The great Albert Einstein postulated that the velocity of light is constant at approximately 300,000 km/h. This one postulate and maybe a few more is the allegedly the foundation of his theory of relativity, a theory that has withstood many attempts at disproof. So far so good. — TheMadFool

It's 300,000 km/sec. It's a speed, not a velocity.
The postulate of SR is that that speed will be measured regardless the reference frame used. It doesn't actually posit that the speed actually IS frame invariant, just that it will be measured that way.

Consider 2 cars, A and B, moving on the same practically straight freeway.

1. Situation 1: A is moving at 20 km/h north and B is moving 60 km/h north. The relative velocity of B with respect to A is 60 - 20 = 40 km/h.

Per Einstein, no. Close, but not exactly 40. For instance, scale up the speed to say 0.2c and 0.6c, and the relative velocity of B with respect to A becomes 4/9 c, not 0.4c.

What then of the postulate that the relative velocity of light with respect to an object is "constant"? If I'm travelling in a spaceship with a given velocity, the relative velocity of light with respect to my spaceship will be 300,000 km/h. If I were then to alter my velocity, doesn't the velocity of light have to change accordingly so as to ensure that the relative velocity stays at a constant 300,000 km/h?

Unintuitive, but no. Light speed (not velocity) remains at c relative to anything. This works out if you use the velocity addition formula instead of straight addition like you're doing all through the OP.

Several of the questions presuppose the idea that minds can exist separated from the body. — Harry Hindu

Well yea, since the OP opens with: "If the mind is immaterial:"
The post asks to explore the viability of the alternate POV where there are two separate things, or where matter supervenes on mind. Given the wording of the post, I'd say more the former of those two.

I ask, "What is the point of a mind separated from a body?"

Or the point of a mind not consisting of a body?

All the above post seems to be about the mind being a function/process of the brain (or larger self), and sure, I am on that side of the fence, but I think the OP was asking about the opposite, where the body is a byproduct/purposeful-extension of the mind. The body seems to poorly implement such a purpose.

I've stayed out, and I find the arguments by unenlightened to be on point.
Nevertheless, the discussion seems to have turned to how materialism explains itself, and the original purpose of the OP seems to have been lost.

I think most of the relevant replies came from Wayfarer, but much of that was dropped. The Lusthaus quote was interesting but does not seem to address the question at hand. OK, it seems that it is a mistake to model the relationship as 'mind as an object'. We instead work with ideas and purpose, and the physical world is derivative from it. But then suppose it was my idea to take my purpose of needing an vehicle to animate my need for getting around and experiencing the world. Given that purpose, why would I imagine a vehicle with zero controls, that goes where it wants, when it wants. That's pretty useless for my purposes. I'd give it pedals and a steering wheel so that I could exert my will upon it. A physical being seems to have no pedals and such. It doesn't seem to be the product of the sort of purposeful ideas posited by this non-primary-material model.

What I'd like to say about that, is that both mind and matter are idealisations or abstractions. There is neither mind as a 'substance' (in the philosophical sense), nor matter per se because all matter has particular attributes and characteristics which define its type.

So whilst I agree that there is no 'immaterial object', I'm also inclined to believe that there are no 'purely material' objects either. — Wayfarer

I actually agree with this. On that point:

And then you've still got three ducks but now you've got a row as well. Assume the ducks are material. — unenlightened

If the row isn't 'new stuff', then neither are the ducks, being themselves just more arrangement of stuff that was already there. At what point is there actually stuff? It seems the scientists have never found it, and hence the unstable foundation of what is typically exemplified as 'materialism'.

Anyway, I was hoping to see more discussion on this original intent of this thread.

Near as I can tell, you mean something like 'coordinate time' when using the phrase 'relativistic time'. Coordinate time and physical (proper) time is the same thing for an inertial worldline with the time axis of the coordinate system aligned with said worldline.

Sure. But as you note later, proper time can be well-defined even in the absence of anything to mark its passage, and that is where I see a problem. You could have a relativistic spacetime with nothing else, and formally it would still have time of every description. But would it be physically meaningful? — SophistiCat

No, time without change is meaningless, as is say motion of an object in the absence of other objects. The words might as well be invisible pink unicorns.

Of course, here we run into the more general question of the nature of the physical law. Are laws ontologically prior to things and events that are subject to them? Do they describe potentialities (like what would happen if that empty spacetime did have something in it to demonstrate its relativistic properties)? Or do laws serve only to connect the dots, describe the regularities in our observations? In the latter case - and only in the latter case - it would be unjustified to talk about time in the absence of anything that is time-like. I think I lean towards the Humean regularity view.

I seem to be in the latter camp. Spacetime with nothing in it doesn't have relativistic properties.

The reason we came up with the theory of relativity in the first place was to give a better account of clock-based time (among other things). Without clocks what is the point of relativity?

Can there be time without clocks? Surely there are primitive people and animals with an awareness of time, but they also arguably have clocks, however inaccurate. If the speed of light was a lot slower, its properties could be more apparent and intuitive to primitive beings who may not have developed accurate measurements for it yet. Similarly, our intuitive perception of time as flowing is only there because that perception makes us more fit, not because time necessarily flows.

An empty, flat spacetime with a positive cosmological constant is an interesting case.

Meaningless. If it has stuff, I don't think it can be flat. If it were, an inertial frame could foliate the space, and it cannot.

relativistic time is not identical to physical time (the time that physical clocks measure) — SophistiCat

Actually, you never really defined what you mean by 'relativistic time'. You say physical time is that which clocks measure. I think physics would say that a clock measures proper time, a frame independent property of any timelike worldline. Clocks, not being confined to a single point, cannot be perfect, just like the exact length of a curving road is ambiguous because the road has nonzero width.
I digress. What do you mean by relativistic time? You said the two are usually the same except after heat death, but that doesn't tell me what you mean by the term, especially since a clock cannot exist in heat death conditions. It seems that time in general (both duration and direction) fade to meaninglessness along with most other physical concepts.

If I take a cube, and divide it in half, and then again, ect to infinity and then line them all up biggest to smallest, what is the smallest? ...
You might say "there is a limit". — Gregory

I might not. You're the one making the suggestion and then driving your own assertions to obvious nonsense conclusions.

So we have a huge paradox here.

Exactly so. So maybe try it without positing a last term in the infinite series.

Does the series go off into the physical horizon forever?

Physical now? A physical cube-shaped object has a finite number of particles in it and can only be divided so many times. There is a smallest part at the end of the sorted line and it has a color if you're going to abstractly assign colors to the even and odd ones.

Except that there is actually no motion according to Eternalism. I would imagine that it's much easier to explain why we perceive motion if there actually is motion than if there actually isn't. My point, again, is better expressed by Kristie Miller:

For the eternalist, the key challenge lies in explaining temporal phenomenology and in explaining the apparent directionality of time. There has been significant work in this area, but questions still remain: why do we have such a different relationship with the future than with the past: why is it that effects typically precede their causes when the laws of nature are symmetric: why do we remember the past, but not the future: why does the present seem to us to have a particularly salient quality that other moments lack; what are the cognitive apparatuses that underlie our experience of
temporality and how do they function to create temporal phenomenology; what is the evolutionary significance of the phenomenology of temporal flow and to what extent is the phenomenology of temporal flow essential for agency.
— Kristie Miller — Luke

I think I'm up to that explanation, which, from a physicalist point of view, can be explained through entropy and evolution, but almost nobody actually accepts physical monism deep down. I think I have but it was a multi-year struggle to shake off the biases put there by a very proficient liar.

So the story from the dualist POV (there is an (physical or spiritual, doesn't matter) identity 'I' that consistently experiences the life of physical body X. The analogy here is that physics is like a first person Harry Potter movie and the experiencer is the guy in the cinema. Eternalism is the same thing, except no cinema, no entity watching the show, and especially no projector.

Under presentism, the present is whatever frame is currently being projected. Normally the film runs front to back, but if it were run back to front, the experiencer in the cinema would notice the difference but Harry would not. The movie would end with the guy in the cinema knowing Harry's life story (the future) but Harry wouldn't even know that he's a wizard at the end. Harry obviously has different memories than the guy in the cinema. So the movie always runs forward because we'd be able to tell if it didn't.

Hence it being totally unintuitive to such a dualist to conceive of eternalism, which requires the lack of the experiencer (the definer of the present), and he interprets the description (the word 'static') as the experience of a stuck projector. The view is anything but that.

The eternalist view has no experiencer. It doesn't even have Harry (as an identity). It only has the individual frames in the film and one can talk about the experience of that frame, and yes, the experience of any given frame is one of motion of the passing car. One is forced to use B-series language to express what each frame experiences because there is no preferred frame defined by a projector, and A-series requires that preferred reference. By 'frame' here, I'm talking a frame of film (the local state of things at a particular time), and not relativity's reference frame.

The subjective flow of time is an illusion, illustrated empirically with the twins scenario in relativity. If people could detect the actual flow of time, then they'd be able to detect movement due to the subjective slowing of clocks when they're moving fast, whereas if it were an illusion, any traveler would notice no difference.
— noAxioms

It's unclear to me what the illusion is that you are referring to. What 'movement' is going undetected? What 'movement' would be detectable if "people could detect the actual flow of time"? — Luke

Not movement. I refer to the rate at which the present moment progresses into say a moment one second hence. No device measures this, and the subjective experience of a human is no exception to this. If there was, one could design an objective clock that would stay in sync with any other objective clock regardless of where it was or how much it has been accelerated around.

How to interpret data is subjective. The sole thing Einstein noticed was the observation that external motion changes the size and some of the rate of change within the object. That's it. — Gregory

This is totally wrong. The sole observation from which Einstein did his SR work was the apparent constant speed of light. From that, all the things above were predicted, not measured ahead of time.

Since he didn't do the experiments, he probably didn't even come up with that.

Indeed, he didn't do them himself.

Do you deny that it is unintuitive to be able to divide something finite a literal infinite amount of times? — Gregory

For one, 'infinite' is not an amount, and 'literal infinite' is no different than 'infinite'.

I would instead find it unintuitive to suggest that there would be a limit to it, a pair of non-identical points for which there is not a location between them. To assert otherwise is to assert that two non-equal numbers A and B can be found such that (A+B)/2 is equal to either A or B or both. You have weird intuition.

So I would say that a finite segment can be divided without limit, and yes, this is intuitive to me.

This is not true of any discreet system. For instance, in the domain of integers, the finite segment from 20 to 6051 can be divided, but only so many times. There is no integer between 21 and 22, and (21+22)/2 does not define a new integer, nor is the answer necessarily equal to either 21 or 22. It might be, depending on how the divide operator is defined for the discreet set in question.

According to the Kristie Miller article cited in the OP, the difference between Presentism and Etetnalism is not only their differing views on existence, but also their staticity/dynamism. — Luke

Miller writes this:

Thus eternalists endorse the following pair of theses:

Eternalist Ontological Thesis (EOT): Past, present, and future times and events exist.

Static Thesis (ST): The present does not move: which moment is the present moment does
not change. — Miller

Now either Miller has no understanding of the position, or she's talking about something completely different. The view denies the existence of a preferred moment called 'the present' and hence the ST part is nonsense. I've actually heard of such a view, which is presentism without the movement, but Miller doesn't seem to be talking about that since she correctly states that all events at all times exist equally, which is not true of a model with a present that stays put like that.

Anyway, I'd never accept these points as worded. The first isn't totally wrong, but past/present/future are all relations like < = >, and not objective states like negative, zero, and positive, and the wording makes it sound like the latter.

Then I take it you agree with all of the following:

Eternalists, then, hold that the world as a whole is static in two senses: which events
exist does not change, and there is no sense in which the present moves. — Luke

I'd say there is no 'the present' to do any moving. 'The present' would be just any event's self reference, and that, by definition, cannot move.

Eternalists accept what is known as the B-theory of time. This is the view that the
world is a static block of events ordered by the earlier than, later than, and simultaneous
with, relations. [1]

Also known in physics as 4-dimensional spacetime. 3D Space and time are separate under presentism.

Presentists endorse the A-theory, since they hold that it is a genuine feature of a
presentist world which moment is present, and that this fact changes over time so that
different moments are present at different times. To say that a view accepts the A-theory
is really to say that it endorses the dynamical thesis, and to say that it endorses the
B-theory is to say that it rejects the dynamical thesis.

I haven't seen the dynamical thesis, but this seems right.

Eternalism, on the other hand, is a static view that rejects temporal flow. Since it certainly
seems to many that there is temporal flow and change, this is a cost to eternalism.
At the least, the eternalist owes us an account of why it s

The subjective flow of time is an illusion, illustrated empirically with the twins scenario in relativity. If people could detect the actual flow of time, then they'd be able to detect movement due to the subjective slowing of clocks when they're moving fast, wheras if it were an illusion, any traveler would notice no difference. This of course isn't easy to test given the cost of the experiment, but it is there.
No, it isn't a proof of one view or the other, just a demonstration that the flow of time is a subjective illusion.

The odd numbers are eternally half the natural numbers, so there is no way at infinity they can be equal. — Gregory

I can think of at least 3 things very wrong with this statement. For one, what's the difference between X being half Y and X being eternally half Y? I mean, 5 is half of 10, and no matter how long I wait, 5 will remain half of 10, so I suppose it is eternally half of 10, but saying it that way doesn't make '5 is half 10' more true.

Let's see... There are 100 natural numbers with magnitude less than 100, and there are 100 odd numbers with magnitude less than 100, so that's not what you mean by this statement.

2nd try... Half of the natural number 36 is 18, which is not an odd number, so the odd numbers are not the halves of the natural numbers (whereas the integers would be half the even numbers, interpreted this way). So anyway, I don't think you meant this either, but I'm out of ideas.

And where is 'at infinity'? That's the treating it like a number that leads to such nonsense statements.
Surely Kant didn't make any such statements. Your intuitions lead to contradictions it seems.

If you can subdivide a segment endlessly, to eternity, it's finite and infinite.

What, exactly, is finite and infinite? Subdividing a finite segment doesn't affect its total length, so its finite length is unchanged. Also, what's the difference between 'endlessly' and 'endlessly, to eternity'? That's twice you've used that redundant modifier like it means something different than its absence.

It has to do with relativism because something can't be both finite and infinite at the same time with respect to the spatial, yet it is so. — Gregory

What is both finite and infinite? The length of AB is finite, and is never infinite. The number of points that can be described along AB is not finite, and is never finite, hence the existence of the bijuntion between that segment and any other. Neither is both finite and infinite.

Is this just another version of those threads that treat infinity like a number and then draw contradictions?

Anyway, I still don't know what this has to do with relativism, a view that seems to have nothing to say about the sort of mathematics you're discussing here.

As always, it's impossible to tell when someone claims to represent opponents' arguments made elsewhere, whether they are doing it accurately. — SophistiCat

Case in point:

it always amazes me that proponents of Eternalism so readily accept the static , motionless nature of their own temporal landscape. I'm no scientist, but much of science appears to be reliant on a dynamic world involving rates of change, momentum, spin, acceleration, velocity, etc. — Luke

I don't think the typical eternalist would assert a motionless landscape. An object is here at time zero, and over there at time 1, thus there is motion, spin, acceleration, velocity and all that.

Except that an arrow of time assumes a dynamic world? — Luke

The block view does not lack dynamics. The arrow of time kind of assumes that view since I don't see how you can draw an arrow in a direction that is posited not to exist.

Bijection has nothing to do with length. That just indicates that no line segment necessarily has more or less individual points than another. Length is not a count of points. Your fallacious thinking is in treating points in a line segment as a finite number.

1) Slant has no effect on the concept of bijection
2) Points are points, and don't have another shape.
3) whatever
4) Points don't have a size, so no.

I don't see how any of this is related to relativism

Are there other minds, or other bodies? — Harry Hindu

Only actual antirealist position I can think of is outright nihilism, and from what I understand of that, no, minds and bodies (not even ones own) exist.

I was referring to metaphysical antirealism which is the idea that "nothing exists outside the mind". — Michael McMahon

Since this topic was resurrected, I want to point out the contradiction of antirealism, defined in the OP as "denial of the existence of an objective reality" and the statement quoted here of "nothing exists except X" where X is the mind in this case. Those two definitions are mutually exclusive, the latter being a form of realism typically knows as idealism, which posits the reality of experiences.

I personally have found 'existence of an objective reality' to be a meaningless concept, and hence see no reason to assert it, which is a little different than actively denying it, so I'm not sure if I qualify as an antirealist.

I think the philosophical preference of a physicist, one who knows what he's talking about, typically has better grounding than a similar opinion from someone less familiar with the physics involved.

I for one know my physics enough to know that I've never seen an empirical falsification of either interpretation, and hence any logical argument must proceed from non-empirical assumptions. I've done that process and concluded what I conclude, but my stance keeps changing as I learn more, so the odds that my current favored view corresponding to 'the way that it actually is' (if there is such a thing) is pretty minimal.

But what's the relationship between the block universe (a physical model) and the metaphysical interpretation of time? — Echarmion

Sorry, but I consider them to be the same model, both metaphysical interpretations of space and time.

the answer to every philosophical question becomes "Because God Says". — Banno

Is it always 'because God says'? Take some moral rule X. Is X a rule because God says, or does God say because X is really wrong? The former denies objective morals. If God said one must light a live puppy on fire at least once a month, then that's the rule, but a rule relative to God, not objective.
The latter would be God forbidding lighting live puppies on fire because that's just wrong, implying there's a higher authority than God.
How is this resolved? I resolve this by denying both.

My stance on this topic is well known. While an eternalist, I've started an advocatus diaboli thread on the old PF defending presentism. There's no falsification test for it, and thus relativity theory doesn't demonstrate the topic one way or the other.

OK, you didn't say 'demonstrate', but it very much suggests it anyway. The vast majority of non-religious physicists that know their relativity (many (most?) probably don't) hold a block view. The view is semi-incompatible with the promises of major religions, and thus meets significant resistance without actually admitting the reason driving the resistance.

Sounds like the truth of any set of propositions being equated to the mutual validity of the propositions. I'm pretty open to that, although it seems to reduce the meaning of 'truth' to the meaning of other words like 'validity'.

Before we move further, I have a quick question about something you suggested relative to infinite regress and logic (my interpretation anyway). And that is, are you thinking the concept of a 'God' is an infinite consciousness/energy rather than some logical axiom? — 3017amen

Not really my place to define God, despite me being raised that way. What's that got to do with logic and infinite regress? My philosophy is currently a relational one, so that removes the need to solve any sort of something from nothing sort of scenario.

Which would, in theory of course, make it [consciousness/the Will] metaphysically necessary v. logically necessary.

I don't follow that at all.

Can you kindly explain what you mean by this? Why is the answer always "yes"? — TheMadFool

It only works with my definition, for the reason I explained in the part you quoted.

Gosh, there's so much information to unpack... If it's okay with you let's take one question at a time and then perhaps we can build something from there.

1. Whether it is logically necessary that there is something rather than nothing, or there's an infinite regression of turtle power, there will always be a question concerning an original or initial cause and/or origin of life, thus the Kantian judgement: all events must have a cause. — 3017amen

Kant is seemingly wrong then, because uncaused events have been demonstrated (well beyond Kant's time), although there are interpretations that posit hidden variables (that cannot be known) that are responsible for such things, so it isn't cast in stone I think. As for the structure that seems to be our universe, there's no particular reason why time should or should not be bounded at one end or the other. There's no entropy level to order it outside our own spacetime, so any cause that comes from there is arguably an effect since there's no particular relationship of cause->effect without an arrow of time. There's just potential bounds which can arbitrarily be labeled first and last.

I'm kind of quoting what little I know. I'm hardly an expert, but my takeaway on the subject is to not apply the laws of our spacetime outside of that spacetime, and positing the necessity of this 'original cause' is doing just that.

I don't see how any of this relates to free will. My view on the above topic is that the universe is not caused at all. It implies there was no universe, and later there was, which is absurd if time is part of the universe.

To further parse Will from Free Will though, I believe having a will implies consciousness or intelligence.

I know plants that seem to have a will, but by the same argument you can paint them as having consciousness as well then. Intelligence? That's a stretch...
I know of machines that have intelligence, but they're almost all slaves, so their will is not their own.
Anyway, consciousness (and probably intelligence as well) are about as poorly defined as free will, so your comment doesn't really help.

Should we try to redefine the meaning of Free Will?

You defined it quite precisely the last attempt. You want to abandon that? I just thought it a funny name to give to what seems to me to be the opposite effect.

First, can we agree on a few items:

1. Free will: a source totally detached from matter (detached from nature) which is the origin (cause) of
options, thoughts, feelings,... That is, the absence of (natural) laws, the existence of an "autonomous
mind", i.e. a principium individuationis. — 3017amen

What does 'original cause' mean? Most effects (I can think of no exceptions) are a combination of countless causes, the absence of which would likely have prevented the effect. Thus none of them is designated as being more original than any of the others.

Anyway, your definition sounds like something undesirable. Dewey possessed by his supernatural demon is the only guy who cannot do what he wills, and thus has free will. Read about Dewey 5 posts back if you don't know what I'm talking about.
Anyway, yes, I often hear free will defined something like that. I don't think I have that, and I certainly wouldn't want it. My definition doesn't work well either, because I cannot do everything I want to do.

Quantum mechanics is indeterministic but it is not a-causal. There is always a cause, an explanation or reason, for any phenomenon

Disagree. There are uncaused events, like radioactive decay, to name a simple one.

4. The opposite of free will is materialism rather than determinism (?).

Ah, there it is. Free will is not about freedom of will at all, but rather an assertion of a different mechanism (possession by a supernatural demon, as I phrase it) for said will. I'm not a materialist, but I also don't think I have the sort of free will you describe. Thus I'm not sure materialism is the necessary stance needed if one denies that sort of free will.

The dualism asserted implies free will only by definition, but does not demonstrate any greater freedom in what is willed since even if the will comes from non-matter, you still don't know if the process by which that supernatural will is implemented is any less a function of external causes other than ones self, than if the same process was implemented with matter. My street crossing example illustrates the sort of behavior resulting from will that is not a function of external causes beyond one's control. I cannot work that way since death would result in minutes.

So, there's such a thing as base nature and we have an override capability. Where is free will in all this? — TheMadFool

Free will, as it is usually defined, means that Dewey, being possessed by a supernatural demon and thus under remote control, has free will. Bob does not. But hey, I never said I approved of the definition.

QM doesn't provide any proof of free-will. How can it?

QM is utterly silent on the subject. I said it show the universe to be non-deterministic in any subjective way. Determinism being false does not prove free will

↪noAxioms What is your definition of free will then? — TheMadFool

I stated this in my prior reply to you.

think I have free will because my choices are my own, — noAxioms

So free will is making your own choices. That's pretty different than the usual definition, I know, but when people say their choices feel free, that's what they're feeling.

It seems pointless to ask anybody (or anything) if they have free will, because the answer is always yes. So Bob is Bob, and makes his own choices. He answers yes. Dewey on the other hand has been possessed by an evil demon, and when asked if his will is free, the demon is the one that answers, and thus the answer is still 'yes'. Dewey no longer has free will, but cannot answer due to the lack of it. Bob is responsible for his actions, and the demon is responsible for Dewey's actions.
Trick is to ask a question in a way that Bob and the demon give distinct replies.

In my humble opinion, a key determinant for free will is awareness, self-awareness and also awareness of possible influences on our choices. This is important because self-awareness leads to the realization that one is part of causation and knowing what influences us helps in deciding how the chain of causation will unfold with our participation in the causal web.

Not sure here. Dewey can be quite aware of all this stuff you mention, but lacking free will, he is incapable of actually making the choices he concludes to be the better ones. But that's using my definition.
Your definition differs from the often implied 'has supernatural control' definition, which requires none of the qualities you mention. Self-awareness is a product of eons of evolution, while introspection is something easily programmed into any device. I don't see how awareness of external influences has anything to do with free will, except that it seems to be a useful trait for a moral agent, and free will is often associated with moral responsibility, but moral awareness is different from moral responsibility.

I understand the requirement of choice for free will arises from the belief that determinism permits of no alternatives

I think this is a misrepresentation. If I want vanilla, I am not coerced into choosing chocolate by deterministic physics. That's not how it works. Determinism is not a lack of choice, and not a lack of responsibility. Read the bit about chess in my prior post where I get into that more. On a side note, QM has shown pretty decisively that our universe is not deterministic in any sense that the future of closed system X can be predicted even in principle, even with arbitrarily large resources, so not sure why determinism keeps coming up in these discussions. I think the argument stems from the old philosophers working from say a Newtonian view of physics with everything being billiard balls bouncing around with perfect mathematical predictability.

Schopenhauer once said "a man can do what he wants but not want what he wants".

I think this is wrong. People override their base nature all the time, which is readily apparent when that override breaks down such as in disaster areas. Ability to want better wants is probably the core of moral behavior.

1. The dandelion obviously does not have a keyboard. — 3017amen

I don't find it obvious. I mean, I don't think I have a keyboard, so if it turns out I do, I have no clue as to what has one and what doesn't. Under panpsychism, maybe everything has one, but probably not. Panpsychism says everything is conscious, not that everything is remote controlled by a non-physical will.

However, much like other lower life-forms, it is likely to have emergent properties genetically coded for it's survival. Is that what the concern is?

My concern is that one life form is a self-contained thing, and some closely related thing (perhaps its near descendant) evolves a new organ that not only detects something never physically detected before, but starts taking hints for choices from it instead of making those choices itself. Mind you, that sort of thing definitely did happen when the cerebellum say, which is used to calling all the shots, suddenly started getting new inputs from say the more recently evolved limbic system. So there is precedent for a new keyboard to suddenly appear, attached to a computer that didn't have one before. Thing is, we see the keyboard, and more importantly, we see the way it is connected to the more central computer.

2. The keyboard represents volitional existence. If you think that making it bluetooth-ableand [...] voice commands, I would consider that analogy.

The analogy can work with any of those mechanisms. Point is, they're all identifiable. There is an obvious point where the computer is taking its commands of what to do from that input. There seems to be no such point in us. We have physical sensory input, but no apparent extra-sensory input from this supposed non-physical keyboard. If our actions are made based on this input, there'd be a receptor for it somewhere. Descartes was aware of the problem and actually posited a point (a gland of all things), which has since been discounted.

automated much like vehicle's without drivers,

A self-driving vehicle are semi-autonomous and don't necessarily have a keyboard (steering wheel say). They make all their own decisions, except for where to go, so I agree still that such a car needs a clearly defined input from outside, and yes, it is pretty easy to identify that point of input.

How does the agent behind the keyboard know what the correct thing to do is? Suppose it is filling out a complex tax form using its free will. Does it tell the computer what number to put in the form, or does it just tell the computer to figure out the answer for itself? I'm wondering where such work is done in this model.

I'm thinking that the computer never shuts down, much like I'm unterrupted power supplies for critical computer systems.

But it does, at least to the ponit where the screen shuts off completely and gives no response to queries. It is still running to the point of critical systems (heartbeat, respiration and such). When my computer does that, I'm still fully there, but unable to do anything with the computer until it comes back. But when my body is in hibernate mode like that, so is the conscious agent. I don't find myself in some sort of boring sensory-deprivation state as you would expect from the arrangement you describe.
My feedback here is that the computer/keyboard model predicts different experience than is empirically observed.

However in this human metaphor, it can be easily put in sleep mode.

You need a different model then.

4. My definition of the Free Will illusion from my interpretation of your question, is more akin to Kant's metaphysics, and more specifically to Bishop Berkeley's Idealism/Metaphysics.

Sorry, but I am not particularly aware of Kant's metaphysics beyond the transcendental idealism. I know he asserts that a person cannot be held responsible for an act if his actions are determined (determinism, analogous to a computer running a program with no external inputs), but I'm not sure if he asserts said determinism (the metaphysical stance) itself. It seems that his definition of 'responsibility for an act' rests on an objective (not part of the universe) standard.
My analogy on this is always a position in a chess game, where the white pieces cannot be held responsible for the weak position it's in, but a player can be held responsible for it if (and only if) he has volition of which moves are made. So while chess is not hard-deterministic (no one side always wins), a given position may be the result of randomness instead of a player's choices. Only in the latter instance is there responsibility for the current state.
My objection I'm voicing here is that I am presented with no mechanism by which the pieces can be moved by the player since they occupy different worlds. There are thus only the pieces which cannot be held responsible for their position in the player's world.

Berkeley is a different story, pushing an idealistic view where seemingly all experience is fed to us by presumably God. I had to look it all up, since I'm also not familiar with his works. How does it avoid soplipsism?
I read this:

although God could make a watch run (that is, produce in us ideas of a watch running) without the watch having any internal mechanism (that is, without it being the case that, were we to open the watch, we would have ideas of an internal mechanism), he cannot do so if he is to act in accordance with the laws of nature, which he has established for our benefit, to make the world regular and predictable. — stanford

But if I open a person instead of a watch, I am presented with the ideas of an internal mechanism which is entirely deterministic, and hence in principle predictable without benefit of knowing what the real volition might have to contribute to a behavior. We're shown no idea of a keyboard port which would render the mechanism under the control of a real agent. So either we're presented with the idea of a body with no control by the person experiencing it, or God has presented us the ideas of a mechanism not acting in accordance with established natural law.

BTW, I consider myself to be a relational idealist, which I don't find described anywhere, but is based on taking Rovelli's RQM to its conclusion. It is a form of idealism that doesn't lead to solipsism.

I truly wonder what all these old (pre 20th century) philosophers would change in their views given the developments in science in the last century. Some churches have flat out denied the science, thus asserting that God and empirical observation are in contradiction. That seems a very dangerous stance to take.

Feel free to poke holes — 3017amen

Don't mind if I do.

Consider briefly, that life is a computer metaphor. All the combinations of life choices exist within the computer program and are determined in advance. The keyboard represents volition or volitional existence. All the ethical (how to live a sad or happy productive life) choices are within our grasp, by virtue of the keyboard, and what we type-in.

Does all life have this? Does a dandelion have a keyboard? It would be like a keyboard attached to a solar sidewalk light: Not very responsive to the input from the keyboard.
Anyway, this model always neglects that detail. If the dandelion doesn't have a keyboard, then there is a threshold of life forms that have a keyboard and them that doesn't. It matters little where it is put, but the model should predict some fundamental difference between being on one side or the other of that threshold.

It seems the model reduces a human to a mere tool of the entity sitting at the keyboard. That's what a computer with a keyboard is: an appliance, an avatar for navigation in a different world. The computers without keyboards might be simpler, but they're actually doing more complex stuff since they're free to make their own choices rather than having the tough decisions deferred to the keyboard input. That seems to be a contradiction, that the self-sufficient computer would be less complex than the passive appliance.

Another problem with the model is that when my computer shuts down, I don't shut down with it. I'm aware that it's off, and I need to turn it on again to access that other world, but otherwise I'm still functional. That seems not to match actual experience.

Final problem is that nobody has ever found where the keyboard attaches to the computer. A real computer has to get input from a very specific place, and there's no hiding it if you take a computer apart.

Surely I'm not the only one to point out these issues, so how does the model deal with them?

The illusion of free-will exists ...

Here you call free will an illusion, implying a stance arguing against its existence. What is your definition of it, and is the computer model above an analogy of free will, or an analogy of the lack of it?

I think I have free will because my choices are my own, so it only seems to come down to what "I" means in that definition, but the definition seems to require no particular stance regarding the philosophy of mind.

Indeed, this is the very essence of free will - to be able to deny/negate anything and everything, whether it's logic or morality or even the basic instinct of self preservation. — TheMadFool

Maybe it would be better to let a proponent of free will do the defining of it then.
I'm a proponent of it, but my definition is very different than the one you quote in the OP.

I'd like to run this by you all to for comments:

It seems that free will isn't just about choices; if it were then there would be no difference between us and computers with algorithmic decision trees (choices). — TheMadFool

Since no demonstration of a difference has been identified, then it hasn't been demonstrated that we're in any fundamental way different from this computer, a supposed symbol of what we're not.

However, free will is about choices that originate in a person

If it is defined as a choice made by a person, then the test for free will can be done with a DNA test. The computer would fail that. It seems important to find a definition that we pass but the computer doesn't.

it's about how these choices are made, specifically concerning whether they were part of a causal chain external to a person.

And we're back to my example of crossing the street. I really would not want to make that decision without the causal chain of the information about the traffic playing a role as to when I choose to cross. I think the computer would fare better than I if I had the free will you describe here.

Choice is central to free will. Free will can be translated as the ability to make choices free from influences we have no control over. — TheMadFool

I know this post is 3 years old, but this seems like a the sort of definition that makes me consider free will to be something undesirable.
I am standing at the side of a road trying to cross safely, using my free will (or not) to choose when to do it. I have no control over when the cars go by. If I choose to be influenced by those cars and wait for a gap, then I don't have free will by this definition. If I free myself from those influences and use the free will, I cross at an effectively uniformed moment and probably get killed.

I garbled the answer for the circular case. Sorry. I should have said the linear acceleration causes the traveling twin and the home twin to disagree about their respective ages when they are separated. But in the circular motion case, they agree about their respective ages, even while they are separated. — Mike Fontenot

If they're separated, their computation of each other's ages is a frame dependent thing, but I agree that the answers agree in the two frames where each person respectively is stationary. There's no reason why some other frame might be chosen, despite your rather solipsistic way of having observers only compute their reality relative to their immediate frame.

There are two "red herring" examples that claim to prove that acceleration doesn't cause the time difference in the twins' ages at the reunion.

One is the example that uses three perpetually-inertial observers: the home twin, and two unrelated people. The fist unrelated person takes the place of the traveler on the outbound leg, and the second one takes the place of the traveler on the inbound leg. The latter is younger than the home twin at the "reunion" by the same amount as the twins in the original scenario. The fallacy is that in the revised case, no one is surprised at the result, so there is no paradox to resolve. — Mike Fontenot

I agree that dismissing acceleration altogether is wrong. We seem to take apart Lincoln's dismissal of the 3-person scenario the same way. I would have explained the different ages in terms of moment-of-acceleration, something not often mentioned in explanations.

The second red herring is the case where the traveling twin circles the home twin, at a high constant speed. When he returns, she isn't older.

Excuse me??? How do you figure this? H-K experiment demonstrates otherwise.

But it's not hard to show that whenever the motion is perpendicular to the line connecting the two twins (which is always is, in the circular case), their rates of ageing will be equal.

Love to see you show this my friend.

Please show it. And circular motion is always under acceleration. The velocity, in other words, is changing continuously. — tim wood

The acceleration doesn't matter in this case since it is perpendicular to the motion in the central frame. The changing velocity doesn't matter either since only the direction changes, not the magnitude. But there is nonzero magnitude, and thus there is dilation. Mike is wrong here.

See this video. Acceleration is the wrong answer.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GgvajuvSpF4&t=10s — tim wood

I looked at the comments first, and the common complaint is that he speaks to you as a child through the first 12 minutes, and then suddenly blurts the real answer in the final seconds and exits without explanation, and his wording is obfuscating if not wrong.

First of all, the 'difference is acceleration' explanation is dismissed by considering a valid 3-observer tag-team scenario, except it doesn't explain the younger age of person C (the return person) using that C's reference frame, in which C is massively younger than A already at the start of the exercise (does Lincoln mention that? No!), so of course C is younger when C and A meet. Acceleration does have something to do with it, but it isn't the direct cause, as my example above demonstrates.

Secondly I have a gripe with Lincoln's obfuscating usage of phrasing like: "Don is in one reference frame but Ron is in two". Under SR, an observer is in all inertial reference frames, and it is impossible to exit one. It can be done only in GR. What he means to say is that Don is stationary in one reference frame the entire time, but Ron is stationary for different periods of time in two different inertial frame. Most of us know that but not everybody does, so it is obfuscating language.

Finally, he announces in the final seconds that the above quote is the reason for the discrepancy, and says this follows directly from Einstein's equations, which, to my knowledge, contain no mention of dilation being due to some count of reference frames. Don could have been pacing back and forth for 8 years ,and hence been 'in' two different reference frames himself. Ron is in an instantaneously accelerating craft leaving him actually stationary while coasting, while Don is on Earth spinning and orbiting, so it seems Don is actually the one stationary in innumerable inertial frames while Ron is confined to the two. I know, the idealized experiment ignores a spinning Don and the his gravity well, but even if he was doing all this continuous accelerating, he'd still be older than Ron when they meet again. Thus the count of frames just isn't enough of the story to explain this.

I'm saying that Linclon's fast exit from the video leaves all these questions unanswered. I'd not ever understand the twins scenario if that's all I had to go on.

I have a question for you. I was told acceleration or the application of force on the male twin is what solves the twin paradox. Please explain. — Michael Lee

You were told incorrectly. This can be verified here on Earth where two clocks are kept at identical speed but one experiences far greater continuous force and corresponding acceleration (in a centrifuge say). They will remain in sync indefinitely. Application of force has no dilation effect on clocks.

Change in rate of change of distance multiplied by distance (a scalar quantity) is what matters. This is a little different from just acceleration times distance since acceleration is a vector quantity, a component of which may not alter the rate of change of distance, and thus has no effect.

"I'm trying to demonstrate its consistency with itself, despite your assertions that your premise "is well supported by hundreds of years of scientific experimentation, empirical evidence".
— noAxioms
This is incorrect, "consistency with itself" does not make it true, — Metaphysician Undercover

Where above did I assert that self-consistency made an argument true? I didn't, which means I'm not incorrect, or at least you've not pointed out where.

You seem to be missing something. Time is passing do you not agree?

Given your beliefs, yes.

Things change as time passes. [...] By the time I say "now" things have changed.

Of course. It takes time to say 'now'. I don't recall mentioning the time it takes to utter words.

Therefore there is no such thing as "the current state" of things.

I don't see how this follows, but if that's how you envision it, fine.

I don't think Einstein ever denied that there is a difference between past and future.

At the time of the publishing of GR, he adopted the geometric interpretation of relativity, thus denying the reality of past, present, and future, and thus any different between these unreal things is irrelevant to the view. For example, a unicorn is different than a bandersnatch, and I don't have to deny that difference in order to posit a view in which neither of them exists.

It's definitely not denied by Special Relativity nor General Relativity. There are those who interpret Special Relativity as forcing the conclusion that there is no real difference between future and past, but that conclusion requires another premise not provided by the theory, so I think it's a misinterpretation.

I agree that SR theory proper does not assert either premise. I don't think GR did either, but the theory was essentially unworkable without a geometric interpretation of relativity. I'm just reading this on wiki in the history section of spacetime, my bold:

Minkowski's geometric interpretation of relativity was to prove vital to Einstein's development of his 1915 general theory of relativity, wherein he showed how mass and energy curve flat spacetime into a pseudo-Riemannian manifold.
- - -
Einstein, for his part, was initially dismissive of Minkowski's geometric interpretation of special relativity, regarding it as überflüssige Gelehrsamkeit (superfluous learnedness). However, in order to complete his search for general relativity that started in 1907, the geometric interpretation of relativity proved to be vital, and in 1916, Einstein fully acknowledged his indebtedness to Minkowski, whose interpretation greatly facilitated the transition to general relativity. Since there are other types of spacetime, such as the curved spacetime of general relativity, the spacetime of special relativity is today known as Minkowski spacetime. — wiki

As I said, if you want me to drop my "biases" you need to give me reasons why I ought to. If your asking me to dismiss what I know to be true, just to accept what I know to be false, then forget it.

Again, I never asked you to alter your beliefs. I'm just demonstrating that the existence of an valid alternate view contradicts your assertion of the necessary truth of the opinions you hold. One opinion at least. Your beliefs are just that, not knowledge as you claim. Some of them are known to be false, as Tim Wood has pointed out.

The existence of a present moment is one of the premises of Aristotle's argument, so if that premise is wrong, his argument is unsound. How do you not see this? You claim to be 'trained in philosophy' and yet you don't see these trivial flaws in your argument. I have no training at all, but I at least took some courses requiring some basic elements of logic. You're the one who cannot back his assertions.
— noAxioms

Existence of a present moment is not the premise being discussed here I clarified that in the last post.

As I've told you, the premise provided by Aristotle is that there is a fundamental difference between past and future. The other premise is that two distinct, or different things require something which separates them, this constitutes "the difference" between them. Therefore there is something which separates past from future, and this is the present.

You're repeating yourself. See my quote that I left just above which answers this. By assuming a present, Aristotle's argument is inapplicable to a view that denies that premise, as does the geometric interpretation.

If my decision to accept this premise is an "uninformed" one then there must be evidence, information out there which demonstrates the falsity of my premise.

You honestly don't see the logical fallacy of this statement, do you?

Yes, my model defines the words differently. It has no 'the past' and 'the future', hence there is no issue to dodge. It denies the existence of such properties.
— noAxioms

Exactly! That demonstrates how you are asking me to dismiss science, in favour of science fiction.

Again with this assertion that you cannot back. Name a single science experiment that predicts a different result given the geometric interpretation. You can't because there isn't one. You've reduced yourself to making up facts to support your case.

However, unlike what you claim, my mind remains open

You probably believe that as well, empirical evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

That's why I continue this discussion. As soon as you can produce any type of evidence or information, which reveals that the distinction between the past and the future might not be a real distinction, I'm ready to follow you into other possibilities.

The claim of such a distinction is yours, hence the burden of proof. That's another part of your philosophical training that seems not to have stuck.
My claim was that your assertion of a real and distinct past and future is not a necessary truth, and I demonstrated that claim by showing a valid alternate interpretation where they don't exist at all.

All I want to know is that I exist. — Kranky

Out of curiosity, why?
What difference would it make if the truth of that bit was knowable one way or the other?

I agree with the prior post about thinking not implying existing, and as it turns out, it doesn't matter to me or what values I hold.

We seem to be talking about different things here. I have been consistently talking about a distinction between past and future, which we call "the present". You have been consistently talking about a "present moment". — Metaphysician Undercover

We're talking about the same thing, just slightly different wording,.

If what you call the present "moment" is the same thing as what I call the present, then it is impossible to make the "positing of no preferred moment" consistent with my perspective

I'm not trying to make it consistent with your perspective. Where ever did I say that?
I'm trying to demonstrate its consistency with itself, despite your assertions that your premise "is well supported by hundreds of years of scientific experimentation, empirical evidence". If your assertion is true, then all these hundreds of years of experimentation and evidence should have in some way by now falsified the alternative premise, and yet that premise remains taught in schools.

Perhaps we could compromise on our differences if we allow that the present (as the division between past and future), is not a dimensionless division as a "moment".

I don't know what you mean by 'dimensionless division'. It does seem to divide past from future (neither of which is actual, so I'm not sure where dimensions suddenly come into play).
'The present' means the objective current time which defines the actual current state of any given object. I made that up just now. Not trying to put words in your mouth.

I am willing to accept that the present, as the division between past and future, does not exists as a dimensionless divide, but as a period of "time", during which the past is changing to the future.

OK, that's really weird since most wordings deny the actuality of the past and future, and thus there is no past to change. There is just the current state of everything (not a short duration), and that is continuously changing to a new state in place. I really don't care how you choose to word it. The alternative premise doesn't have a present at all, so how you want to defined it is essentially moot.

This requires two dimensions of "time", and makes the present not a "preferred moment", but a "preferred time". Will you agree to this, and release your use of "preferred moment", and "present moment", for "preferred time", and "present time"?

You speak now of a model with two dimensions of time, but you seem incapable of getting your head around even one.
I can refer to the present using any of those terms, but if there are two things that require different terms, then I'm not talking about that at all.

So, you have misunderstood my argument. I have not argued for a "present moment". I argue that there is undeniable empirical evidence for a distinction between past and future.

The existence of a present moment is one of the premises of Aristotle's argument, so if that premise is wrong, his argument is unsound. How do you not see this? You claim to be 'trained in philosophy' and yet you don't see these trivial flaws in your argument. I have no training at all, but I at least took some courses requiring some basic elements of logic. You're the one who cannot back his assertions.

I assume this premise, right up front, because I believe it is so fundamental, and undeniably true.

You're wrong about it being undeniable since it is denied by plenty, including Einstein who resisted doing so even beyond publishing Special Relativity, but GR could only be worked out with the premise dropped. So we're back to you admitting you can't consider any view that conflicts with your biases. That's being closed minded.

If you have any reasons whatsoever, why this premise might not be true, then as I've requested of you, put these reasons forward.

Because it doesn't have to be true. That's actually the reason.
Being open minded to all valid views is the first step in making an informed choice. Your choice is made, but it is a completely uniformed one. My choices are at least more informed, and I make no claim as to the necessary truth of them when I'm aware of a viable alternative.

Until you model this difference, your model has no past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

If A is before B, then B would be in the future of A and A would be in the past of B. This illustrates the usage of the terms as relations instead of properties.
— noAxioms
Defining "past" and "future" in a different way doesn't give me what I requested, it just dodges the issue.

Yes, my model defines the words differently. It has no 'the past' and 'the future', hence there is no issue to dodge. It denies the existence of such properties.

Argument here is hopeless. Is there a real, live physicist who will enter the discussion and untangle this mess? :roll: — jgill

I've queried a few 'live physicists' about a couple points (not this one), and most of them don't know their philosophy very well, and might have differing opinions to such questions. As physicists, if the topic is relevant to their field, they'll be able to tell you what will be expected to be measured by a given test, which should be true regardless of their opinions on the metaphysics of the situation.

Translation: You're probably not going to get a better answer from them.

I can think of countless counterexamples to pretty much everything asserted in the OP.
Distance is not an issue. The moon causes tides without touching them. The sun causes my sunburn at a larger distance.
The dinosaur falling into a tar pit causes me to learn about it when I dig it up millions of years later.

The principle of locality (if you accept it) says that cause and effect must occur within each other's light cones, so that principle would deny for instance spooky action at a distance.