Let's focus on Kant's first formulation of morality since the article is long and he has several formulations. We can discuss other formulations after I have time to read and think about them. Here is the first formulation: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law". My main objection to this formulation is why I should accept to only act according to a maxim that I can will when it becomes a universal law.

It is discussed in the article that four steps must be taken to find out whether an action is right or wrong. These four steps are: "First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your proposed plan of action. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this new law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible." We of course cannot conceive a world in which a specific maxim, like killing is permissible, but my question is why we should generalize a maxim to become a universal law.

Think of a person with locked-in syndrome. He suffers from being in such a condition greatly. He wishes to die desperately. Isn't it right to assist him to die? Is it right to keep him in such a condition? Accepting that we only can find the rightness of a maxim by generalizing it to become a universal law has this danger of putting people in an undesirable and unfair situation such as people with locked-in syndrome.

I thought you did. Maybe it was someone else. My sincere apologies for mistaking your religious stance. — Corvus

No problem mate! :)

So are you a Christian? — Corvus

I am undecided about believing in God. The same applies to life after death. I have to face these to be certain.

Or different essences, if you prefer? — Corvus

Yes.

Ok, I will read them when I have time.

You claimed you are an atheist. — Corvus

Never did I claim such a thing.

What would the different substance be in their nature? — Corvus

Different substances are different in their essences.

I think you are talking about the attributes of an intelligent agent. Animals also experience and cause for example.

Isn't this the whole trinity problem, as in how can one thing be three things at the same time? — Hanover

The fact that Jesus was abandoned is against Trinity doctrine. There is a problem with this doctorine as you mentioned.

If you have truly seperate things, you have polytheism, which I think Christianity wants to deny, except for the Mormons, who just go ahead and accept the polytheism. — Hanover

Mormons believe that they become God after they resurrect if they fulfill the conditions. Jesus however believed to be God while He was human.

It is entirely possible that the theology just doesn't make sense at a basic level, which is a problem if you place a high value on making sense. I don't say that sarcastically because it is the case that (1) many people do get great fulfillment through Christianity, and (2) Christianity doesn't make sense at a basic logical level and it is also based upon a false factual narrative. This isn't me picking on Christianity. I think the same problem arises in most if not all religions. — Hanover

Correct.

The question is what do you do now that you've realized the obvious? — Hanover

I spread what I think is correct.

And you believe God can make us Omniscient? — Corvus

Well, God can teach us the truth so we can become Omniscient if knowledge is bound.

Yes, I would be interested to know about your ideas on that. — Corvus

I think two entities with the same sort of substance cannot occupy the same location. Therefore, two Omnipresent entities must have different substances.

That's avoiding the question MoK. Liking something is a feature of our experiences. Is feeling that something is good exactly the same as liking it, or is it different? — Philosophim

We like things because they make us feel good.

No one defines good as reward and punishment as evil. That's simply an incorrect use of their definitions, even given the wiggle room they provide. If a man rewards a murderer with money, its not good. If a person who murdered someone is punished for their actions, that's not evil. Good and evil are descriptors of rewards or punishments. A good/evil reward, a good/evil punishment for example. — Philosophim

I have my definition of good and evil. I used these definitions to explain my coherent view when it comes to morality. Good and evil to me are subjective. Good and evil to you are synonyms for right and wrong that I cannot disagree with them anymore. So why use good and evil at all and instead don't use right and wrong? Right is what it should be so we achieve the conclusion!

I am not stuck. I hope we can chat on another topic sometime soon. :)

I am wondering what is the argument for objective morality. As I mentioned Kant's argument is false. Hume's argument is based on specific feelings that are not common between human beings.

And here is the objectional premise driving the slide to moral nihilism in much thought. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it leads to moral anti-realism. Why do you think that it leads to moral nihilism?

"If something has to do with desirability or choiceworthyness it always has to do with feelings (i.e., the passions and the appetites) and never involves reason directly." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, reason requires facts as its premises. I am wondering what are the facts when it comes to objective morality. I am not saying that reason or fact is divorced from subjective morality though. A thief for example has a reason or fact not to steal since he knows he may be arrested. So I distinguish between reasons that are involved in subjective morality (the thief example) and facts that lead to objective morality.

Why can't the desire to know the truth, or the desire to know what is truly best, be ascribed to reason? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that knowing the truth or what is truly the best can be based on both reason and feeling. We know for sure that advancing in science is good by reason. Reason as I mentioned in the example of the thief plays an important role in a stable and healthy society as well. I just don't think that there are reasons or facts for objective morality.

Why must knowledge of moral facts be universal and infallible? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I challenge the belief of those who think that moral facts are universal and infallible. All people who believe in an eye for an eye for example. All people who believe that killing a serial killer is right. And I don't think that the knowledge of moral facts must be universal since we could have a healthy life following our common feelings that are subjective.

The person committed to the idea that there are no facts about values is committed to the implausible position that the statements above lack any truth value, that they are, in a sense, undecidable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't disagree with the truth value of those statements. I however think we have to be very cautious about the truth value of the statements that are accepted as facts related to morality.

I'd argue that moral anti-realism and nihilism only seem as plausible as they do because people try to scope it down to "moral values," making "moral good" a sort of sui generis good that is divorced from all other notions of goodness, choiceworthyness, desirability, etc. But is this a proper distinction? I don't think it is, since it is unclear what such a distinct "moral good" is supposed to consist in once it has been isolated from all other questions of value. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not a moral nihilist. However, I think that moral anti-realism is correct. All our values are subjective. What we call good or evil is subjective. Don't take me wrong. I think that the subjective values and features of our experience, good and evil, are important when it comes to morality, without them, we cannot be functional and have a healthy life.

If good is just a feeling, why should the majority of the human population matter? — Philosophim

They feel the same way; they establish the laws based on that and everybody has to follow the laws.

If a minority feel a certain way and can act on it, who cares? — Philosophim

There is no problem as far as there is no conflict of interest between majority and minority. But that is not always the case.

Why is the majorities feelings any more important than the minorities feelings? — Philosophim

Because they establish the laws.

Is it purely based on your feelings, or do you have some reasons you put out there? — Philosophim

It is merely based on feeling in my case. Reason however could matter for some individuals who want to harm others for example. They are afraid of getting arrested.

Justification for that feeling? — Philosophim

Yes, we could have reasons that it is wrong to follow certain feelings. Consider the previous example.

As an example, I want to kill this person that I think stole from me. I have an opportunity to act, and I do. In another scenario I see the opportunity, but I want to be sure it was them first. I really feel like killing them is good, but I hold off. Five minutes later I discover it wasn't them that stole from me. Am I still a good person in the first scenario? Am I still a good person in the second scenario? Is there really no way for me to rationally say, "I behaved better in the second scenario than in the first?" — Philosophim

Accepting that killing is permissible in such a situation, your action is wrong in the first scenario and right in the second one.

My arguments against a subjective morality are purely because of the irrationality of its stance, and the utterly destructive outcomes it leaves in its wake in the world if followed to the letter. — Philosophim

It is not irrational at all. Subjective morality is functional because the majority agree on it.

If you are stating now that right and wrong do not exist independently from social constraints or opinions, then this particular point no longer holds. — Philosophim

Morality therefore is subjective if we accept that.

We agree then. — Philosophim

Cool. :)

And what is 'feeling good"? Is it just an expression of "I like the rose"? Or is it different? — Philosophim

Feeling good is a feature of our experiences.

How do you define 'rightness' MoK? — Philosophim

To me, the right action is what we should do and that can be good or evil, like rewarding or punishing.

Sure. It is rather simple. When we see a fellow human being suffering, we want to offer help to save the folk if we can. It is out of our sympathy in our emotion which we share with all the human beings in the world.

When we see the fellow human being saved from our help, we feel moral good, that we have done something good for other human beings. It is the nature of our mind which are loaded with these sharable emotions called sympathy, Hume says. — Corvus

Well, that is not an argument in favor of objective morality. The majority of the human population feels the same way in the same situations. But there is a minority that enjoys from inflicting pain on others. Therefore, the feeling cannot be a base or fact for objective morality.

I can definitely deny it. :) Especially if its subjective. It only can't be denied if its objectively true. A group decision results in what action occurs, but does not determine if its right or wrong. If a group of people decide to steal a plane and fly it into the twin towers, does that mean it was good to do so? If a group decides to nuke the world and end all life, is that good to do so? No one would rationally argue it is, and a person with subjective morality doesn't care about rationality because there is none if there are no moral facts. — Philosophim

By the group, I mean the majority of the human population.

And if its all just a feeling, then its irrelevant what they feel or believe. Its irrelevant what the nukers feel and believe. Everything is irrelevant but feelings. Pump yourself full of meth and feel amazing! Shoot people with glee and abandon! This is good. Lie, cheat, steal, rob, rape, destroy, and ruin for pleasure, its is good. Do you really believe that in practice? You would approve of that for your children, your family, your friends, and even yourself? — Philosophim

No, I won't approve of any of these but my disapproval is biased by how I feel in such situations. My feeling is not a moral fact though.

Feelings are indicators of our needs, they are not the needs themselves. — Philosophim

Quite opposite. There would be no needs or wants without feelings. I didn't say that needs are feelings though.

I'm an atheist MoK. I don't believe in an afterlife. — Philosophim

Even as an atheist, you have certain worries about your life.

Its a note about how to function best as an emotional and rational human agent in the world. — Philosophim

But there is no objective morality since there are no moral facts.

You noted that right and wrong have some factual basis to them because they exist independently of social constraints or opinions. — Philosophim

I have never mentioned that.

To me, consciousness is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. The mind however has another ability, namely the ability to cause as well. So, to summarize, the mind is an entity with the ability to experience and cause.

The argument is based on the logical implication from the Ethics and Practical Reasoning by Kant, and the concept of Sympathy of Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature. — Corvus

I already mentioned the problem within Kant's argument, first formulation. I am currently reading this article on Hume's argument on the topic. The article is however very long. Could you summarize Hume's argument?

What is the argument for that?

Hi Bob Ross. Are you going to reply to my objections here?

Stealing is universally regarded as morally wrong. — Corvus

By whom? A person who is hungry and steals food does not think so. And where is the argument for that?

It is not about personal property. It is about the action i.e. stealing. — Corvus

Accepting stealing as permissible negates the right of having a property, not the ability to have a property. A person could be politically, socially, ... strong and steal from others and keep it as his/her property.

Ok, let's focus on his first formulation of categorical imperative since the second formulation is derived from the first one. From Wiki: "The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction upon universalisation. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of personal property, but were A universalized, then there could be no personal property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself." I think this formulation does not consider two aspects of a property, namely the right to have a property and the ability to have a property. I think universalizing stealing negates the right to have a property but not the ability to have a property. A person could be strong enough to steal a property and keep it for himself/herself. Therefore, saying that "there could be no personal property" does not follow hence his argument fails.

Ok, but liking a rose isn't the same as experiencing redness. — Philosophim

No, they are different. Liking a rose is another feature of our experience.

What you're saying is that liking the rose is the same as saying the rose is good. Are you saying that good is something apart from what you like, or is it the same? — Philosophim

As I mentioned in another thread, feeling and reason, are two fundamental things that affect us. And yes, I am saying that rose is good because it feels good.

Generally the base definition of good is, "What should be". — Philosophim

I think you are mixing right with good. A serial killer thinks differently from the rest of the people when it comes to killing. How do you derive rightness from goodness?

I am not saying the Bible is the reliable source for morality. I am saying that many current morality is based on the Bible. — Corvus

Correct.

I did read the OP again. Your just wrote God must know all moral facts. That is not a definition. How can God know all moral facts, if it doesn't exist? Can you give some examples of moral facts? — Corvus

I mentioned that moral facts are a set of facts that we can derive from whether an action is right or wrong.

Why don't you think Kant is right in this instance? — Corvus

Because I think that morality cannot be objective.

If someone talks badly to other folks about you with false accusations and lies about you for some egotistic motives for him. Would you not reason and judge it is morally wrong? — Corvus

From my perspective, he did something evil and morally wrong. He may think otherwise.

Anyone in the world would judge the case as morally wrong because we all have practical reason which is universal and objective according to Kant. — Corvus

Could you give a reason why an action is universally and objectively wrong?

All you've replaced is personal emotion with group emotion. — Philosophim

It is what it is and you cannot deny it. It is the group decision that makes something right or wrong. I am not saying that it is objectively right or wrong though.

Meaning I could nuke a group that doesn't have the emotions I do to do what I want, and that's good. That's genocide. According to your argument, there's nothing wrong or evil with genocide. Might makes right is the end result. — Philosophim

Even if you can nuke the group your action from their perspective is evil.

All the time. Social conflict is not always about good and evil, but wants and needs and the denial of those wants being fulfilled. — Philosophim

Wants and needs are affected by feelings. You want to eat because you feel hungry. How could you have any needs if you have no feelings?

Once again, you can sum that all up as 'feelings'. MoK, can I believe something and realize its wrong? — Philosophim

Two things affect humans, reason or feeling. These two are fundamental. Conscience for example is a sort of feeling. Belief is based on reason and feeling. You have certain beliefs because of the reason of the afterlife. You worry about entering Hell and prefer Heaven.

And my point is that you asserted one. — Philosophim

Where?

I don't feel that the rose is red. — Philosophim

You experience that the rose is red. The redness is a feature of your experience. That is what I am trying to say.

Red is not a feature of my feeling, its a feature of the light bouncing off the flower, a fact. — Philosophim

I think it is off-topic to discuss the philosophy of color here. But I have to say that the rose does not have any color and the color is a feature of your experience created by your brain.

If you're saying that liking something means its good, then you've equated good = like without any real rational argument beyond, "Because I believe this". — Philosophim

Yes, I equate like to good and dislike to evil. I however have a plan in my mind by such a definition. I can then discuss that these features when it comes to morality are subjective or person-dependent and not objective. We are also very dependent on our experiences hence their features. That is true since we interact with reality through our experiences. I am wondering how one can conclude that morality is objective when we accept that features of our experiences are subjective. You like this I like that. This is good to you but evil to me. Serial killers enjoy killing but I hate it. Etc.

I could just as easily assert good = apple. There is not a single definition of good in a moral sense anywhere in the world that equates good with what people personally like, and as I've noted, any serious thought on the subject would erase that notion in any practical application. — Philosophim

What is the other definition of good when it comes to morality?

I never claimed to believe anything of the sort. Simply, to the best of my ability, offered an explanation why your claim to such is open to reasonable scrutiny and certainly doesn't quite meet the threshold of "reasonable fact" or "common knowledge", in my opinion. — Outlander

I am open to discussion. I am however wondering how could one conclude that morality is objective when s/he accepts that the features of our experiences are subjective.

We are on the same page when you think morality is subjective.

Very correct. :up:

God can make us Omniscient. Whether we can become Omnipresent is however the subject of discussion. That is a problem since there is no way to distinguish two entities if they are both Omnipresent. Whether two different Omnipresent entities can distinguish themselves from one another knowing that they both exit everywhere is the subject of discussion and contemplation (I am currently thinking about this). Becoming Omnipotent requires Omniscience and Omnipresence. Therefore we can become God if we can become Omnipresent.

He either resurrected Himself or God did it. How could He resurrect Himself if He is dead? Therefore, it must be God who resurrected Jesus.

The data we can collect is the brain activity but not Qualia itself. I think it is feasible in the future to tell what sort of experience a person has from this data but we cannot possibly collect Qualia.

No need to elaborate, your point is solid and correct, simply, it's relevance to philosophy or greater logical progression is perhaps not as "involved in anything" as you may believe. — Outlander

How come? Morality cannot be objective if good and evil are subjective. That is my main point that is against Philosophim's argument.

Ok, here is my take on your argument:

8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts. — Bob Ross

What do you mean by purely simple? Why an uncomposed thing must be purely simple?

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts. — Bob Ross

Correct if two beings are composed. We can distinguish uncompsed beings by their attributes though.

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none). — Bob Ross

I don't see how this follows. Two uncomposed beings just do not have parts.

11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist. — Bob Ross

I don't see how this follows either. Two uncomposed beings can have different attributes so there can be more than one.

12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actual—devoid of any passive potency—because passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other. — Bob Ross

What do you mean by purely actual? Why cannot an uncomposed thing have potency?

14. Therefore, there can only be one purely actual being which is also purely simple. (11 & 12 & 13) — Bob Ross

This does not follow to me as I don't understand the previous premises and conclusion.

19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being. — Bob Ross

What do you mean by this?

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!) — Bob Ross

Yes, if the form of things can be manifested as thoughts.

21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19) — Bob Ross

That does not follow to me as I don't understand what do you mean by (19).

24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient. — Bob Ross

Yes, if all possible forms of composed beings exist. Otherwise, the purely simple and actual being lacks omniscience.

27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is. — Bob Ross

To me, good is just a feature of our experiences and has nothing to do with privation.

28. The purely simple and actual being cannot have any privations, since it is fully actual. — Bob Ross

That does not follow since I disagree with the definition of good.

35. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipotent. — Bob Ross

The omnipotent is the ability to actualize all possible forms. It is not sure whether all possible forms exist and whether they are only caused by a purely simple being.

Me neither. However, it seems perfectly plausible to make inference that he could only have resurrected and ascended to Heaven, because he became God after the resurrection. — Corvus

I don't think so when there is no verse from the Bible to justify this.

What would stop one from say, comparing viewing the text of your reply (whether the viewer is fluent in the language of the text or not) as a similar "experience". — Outlander

I say that we have the same experience when the features of our experiences are the same. We have the same experience of rose if the redness is similar to us, likewise the shape and other features of our experience.

Perhaps that's your point? — Outlander

My point is that our experiences of what is good or evil are different. Good and evil are features of our experiences. I say something is good when it is pleasurable to a person otherwise it is evil. As I noted we are different when it comes to good and evil. For example, murder is evil to the majority of people. However, some people have pleasure from killing therefore killing to them is good. I hope that makes sense to you. If not please let me know so I can elaborate further.

Then the only thing we can reason is that we can all do whatever we want to each other and no one has a reasonable way of saying what can and cannot be permitted. — Philosophim

We cannot do whatever we want because of social constraints. Social constraints are however based on what the majority agree on and this agreement is due to having the same conscience, belief, interest, and the like.

You also cannot justify forbidding any action either. MoK, this is when armchair philosophy fails. You know darn well that if someone stole from you, you would want society to agree with you that it was wrong, despite what others feel. You know that even if a majority thought it was good to murder an entire group of people in a concentration camp, that would still make it wrong. I can't take a person seriously who does not consider these realities. — Philosophim

No, we can forbid many actions because of social agreement. This agreement is possible since the majority of people have a common conscience, belief, interest, etc.

No, because it would have to be a fact that they exist. If good and evil are not facts, they don't exist. Even if you claimed, "Good is what I like", then you are asserting that as a fact. If its not a fact, then its only an opinion, and therefore nothing anyone has to agree with. — Philosophim

What looks good to me may look evil to others, which is the source of social conflicts. Have you ever asked yourself what is the source of social conflicts?

Alright, we're getting somewhere now. How do we know what we should or shouldn't do? — Philosophim

The only source that we have to see what is permissible and what is not is conscience, belief, interest, and the like. But people have different consciences, beliefs, and interests and that is the cause of all struggles that we witness now and existed in the past.

So you think that right and wrong have some factual basis to them, because they exist independently of social constraints or opinions. Those would be moral facts MoK. — Philosophim

Yes, I think morality can be objective if there are moral facts.

How so? That's just an assertion, not a reasoned explanation. My point that if there are no moral facts there are no rights stands. But saying that because there is conflict over something, that something cannot be a fact is absurd. If my wife and I fight over who gets the last cookie, is there no cookie? :D — Philosophim

Of course, there is a last cookie. You however have your own interests and that is the source of conflict.

I don't understand what this means, can you go more in depth? — Philosophim

Let's say that you are looking at a rose. You experience the rose. This experience, however, has different features like the redness of the rose, shape, and the like.

Then good and evil are just synonyms for feelings. At that point why even have the words? You haven't differentiated them from feelings, you've simply labeled them as feelings. — Philosophim

They are features of our feelings but they are not synonyms to feelings.

So we both agree that good is what we should do, while evil is what we should not do. If that's the case, then we have the same definition of good and evil. — Philosophim

No, good or evil could be right or wrong depending on the situation. Punishing a kid is evil yet we do it because we think it is right in a specific situation.

Lets analyze the word, "should" next. There is another word, 'want'. Want is an emotional desire to commit an action. Should is a question of whether following that desire results in an optimal outcome. — Philosophim

Desire is one factor that plays an important role in building a situation. The optimal outcome for who? An evil person who wants to commit a crime or a good person who wants to prohibit it?

Good is what should be. — Philosophim

No, good is just a feature of our experience.

And what should be is a right action. — Philosophim

No, the right action is what we should do and that should be based on moral facts that there is none.

Evil is what shouldn't be. — Philosophim

No, we do evil actions in some situations, like punishing them.

And what shouldn't be is a wrong action. — Philosophim

I am sorry for saying another no but here you go: :) No, a wrong action is what we shouldn't do.

Good is not what we want, good is an action that leads to a right outcome. Evil isn't what we dislike, evil is an action that leads to a wrong outcome. — Philosophim

I disagree. Don't you punish your children when they do something wrong? Punishing children is evil since it is not pleasant to them and the parents, yet we do it because it leads to the right outcome.