You are making a presupposition here that time exists in a classical framework and this will make it real or objective. — TimeLine

That is true. I personally find the illusion of time convincing, but I think granting a classical framework would not be unreasonable, at least from an experiential perspective. I'm not even sure one

The reactive approach is also about probabilities and not possibilities. There are algorithms where past decisions can be used to ascertain possible or likely choices made in the present (like voting a presidential candidate) and whilst not absolutely accurate, relies both on time (the past) and information. I think it is very complex that only the proactive approach really enables us to discuss the subject in question without it leading to a slippery slope. What do you think? — TimeLine

It seems to me that opening up the possibility of multiple time theories can lead to some very complex problems that I'm not prepared to answer (e.g. how can intervention have meaning at all when all actions happen at once?).

As for probabilities,(slightly) balanced probabilities (60/40) pose no threat as the choice by Jones is indeterministic. As we get into more unbalanced probabilities, though, we might see a problem. I suppose it could be extremely unlikely (.00001% chance) that one of the two options are chosen, which means the choice could be considered irrelevant, and an irrelevant choice may as well just be no choice at all. Yet, the choice is still technically indeterministic (probabilistic), so I'm not sure which side of the fence I want to lean.

In any case, doesn't the idea of probabilities (desired outcomes/possible outcomes) require alternate possibilities?

Jones could have done something otherwise and so while the decision may have been changed by this device, it does not challenge in any way the possibilities in advance of the outcome that was determined by an earlier event - implanting this device. Moral responsibility cannot be abandoned because free will and alternate possibilities still exist — TimeLine

And that is why I struggled with understanding how Robert Kane could describe Frankfurt-style cases as an ongoing problem...Since 1969!

Moral responsibility cannot be abandoned because free will and alternate possibilities still exist. This leads back to the problem between responsibility and moral responsibility. — TimeLine

I'm having trouble distinguishing the difference between responsibility and moral responsibility, but at risk of going off-topic, I will continue without mentioning both unless someone can explain the distinctions.

I would be keen to see your examples and maybe we can flesh them out together. — TimeLine

Going back to the Jones and Black scenario, Jones is standing in front a table, and on this table are two voting machines, which tally the counts electronically. Each vote is recorded by simply pressing a button located on the top of each machine. Still undecided, Jones rests his left hand on the left machine button (Vote A) and places his right hand on the right machine button (Vote B). Now of course we all know that Black wants Jones to vote for A but is not sure about the method with which use to ensure this happens. The two options available to Black are:

1) reactive approach - Black waits for a sign of what Jones is going to do before intervening.
2) proactive approach - Without waiting for Jones to act, Black can reprogram the electronic tally machines so that no matter which button Jones selects, the electronic signal will be routed to the left machine. In other words, vote A will always count.

My reason for this example is that we need something in which timing does not complicate the matter. Having Jones' hands resting on each button severely reduces the time between the beginning of the act and the end of the act, which almost completely removes the possibility of an objection like "well, Black waits for Jones hand to begin moving towards a particular box and THEN he intervenes". My point is that once Jones takes action, the action is, for all practical purposes, completed. With that said, I don't think this condition reduces the force of my example, because one while one cannot appeal to the action as evidence, one can always appeal to prior evidence that the action will occur. Further, prior evidence is what I think Frankfurt was getting at when he said "Jones is about to make up his mind" and "Jones is going to do something other than what he [Black] wants him to do"

Now let's say Jones deliberates about the decision and let us call this decision process PL or PR ( decision to press left button/decision to press right button) . This decision process, however long it takes, begins and ends at time T1, so PL/PR occurs at T1. Immediately following T1, Jones takes action by pressing one of the buttons LB or RB (left button/right button). This button pressing process begins and ends at time T2, so LB/RB occurs at T2. From a chronological perspective:

PL or PR --> LB or RB
T1 -----------> T2

Using the reactive approach, Only after PR at T1 will Black intervene at T2 with LB, rendering PAP true(Jones holds no responsibility). Black will not intervene after PL at T1, rendering PAP true(Jones is responsible).

Using the proactive approach, Jones will carry responsibility either LB or RB, because while the result of voting for A at T2 was the same due to the reprogramming, his decision making process or PL or PR at T1 was not coerced. His deliberation process had alternate possibilities, and, therefore Jones is responsible for what he intended to do.

I'm sorry if what I said sounded confusing. If it helps, we can remove the word moral and just look at responsibility.

I'm trying to understand the relation between responsibility and alternate possibilities as my OP mentions. Are you able to address that relationship or is the mere notion of responsibility still a peri-christian nonsense concept?

I'd also like to add that not everyone agrees that determinism is true, so if that is the assumption in your response, please state that.

Determinism states that at no single nexus of events a person could have acted otherwise. If we suppose that determinism is true, then where does that leave moral responsibility??
Answer exactly where it is. — charleton

I don't think I have a problem with a lack of moral responsibility given determinism is true (deterrence laws, as you state, will still be in effect). With that said, my issue is centered more on the requirement of alternate possibilities, given that moral responsibility is true.

This is where incompatibilists would perhaps draw the line and say that it is impossible for determinism and moral responsibility to be compatible in anyway and the objections to his nefarious neurosurgeon example as this 'irresistible force' implies Frankfurt to be begging the question, basically that the Frankfurt controller cannot stop or manipulate alternative possibilities without thinking about epistemic causality and so the neuroscientist will never know what a person will be choosing to do until at that very moment unless he had some prior knowledge. — TimeLine

Thank you for sharing this information. My book also mentions this objection about the neurosurgeon (Black) not knowing what the subject(Jones) will do until Jones has already performed the action, unless some prior indication is given. Without some prior indication, there cannot be intervention after the action, which was desired to be interrupted, has already completed, resulting in responsibility with alternatives on Jones' part. This objection is countered with the preventative (blockage) measure argument proposed by David Hunt, and it involves restricting actions before the decision is made (think standing at the end of a long corridor, facing two doors, one of which was locked beforehand). Further blockage developments involve implanting a device into the neural pathways of Jones' decision making process so that only one conclusion can be made. If Jones' independent deliberation arrives at A, the implant will override the decision, but isn't Jones still responsible for the decision he independently arrived at, whether that decision is interrupted?

Upon reflection, it seems to me that the issue simply got pushed back one step (what's next, restricting the action that initiated the neural pathway process... and so on and so forth???). It seems to me that in all of the examples:

1. A decision event occurs by the subject (alternate possibilities exist)
2. The following event is either interrupted (reactive or blockage) or not interrupted at all.
3. Either way, (moral) responsibility and alternate possibilities existed at the decision event.

I think I can come up with examples, but before I do, am I missing something here?