• Exam question
    Is this some kind of wacky pomo course? — Terrapin Station

    Yeah I thought the same, the "ingredients" seem to be there: e.g. an all-encompassing assertion, a lack of argument, the misuse of scientific terminology, and some wilfully constructed absurdity or conundrum in order to make the whole thing appear deep or advanced. The medieval dark ages were probably brighter and intellectually more honest and prosperous.
  • Exam question
    The human condition is partly characterized by hypocrisy, irrational beliefs, and misapplied logic. How could something alogical be a logical entity?
  • Meaning of life
    What do people mean when they say: "what is the meaning of life?" or "life has no meaning." — Emptyheady

    They first seem to assume that life should have one primary or all-encompassing meaning, and since there can be no such monstrosity some get stuck asking what that meaning is without ever finding an answer. Others therefore conclude, but incorrectly, that life has no meaning (a conclusion that arises from an incorrect assumption).

    I'd say life consists of uncountable meanings, or varieties of meanings: some are found, others created.
  • What is realism?
    ↪Terrapin Station
    It seems clear that thought about things in a manner of signs and signified is presupposed in representation.

    Yet an overwhelming amount of the things in our environment are not signs, they don't represent something else. We identify trees and pictures whose coloured shapes resemble trees because we have a background capacity to perceive and identify things in our environment and their properties, including differences and resemblances. In this sense resemblance is psychologically more primitive than representation.

    For example, you see what a bundle of coloured shapes on a photograph resembles, but you've got to learn what a traffic sign represents. It seems clear that in order to know what something represents we need more than a capacity for identifying things: we need a symbol system, a language, and thus thought about the thing in a manner of sign and signified.


    (clarified some parts, deleted others)
  • What is realism?
    Here's an example of signs and realism.

    A photograph of Ghandi signifies its object, the man, by resemblance between some of his visual features and some of the visual features of the photo. The photo may also represent the man, or what he stood for. But as a representation the photo is used as a symbol, and in order to represent the man or what he stood for we could substitute the photo with his name without changing the representation relation. From the logical difference between resemblance and representation it follows that if a portrait resembles, then it cannot represent in the same respect.

    For someone who does not know of Ghandi the photo may still signify by resemblance between some of its visual features and visual features of men, whereas its possible use as a representation of Ghandi or what he stood for remains unknown. Unlike what the photo resembles, what it represents does not depend on the photo but on symbolic convention. Someone who has never seen a photo, nor a half-naked man, could arguably still see a symmetric relation between colour patches on the photo and the visual features of the man.
  • Dreaming of Direct Realism
    It's the perception of the photo which is direct, neither more nor less. Likewise, one perceives the light of a distant star directly despite that the star "died" millions of years ago.
  • What is realism?
    You are not adhering to the definitions that I am using, which come from Peirce and are well-established in semiotics, so we are just talking past each other. — aletheist
    There is no good reason to exclusively adhere to the terminology of a 19th century theory of signs. It is fairly easy to see that representation is an asymmetric relation whereas resemblance is symmetric. That's what sets portraits apart from representational symbols, e.g. traffic signs or words.

    In particular, you seem to have a very narrow concept of representation. If "the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance," then it represents its object by resemblance--it is an icon. — aletheist
    Granted that a portrait can both resemble and represent its object, but if resemblance is the predominant relation which determines how a portrait signifies its object, then in this respect (i.e. as in how it predominantly signifies its object) it cannot represent its object, because representation is asymmetric whereas resemblance is symmetric. The portrait may, of course, represent its object in other respects by way of convention, for instance. *

    Would it make sense to say that the portrait primarily signifies its object symmetrically (by resemblance) and therefore "represents it" (i.e. signifies the object asymmetrically)? I don't think so.

    The weather vane represents (i.e., indicates) the direction of the wind, regardless of whether anyone interprets it as doing so--it is an index. — aletheist
    But the question is how, recall. A tumbling dust ball is also connected to the direction of the wind, but that does not make it a representation of it, does it?


    If the photo "presents certain features which are recognizable as the face," then it represents the face--iconically due to the resemblance, and indexically due to the causal process that placed the image on the film. Now, just about every sign has all three aspects--iconic, indexical, and symbolic; but I am focusing on the predominant relation of the sign to its object. — aletheist
    I'm also focusing on the predominant relation, but the mere application of semiotic terminology is not an argument for "HOW a particular sign represents its object".

    (*some clarification the day after my original post)
  • What is realism?
    A portrait does not represent the person whom it portrays (resemblance)? — aletheist
    Any picture can represent the person, but then it is used as a symbol, regardless of its resemblance. A caricature, for instance, seldom resembles yet represents; resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation. A portrait, however, resembles, and a photographic portrait could be visually indistinguishable from the present features of the person. Granted that it could also represent the person, but if the question is: how does the picture signify, then it seems fairly clear that while a caricature represents by asymmetrically exaggerating or contorting known features of the person the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance.

    A weather vane does not represent the direction of the wind (connection)? — aletheist
    It represents the direction of the wind by being used as a conventional symbol for it, regardless of its direct causal connection to the wind.

    You do not recognize a familiar face in a photograph (both)? — aletheist
    There is no face in the photo but colour patches, and the photographic process arranged those patches in a way that resembles the way which makes the face familiar. The photo does not represent the face, it presents certain features which are recognizable as the face.
  • What is realism?
    I am looking at HOW a particular sign represents its object. There are only three options--by resemblance (icon), by direct connection (index), or by convention (symbol). — aletheist
    While it seems fairly clear that conventional symbols represent I don't think resemblance represents. Resemblance is symmetric, i.e. one thing resembles another by actually possessing some of its recognizable properties. Representation, however, is asymmetric, i.e. one thing represents another, regardless of whether they share properties.

    Therefore, resemblance does not represent. Neither does direct connection (index) or perception. Conventional symbols, statements, and beliefs represent things. Resemblance and direct connection, or perception don't (they present things).

    For example, a photograph presents properties which resemble properties of the optical state of affairs which was photographed, i.e. the photo reflects light in ways which resemble how the photographed things reflected light when they were photographed. The resemblance relation does not re-present the things (nor an impression inside the head of the photographer). It presents what's really there to see on the surface on the photo: properties shared by two different optical state of affairs.
  • Logical reasoning has led me to conclude that everyone around me is a p-zombie...
    ↪lambda

    Bullshit disguised as logic is worse than bullshit, it's fraud.
  • How many bodies do I have?
    In what sense is the human body independently existing from its visual field? What is left of a visual field if you remove the body which constitutes its point and angle of view, i.e. the properties which constitute the field?
  • The isolation of mind
    a form of an argumentum ad ignorantiam — Gooseone

    Spot on!
  • The isolation of mind
    This is merely communication and inference. — darthbarracuda

    "Merely"? What do you expect? Ability to be someone else?
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    ↪Real Gone Cat

    What's active is what's constituitive for sensing: e.g. sense organs interacting with physical force, radiation, synaptic events in the brain etc. But sensing also involves a passive identification of what is sensed, for, as you say, "We do not get to choose what is in our visual field".

    So it seems fairly clear that sensing is active in one use of the word but passive in another use.
  • The isolation of mind
    at least conceptually we can open these containers and see their contents. We cannot do this with mind. — darthbarracuda
    Evidently we can, for example, when we talk about the mind, and share insights into the minds of different speakers. Therefore, the mind is not isolated.
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    The cat does not cause the observer to have a visual experience, but it does cause the visual experience to be that of a cat. — Real Gone Cat
    I agree.
    Sensing is passive. — Real Gone Cat
    I would amend that slightly ;). Sensing is hardly passive but it is passively identifying what is sensed, for example, the cat.
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    ↪Michael

    Pretty clear analogy, but... unlike the boy who must kick the ball to break the window the cat does not really act to produce the observer's visual experience of it. The cat's presence in the observer's visual field is not sufficient but it is necessary for having a visual experience of the cat. One could probably hallucinate it, but in hallucinations nothing is seen.
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover

    The visual experience of seeing a cat is obviously caused by the presence of a cat in your visual field. Otherwise you'd be hallucinating. The biology of the being causes an activity by which things can be sensed but in which nothing is sensed, whereas the presence of the cat causes this activity to sense a cat. In this way the presence of the cat causes you to see the cat.

    I find no counter argument to this in your posts (only stinking ad hominems).
  • Is consciousness created in the brain?
    ↪intrapersona

    That's an obvious fallacy. The fact that some "parameters" like electrical firing rates are sufficient for photosynthesis to work in plants does not mean that computers or toilet plumbing could produce photosynthesis. Like photosynthesis consciousness is a biological phenomenon.
  • What IS this experience?
    Now that I have given up naive realism — intrapersona

    Lol did you ever stop rejecting naive realism?
  • Solutions to False Information and News in Our Modern World
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    I'm not positioning the seen cat within the sensing being. — Metaphysician Undercover
    Yet you wrote this:
    ... Let's position the referred to activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being, ... — Metaphysician Undercover
    It seems fairly clear to me that you suggest to position the cat within the sensing being since we were talking about a cat that you see. Now if "the referred" does not mean the cat that you see, then what?

    I think you'd agree that there is no cat within you when you see a cat but perceptual activity which enables you to see a cat when there is a cat to be seen in your visual field. You can't see your own perceptual activity at work when you see the cat.

    I am positioning the sensation of the cat within the being, and saying that the cause of the sensation is the act of sensing. — Metaphysician Undercover
    With respect to the OP which concerns the relation between sense organs and experience the location of the act of sensing is hardly an issue here. Obviously sensing is located within the one who's got the sense organs, not elsewhere (we're not discussing whether remote sensing is possible, are we?).
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    Can things be the both a cause and an effect? Can they cause themselves? Seems incoherent. — dukkha

    Seeming incoherences tend to arise from fallacies of ambiguity. For example, when using of the word 'see' in two different senses: for what constitutes seeing (perceptual activity), and for what you see (what the activity is about or directed towards). Unless the two are understood as different, then it may serm as if seeing would both be its cause and effect.
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    I merely corrected you, by pointing out that the act of "sensing", is the cause of the sensation of a cat. The cat is not the cause of sensing nor seeing the cat. Rather, the living being which senses is the cause of this activity of sensing. Let's position the referred to activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being, not within the thing being sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

    You're not correcting anyone by "positioning the referred" cat "to activity, seeing" within the sensing being, because then you'd neither refer nor see the cat, only your own activity of sensing (e.g. "data" or ideas or hallucinations of an invisible cat).

    Our biology causates perceptual activity as the sense organs interact with physical force, radiation etc.. This activity is constituitive for seeing things, but it is the presence of a cat in your visual field which causes your biology to see a cat. The cat is what the perceptual activity is about when you see the cat.
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    This act produces sensation, perhaps the seeing of a cat. — Metaphysician Undercover

    The act is the sensation/seeing, the act cannot produce the cat that you see, only its presence in your visual field can.
  • How to reconcile the biology of sense organs with our sensory perceptions?
    I suppose you could describe the intentionality of perception as a "gaze" which goes out from your body towards the object that you see.

    Unlike electromagnetic radiation which goes towards your body so that your sense organs can interact with it the sensing is characterized by an outwards going direction as in identifying what causes a sensed change in the frequencies of the radiation: for example, the presence of a radiation-reflecting object in your visual field. The sensing is about that object, so you see the object, e.g. a cat. Unless you're hallucinating the present cat is the cause of sensing/seeing a cat.
  • The Dream Argument
    I asked how you know you aren't dreaming right now. — Mongrel
    Since I perceive the world directly there is no reason for me to doubt whether my experiences right now when I'm awake might be real or dreams.

    What does it suggest.. that you don't simply answer the question? — Mongrel
    No, after your clarification your question turned out to be easy to dismiss (despite your misuse of "logic").
  • The Dream Argument
    Problem? — Mongrel
    Yes, do you mean that the existence of dreams, or dreams of saying things, would somehow show that we never know whether we dream or not?
  • The Dream Argument
    ↪Mongrel

    You're not making sense. Would you care to explain?
  • The Dream Argument
    ↪Mongrel

    Nothing is literally said in the dream.
  • The Dream Argument
    What properties does one have that the other doesn't? — Mongrel

    Unlike the dream the real table has the property of being the object of your experience of a table. For example, its present features in your visual field cause your visual experiences of it.

    The dreamt table, however, is not causing your dream of it, instead it is evoked by your memories of a table, or your will, habits, or familiarity with describing tables.

    The two experiences might be momentarily indistinguishable despite their difference in objects experienced, but it is not difficult to find out whether there is a table in your visual field.

    The mistake of the skeptic is to assume that what the dream and the veridical case have in common would also be the object that you experience, or an element of the experience. It isn't. They only have in common what is constituitive for any experience, brain events. They differ, however, in what causes them, e.g. the real table as the intentional object of perceiving it, and in the dream it is your memories etc.
  • The Dream Argument
    ↪Mongrel

    But experiences are not objects of observation; it's trivially true that you don't observe whether this has dreamy or veridical features... and from the lack of such observation it doesn't follow that there would be no difference between this and a dream.
  • The Dream Argument
    The dream argument attempts to demonstrate that belief in the existence of an "external" world is never justified. — Aaron R
    That's a bad argument. You shouldn't ask for justification of belief in the existence of an external world under the assumption that the external world doesn't exist, or that we would never encounter the external world, only our own internal constructs.
  • What is the best realist response to this?
    Then how does the realist distinguish between a veridical and a non-veridical experience? — Michael
    For example, by verification.

    The very principle of realism is that the way the world is is independent of our experiences such that we can see things that aren't there and not see things that are there. — Michael
    That's not a principle of realism.

    Realists assume that the world exists independently of our beliefs and statements. You should not conflate that with talk about experiences and seeing, because many realists differ on questions on the nature of experiences and seeing (direct vs indirect realism).
  • What is the best realist response to this?
    ↪Marchesk

    For a realist reality exists independently of his/her beliefs or statements about it. The idea that reality would somehow exist in itself adds nothing. It is a term invented by thinkers who seemed to have reasons to distinguish an invisible yet existing reality from its visible parts.
  • What is the best realist response to this?
    Plenty of realists would disagree. — Aaron R
    What is an example of a realist who would disagree with a rejection of the idea that the world exists in itself?

    "In itself" need not denote Kant's "ding an sich", which is just his particular take on the concept. — Aaron R
    No-one says it needs to denote Kant's ding an sich, but you mentioned "thing in itself", and I replied. Moreover, plenty of scholars disagree on whether Kant's take implies two worlds or two perspectives. One is invisible and assumed to exist "in itself" whereas another is assumed to be a "visible" mind-dependent version of the invisible version. Neither is plausible, and regardless of what Kant's particular take might be I see no good reason for a realist to speak of things in themselves.
  • What is the best realist response to this?
    There is no such thing as the world in itself. You don't get to take anti-realist assumptions for granted.
  • What is the best realist response to this?
    There's no good reason at all to believe that the world would be differentiated by someone's mind.
  • Why I don't drink
    ...
    And you, you can be mean
    And I, I'll drink all the time
    'Cause we're lovers, and that is a fact
    Yes we're lovers, and that is that
    ...     — Bowie
  • Is Truth Mind-Dependent?
    Yet we don't just invent things to say, out of nowhere, for maintaining them in a linguistic system. We also discover reasons to invent and say them. Perhaps in some sense statements exist as reasons to say them, regardless of whether they are ever said or maintained by minds. Likewise their truths might exist as certain relations to what they refer to, regardless of whether minds discover them.
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