The odd numbers are eternally half the natural numbers, so there is no way at infinity they can be equal. — Gregory

I can think of at least 3 things very wrong with this statement. For one, what's the difference between X being half Y and X being eternally half Y? I mean, 5 is half of 10, and no matter how long I wait, 5 will remain half of 10, so I suppose it is eternally half of 10, but saying it that way doesn't make '5 is half 10' more true.

Let's see... There are 100 natural numbers with magnitude less than 100, and there are 100 odd numbers with magnitude less than 100, so that's not what you mean by this statement.

2nd try... Half of the natural number 36 is 18, which is not an odd number, so the odd numbers are not the halves of the natural numbers (whereas the integers would be half the even numbers, interpreted this way). So anyway, I don't think you meant this either, but I'm out of ideas.

And where is 'at infinity'? That's the treating it like a number that leads to such nonsense statements.
Surely Kant didn't make any such statements. Your intuitions lead to contradictions it seems.

If you can subdivide a segment endlessly, to eternity, it's finite and infinite.

What, exactly, is finite and infinite? Subdividing a finite segment doesn't affect its total length, so its finite length is unchanged. Also, what's the difference between 'endlessly' and 'endlessly, to eternity'? That's twice you've used that redundant modifier like it means something different than its absence.

It has to do with relativism because something can't be both finite and infinite at the same time with respect to the spatial, yet it is so. — Gregory

What is both finite and infinite? The length of AB is finite, and is never infinite. The number of points that can be described along AB is not finite, and is never finite, hence the existence of the bijuntion between that segment and any other. Neither is both finite and infinite.

Is this just another version of those threads that treat infinity like a number and then draw contradictions?

Anyway, I still don't know what this has to do with relativism, a view that seems to have nothing to say about the sort of mathematics you're discussing here.

As always, it's impossible to tell when someone claims to represent opponents' arguments made elsewhere, whether they are doing it accurately. — SophistiCat

Case in point:

it always amazes me that proponents of Eternalism so readily accept the static , motionless nature of their own temporal landscape. I'm no scientist, but much of science appears to be reliant on a dynamic world involving rates of change, momentum, spin, acceleration, velocity, etc. — Luke

I don't think the typical eternalist would assert a motionless landscape. An object is here at time zero, and over there at time 1, thus there is motion, spin, acceleration, velocity and all that.

Except that an arrow of time assumes a dynamic world? — Luke

The block view does not lack dynamics. The arrow of time kind of assumes that view since I don't see how you can draw an arrow in a direction that is posited not to exist.

Bijection has nothing to do with length. That just indicates that no line segment necessarily has more or less individual points than another. Length is not a count of points. Your fallacious thinking is in treating points in a line segment as a finite number.

1) Slant has no effect on the concept of bijection
2) Points are points, and don't have another shape.
3) whatever
4) Points don't have a size, so no.

I don't see how any of this is related to relativism

Are there other minds, or other bodies? — Harry Hindu

Only actual antirealist position I can think of is outright nihilism, and from what I understand of that, no, minds and bodies (not even ones own) exist.

I was referring to metaphysical antirealism which is the idea that "nothing exists outside the mind". — Michael McMahon

Since this topic was resurrected, I want to point out the contradiction of antirealism, defined in the OP as "denial of the existence of an objective reality" and the statement quoted here of "nothing exists except X" where X is the mind in this case. Those two definitions are mutually exclusive, the latter being a form of realism typically knows as idealism, which posits the reality of experiences.

I personally have found 'existence of an objective reality' to be a meaningless concept, and hence see no reason to assert it, which is a little different than actively denying it, so I'm not sure if I qualify as an antirealist.

I think the philosophical preference of a physicist, one who knows what he's talking about, typically has better grounding than a similar opinion from someone less familiar with the physics involved.

I for one know my physics enough to know that I've never seen an empirical falsification of either interpretation, and hence any logical argument must proceed from non-empirical assumptions. I've done that process and concluded what I conclude, but my stance keeps changing as I learn more, so the odds that my current favored view corresponding to 'the way that it actually is' (if there is such a thing) is pretty minimal.

But what's the relationship between the block universe (a physical model) and the metaphysical interpretation of time? — Echarmion

Sorry, but I consider them to be the same model, both metaphysical interpretations of space and time.

the answer to every philosophical question becomes "Because God Says". — Banno

Is it always 'because God says'? Take some moral rule X. Is X a rule because God says, or does God say because X is really wrong? The former denies objective morals. If God said one must light a live puppy on fire at least once a month, then that's the rule, but a rule relative to God, not objective.
The latter would be God forbidding lighting live puppies on fire because that's just wrong, implying there's a higher authority than God.
How is this resolved? I resolve this by denying both.

My stance on this topic is well known. While an eternalist, I've started an advocatus diaboli thread on the old PF defending presentism. There's no falsification test for it, and thus relativity theory doesn't demonstrate the topic one way or the other.

OK, you didn't say 'demonstrate', but it very much suggests it anyway. The vast majority of non-religious physicists that know their relativity (many (most?) probably don't) hold a block view. The view is semi-incompatible with the promises of major religions, and thus meets significant resistance without actually admitting the reason driving the resistance.

Sounds like the truth of any set of propositions being equated to the mutual validity of the propositions. I'm pretty open to that, although it seems to reduce the meaning of 'truth' to the meaning of other words like 'validity'.

Before we move further, I have a quick question about something you suggested relative to infinite regress and logic (my interpretation anyway). And that is, are you thinking the concept of a 'God' is an infinite consciousness/energy rather than some logical axiom? — 3017amen

Not really my place to define God, despite me being raised that way. What's that got to do with logic and infinite regress? My philosophy is currently a relational one, so that removes the need to solve any sort of something from nothing sort of scenario.

Which would, in theory of course, make it [consciousness/the Will] metaphysically necessary v. logically necessary.

I don't follow that at all.

Can you kindly explain what you mean by this? Why is the answer always "yes"? — TheMadFool

It only works with my definition, for the reason I explained in the part you quoted.

Gosh, there's so much information to unpack... If it's okay with you let's take one question at a time and then perhaps we can build something from there.

1. Whether it is logically necessary that there is something rather than nothing, or there's an infinite regression of turtle power, there will always be a question concerning an original or initial cause and/or origin of life, thus the Kantian judgement: all events must have a cause. — 3017amen

Kant is seemingly wrong then, because uncaused events have been demonstrated (well beyond Kant's time), although there are interpretations that posit hidden variables (that cannot be known) that are responsible for such things, so it isn't cast in stone I think. As for the structure that seems to be our universe, there's no particular reason why time should or should not be bounded at one end or the other. There's no entropy level to order it outside our own spacetime, so any cause that comes from there is arguably an effect since there's no particular relationship of cause->effect without an arrow of time. There's just potential bounds which can arbitrarily be labeled first and last.

I'm kind of quoting what little I know. I'm hardly an expert, but my takeaway on the subject is to not apply the laws of our spacetime outside of that spacetime, and positing the necessity of this 'original cause' is doing just that.

I don't see how any of this relates to free will. My view on the above topic is that the universe is not caused at all. It implies there was no universe, and later there was, which is absurd if time is part of the universe.

To further parse Will from Free Will though, I believe having a will implies consciousness or intelligence.

I know plants that seem to have a will, but by the same argument you can paint them as having consciousness as well then. Intelligence? That's a stretch...
I know of machines that have intelligence, but they're almost all slaves, so their will is not their own.
Anyway, consciousness (and probably intelligence as well) are about as poorly defined as free will, so your comment doesn't really help.

Should we try to redefine the meaning of Free Will?

You defined it quite precisely the last attempt. You want to abandon that? I just thought it a funny name to give to what seems to me to be the opposite effect.

First, can we agree on a few items:

1. Free will: a source totally detached from matter (detached from nature) which is the origin (cause) of
options, thoughts, feelings,... That is, the absence of (natural) laws, the existence of an "autonomous
mind", i.e. a principium individuationis. — 3017amen

What does 'original cause' mean? Most effects (I can think of no exceptions) are a combination of countless causes, the absence of which would likely have prevented the effect. Thus none of them is designated as being more original than any of the others.

Anyway, your definition sounds like something undesirable. Dewey possessed by his supernatural demon is the only guy who cannot do what he wills, and thus has free will. Read about Dewey 5 posts back if you don't know what I'm talking about.
Anyway, yes, I often hear free will defined something like that. I don't think I have that, and I certainly wouldn't want it. My definition doesn't work well either, because I cannot do everything I want to do.

Quantum mechanics is indeterministic but it is not a-causal. There is always a cause, an explanation or reason, for any phenomenon

Disagree. There are uncaused events, like radioactive decay, to name a simple one.

4. The opposite of free will is materialism rather than determinism (?).

Ah, there it is. Free will is not about freedom of will at all, but rather an assertion of a different mechanism (possession by a supernatural demon, as I phrase it) for said will. I'm not a materialist, but I also don't think I have the sort of free will you describe. Thus I'm not sure materialism is the necessary stance needed if one denies that sort of free will.

The dualism asserted implies free will only by definition, but does not demonstrate any greater freedom in what is willed since even if the will comes from non-matter, you still don't know if the process by which that supernatural will is implemented is any less a function of external causes other than ones self, than if the same process was implemented with matter. My street crossing example illustrates the sort of behavior resulting from will that is not a function of external causes beyond one's control. I cannot work that way since death would result in minutes.

So, there's such a thing as base nature and we have an override capability. Where is free will in all this? — TheMadFool

Free will, as it is usually defined, means that Dewey, being possessed by a supernatural demon and thus under remote control, has free will. Bob does not. But hey, I never said I approved of the definition.

QM doesn't provide any proof of free-will. How can it?

QM is utterly silent on the subject. I said it show the universe to be non-deterministic in any subjective way. Determinism being false does not prove free will

↪noAxioms What is your definition of free will then? — TheMadFool

I stated this in my prior reply to you.

think I have free will because my choices are my own, — noAxioms

So free will is making your own choices. That's pretty different than the usual definition, I know, but when people say their choices feel free, that's what they're feeling.

It seems pointless to ask anybody (or anything) if they have free will, because the answer is always yes. So Bob is Bob, and makes his own choices. He answers yes. Dewey on the other hand has been possessed by an evil demon, and when asked if his will is free, the demon is the one that answers, and thus the answer is still 'yes'. Dewey no longer has free will, but cannot answer due to the lack of it. Bob is responsible for his actions, and the demon is responsible for Dewey's actions.
Trick is to ask a question in a way that Bob and the demon give distinct replies.

In my humble opinion, a key determinant for free will is awareness, self-awareness and also awareness of possible influences on our choices. This is important because self-awareness leads to the realization that one is part of causation and knowing what influences us helps in deciding how the chain of causation will unfold with our participation in the causal web.

Not sure here. Dewey can be quite aware of all this stuff you mention, but lacking free will, he is incapable of actually making the choices he concludes to be the better ones. But that's using my definition.
Your definition differs from the often implied 'has supernatural control' definition, which requires none of the qualities you mention. Self-awareness is a product of eons of evolution, while introspection is something easily programmed into any device. I don't see how awareness of external influences has anything to do with free will, except that it seems to be a useful trait for a moral agent, and free will is often associated with moral responsibility, but moral awareness is different from moral responsibility.

I understand the requirement of choice for free will arises from the belief that determinism permits of no alternatives

I think this is a misrepresentation. If I want vanilla, I am not coerced into choosing chocolate by deterministic physics. That's not how it works. Determinism is not a lack of choice, and not a lack of responsibility. Read the bit about chess in my prior post where I get into that more. On a side note, QM has shown pretty decisively that our universe is not deterministic in any sense that the future of closed system X can be predicted even in principle, even with arbitrarily large resources, so not sure why determinism keeps coming up in these discussions. I think the argument stems from the old philosophers working from say a Newtonian view of physics with everything being billiard balls bouncing around with perfect mathematical predictability.

Schopenhauer once said "a man can do what he wants but not want what he wants".

I think this is wrong. People override their base nature all the time, which is readily apparent when that override breaks down such as in disaster areas. Ability to want better wants is probably the core of moral behavior.

1. The dandelion obviously does not have a keyboard. — 3017amen

I don't find it obvious. I mean, I don't think I have a keyboard, so if it turns out I do, I have no clue as to what has one and what doesn't. Under panpsychism, maybe everything has one, but probably not. Panpsychism says everything is conscious, not that everything is remote controlled by a non-physical will.

However, much like other lower life-forms, it is likely to have emergent properties genetically coded for it's survival. Is that what the concern is?

My concern is that one life form is a self-contained thing, and some closely related thing (perhaps its near descendant) evolves a new organ that not only detects something never physically detected before, but starts taking hints for choices from it instead of making those choices itself. Mind you, that sort of thing definitely did happen when the cerebellum say, which is used to calling all the shots, suddenly started getting new inputs from say the more recently evolved limbic system. So there is precedent for a new keyboard to suddenly appear, attached to a computer that didn't have one before. Thing is, we see the keyboard, and more importantly, we see the way it is connected to the more central computer.

2. The keyboard represents volitional existence. If you think that making it bluetooth-ableand [...] voice commands, I would consider that analogy.

The analogy can work with any of those mechanisms. Point is, they're all identifiable. There is an obvious point where the computer is taking its commands of what to do from that input. There seems to be no such point in us. We have physical sensory input, but no apparent extra-sensory input from this supposed non-physical keyboard. If our actions are made based on this input, there'd be a receptor for it somewhere. Descartes was aware of the problem and actually posited a point (a gland of all things), which has since been discounted.

automated much like vehicle's without drivers,

A self-driving vehicle are semi-autonomous and don't necessarily have a keyboard (steering wheel say). They make all their own decisions, except for where to go, so I agree still that such a car needs a clearly defined input from outside, and yes, it is pretty easy to identify that point of input.

How does the agent behind the keyboard know what the correct thing to do is? Suppose it is filling out a complex tax form using its free will. Does it tell the computer what number to put in the form, or does it just tell the computer to figure out the answer for itself? I'm wondering where such work is done in this model.

I'm thinking that the computer never shuts down, much like I'm unterrupted power supplies for critical computer systems.

But it does, at least to the ponit where the screen shuts off completely and gives no response to queries. It is still running to the point of critical systems (heartbeat, respiration and such). When my computer does that, I'm still fully there, but unable to do anything with the computer until it comes back. But when my body is in hibernate mode like that, so is the conscious agent. I don't find myself in some sort of boring sensory-deprivation state as you would expect from the arrangement you describe.
My feedback here is that the computer/keyboard model predicts different experience than is empirically observed.

However in this human metaphor, it can be easily put in sleep mode.

You need a different model then.

4. My definition of the Free Will illusion from my interpretation of your question, is more akin to Kant's metaphysics, and more specifically to Bishop Berkeley's Idealism/Metaphysics.

Sorry, but I am not particularly aware of Kant's metaphysics beyond the transcendental idealism. I know he asserts that a person cannot be held responsible for an act if his actions are determined (determinism, analogous to a computer running a program with no external inputs), but I'm not sure if he asserts said determinism (the metaphysical stance) itself. It seems that his definition of 'responsibility for an act' rests on an objective (not part of the universe) standard.
My analogy on this is always a position in a chess game, where the white pieces cannot be held responsible for the weak position it's in, but a player can be held responsible for it if (and only if) he has volition of which moves are made. So while chess is not hard-deterministic (no one side always wins), a given position may be the result of randomness instead of a player's choices. Only in the latter instance is there responsibility for the current state.
My objection I'm voicing here is that I am presented with no mechanism by which the pieces can be moved by the player since they occupy different worlds. There are thus only the pieces which cannot be held responsible for their position in the player's world.

Berkeley is a different story, pushing an idealistic view where seemingly all experience is fed to us by presumably God. I had to look it all up, since I'm also not familiar with his works. How does it avoid soplipsism?
I read this:

although God could make a watch run (that is, produce in us ideas of a watch running) without the watch having any internal mechanism (that is, without it being the case that, were we to open the watch, we would have ideas of an internal mechanism), he cannot do so if he is to act in accordance with the laws of nature, which he has established for our benefit, to make the world regular and predictable. — stanford

But if I open a person instead of a watch, I am presented with the ideas of an internal mechanism which is entirely deterministic, and hence in principle predictable without benefit of knowing what the real volition might have to contribute to a behavior. We're shown no idea of a keyboard port which would render the mechanism under the control of a real agent. So either we're presented with the idea of a body with no control by the person experiencing it, or God has presented us the ideas of a mechanism not acting in accordance with established natural law.

BTW, I consider myself to be a relational idealist, which I don't find described anywhere, but is based on taking Rovelli's RQM to its conclusion. It is a form of idealism that doesn't lead to solipsism.

I truly wonder what all these old (pre 20th century) philosophers would change in their views given the developments in science in the last century. Some churches have flat out denied the science, thus asserting that God and empirical observation are in contradiction. That seems a very dangerous stance to take.

Feel free to poke holes — 3017amen

Don't mind if I do.

Consider briefly, that life is a computer metaphor. All the combinations of life choices exist within the computer program and are determined in advance. The keyboard represents volition or volitional existence. All the ethical (how to live a sad or happy productive life) choices are within our grasp, by virtue of the keyboard, and what we type-in.

Does all life have this? Does a dandelion have a keyboard? It would be like a keyboard attached to a solar sidewalk light: Not very responsive to the input from the keyboard.
Anyway, this model always neglects that detail. If the dandelion doesn't have a keyboard, then there is a threshold of life forms that have a keyboard and them that doesn't. It matters little where it is put, but the model should predict some fundamental difference between being on one side or the other of that threshold.

It seems the model reduces a human to a mere tool of the entity sitting at the keyboard. That's what a computer with a keyboard is: an appliance, an avatar for navigation in a different world. The computers without keyboards might be simpler, but they're actually doing more complex stuff since they're free to make their own choices rather than having the tough decisions deferred to the keyboard input. That seems to be a contradiction, that the self-sufficient computer would be less complex than the passive appliance.

Another problem with the model is that when my computer shuts down, I don't shut down with it. I'm aware that it's off, and I need to turn it on again to access that other world, but otherwise I'm still functional. That seems not to match actual experience.

Final problem is that nobody has ever found where the keyboard attaches to the computer. A real computer has to get input from a very specific place, and there's no hiding it if you take a computer apart.

Surely I'm not the only one to point out these issues, so how does the model deal with them?

The illusion of free-will exists ...

Here you call free will an illusion, implying a stance arguing against its existence. What is your definition of it, and is the computer model above an analogy of free will, or an analogy of the lack of it?

I think I have free will because my choices are my own, so it only seems to come down to what "I" means in that definition, but the definition seems to require no particular stance regarding the philosophy of mind.

Indeed, this is the very essence of free will - to be able to deny/negate anything and everything, whether it's logic or morality or even the basic instinct of self preservation. — TheMadFool

Maybe it would be better to let a proponent of free will do the defining of it then.
I'm a proponent of it, but my definition is very different than the one you quote in the OP.

I'd like to run this by you all to for comments:

It seems that free will isn't just about choices; if it were then there would be no difference between us and computers with algorithmic decision trees (choices). — TheMadFool

Since no demonstration of a difference has been identified, then it hasn't been demonstrated that we're in any fundamental way different from this computer, a supposed symbol of what we're not.

However, free will is about choices that originate in a person

If it is defined as a choice made by a person, then the test for free will can be done with a DNA test. The computer would fail that. It seems important to find a definition that we pass but the computer doesn't.

it's about how these choices are made, specifically concerning whether they were part of a causal chain external to a person.

And we're back to my example of crossing the street. I really would not want to make that decision without the causal chain of the information about the traffic playing a role as to when I choose to cross. I think the computer would fare better than I if I had the free will you describe here.

Choice is central to free will. Free will can be translated as the ability to make choices free from influences we have no control over. — TheMadFool

I know this post is 3 years old, but this seems like a the sort of definition that makes me consider free will to be something undesirable.
I am standing at the side of a road trying to cross safely, using my free will (or not) to choose when to do it. I have no control over when the cars go by. If I choose to be influenced by those cars and wait for a gap, then I don't have free will by this definition. If I free myself from those influences and use the free will, I cross at an effectively uniformed moment and probably get killed.

I garbled the answer for the circular case. Sorry. I should have said the linear acceleration causes the traveling twin and the home twin to disagree about their respective ages when they are separated. But in the circular motion case, they agree about their respective ages, even while they are separated. — Mike Fontenot

If they're separated, their computation of each other's ages is a frame dependent thing, but I agree that the answers agree in the two frames where each person respectively is stationary. There's no reason why some other frame might be chosen, despite your rather solipsistic way of having observers only compute their reality relative to their immediate frame.

There are two "red herring" examples that claim to prove that acceleration doesn't cause the time difference in the twins' ages at the reunion.

One is the example that uses three perpetually-inertial observers: the home twin, and two unrelated people. The fist unrelated person takes the place of the traveler on the outbound leg, and the second one takes the place of the traveler on the inbound leg. The latter is younger than the home twin at the "reunion" by the same amount as the twins in the original scenario. The fallacy is that in the revised case, no one is surprised at the result, so there is no paradox to resolve. — Mike Fontenot

I agree that dismissing acceleration altogether is wrong. We seem to take apart Lincoln's dismissal of the 3-person scenario the same way. I would have explained the different ages in terms of moment-of-acceleration, something not often mentioned in explanations.

The second red herring is the case where the traveling twin circles the home twin, at a high constant speed. When he returns, she isn't older.

Excuse me??? How do you figure this? H-K experiment demonstrates otherwise.

But it's not hard to show that whenever the motion is perpendicular to the line connecting the two twins (which is always is, in the circular case), their rates of ageing will be equal.

Love to see you show this my friend.

Please show it. And circular motion is always under acceleration. The velocity, in other words, is changing continuously. — tim wood

The acceleration doesn't matter in this case since it is perpendicular to the motion in the central frame. The changing velocity doesn't matter either since only the direction changes, not the magnitude. But there is nonzero magnitude, and thus there is dilation. Mike is wrong here.

See this video. Acceleration is the wrong answer.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GgvajuvSpF4&t=10s — tim wood

I looked at the comments first, and the common complaint is that he speaks to you as a child through the first 12 minutes, and then suddenly blurts the real answer in the final seconds and exits without explanation, and his wording is obfuscating if not wrong.

First of all, the 'difference is acceleration' explanation is dismissed by considering a valid 3-observer tag-team scenario, except it doesn't explain the younger age of person C (the return person) using that C's reference frame, in which C is massively younger than A already at the start of the exercise (does Lincoln mention that? No!), so of course C is younger when C and A meet. Acceleration does have something to do with it, but it isn't the direct cause, as my example above demonstrates.

Secondly I have a gripe with Lincoln's obfuscating usage of phrasing like: "Don is in one reference frame but Ron is in two". Under SR, an observer is in all inertial reference frames, and it is impossible to exit one. It can be done only in GR. What he means to say is that Don is stationary in one reference frame the entire time, but Ron is stationary for different periods of time in two different inertial frame. Most of us know that but not everybody does, so it is obfuscating language.

Finally, he announces in the final seconds that the above quote is the reason for the discrepancy, and says this follows directly from Einstein's equations, which, to my knowledge, contain no mention of dilation being due to some count of reference frames. Don could have been pacing back and forth for 8 years ,and hence been 'in' two different reference frames himself. Ron is in an instantaneously accelerating craft leaving him actually stationary while coasting, while Don is on Earth spinning and orbiting, so it seems Don is actually the one stationary in innumerable inertial frames while Ron is confined to the two. I know, the idealized experiment ignores a spinning Don and the his gravity well, but even if he was doing all this continuous accelerating, he'd still be older than Ron when they meet again. Thus the count of frames just isn't enough of the story to explain this.

I'm saying that Linclon's fast exit from the video leaves all these questions unanswered. I'd not ever understand the twins scenario if that's all I had to go on.

I have a question for you. I was told acceleration or the application of force on the male twin is what solves the twin paradox. Please explain. — Michael Lee

You were told incorrectly. This can be verified here on Earth where two clocks are kept at identical speed but one experiences far greater continuous force and corresponding acceleration (in a centrifuge say). They will remain in sync indefinitely. Application of force has no dilation effect on clocks.

Change in rate of change of distance multiplied by distance (a scalar quantity) is what matters. This is a little different from just acceleration times distance since acceleration is a vector quantity, a component of which may not alter the rate of change of distance, and thus has no effect.

"I'm trying to demonstrate its consistency with itself, despite your assertions that your premise "is well supported by hundreds of years of scientific experimentation, empirical evidence".
— noAxioms
This is incorrect, "consistency with itself" does not make it true, — Metaphysician Undercover

Where above did I assert that self-consistency made an argument true? I didn't, which means I'm not incorrect, or at least you've not pointed out where.

You seem to be missing something. Time is passing do you not agree?

Given your beliefs, yes.

Things change as time passes. [...] By the time I say "now" things have changed.

Of course. It takes time to say 'now'. I don't recall mentioning the time it takes to utter words.

Therefore there is no such thing as "the current state" of things.

I don't see how this follows, but if that's how you envision it, fine.

I don't think Einstein ever denied that there is a difference between past and future.

At the time of the publishing of GR, he adopted the geometric interpretation of relativity, thus denying the reality of past, present, and future, and thus any different between these unreal things is irrelevant to the view. For example, a unicorn is different than a bandersnatch, and I don't have to deny that difference in order to posit a view in which neither of them exists.

It's definitely not denied by Special Relativity nor General Relativity. There are those who interpret Special Relativity as forcing the conclusion that there is no real difference between future and past, but that conclusion requires another premise not provided by the theory, so I think it's a misinterpretation.

I agree that SR theory proper does not assert either premise. I don't think GR did either, but the theory was essentially unworkable without a geometric interpretation of relativity. I'm just reading this on wiki in the history section of spacetime, my bold:

Minkowski's geometric interpretation of relativity was to prove vital to Einstein's development of his 1915 general theory of relativity, wherein he showed how mass and energy curve flat spacetime into a pseudo-Riemannian manifold.
- - -
Einstein, for his part, was initially dismissive of Minkowski's geometric interpretation of special relativity, regarding it as überflüssige Gelehrsamkeit (superfluous learnedness). However, in order to complete his search for general relativity that started in 1907, the geometric interpretation of relativity proved to be vital, and in 1916, Einstein fully acknowledged his indebtedness to Minkowski, whose interpretation greatly facilitated the transition to general relativity. Since there are other types of spacetime, such as the curved spacetime of general relativity, the spacetime of special relativity is today known as Minkowski spacetime. — wiki

As I said, if you want me to drop my "biases" you need to give me reasons why I ought to. If your asking me to dismiss what I know to be true, just to accept what I know to be false, then forget it.

Again, I never asked you to alter your beliefs. I'm just demonstrating that the existence of an valid alternate view contradicts your assertion of the necessary truth of the opinions you hold. One opinion at least. Your beliefs are just that, not knowledge as you claim. Some of them are known to be false, as Tim Wood has pointed out.

The existence of a present moment is one of the premises of Aristotle's argument, so if that premise is wrong, his argument is unsound. How do you not see this? You claim to be 'trained in philosophy' and yet you don't see these trivial flaws in your argument. I have no training at all, but I at least took some courses requiring some basic elements of logic. You're the one who cannot back his assertions.
— noAxioms

Existence of a present moment is not the premise being discussed here I clarified that in the last post.

As I've told you, the premise provided by Aristotle is that there is a fundamental difference between past and future. The other premise is that two distinct, or different things require something which separates them, this constitutes "the difference" between them. Therefore there is something which separates past from future, and this is the present.

You're repeating yourself. See my quote that I left just above which answers this. By assuming a present, Aristotle's argument is inapplicable to a view that denies that premise, as does the geometric interpretation.

If my decision to accept this premise is an "uninformed" one then there must be evidence, information out there which demonstrates the falsity of my premise.

You honestly don't see the logical fallacy of this statement, do you?

Yes, my model defines the words differently. It has no 'the past' and 'the future', hence there is no issue to dodge. It denies the existence of such properties.
— noAxioms

Exactly! That demonstrates how you are asking me to dismiss science, in favour of science fiction.

Again with this assertion that you cannot back. Name a single science experiment that predicts a different result given the geometric interpretation. You can't because there isn't one. You've reduced yourself to making up facts to support your case.

However, unlike what you claim, my mind remains open

You probably believe that as well, empirical evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

That's why I continue this discussion. As soon as you can produce any type of evidence or information, which reveals that the distinction between the past and the future might not be a real distinction, I'm ready to follow you into other possibilities.

The claim of such a distinction is yours, hence the burden of proof. That's another part of your philosophical training that seems not to have stuck.
My claim was that your assertion of a real and distinct past and future is not a necessary truth, and I demonstrated that claim by showing a valid alternate interpretation where they don't exist at all.

All I want to know is that I exist. — Kranky

Out of curiosity, why?
What difference would it make if the truth of that bit was knowable one way or the other?

I agree with the prior post about thinking not implying existing, and as it turns out, it doesn't matter to me or what values I hold.

We seem to be talking about different things here. I have been consistently talking about a distinction between past and future, which we call "the present". You have been consistently talking about a "present moment". — Metaphysician Undercover

We're talking about the same thing, just slightly different wording,.

If what you call the present "moment" is the same thing as what I call the present, then it is impossible to make the "positing of no preferred moment" consistent with my perspective

I'm not trying to make it consistent with your perspective. Where ever did I say that?
I'm trying to demonstrate its consistency with itself, despite your assertions that your premise "is well supported by hundreds of years of scientific experimentation, empirical evidence". If your assertion is true, then all these hundreds of years of experimentation and evidence should have in some way by now falsified the alternative premise, and yet that premise remains taught in schools.

Perhaps we could compromise on our differences if we allow that the present (as the division between past and future), is not a dimensionless division as a "moment".

I don't know what you mean by 'dimensionless division'. It does seem to divide past from future (neither of which is actual, so I'm not sure where dimensions suddenly come into play).
'The present' means the objective current time which defines the actual current state of any given object. I made that up just now. Not trying to put words in your mouth.

I am willing to accept that the present, as the division between past and future, does not exists as a dimensionless divide, but as a period of "time", during which the past is changing to the future.

OK, that's really weird since most wordings deny the actuality of the past and future, and thus there is no past to change. There is just the current state of everything (not a short duration), and that is continuously changing to a new state in place. I really don't care how you choose to word it. The alternative premise doesn't have a present at all, so how you want to defined it is essentially moot.

This requires two dimensions of "time", and makes the present not a "preferred moment", but a "preferred time". Will you agree to this, and release your use of "preferred moment", and "present moment", for "preferred time", and "present time"?

You speak now of a model with two dimensions of time, but you seem incapable of getting your head around even one.
I can refer to the present using any of those terms, but if there are two things that require different terms, then I'm not talking about that at all.

So, you have misunderstood my argument. I have not argued for a "present moment". I argue that there is undeniable empirical evidence for a distinction between past and future.

The existence of a present moment is one of the premises of Aristotle's argument, so if that premise is wrong, his argument is unsound. How do you not see this? You claim to be 'trained in philosophy' and yet you don't see these trivial flaws in your argument. I have no training at all, but I at least took some courses requiring some basic elements of logic. You're the one who cannot back his assertions.

I assume this premise, right up front, because I believe it is so fundamental, and undeniably true.

You're wrong about it being undeniable since it is denied by plenty, including Einstein who resisted doing so even beyond publishing Special Relativity, but GR could only be worked out with the premise dropped. So we're back to you admitting you can't consider any view that conflicts with your biases. That's being closed minded.

If you have any reasons whatsoever, why this premise might not be true, then as I've requested of you, put these reasons forward.

Because it doesn't have to be true. That's actually the reason.
Being open minded to all valid views is the first step in making an informed choice. Your choice is made, but it is a completely uniformed one. My choices are at least more informed, and I make no claim as to the necessary truth of them when I'm aware of a viable alternative.

Until you model this difference, your model has no past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

If A is before B, then B would be in the future of A and A would be in the past of B. This illustrates the usage of the terms as relations instead of properties.
— noAxioms
Defining "past" and "future" in a different way doesn't give me what I requested, it just dodges the issue.

Yes, my model defines the words differently. It has no 'the past' and 'the future', hence there is no issue to dodge. It denies the existence of such properties.

Argument here is hopeless. Is there a real, live physicist who will enter the discussion and untangle this mess? :roll: — jgill

I've queried a few 'live physicists' about a couple points (not this one), and most of them don't know their philosophy very well, and might have differing opinions to such questions. As physicists, if the topic is relevant to their field, they'll be able to tell you what will be expected to be measured by a given test, which should be true regardless of their opinions on the metaphysics of the situation.

Translation: You're probably not going to get a better answer from them.

I can think of countless counterexamples to pretty much everything asserted in the OP.
Distance is not an issue. The moon causes tides without touching them. The sun causes my sunburn at a larger distance.
The dinosaur falling into a tar pit causes me to learn about it when I dig it up millions of years later.

The principle of locality (if you accept it) says that cause and effect must occur within each other's light cones, so that principle would deny for instance spooky action at a distance.

No, you're wrong. It's not conjecture, it's proven. The truth of it has been demonstrated to me as true, through evidence and logic, therefore it is proven. Aristotle thoroughly explained this thousands of years ago. — Metaphysician Undercover

The view to which I refer (positing no preferred moment in time) was probably not something Aristotle was aware of. The argument you outline assumes the opposite point of view (yours) and argues for a distinction between past, present, and future. I have little against the argument, but it is irrelevant to proving its assumption, that there is a present moment.

So we're back to unproven conjecture. You need a proof that does not proceed right up from an assumption that a present moment exists, as both you and Aristotle do.

It has been proven, and now you need to demonstrate that what has been proven to me as true, is actually false if you have any desire to lead me in another direction.

As I said, the argument isn't particularly invalid, but it assumes your premises right up front. Aristotle can be forgiven because to my awareness the alternate position would not be proposed for around 14 centuries.

The alternate view does not describe a different experience, so there is no distinction. There is still past and future, but they're just relations between events, not actual states of events. — noAxioms
"Relations between events" does not produce a past and future, it produces a before and after.

Pretty much yes. To be a little more precise, if you assume a preferred frame, then there is an objective before/after/simultaneous relationship between any two events. If you assume neither a preferred moment nor a preferred frame (mainstream view), then there is a relationship of before/after/ambiguous between any two events (the 'ambiguous' meaning the relation is frame dependent). No event is in 'the past' or 'the future'. Thus any references to such properties in any demonstration of inconsistency of this view would be begging a different set of assumptions.

Until you model this difference, your model has no past and future.

If A is before B, then B would be in the future of A and A would be in the past of B. This illustrates the usage of the terms as relations instead of properties.

Every person, as a self, body, or both, knows they exist. — Unlimiter

Why ask the question if every person knows the answer?

Fundamental facts, proven by hundreds of years of application of the scientific method, are what you call "biases". — Metaphysician Undercover

You cannot back this assertion. Science has done no such thing, especially since what I called a bias (the lack of a present moment) is strictly a philosophical premise.

I am actually very capable of putting aside such biases, when they are demonstrated to contain contradictions and inconsistent premises.

Wrong. You should be able to set them aside when considering an alternate point of view. It doesn't mean you have to change your personal belief to that alternate PoV. The exercise is done simply to recognize that your favored 'proven' view is not proven fact at all, but merely conjecture.

That there is a difference between future and past is easily proven. Past events are remembered, and future events are anticipated. Furthermore, past events cannot be changed while future events can be created, or avoided. Therefore there is a fundamental difference between past and future. That this difference cannot be measured is irrelevant to the proof We do not need to measure things to prove that they are different, we only need to describe the difference.

The alternate view does not describe a different experience, so there is no distinction. There is still past and future, but they're just relations between events, not actual states of events.

- - -

The problem here, as I've already explained, is that the field is the medium. — Metaphysician Undercover

Still assuming the conclusion I see.

Feynman, as a physicist, is very good at tutorials, putting things into words which non-physicists can understand.

Then you're summarizing his argument completely wrong. You really need to find that reference as jgill requested. I don't think Feynman would make commit such an obvious fallacy as blatant begging.

The field exerts force on the particles through the means of the waves

The quote you originally made said something different, and I agree with the former only:

Changes within the field are described as waves, — Metaphysician Undercover

The waves convey changes to the field, but not the force. Gravity waves for instance are not generated for a mass exerting a force at a distance. Gravity waves are energy, and energy expenditure would quickly deplete the mass of an object. But gravity waves do this. Earth for instance, due to its acceleration around the sun, emits about 200 watts of power in the form of gravity waves, far less than the energy given to even a small rock falling to the surface. Thus the force upon and kinetic energy gained by the falling rock does not come from waves of any kind.
Ditto with EM force and energy. The waves do not carry the force, only the minor energy of the changes which has negligible effect on other masses. LIGO is sensitive enough for instance to detect this, but any object can measure gravity.

I believe that some physicists such as Feynman have produced very convincing arguments which demonstrate that electromagnetic fields must have real physical existence, i.e. substance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please do. I am curious. :chin: — jgill

An electromagnetic field is necessarily a real object (what I call substantial) because it exerts a force on particles (exemplified by iron filings). This is the energy of the field. Changes within the field are described as waves, and this is how energy moves from one place to another through the field, by means of waves. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you are attacking the soundness of my argument, not the validity of it.
-- Meta
Only when your argument is in fact invalid. — noAxioms

jgill bumps an excellent example of an invalid argument which in this case begs two different conclusions by assuming them both true in order to conclude them. It begs the field being a real object, and it also begs a medium for EM waves.
To illustrate that, let's assume otherwise and see if a contradiction is reached.

The force on particles (iron filings) is exerted by the magnet nearby. Changes within the field are described as EM waves which require no medium. It works just fine with the opposite assumptions, therefore the argument demonstrates nothing.

As for energy, your comment seems to equate force to energy, which is just wrong. It makes it sound like the field itself has energy, and if that energy was consumed by something, it would be gone, leaving the magnet with no field. Gravity is like that. There's no gravitational energy of an object or its field. Nobody quotes some number representing the gravitational energy of say the Earth or its gravitational field (which is neither an energy field nor a force field, but rather an acceleration field).

Anyway, if Feynman did actually argue for this, and it was in any way convincing, then you've not summarized it very well.

The problem is you have not presented anything which makes sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

It make sense to those that understand it. I'm sorry that you're apparently not one of them.

Present me with contradictions and it's intelligent for me to attack them.

Your contradictions come from twisting my statements out of context. Maybe spell out the contradictions more clearly so I can point out where you didn't get it right.

Your approach is fruitless if you cannot demonstrate why the thing which is extremely obvious to me might be false.

I cannot demonstrate it to you. It's like trying to convince my cat. I've spent whole threads discussing this with you. I know where it goes. You are incapable of setting aside your biases, and hence you see contradiction where there is none. You already know the answer, so any premise that contradicts it must be wrong, and is thus not worthy of consideration.

If your claim is that a similar empirical experience could be produced without the present, as in "a simulation",

A simulation has a present, and a dualistic experience for that matter.. Not at all a good model of what I'm talking about.

On the contrary, there seems to be no measurement that can be made to distinguish between the premise being the case or not, which makes hundreds of years of nothing. They've tried too. I've seen many attempts, mostly logical, to disprove one view or the other. I've never seen a successful one. I even have my own argument, but it rests on premises that cannot be proven. — noAxioms

I went through this with you already, it's called "refraction".

I'm talking about the existence of a present moment, which has little if anything to do with refraction.

I don't see how this is relevant. The patterns exist in a medium. If they simply look like waves, but are not actually waves, they are still an activity of the medium.

No, they can appear and move with no activity of what you might consider to be the medium. That's why I brought it up.

Just a thought and the connection to the topic title is the possibility of an object/objects that could be at rest relative to everything else in the universe. — TheMadFool

Not possible. Beyond a certain distance away, the Hubble expansion prevents any object from being stationary relative to something over here.

If two objects A and B have the same velocity relative to another object C, then the two objects A and B must be at rest relative to each other.

Seems correct to me.

If that's the case then since all objects in the universe have the same velocity relative to light

They do not. Read what I said above about light not defining a valid reference frame. Also, light doesn't all have the same velocity since it is moving in all different directions

Do thoughts require a thinker? — Kranky

Kind of by definition, yes. I think it safe to use such a definition.

If they do, and thoughts occur, then I exist?

Doesn't follow the way it is worded.
Give the above definition, try: "if thoughts exist, then the thinker exists". That seems to work for any definition of 'exists' one cares to use.

Then you clearly have inconsistency, contradiction, if you model gravity waves as wrinkles in the fabric of spacetime, and you maintain that things do not travel through spacetime. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wrinkles in fabric are not movement, so 'clearly' hasn't exactly been spelled out.

And if you say that nothing moves because spacetime is an eternal static block

I didn't say nothing moves. Your refusal to understand the view isn't evidence that it is inconsistent. Read up on it and attack it intelligently.

know you have a consistent history of inability to understand that view, as again evidenced by your statement above.
— noAxioms

That's right, I cannot understand principles which appear fundamentally contradictory, and the appearance of contradiction is only made to go away when the obvious is denied.

There you go. You admit that you cannot let go of at least this one particular bias long enough to comprehend a view that doesn't posit it. Yes, the view indeed becomes contradictory if this additional 'obvious' premise is made, but the fact is that there is a different set of premises that predict the same empirical experience and these premises deny the existence of the present moment. Hence the truth of that premise is not obvious.

You might say this, but you attack my premises, not my logic

I only attack your premises if you insist on applying them to a view that doesn't posit them. Otherwise, when have I ever asserted your premises are necessarily wrong in any way? Maybe some of them are. I forget.

so you are really demonstrating that you think my arguments are unsound.

I meant invalid, and if they're invalid, then they're also unsound, which is why I kind of used both words.

For example, here's my argument. P1. Light exists as waves. P2. Waves require a medium. C. Therefore there is a medium for light, "the ether". The logic is valid, but you consistently attacked the truth of my first premise.

Sorry, but I never attacked that line of reasoning. I might attack your assertion that those premises are necessarily true.

So you are attacking the soundness of my argument, not the validity of it.

Only when your argument is in fact invalid.

However, my first premise is well supported by hundreds of years of scientific experimentation, empirical evidence, so you haven't gotten very far with your attack.

On the contrary, there seems to be no measurement that can be made to distinguish between the premise being the case or not, which makes hundreds of years of nothing. They've tried too. I've seen many attempts, mostly logical, to disprove one view or the other. I've never seen a successful one. I even have my own argument, but it rests on premises that cannot be proven.

Also, you or others, have made some attempt at creating ambiguity, and obscuring the separation between P1 and P2, by saying rather that light is "wavelike". This allows P2 to appear unsound, because there could be a "wavelike" thing which cannot be called a "wave" because it does not require a medium.

P2 might be true by definition. It depends on how a real wave is defined. But yes, the logic goes pretty much along the lines of what you say here. Known real waves do things that light doesn't, and light does things that known waves do not. That doesn't demonstrate that light is not a wave, but it does demonstrate that your premises are not necessarily true.

The ambiguity as to the criteria of "wave" allows for something which we would normally call a wave, to actually not be a wave, only "wavelike", and therefore exist without a medium.

As an example of something wavelike: Take interference patterns, which are formed by things other than waves. Moire patterns are a good example of this. The patterns move in apparent 'waves' without an obvious medium carrying the waves, as evidenced by the fact that there seems to be no limit to the speed at which they move.

What about light? No matter who the observer, where the observer, relative velocity with light is always 186,000 mph. — TheMadFool

The speed (not velocity) of light is constant. Each photon has a different frame dependent velocity.

Isn't this kinda like saying that all object in the universe, because they're moving at the same velocity with respect to light,

Light does not define a valid reference frame, so no, it's not like saying that. If one was to attempt consideration of such a frame, the universe collapses into a singularity and there is no space or time in which to define motion at all.

I am wondering what any of this has to do with the topic title. Absolute rest (of a given object) is conceptually possible, and it means that the object's absolute location is unchanging, and has nothing to do with what any of the other objects are doing. It requires a definition of absolute location, which isn't trivial.

Correct. Thanks for pointing that out. Motion is always relative. What I meant to ask was if there exists an object that's at rest relative to everything else in the universe? There is no such thing, right? — TheMadFool

If there are only two objects in the universe moving relative to each other, a third object might be stationary relative to one of them, but it would be moving relative to the other at the same velocity as the thing relative to which it is stationary. This is pretty trivial geometry. Yes, you describe this in your lower paragraph.

Another way of wording it: For an object to be a rest relative to the rest of the universe, everything in the universe would need to become stationary relative to the one thing. All motion everywhere would need to stop. That's not going to happen.

In some of your posts you talk about the distance between things changing or not. That's not the same as relative motion. Given two objects in relative motion (like a pair of masses A, B in eccentric orbit say), one can find a 3rd point (not stationary) that is always some unchanging distance from them, forming a constant length AC and BC despite the ever changing AB. That's still relative motion, but unchanging separation. It might even work for 3 objects, but not 4.