I put "minds" in quotes. I don't believe a "mind" is an object that exists. Rather, a brain engages in mental activities (perceptions, moderating between stimulus and response intentional behaviors, deliberations, learning...). IMO, experience is the constant flow of these mental activites, which entails changes in the brain — Relativist

I have three questions for you: 1) How experience can affect the brain knowing that it is not a substance, 2) Do you believe that physical motion is deterministic and is only based on the laws of nature? and 3) If yes, then how could the brain be affected by experience?

Now you tell me what you mean by "experiences". — Relativist

A conscious event that is perceived by the Mind and contains information.

Emergence doesn't end up in Epiphenomenalism. — DifferentiatingEgg

It does. If not please explain how experience can cause a change in matter considering that the state of matter is subject to change by the laws of nature and experience is not a substance.

"Experience" is a feature (output?) of "mind" and mental and physical – the former either an epiphenomenon or emergent (strange loop-like) from the latter – are complementary descriptions of the manifest activities of – or ways of talking about – natural beings (i.e. property dualism¹). — 180 Proof

What do you mean by the mind here? Property dualism explains the experience's emergence (weak emergence) but cannot explain how the experience can affect the physical. Therefore, we are dealing with epiphenomenalism.

A more fundamental, or metaphysical, version of property dualism is (Spinoza's) parallelism²: — 180 Proof

You don't want me to believe in parallelism, whether the Spinaza, Leibniz, or Malebranche versions. Do you?

physical and mental are conceived of as parallel aspects of every natural being (not to be confused with panpsychism or epiphenomenalism) which do not interact causally (or in any other way) and we attribute to each natural being to the degree either or both aspects are actively exhibited. — 180 Proof

We know that change in the physical is due to experience. Spinoza's version of parallelism does not explain this since he was not aware of the change in the texture of the brain due to experience. It does not explain how experience is possible; it just says that it is.

So whether a mental property¹ or mental aspect², it doesn't make sense to conceive of "experience" as an independent causal entity — 180 Proof

Experience is a separate thing. It is not the direct cause of change in physical but the change in physical as I mentioned in OP is due to it.

(re: Descartes' interaction problem ... disembodied mind). — 180 Proof

I am not defending Descartes here. I have my version of substance dualism.

Define "experience". — Relativist

A conscious event that contains information.

Similarly our "minds" are altered by sensory perceptions and by its own inner processes. — Relativist

What do you mean by the mind here?

Am I an agent? No, I am just a bundle of perceptions. — Corvus

So you are an idealist. So you are not made of physical?

Do I have certain experience? I do. But I need to dig out the past events which are dead and gone now from my memory, and then package into concepts called experience. — Corvus

How could you have memory? Memory must be stored somewhere.

It is a kind of reduction of the past memories into the conceptualised concept called experience. — Corvus

How could you construct any coherent thoughts if you are mere perception? Any coherent thought requires a memory of ideas you experienced in the past. It also requires a process on the memory as well.

Does it exist? Experience only exists in one's mind. Could we call it as existence? You tell me. — Corvus

What is the mind to you?

I don't jump into a thread where the OP has been engaging discussion with the other folk. It wouldn't be fair to the party criticised by more than one debater, whoever happens to be criticised, supported or condoned in the debate.

That action would be like ganging up with others like the gangs in the streets, and wouldn't be fair for the lone defender. It would not likely yield true and fair conclusions, and anyone ganging up in the debates are not neutral or genuine debaters. Waiting for 1:1 engagement is my etiquette in debates. I am quite happy to wait, and take things easy and slow. — Corvus

I have no problem being criticized by many. It would be nice of you if we could continue this discussion in another thread since our discussions relate to that thread and your question could be a question from others.

You know philosophical debates not all about proving one is right and the other is wrong, one is better than the others, one knows more than the others etc. That would be pointless psychological masturbation.

Philosophical discussions are for pursuit of fair truths by all parties involved in the discussions motivated by mutual fairness, good spirits and eudaimonia. — Corvus

Correct.

Well, frankly I don't know anything about your experience, hence it would not be meaningful to agree your experience exists. X cannot exist, if X passed and belong to the past, or if X is unknowable. So "MoK's experience exists." would be a meaningless statement to me, unless MoK tells me what the experience is about MoK was meaning.

I know my own experience which need to be conceptualised into linguistic form, if someone wants to hear about it. — Corvus

Yes, let's focus on you. Could we agree that you are an agent and have certain experience?

Since you don't know what Emergence is, you equate it to monism... — DifferentiatingEgg

I know what emergence is and I think we discuss the consequence of accepting that emergence of consciousness from the physical, namely epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism is unavoidable if you accept that the physical move on its own based on the laws of nature and consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. Consciousness is a phenomenon and a problem within materialism but it is not a substance. Therefore, even if we accept that one day we can explain the emergence of consciousness and solve the Hard Problem of consciousness, we are still dealing with monism since consciousness is not a substance.

Back to my question now: Accepting that experience is real, how the experience can affect physical?

Could you please continue this discussion in another thread?

Me, you, etc.

Experience is a word of empty shell when it is said with no information on the owner and content i.e. whose experience it is, and what the experience is about. — Corvus

Of course, I am not an Idealist so by experiencing I mean that there is an agent who experiences something.

It is the same thing. When I watch movie, I am having visual and auditory perception. — Corvus

But visual and auditory perception are sorts of experiences.

Experience is an abstract mental state, which is a concept. It is not sensation or perception. — Corvus

Experience is a conscious event that contains information, whether it is perception, recalling memory, having emotion, etc.

It is just feeling the pain, not experiencing it. Experience happens when I conceptualise the pain from the memory, and tell someone about it. I experienced the pain of getting kicked. You seem to confusing between feelings and concepts. — Corvus

Feeling pain is a sort of experience and I am not talking about concept here.

So do you agree that experience cannot be said to exist? You either have it, or don't have it. You can only have experience of something if you had perceived something from the empirical world. You can only be aware of your own experience. No one else's. I don't have a single scooby clue what experience you have. I just know of my own. — Corvus

I think I was clear with what I said. If you are not in Australia then you cannot experience Australia.

It is not experience. It becomes only experience, if I conceptualise it. If I decided not to conceptualise, then it is not an experience. It is just a perception.

Not true. If and only if it could be conceptulaised into knowledge. You have experience or don't have it. Experience cannot be said to exist or changed. — Corvus

If you are not happy with this example then think of moving around while seeing things, watching a movie, etc.

It would be nice of you if you discuss this topic in another thread

I have no experience ever visiting Australia. Australia is both physical in its land, but also abstract for the country, and it seems to exists (I presume). Why my experience of visiting Australia doesn't exist? — Corvus

Because you have never been there.

From this case, can we say all experiences exist? — Corvus

Sure not.

Isn't it the case, some experience exist, but some don't. — Corvus

Yes.

In that case, it is correct to say experience exist? — Corvus

Yes, certain experience exists.

I have experience of seeing the sky. My experience of seeing the sky was it was blue when there was no clouds, and sunny. Why don't my experience of seeing the sky has not changed the colour of the sky at all? From this does all experience change the state of physical? — Corvus

That is not what I mean. Let me give you an example: Suppose someone kicks you, and you say, Ouch. Kicking is the cause of experiencing pain and Ouch is the result of experiencing pain.

Does experience exist? — Corvus

Sure experience exists. You are reading my answer now and have a certain experience.

Whose experience are you talking about here, and what experience? — Corvus

Human experience for example and whatever she/he experiences.

Does experience change? From what to what does it change? — Corvus

Experience changes. For example, your experience changes from not knowing to knowing after reading a book.

I certainly did, you're asserting that the mind has no affect on the physical that's simply not true, from my position, as the mind incites physical production within the body.

Mind and Body are parallel heterogeneous productions born of the same cause: the CNS. That doesn't equate to monism. — DifferentiatingEgg

But to you, the mind is simply the arrangement of physical. That certainly is monism. And I didn't talk about the mind and its role in the body but the experience.

Patterns of neural activity occur when the brain processes input/information, whatever we wanna call it, from the mind and or the external world. Patterns of neural activity are specific arrangements and sequences of electrochemical signals that occur within the brain's network. — DifferentiatingEgg

It seems to me that you didn't read my post carefully.

Experience is encoded and processed by the brain through a complex biological network. — DifferentiatingEgg

Yes, the experience is encoded in the brain. I am saying something different though: How the experience can cause a change in the brain knowing that it is not a substance? Let me give you an example: We are discussing a topic right now. Let's focus on me for the sake of simplicity. I read your post and have a sort of experience. This experience, then is encoded into my brain for further analysis. I am interested to know what causes the change in my brain to allow the experience to be encoded in my brain. I am arguing that that thing cannot be the experience itself since the experience is not a substance so we need a substance that can cause a change in my brain.

Not trying to deny it's existence. Experience affects the brain through things like neuroplasticity. Which is pretty much a self referential and self affirming as experience even reinforces it's own self through the genesis of neuroplasticity, which makes it more and more likely something will be utilized. — DifferentiatingEgg

But experience is not a substance so how it could affect the brain?

Please find my argument here.

What it is saying is that what we experience in the external world affects even our internal world. But also that what we experience in our internal world affects our external world also. As in, it's a two-way street. — DifferentiatingEgg

I agree with that.

Experience isn't just a "physical" phenomenon... — DifferentiatingEgg

But you cannot deny its existence and the fact that it affects the physical such as the brain. My question is how experience can affect the brain?

I am not sure what "uncaused cause" means. Shouldn't you prove or demonstrate what uncaused cause means before progressing into the argument? — Corvus

It means that it is not caused and it is the cause of everything else.

I can understand "unknown cause", but "uncaused cause" sounds like a contradiction to me. — Corvus

It is not contrary at all. I have my own argument for it.

I am not a philosopher. I am a scientist. We make voluntary choices but our choices are never free from determinants, constraints and consequences. The so-called Hard Problem of Consciousness is not actually all that hard. It's a philosophical construct, nothing more. You could claim that I am a Philosophical Zombie. It would be impossible for me to prove to you that I am a conscious being. Just because it is impossible to prove to others that I am conscious, it does not mean I am a Philosophical Zombie. Philosophical Zombie is yet another philosophical construct, nothing more. — Truth Seeker

Let's say that we disagree and put an end to this discussion. Thanks for your time.

Sorry, made a late edit: — DifferentiatingEgg

No problem.

"Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit [What occurred in the light, goes on in the dark]: but the other way around, too." — DifferentiatingEgg

I don't understand what you mean by that and how that could be relevant to the discussion.

Experience is something we can gain from both our internal and external world. — DifferentiatingEgg

That is very ambiguous to me. To me, that is a definition of knowledge. Do you mind elaborating?

It doesn't "work on it's own" it is a dynamic model created from inputs from our internal and external world. — DifferentiatingEgg

So again, if we accept that the mind is the software and the brain is the hardware then the brain can work on its own. What is the role of experience here?

You want to remain ignorant instead of learning something new. How fascinating! I am not blaming you or crediting you. If I or another organism had your genes, environments, nutrients and experiences, I or another organism would have the same thoughts as you because we would be identical to you. — Truth Seeker

I am not ignorant of the topic. I have no time to read a book that denies the reality of free will. Philosophers of mind still struggle with the Hard Problem of consciousness. I am wondering how then could address free will when they are unsure what consciousness is!

Exactly the point... the mind doesn't exist as a thing by itself. — DifferentiatingEgg

To you, but not to me. I have an argument for it, the OP.

By the way, could you please answer my other question as well: What is an experience to you, and why it is relevant if the brain is merely software and hardware and can work on its own?

No, doubt is not special. Just because you claim it to be special does not make it so. Have you read the two books I recommended? — Truth Seeker

I know enough about the philosophy of the mind and I don't need to read another book on the topic.

We can think of it like this: the software and hardware of the body both grow out of the FIRMWARE of the body. — DifferentiatingEgg

Software is nothing but an arrangement of bytes of memory in a hardware. So it is not a thing by itself.

Mind is emergent cognition (software) that arises out of the CNS (firmware), shaped by body (hardware) and experience. — DifferentiatingEgg

So to you, the mind is an arrangement of physical? What is an experience to you and why it is relevant if the brain is merely software and hardware and can work on its own?

No, doubting is not special. — Truth Seeker

The doubt is special as I argued.

You clearly don't understand how the brain works. Please read "Being You: A New Science of Consciousness" by Anil Seth and "Determined: Life Without Free Will" by Robert M. Sapolsky. If you have any questions while reading these books, please ask here and I will do my best to answer them. — Truth Seeker

I have been working and reading on the philosophy of the mind for several years. Well, it seems to me that is an end to the discussion.

Not quite — DifferentiatingEgg

No.

Because the two have generally been perceived as existing through the antithesis of values rather than growing out of the body through fractal emergence. — DifferentiatingEgg

How do you distinguish between the mind and the brain? What is your definition of the mind?

In fractal emergence, one shouldn't consider the mind as something that isnt fundamentally "the body." They are in essence one and the same. — DifferentiatingEgg

The Mind is not the brain. The brain is physical, by physical I mean it is a sort of substance. Accepting that the brain and the mind are the same one commits monism. If they are the same thing then why use different words?

The mental state of experiencing doubt is not something special that sets it apart from other mental states. — Truth Seeker

It is special. If we accept the mental phenomenon of doubt, we can conclude that options are real.

We experience many sensory perceptions, thoughts and emotions. They are all produced by our brain activities. — Truth Seeker

Yes, brain states are subject to change and are deterministic. The question is how doubt can arise from the brain, considering that it is a deterministic object.

I'm of the mind that one wouldn't classify experience as emergent just because the mind is? — DifferentiatingEgg

I am saying two things here: 1) Accepting that experience is an emergent property then we deal with epiphenomenalism and 2) Experience is not a substance so it has no causal power so it cannot cause a change in physical.

Non sequiturs ... Whatever. — 180 Proof

What is non sequiturs here?

Are you familiar with Emergent Properties? For example, it's possible to show things exist between dimensions like 2d and 3d...

Our most current models suggest Consciousness is an emergent property of our fractally nested biology. — DifferentiatingEgg

Yes, I am aware of the emergence concept. Accepting that experience is an emergent property leads to epiphenomenalism in which experience does not have any causal power. This is however against intuition since we experience a fantastic correlation between experience and change in physical.

Metaphysical theories can be established only via the refutations and arguments against their critics, not by avoidance of the critics. Keep arguing rationally and logically until the sound conclusions are reached is the way of the establishment. — Corvus

Here is the argument from Change for God by Aquinas:

1. Some things in the world change.
2. Everything that changes is caused to do so.
3. Nothing is its own cause.
4. Therefore, things that change are caused to do so by something else.
5. There cannot be an infinite regress of such causes.
6. Therefore, there is an ultimate, unchanging cause of change.
7. God is the ultimate, changeless cause of change
8. Therefore, God exists.

There are two objections here: a) 3 is not necessarily true and b) there is a jump from 6 to 7. Accepting b) is a correct objection the argument looks like this:

1. Some things in the world change.
2. Everything that changes is caused to do so.
3. Nothing is its own cause.
4. Therefore, things that change are caused to do so by something else.
5. There cannot be an infinite regress of such causes.
6. Therefore, there is an ultimate, unchanging cause of change.

This argument is valid and sound if we accept that objection a) is not valid or there is a way to answer this objection. This is an argument for the existence of uncaused cause though. All I am saying is that people falsely equate God, who is the creator of the creation from nothing, by uncaused cause. I argue that God, given His definition, is subject to change therefore God cannot be the uncaused cause since the uncaused cause is changeless.

I already change the argument to include your objection:

P1) God exists and is the creator of the creation from nothing
P2) If so, then there is a situation in which only God exists
P3) If so, then God is in an undecided state about the act of creation when only God exists
P4) If so, then the act of creation is only possible if God goes from an undecided state to a decided state
P5) If so, then the act of creation requires a change in God
P6) If so, then God changes
C) So, God changes

perhaps I may be confused by the way it's worded, but are you suggesting that experience is due to physicality with an event? — DifferentiatingEgg

I am saying that experience is due to physical. Physical is a substance, like the brain, without it experience is not possible.

Nonsense. Abstractions do not "exist" (A. Meinong) and are not "subject to change". Thus your conclusions are not valid. — 180 Proof

I am not talking about the abstract objects here. I am talking about experience. Are you denying that you experience and your experience is not subject to change?

Also, "mind" is what sufficiently complex brains do – activity / process (i.e. mind-ing) – and is not a concrete thing. "Mind(ing)" causes brains no more than 'walking causes legs' or 'digesting causes intestines'. — 180 Proof

Saying that the mind is the brain's activity or process does not add anything informative. Please read the rest of the argument.

Lastly, in nature "uncaused cause" is not unique since (e.g.) random – "uncaused" – radioactive decay causes EM static (i.e. radiation). — 180 Proof

I believe in De Broglie–Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics, so no Schrodinger cat paradox, no particle-wave duality, Wheeler's delayed-choice experiment is explained well, etc.