Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality". — Arcane Sandwich

I'll just suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that this is our point of disagreement, @Bob Ross. I'm not saying that it is, I'm just imagining it as a possibility among others. It's a hypothesis, nothing more. That's how science works, Bob. You imagine a hypothesis, which is a claim about some thing or feature of the world, and then you investigate that claim to see if it's true. You don't have to believe the claim yourself. If you did, it wouldn't even be a hypothesis to being with. It would be something else, like justified true belief, for example.

Now, with that in mind, I'm not asking you to believe Meillassoux's claims. Stated differently, I'm not asking you to believe him when he says that factiality is the speculative essence of facticity. I'm just telling you to consider it simply as a hypothesis to be investigated. Why would someone investigate it, you might ask? To see if it's true or not. What more do you expect from philosophy, Bob? Honest question.

Let's proceed. I'm going to quote Meillassoux's definiton of facticity, Bob. Not of factiality, this time we're gonna take a look at what he has to say about facticity, which, so far, seems to be the "metaphysical substrate", if you will, of this other thing that he calls "factiality", which he claims is the "speculative essence" of facticity. I'm not asking you to take his word for it, ok? I'm just saying: entertain the thought, for a moment, if only for the sake of argument, even if you, personally, cannot picture it or cannot understand it. I'm just saying: if he's saying "A", and we know that "not B" is true, can we construct a modus tollens that shows that "A" is false? That's just one question among many that can be reasonably asked at this point. That's the sort of thing that would strike a fatal blow to Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism. The problem is, that no one, so far, it seems, has been able to construct that sort of coup de grâce argument yet, even though many have been attempted (I myself published a few good, decisive critiques of Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism, but nothing of the importance of a modus tollens style refutation of his concept of factiality). That being said, let's take a look at Meillassoux's definition of the word "facticity". He says:

Let us go back to Kant. What is it that distinguishes the Kantian project - that of transcendental idealism - from the Hegelian project - that of speculative idealism? The most decisive difference seems to be the following: Kant maintains that we can only describe the a priori forms of knowledge (space and time as forms of intuition and the twelve categories of the understanding), whereas Hegel insists that it is possible to deduce them. Unlike Hegel then, Kant maintains that it is impossible to derive the forms of thought from a principle or system capable of endowing them with absolute necessity. These forms constitute a 'primary fact' which is only susceptible to description, and not to deduction (in the genetic sense). And if the realm of the in-itself can be distinguished from the phenomenon, this is precisely because of the facticity of these forms, the fact that they can only be described, for if they were deducible, as is the case with Hegel, theirs would be an unconditional necessity that abolishes the possibility of there being an in-itself that could differ from them. — Quentin Meillassoux

The main takeaway there seems to be that facticity is to be understood (Meillassoux suggests) as the fact that the forms in question can only be described (as Kant would have), not deduced (as Hegel would have).

EDIT : Later on, he says:

Let us try to attain a better grasp of the nature of this facticity, since its role in the process of de-absolutization seems to be just as fundamental as that of the correlation. First of all, from the perspective of the strong model, it is essential to distinguish this facticity from the mere perishability of worldly entities. In fact, the facticity of forms has nothing to do with the destructability of a material object, or with vital degeneration. When I maintain that this or that entity or event is contingent, I know something positive about them - know that this house can be destroyed, I know that it would have been physically possible for this person to act differently, etc. Contingency expresses the fact that physical laws remain indifferent as to whether an event occurs or not -they allow an entity to emerge, to subsist, or to perish. But facticity, by way of contrast, pertains to those structural invariants that supposedly govern the world - invariants which may differ from one variant of correlationism to another, but whose function in every case is to provide the minimal organization of representation: principle of causality, forms of perception, logical laws, etc. These structures are fixed - I never experience their variation, and in the case of logical laws, I cannot even represent to myself their modification (thus for example, I cannot represent to myself a being that is contradictory or non self-identical). But although these forms are fixed, they constitute a fact, rather than an absolute, since I cannot ground their necessity - their facticity reveals itself with the realization that they can only be described, not founded. But this is a fact that - contrary to those merely empirical facts whose being-otherwise I can experience - does not provide me with any positive knowledge. For if contingency consists in knowing that worldly things could be otherwise, facticity just consists in not knowing why the correlational structure has to be thus. — Quentin Meillassoux

EDIT 2: He talks about facticity throughout other sections of the book, but the only other "really important" snippet seems to be the following one:

Facticity is the 'un-reason' (the absence of reason) of the given as well as of its invariants. Thus the strong model of correlationism can be summed up in the following thesis: it is unthinkable that the unthinkable be impossible. I cannot provide a rational ground for the absolute impossibility of a contradictory reality, or for the nothingness of all things, even if the meaning of these terms remains indeterminate. Accordingly, facticity entails a specific and rather remarkable consequence: it becomes rationally illegitimate to disqualify irrational discourses about the absolute on the pretext of their irrationality. From the perspective of the strong model, in effect, religious belief has every right to maintain that the world was created out of nothingness from an act of love, or that God's omnipotence allows him to dissolve the apparent contradiction between his complete identity and His difference with his Son. These discourses continue to be meaningful -in a mythological or mystical register - even though they are scientifically and logically meaningless. — Quentin Meillassoux

He wants to refute strong correlationism, and he thinks that Speculative Materialism is the right tool for that task.

I come from a country were military service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women, hence military service is very normal. — ssu

Above all, if the country or nation state doesn't have an imminent outside threat, there's not going to be compulsory service and military service will look like an oddity. — ssu

I don't understand, you lost me here. Is there an inminent outside threat to Suomi (Finland)?

Unfortunately there's not enough Swedes and Finns (or other Nordic people) for a Swedish discussion site. And anyway, Swedish is usually worst for the Finns and the Danes, Norwegians do better. — ssu

I got kicked out of another forum for making a very light-hearted joke about Swedes. The joke that I said was: "Between Sweden, Norway and Finland, Sweden is the worst. Why? Because they're not right in the head. Why not? Because they have the most metal bands per capita, and that's a fact."

Instead of laughing, the Admin of the site banned me for nationalism" (yes, he actually wrote that in the email with the decision to ban me, among other nonsense).

Like, come on, you can't take a metalhead joke from another metalhead?

@Wayfarer

Tomorrow's News will be like: "Is it Ethical for an Australian man to punch a Roo in the face if the roo in question is attempting what can only be described as a front head-lock on a dog? Stay tuned and find out."

I am not familiar enough with what you are referring to by metaphysical conservatism, eliminativism, and permissivism to comment adequately on this one; but I suspect you are addressing a view which has no relevance to substance theory (in the sense of rebuking a position that holds that everything is one concrete entity). — Bob Ross

Hmmm... well, you see, here's where I personally disagree with you (I'm not attacking you, BTW). Here's what I'm saying about that: mereological nihilism is the opinion that composition never occurs. An object A never composes an object B. Does that mean that the objects A and B exist? No, it does not. So what does the nihilist say? She says that only atoms exist ("atoms" in the sense mereological sense, literally "in-dividual", you cannot divide them). And what are those? The elementary particles of contemporary physics. In other words, the nihilist is a realist about physical, elementary particles. She is not a realist about anything else. You, me, these other fine folk, we don't exist, technically speaking. That's what the nihilist says. So, what are we? Well, just a bunch of good ol' particles, and nothing more.

So Bob, you see why these debates are not restricted to formal mereology. There are of interest and relevance to metaphysics, as I've hoped to have shown.

So, I mean that we can describe the type of substrate a substance is to meaningfully discuss things. Idealists accept hat there is a mental substrate; physicalists accept a physical substrate; a substance dualist accepts both; a non-dualist adds a third; etc. — Bob Ross

Maybe, I don't know. Sounds reasonable enough to me, but I'm not sure if I agree with what all of that implies, from a technical standpoint.

Ok, cool. So, then, under your view, is this “Absolute” of a different type of substrate than physical stuff? — Bob Ross

God damn, that's a hard question. What do you want from me, Bob? You just want to "beat the metaphysical truth out of me, whatever that metaphysical truth might happen to be". I mean, it feels like intellectual torture, "mate".

Ok, so are you just noting by “The Absolute” the totality of reality and negation? I know that much about Hegel haha…. — Bob Ross

I have no idea, I'd have to think about it. See my comment above.

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.


Then why do you believe in it? — Bob Ross

Because I'm a simple peasant from Argentina at the end of the day, mate.

How am I supposed to discuss it with you, if you can't give a basic description of what the word refers to?

You want me to step through the door, when I can't until you tell me the password. — Bob Ross

Ok Bob, let's say that's fair (I don't know if it is, but let's just pretend for a moment). I'll try to be more charitable to you, since you're making (to my mind, at least) a very specific request. You want me to just deliver some information, in an objective but brief way, in such a way that it makes sense to you, so that you can tell me if I'm right or wrong about whatever it is that I'm talking about. So, here's what we'll do:

I will attempt to explain to you (and to myself, BTW) what, if anything, the word "factiality" means for Quentin Meillassoux himself. I hope you can see why this is a tall order from you, Bob, and not "a mere request".

Factiality, to the best of my knowledge, and to the best of my understanding, is a word that the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, invented. He made it up. Now, his argument (let's see if it's even an argument to begin with) is that the word that he made up, "factiality", should be understood as a technical, philosophical term (comparable, to, say, the word hyle, meaning "wood", which Aristotle takes from the common language of his time and gives it a precise, technical meaning in his own philosophy: it is materia, matter.)

That's how Meillassoux intends the very word "factiality". In short: he want us to take him seriously.

Ok, so what does he mean, by "factiality"? Well, he says that it's "the speculative essence" of facticity. So what are those? The speculative essence, is basically "the essence of facticity". In other words, Meillassoux is an essentialist: he believes that essences are real. Which things have essences? Does an animal have an essence? Does a number have an essence? What is an essence? Is it a soul? Is it the most important property of a thing? In that case, the essence would be identical to the essential property, which means that the essence must be a quality, not a quantity, and certainly not a res in the Medieval Latin sense.

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality".

Are you with me up to here, Bob? Or do you want to interrupt me and say something?

As I said earlier: "If the infinitely many integers are understood to be merely potential as a logical consequence of a conceptual operation—in this case iteration—and are not considered to be actually existent, then the need for a Platonic 'realm' disappears." — Janus

So what are you asking me, @Janus? If your solution is the right answer to the question in the OP? Because there's also @Banno's proposed solution, as well as the one that I proposed myself (mathematical fictionalism). How do you propose to solve this, in practical terms?

Not perplexity, just plain old oddness. I'm not suggesting anything about essences; I think the very idea is problematic. Identity is just an idea. The odd thing is that the "in itself' the very thing which is conceived as having no identity or identifiability for us, is an expression couched in terms of identity. — Janus

Right but then if it's plain old oddness that you want to talk about, I'd say that Mathematical Platonism in general is far more odd than Mathematical Fictionalism. It is less odd to say "infinitesimals are just fictions, which means that they are a series of brain processes" than to say "infinitesimals exist in some sense in the external world, structuring reality itself from outside of spacetime itself in some mysterious way that is incomprehensible to modern science."

The odd thing about the idea of "in itself" is that it is saying "in its identity". Identity suggests integrity. When we eat the oyster, it is broken down, loses its integrity, and thus loses its identity. Once eaten it is "in us" now a part of our identity. We cannot eat the oyster's identity, because the act of eating progressively destroys it—in eating the oyster we do not digest the oyster's identity, but its brokenness. — Janus

But you say that in a very perplexed way, and I'll I'm saying is that it's not that perplexing. What would be the perplexing "thing" about it? The possibility that essences can be destroyed? Why? Who says that essences have to be eternal, or even non-physical? Aristotle already dealt with this problem, way back in the day, so to speak. A small seed turns into a sapling, then into a mighty oak, then a lumberer cuts it down, hands it over to the carpenter, who then makes a table. The tree has lost its essence by that point, it has been destroyed. What exists now, in the form of a wooden table, is not a tree. So why is it so perplexing that the oyster's identity is destroyed once you digest the oyster?

I mean it in the Analytic Philosophy sense of a substrate which bears the properties of things. — Bob Ross

In that case no, there is no such thing (not to my mind, at least). I'll give you three examples why not:

1) From an ordinary point of view (the POV of ordinary life), Reality is not a single, gigantic, homogeneous block. It's a bunch of stuff, it's a plurality of entities. That's just how it seems.
2) And that leads us to the concept of intuition. You simply intuit many things around you, or you simply have the intuition that there are many things around you, like this stone on the floor, or this desk, that table, this computer, and so forth.
3) From a metaphysical point of view (as developed in the Analytic Tradition, particularly in the field known as Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects), it makes more sense to be a metaphysical conservative, than to be a metaphysical eliminativist or a metaphysical permissivist. Likewise, it makes more sense to give a particularist answer to van Inwagen's Special Composition Question, or SCQ for short, than to give an nihilist or a universalist answer.

Ok, so you are a ‘materialist’; so there’s, so far, two types of substrates for you: the physical and the kind that bears the properties of this ‘Absolute’. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's correct, but I'll just ignore it, for now. Unless you want to make that point clearer, because I didn't understand what you said there.

Are you a bundle theorist? — Bob Ross

No, I am not. There are things that have a metaphysical substrate. It just so happens that not everything does, or even is, a metaphysical substrate to begin with. I don't believe in disembodied universals: there is no redness apart from red things, like this rose or that brick. But there are pseudo-things, if you want to call them that: a pack of six wovles is a pseudo-thing, the pack itself is not a substance, the only substances there are the six individual wolves.

Otherwise, how does things which are of this non-physical (and non-mental) interact with or relate to the stuff which is bore by the physical substrate? The hard problem of interaction seems to plague this theory. — Bob Ross

Everything that is mental is physical, but not everything that is physical is mental. That's what seems the most reasonable thing to say here.

Ok, it isn’t physical. What is it? When you say ‘The Absolute’, I am thinking of just reality as it is in-itself. Why should be posit this thing as being real? — Bob Ross

It isn't. Reality Itself and the Absolute are two different "entities", if you will. They belong to different categories. Reality is what exists, and the Absolute, in the Hegelian sense, is the truth (it is the Ultimate Truth) about that (about Reality itself)

I think you should be able to briefly explain what the Absolute is, conceptually, if you have a firm grasp of what it is. — Bob Ross

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.

Answer me this (in all honesty): how have you published multiple books on their works and yet cannot give me a simple explanation of what factiality is? — Bob Ross

Because the concept of factiality is a difficult one to understand, since Meillassoux never explained what he means when he speaks of "the speculative essence" of such and such. The best we've got so far (the Meillassoux scholars, that is) is a connection to the "objective ideas" of Fichte, and perhaps Schelling, or maybe even Hegel. Or, one might understand the "speculative essences" as something more or less comparable to Graham Harman's "real qualities", as he distinguishes them from "sensual qualities" in the context of Speculative Realism, of which both Meillassoux and Harman are pioneers and, you could say, "Founding Fathers", together with Ray Brassier and Iain Hamilton Grant.

You have to be able to appreciate my frustration here. I haven't written anything on Transcendental Idealism nor Aristotelianism, and I can give you an in depth (an adequate) explanation of both views. — Bob Ross

So what is it that would want from me at this point? A sort of crash course on Speculative Realism? A crash course on After Finitude? What?

Let me try one more time: what is factiality? What would be mean for there to be non-facts about facts that aren't just non-objective dispositions? — Bob Ross

You have to understand that this is what we're currently investigating here. What is factiality, anyways? Not how the dictionary defines it, not how Meillassoux defines it in After Finitude, but more concretely, what would it be, if it were a "real thing", so to speak? A "real thing" like something that exists in your ordinary life, for example.

↪Arcane Sandwich
I love posting in Spanish with you, yet I think we are not entitled to do so in this thread. It is fine to do it a bit, but the moderators might scold us next time since the forum is an English-speaking site. :smile: — javi2541997

Fair enough, I'll have to stop by the Spanish section of the Forum, then : )

Let me just ask you: are you familiar with the book, or are you using this OP to familiarize yourself with it? — Bob Ross

Hi Bob, thanks for your contributions to this Thread, they will be recognized in the edited version of the OP once we're done with the discussion throughout the Thread.

In response to your question, it is both, at the same time. I am familiar with the book. I have also published 6 or 7 articles about different aspects of Meillassoux's philosophy. I have praised what I felt needed to be praised, I refuted what I believed needed to be refuted. I then published a book about Meillassoux, in Spanish, with the Editorial of a National University of my country (Argentina). So, yes, I am quite familiar with the book. Still, I do not claim to understand all of the theorems (conclusions, if you will) of his axioms (his premises, if you will).

EDIT: If you would like to take a look at my publications about Meillassoux, or any publications of mine in general, about other topics as well, you're free to send me a Private Message, and I'll share some links with you.

Nonetheless, Spain—as the union of Castille and Aragon—is the representative entity of Spaniards, whether Catalans like it or not. — javi2541997

Está bien, buen hombre, entiendo su punto. Y se lo concedo. De hecho, yo mismo lo dije antes que usted. El Reino de Castilla y Aragón, en tanto concepto, en tanto idea, simplemente es mejor que el concepto de Catalunya, o Cataluña, etc. Pues que la discusión está aquí entonces: al nivel del lenguaje. Justamente, le pregunto, javi, ¿Usted preferiría que todo el mundo hable Català en vez de Castellano? Porque yo no. Yo estoy dispuesto a cambiar mi vocabulario y todo eso, como todo ciudadano responsable debería, pero yo no voy a dejar de hablar castellano en mi vida cotidiana sólo por el hecho de que me parece "más correcto" empezar a hablar en Català así nomás. Primero que todo, ni siquiera conozco ese idioma, lo único que conozco es de la serie "Merlí" en Netflix. Y traté de seguir la serie en el idioma original, en Català, sin subtítulos Castellanos, y simplemente no entendí nada.

Bueno, la mentalidad colectiva podría estar relacionada con los valores, costumbres, ideas... Por ejemplo: Creo que la famosa sobremesa española forma parte de nuestra mentalidad colectiva. — javi2541997

Si, no digo que sea imposible, simplemente digo que si existe (y bien podría), no está bien estudiado científicamente. Lo único que hay son teorías sociológicas, psicológicas, biológicas, etc. Pero no tienen mucha cientificidad. No en comparación con la física y la química, por ejemplo.

Thanks, @ToothyMaw. If there's any music video by any band that you would like to share, that has anything to "bring to the table" in terms of philosophical discussion, feel free to do so. In the meantime, I will share another video, since it could give us something to think about, and to talk about.



Here's the Philosophical Exercise that I would propose for that video, I'll post my own answer to this Exercise later.

1) Does everyone have to convert to veganism?
2) If one does not want to be a vegan, is one being selfish?
3) Is it Ethical to be selfish?

Whoever wishes to contribute to this Thread, can freely do so.

Military is an integral and essential part of historical and modern societies, even if we don't admit it. — ssu

Most people don't even recognize it, is what I'm saying. Or they have conspiratorial, deluded thoughts about what the military as an institution actually is. In simpler terms: ordinary people (myself included) simply don't understand some of the most important aspects of the military, and that is by definition, why? Because we're talking about classified documents, whatever those may be in each specific case. A classified document is, by definition, a document that cannot be seen by the general public. That's why many case files have a now infamous caption that says "For your eyes, only".

You cannot seriously tell me that Cataluña is better than El Reino de Aragón y Castilla. — Arcane Sandwich

I expect an answer, @javi2541997. And I'll add one more difficulty: your answer has to be related, in some way, to Australian politics.

Or don't answer : )

-- Alas, an international organisation appears to be insufficient for the most relevant matters. Look at the attitude of the UN towards Palestine, for instance. Furthermore, if Australia would have a dispute with Spain because of the eucalyptus, both nations would resolve it bilaterally. No supranational entity can do anything. — javi2541997

Well, there is one possible solution, among other possible solutions: what I call "continentalism". Continentalism is the "highest stage" of nationalism. For example, if you are a Spanish nationalist, then you can also be a European continentalist, because Spain is part of Europe. If you're an Australian nationalist, then you can be an Oceanic continentalist, because Australia is part of Oceania. If you're an Argentine nationalist, you can be a Southamerican continentalist, because Argentina is part of South America. So, you see javi, the "Hispanicidad" has nothing to do with this part of the discussion. But somehow it does, because we are having this discussion in English, not Spanish (except for a few fragments from you and me).

it is doing its best to get a multi-national peninsula. — javi2541997

Hmmm... But Spain was always a multi-national peninsula, is what they would say in response to that. The most obvious example is the Basque Country. But then there are more subtle cases, like Cataluña. You cannot seriously tell me that Cataluña is better than El Reino de Aragón y Castilla. And so it becomes a very strange thing to talk about, especially in English. Especially in a Thread called "Australian politics". Hmmm... is it correct to talk about this, here? Well, they (the Australians) are part of a monarchy, so I would say yes.

But that's not what we were just talking about, @javi2541997. What you and I were just talking about is Hispanidad, not Royalty vs Republic. Here in Argentina, there is a holiday (I can't remember what type of holiday it is, I don't want to say something barbaric), that is called "Día de la Hispanidad". I do not celebrate it myself. Because you said the following:

Al final, las raíces y la idiosincrasia pesan mucha en el alma y la mentalidad colectiva de cada pueblo. — javi2541997

Yo no siento que la Hispanidad sea parte de mi idiosincrasia. Ni que decir del alma, en la cual no creo. ¿Mentalidad colectiva? ¿Y que sería eso, buen hombre? Que yo sepa, la única mentalidad que tengo es la que está en mi cerebro, disculpe usted mi materialismo. Que existen pueblos, se lo concedo. Es que es una trivialidad decir eso. Ahora, si usted me pregunta "¿Existe la Hispanidad?" Yo que se, buen hombre. Que eso es cosa de poetas, podríamos decir. Que yo sepa, científicamente, ni siquiera está bien definido ese concepto.

Could it be because they are the Kantian oysters? Oysters in themselves are in noumenon. They are not available in the physical world. You can only eat the oysters in phenomenon, which are are brought under the physiological and chemical conditions — Corvus

Exactly. That is the correct answer. You can then add more recent metaphysical theory to that, for example Object-Oriented Ontology, also known as OOO, or simply Triple O.

But folks here don't seem to like Speculative Realism too much for some reason. I blame Alain Badiou for that.

Of course Science is not religion. No one would argue about that. My point was, that the way that Science can mislead the ordinary folks' perception at times is the same as religion. — Corvus

Yes. The ordinary folk should not be deceived, in any way. It would be immoral to do so.

Are you conveying here that you accept a version of non-dualism? Viz., the idea that there is some substance which unites both the mental and physical and of which is neither? — Bob Ross

I accept a version of non-dualism (I accept several versions of non-dualism, actually), yet I disagree that there is some substance (if by that, you mean something like an Aristotelian substance) which unites both the mental and the physical (because the mental, as far as I'm concerned is physical). If by "the mental" and "the physical" you are speaking non-scientifically, as a mere folk would, then yes, I'm saying "something like that", if you will. The absolute is not a object, it is not one more thing in the world like this stone on the floor or this table. And it is not a subject, it is not like you, and it is not like me. It is something else. Or, again, perhaps I am deluded.

Oh, are you an ontological idealist? — Bob Ross

No, I am not. I will tell you what I am, and you can call me deluded all you want: I won't change the following five premises of my personal philosophy. Those are:

1) Realism
2) Materialim
3) Atheism
4) Scientism
5) Literalism

Those are my axioms, my "premises", if you will. I am not an idealist, as Hegel was, since I am a materialist. As for the term "ontological", sure, you could call me an ontological materialist, if that makes any sense to you.

This may make sense to you because you are familiar with the ‘Absolute’; but I have no clue what you are trying to say here. — Bob Ross

Well, I'm trying to explain it to the best of my ability. I'm not the best philosopher in the world, you know. And "Explain the Absolute to another human" is not exactly the type of question that I would expect for a midterm exam or whatnot.

Hi @Bob Ross, welcome back, glad to see that you haven't given up on this Thread.

What does this mean?!? What is a “speculative essence”?!? — Bob Ross

We (as in, Meillassoux's typical readers) honestly don't know. I don't think Meillassoux ever defines what he calls "speculative essence". Not as far as I'm aware of, anyways. And in the interviews that Meillassoux has given, I don't think he ever clarified that point.

What I think the are, the speculative essences (and this is just my interpretation) is something like "objective ideas", in the manner of the German Idealists of the 19th Century, especially Schelling. But I could be wrong about that, of course. I see Meillassoux leaning more towards Fichte or Hegel than Schelling, but again, I could be wrong about that.

What?!? That’s just jibberish. Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts; and so everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts. Give me example where the facticity of a proposition cannot be thought of as a fact or non-fact. — Bob Ross

Hmmm... so let's reconstruct your argument, a bit more formally. As far as I can see, these are your premises so far:

1) Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts.
2) Everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts.

Is that right?

As for the example that you ask, let me check After Finitude real quick. I don't know if the following words count as an example, but maybe they'll help clarify what Meillassoux is trying to say when he uses that word, "factiality":

Thus factiality must be understood as the non-facticity of facticity. We will call 'non-iterability of facticity' the impossibility of applying facticity to itself - this non-iterability describes the genesis of the only absolute necessity available to non-dogmatic speculation - the necessity for everything that is to be a fact. — Quentin Meillassoux

Does that mean anything to you?

Pfft... there are a lot of things that are "incompatible with the demands and expectations of the worldwide public of the 21st century," and I think a king or queen is less harmful to the people, honestly. — javi2541997

Sure. And you're right. Kings and Queens, Princes and Princesses, generally have no actual influence in efficient matters. Except for Lady Di, also known as Diana, Princess of Wales. Not only was she "less harmful to the people", as you say, I would go even further: she was more beneficial to the people.

Ethics and a Republic either. :wink: -- — javi2541997

Hmmm... Well, it's the Royalty vs Republic debate, isn't it? Man, that one is really tough just from a philosophical standpoint. Is it possible for one to be both a Republican and a Royalist? I don't think so, that doesn't make sense to me. You're either a Republican or a Royalist, you have to choose. Right? Or am I wrong about that? It's an "either, or" type of thing. (O lo uno o lo otro, como decía Kierkegaard).

Is Maduro an ethical politician to his own people? — javi2541997

No idea. I don't think so, because Republicanism is not the only type of political philosophy that characterizes the situation of Maduro, politics, and his own people.

It is an old classic debate. Yes, there are strong republics such as Germany or Ireland, but also monarchies that represent the welfare like Denmark and Japan. I mean, it is obvious that the Japanese system (a monarchy) is by far more ethical than Ecuador or Mexico. But, at the same time, our royalty — javi2541997

But see that's my point. Argentina does not have a royalty. Let me ask you this: in your honest opinion, should every country in the world have a royalty? Should there be, for example, a "King of the Planet"? Or should every country have its own royalty?

EDIT: La última parte, en Castellano. Ves, ese es mi punto. La Argentina no tiene una realeza. Así que permitime preguntarte esto: en tu honesta opinión, acaso debería cada país en el mundo tener una realeza? Debiera haber, por ejemplo, un "Rey del Planeta"? O debiera cada país tener su propia realeza?

Do you really think you can get consistency between 3 citizens picked at random from each of the world's countries ( so, less than 600 citizens of the world) as to their demands and expectations regarding compatibility of monarchies as a form of government? 600 out of 7-8 billion people? Good luck! — kazan

Thanks, I'll need it. The luck, that is.

if you restrict your statistical base to those that are interested in this area of governance and choose by the same method i.e. 3 at random that are interested per country, you may get lucky.... — kazan

Hmmm... do I agree with this? It sounds like a reasonable thing to say, but I should test it to accurately quantify its degree of scientificity.

In short, the 21st Century worldwide public has more pressing interests in their own neighbourhood. — kazan

I know, that's true. But I'm asking you (I'm asking everyone, really) how does that make sense? It makes no rational sense.

Not having a shot at you — kazan

Republics, autocracies, oligarchies etc. etc, all have executive problems — kazan

Which is why monarchies exist to "dignify" the three efficient powers: the executive power, the legislative power, and the judicial power. Argentina has the latter but not the former: we have the three powers (executive, legislative, judicial) but no fourth power (the royal power) to dignify them (the three efficient powers). It's an odd thing, is what I'm saying.

Maybe,the question to ask is "What governance works best for which country's people at any given time?" and give it a name or categorize it when it's working. — kazan

Right, but then you end up with scientific problems, because maybe (for example) slavery worked better than capitalism in some specific town of the 19th century in the state of Tennessee or whatever. That doesn't mean anything to me, I'm against slavery on purely moral and Ethical grounds.

The realization that politics/policies in some/most countries have world wide effects is another whole bowl of goldfish teetering on the edge of the ledge as well.

Just a thought. — kazan

It's a nice thought.

Will leave it up to Banno to explain the position/relationship of the Gov - General, Charlie and the Aust parliaments in this constitutional monarchy.... that is what we still call it, isn't it?
Banno's more verbally cost/time efficient.

Tolerant, but not superior, smile — kazan

Yeah but he doesn't wanna talk about it, "mate".

Because once eaten they are no longer "in themselves" but in us? — Janus

Hey, could be. Why not?

Fifty posts a day is a lot. Make sure you take time to step away from the screen. — Banno

That's actually really good advice. I'll try to do that. Thanks.

Australia has the moral responsability to declare its independence from the rule of a Crown, if only for the simple reason that the existence of monarchies are incompatible with the demands and expectations of the worldwide public of the 21st Century. Monarchies, even constitutional monarchies, are conceptually ill-equipped to adequately dignify the executive power in certain strategic, key decisions that must be taken purely in terms of cost-effectiveness. Whatever those are, they must be considered case-by-case. Ethics and Royalty do not necessarily go hand-in-hand.

Thank you very much, fdrake.

There is only the Permanent Existence; its rearrangements into temporaries are still It. — PoeticUniverse

Hmmm...

We can eat oysters only insofar as they are brought under the physiological and chemical conditions which are the presuppositions of the possibility of being eaten.

Therefore,

We cannot eat oysters as they are in themselves. (Stove, 1991, 151, 161) — Franklin

I agree with the conclusion of that argument, really. We cannot eat oysters as they are in themselves. That is true. I only wish the premises were true as well.

unless you want to explain to me what “factiality” means. — Bob Ross

Yes, I choose this option of the dilemma that you are presenting me. I already gave you a link to the dictionary definition for the word "factiality". I will quote the definition of that word:

factiality
Noun (uncountable)
(philosophy) In the philosophy of Quentin Meillassoux, the principle that things could be other than they are — we can imagine reality as being fundamentally different even if we never know such a reality — part of a critique of correlationism.

Related terms: factial

factial
(philosophy) Of or relating to factiality. — Wiktionary

And here is Meillassoux's own definition, in After Finitude:

Let us settle on a terminology. From now on, we will use the term 'factiality' to describe the speculative essence of facticity, viz., that the facticity of every thing cannot be thought as a fact. — Quentin Meillassoux

Those are the literal words, Bob. Tell me what you think of them, please.

I want to know what "The Absolute" means to you, in whatever sense you mean it. You keep saying the ultimate truth is the Hegelian concept of the Absolute; and I have no clue what you mean by that. — Bob Ross

The Absolute, as I understand it, is what is ontologically greater than subject and objects. It is better than them, in some sense of the term. It is similar to what Lao Tzu calls Tao. It is the symbol of the ying and the yang. It is the Holy Spirit in Christianity. It is the number 3 in some sense of the term. It is what truly, properly transcends. "Transcends what?", you might ask?

Everything. Including itself. It is why there is an External World, called Nature, in the first place. The Absolute Spirit is the realization of this as a brute fact, as something that one simple "encounters". It is a presence of some sort, but in the way that Derrida spoke about Heidegger's "metaphysics of presence". It is the phenomenon of oddness itself as a psychological phenomenon. And it is a great source of poetry (how could it not be?), at the same time it is a great source of philosophical perplexity (how could it not be?), and of scientific inquiry (could it not be?).

Now, if you ask me personally if I just happen to like the number 3, then I well tell you no, that I prefer the number 4. After all, it is literally Hegel's concept of the Absolute, not mine. Therefore, my personal commitment to the number 4 is greater than my personal commitment to the number 3.

@Wayfarer @Banno @Joshs @Janus and whoever wishes to express some opinion on the Ultimate Truth about Reality.

The idea was morally true {a term in maths scholarship}. — fdrake

Hi @fdrake, How are you? Would it be possible for you to explain to me, a non-mathematician, what that means, to mathematicians? I don't understand the underlying concept here. Is it a mathematical concept, or a moral concept? I'm not seeking to debate this point with you at the moment (though I might, in another Thread, in the future). All I'm asking for is a bit of clarification for the readers in general, including myself. Thanks in advance.

So, all I'm saying is that I think what I outlined is the best way to understand the situation regarding what is a given in mathematics—that there are infinitely many integers. — Janus

But the question of the OP literally asks if they exist in a "Platonistic" (sic) Platonic way.

Tomorrow's Newspaper will say "Newsflash: Up next, we'll take a look at why some Australians don't believe in reality, and -according them- neither should you. Stay tuned."

I did just that, but you're in such a hurry to reply that you didn't notice. — Wayfarer

I disagree, I considered it, and I arrived at the logical conclusion that this specific example that you quote is not indicative of the behavior you claim to observe in the visual recognition of my writing habits and patterns. Therefore, I claim that what you have presented does not qualify as evidence in the way that you intend it.

Sure thing. Hope you enjoy your time here, but might serve not to spread yourself too thin. — Wayfarer

I'm having a great time here, it's the best Forum I've ever seen. A bit "rambly" at times, but it's a nice atmosphere. I like the colors, green is actually my favorite color.

So are you an Australian Realist, yes or no? — Arcane Sandwich

Philosophy in Australia is not that simple. — Banno

That doesn't answer my question though.

↪Arcane Sandwich
I'm beginning to form the view that you're too confused to debate with. — Wayfarer

Then don't debate with me. No one's forcing you.

You will jump in with an appeal to Mario Bunge, who you mention frequently, who is a textbook scientific materialism and professor of scientism, yet when those ideas are criticized, you will say, 'hey that's not me, that's him!' - even though you're the one who introduced him and appeared to argue for his position. What gives? — Wayfarer

I disagree. Give me a specific example of such behavior on my part. With quotes.

You will say things that I find quite agreeable with, and then a couple of sentences later, say the opposite. Maybe your screen name is well-chosen. :chin: — Wayfarer

Sure. I'm allowed to agree on some points, and to disagree on some other points, about anything, with anyone. You have the same basic right. Everyone does.