identified as the noumena of Kant- the Thing-in-Itself. — schopenhauer1

Yes I understood that but rehashed it poorly.

so Will's expression via Representation is to have a subject that perceives, experiences, and knows objects — schopenhauer1

Ok, that is clarified now.

as Kant proposed, is mediated by a priori categories such as time/space/causality, such that when it looks upon the object, it manifests the idea of the object in space/time/causality and the PSR (the world of phenomenon). — schopenhauer1

Yes, this is where I have the most trouble and need to understand more thoroughly. And this...

The objects for Schopenhauer, are akin to some kind of Platonic Forms. These Forms are the direct manifestation of Will unmediated by a subject — schopenhauer1

WHY is it that Will has the double aspect? — schopenhauer1

...confusing me into seeing dualism...If you have a neat answer, please. Otherwise, I will read with a view to an answer.

That is to say, Will cares not for its individuated expressions that are its manifestations. We end up suffering as being taken along for its ride as beings who strive constantly, being expressions of Will. — schopenhauer1

And this, I understand and agree with, but with my modifications, admittedly requiring more "research" on my part before expressing the modifications with so much zeal

It is purely experiencing the Will without willing, if you will. — schopenhauer1

Wow. Not making conclusive comparisons, reminds me of Wu Wei, the Taoist, actionless action

If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape. — schopenhauer1

I assume that last one was a generous "I guess," and not a certain position espoused by S?

Thank you,

I think you need to slow down a bit. — Wayfarer

Of course. I'm getting carried away. I'll follow your good advice.

First, apologies to both of you. Please ignore if it is frustratingly butchering Schopenhauer. For my part, I am grateful to him.

"And in all the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, we shall find the same emptiness, and shall see that not time only but also space, and the whole content of both of them, i.e., all that proceeds from causes and motives, has a merely relative existence, is only through and for another like to itself, i.e., not more enduring."

The empty, for another like to itself, not more enduring, is, whether or not he expressed it as such, the relative constructions and projections of Mind. The location of suffering.

The more enduring is the living organism, the human body aware-ing its feelings, movements, sensations, without regard for the projections. The location of enduring.

The latter is impossible for the former to access; and so, yes, humans suffer inevitably, in their projections. But the latter is still there, still enduring, suffering when in pain, alone or hungry; blissful when fed, painless and bonding.

Note: the suffering projections indirectly code the body attuned to mind to feel suffering. That's where Zazen or forms of Yoga might alleviate suffering by highlighting the aware-ing of body, reducing attendance upon the Narratives of suffering.

Worst case scenario, why can't Schopenhauer inform history in unexpected ways? Isnt history itself, let alone Schopenhauer, always changing?

I'm reading from Will and Representation. Now, I'm skipping around.

Will. He speaks about as if it were an almighty scoundrel, etc. leading to the impression that the will is something "else". Separate. I won't even confuse it with a separate from "what".

I'm going to read before I conclude. But until then, here is a loose, but to me, compelling, picture.

Schopenhauer was not blessed with Husserl, Heidegger, and then all of the stuff that followed from existentialism to functionalism, structuralism, linguistics, postmodernism, psychoanalysis (and these are the blessings my limited narrative can enumerate), and he was barely exposed to Buddhism, the way, he would have been today. How can we disregard those limitations when honestly extrapolating? Extrapolating not to conclude with truth, but to clear the forest for a proper sense of what is worthy of interpolation.

So he intuits this autonomous thing, the will, and you tell me it's one and the same as the self, and Rationality, and those (among other things) constitute a unified, whole and real human being.

Or, is it, will is (in a Spinoza/panpsychism/Vedanta way) survival, the being of everything? In which case, what are these attributes or dualities?

Either way, owing to where he was along his (with humility, this) particular path

1. He was expressing qualities as dualities. Either forcing them into a monism to suit his narrative, or recognizing that only a single of the "dualities" like, will*, is real, the rest are projections. *though I observe he mis-defined "will" if by it he meant the insatiable etc; he mis-alotted some things to will etc..

2. His pathatic (as in pathos) pessimism is rooted in not realizing that the scoundrel stuff, the boredom, the suffering, isn't our will, there is hope; though the "scoundrel" has a powerful hold. Ironically, our will is that supple. The hope is in the interpretation that the dualities are projections; and correcting his error that insatiable follows naturally with survival. The will if that is organic being, is balanced. The dualities are insatiable.

Schopenhauer generally got everything right, and to him history owes a debt, but assuming his "the will" is the real being, (so far) he was mistaken in locating dissatisfaction and suffering there.