The split is determined by the definition used for the word. Every word in the definition that is not already clearly understood gives rise to a new branch leading to a node that is the definition of that word. — andrewk

I understand that, and I continue to see the appeal of the idea. But I still think there's a problem at the branching of the nodes. If I define a word in terms of three nonterminal nodes, for instance, then I have the problem of how those non-terminal nodes 'snap together.' I have to speak ambiguously here, but I want to say that meaning is distributed not only over sentences but over paragraphs and eventually over all practice and word use. As you read this sentence, these words are automatically snapped together for you into a complete thought. The meaning we might want to localize in a particular word is a function of all the other words in sentence. They all have one another as the foundation of their meaning. 'Holism' is a word I associate with this insight.

I like your choices of other problematic words. All three of those are controversial, and have given rise to great debate over the years. — andrewk

Indeed. I've read and enjoyed some of the great systematic philosophers. I still 'believe' in parts of their systems personally. I'm not anti-metaphysical. It's an issue of style, really.

The first part of Plato's Republic is devoted to debate over what Justice is. — andrewk

That's one of Plato's work that I truly enjoyed. I also liked the Apology. But Plato's dialogues can be annoying. 'Get to the point, Plato.'

I find debate over such words as meaningless as debate over the use of 'exist', and I try to avoid use of those words as well. — andrewk

I can relate. I use them freely in ordinary life, but I have a sense of the bias and ambiguity that haunts them. I can even relate to the project of trying to squeeze them for their essential juices, except that I've tried that. When I returned to ordinary life among the non-philosophers, it wasn't clear to me that I knew anything important that they did not know. Indeed, a person can become hard to understand (or to like) once they've absolutized ordinary words. Or if they think reading a famous dead person's opinion on the matter gives them authority in their eyes of others on a word's meaning. Of course it will give them authority, if the others are also dazzled by that reputation. But then one is just quoting scripture, which is too easy and not particularly exciting.

When I do use them, I use them with a meaning I prefer, to which I can give a definition, but it will be a meaning that many people would not accept. — andrewk

Right. For me objectivity also connects with an awareness of how my claims will be perceived. Difference in basic worldviews is palpable. Just as I want to be recognized as a shrewd consumer of claims, I especially value others who are shrewd or critically minded. The 'just the facts' ideal implies an openness to the differing uses that others may have for truth. It also suggests an awareness that one is not a flawless or authoritative interpreter of the situation. A person might say that 'there are no facts, only interpretations,' and this might be true in a particular sense, but only at the cost of wasting a distinction that is fundamental to practical life. Of course it's another one of those vivid hyperboles that serve to soften naively absolutized distinctions, so I see where its purveyor was coming from.

I'll add 'free will' as another example of something that people argue furiously over even though none of them know what they mean by the term. — andrewk

Good example. I was troubled by this once for religious reasons. My failure to make sense of it was a big reason that I eventually doubted the entire theological framework I adopted as child. Our practice suggests that we believe in something like free will and something like determinism simultaneously.

Why do you think that if someone uses a word it must have a meaning? — andrewk

I probably said something like 'if we look to use for meaning,..." I understand myself to be criticizing the sharpness of the distinction between use and meaning. I don't want to abolish the useful and meaningful distinction, only to caution against an insistence on its absoluteness. Or to express a distaste for where this insistence tends to lead thinking.

This is not "the science of formal systems", this is philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

And it's dark at night.

In philosophy we are concerned with understanding reality as a whole, so we cannot dismiss certain contradictions and inconsistencies as irrelevant to the field of study. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless we dismiss them at dead ends or as not really being contradictions. We decide all the time (implicitly at least) what is and is not worth talking about.

If it is necessary that we take two distinct things, which have a very similar physical appearance (two distinct instances of a symbol), and assume that they are "the same", despite the fact that they are clearly not the same, in order to understand some aspect of reality, then as philosophers we ought to recognize and take interest in this, to determine what the implications of such a contradiction might be. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see any mystery in the process. I know very well that two marks are different as marks. I just want these marks to function as symbols. The formal system example just shows this categorization at its nakedest. As you read this sentence, you see words and not marks. As you write your replies to me, you think in terms of words/symbols. This know-how is ultimately mysterious and elusive. I can't say what it is to mean in some conclusive end-of-conversation way. I think it's interesting to try, at least for awhile. But then I may want to actually look into something that I can be far more conclusive about. I think this touches on how virtuous an individual finds philosophical hand-wringing.

Now my use of the phrase is already taking a certain side. I'm an ex-philospoher being a smart-ass, one might say. But I think it's good 'philosophy' to demystify certain classic poses. My 'complaint' would be perhaps that this 'handwringing' is too easy. I think that's why the genre isn't admired much by its non-participants. As a reader of philosophy, I certainly don't side with 'anti-intellectualism,' but sometimes 'anti-intellectualism' is just the flip side of handwringing --a word the handwringers have for those unimpressed by their sweaty palms. To be clear, I'm interested in a synthesis of both sides, and I try to sort effective handwringing (which is perhaps the most powerful kind of talk and thought) from running around in the same old circles compulsively. I'm well aware that I am far from the objectivity of formal systems in presenting my views and preferences.

Do you recognize the difference between "the ideal", and "the notion of the ideal"? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's tricky in math, though. We can have whatever we dream up, with a certain constraint on the dream that keeps it mathematical. I mentioned a field with 6 elements because I can imagine a real world application that might be possible if such a field were possible. Maybe I'm designing a code and such a thing would be convenient, the perfect size. The practical ideal exists, and yet the logical structure of human cognition makes such a thing impossible. Abstract algebra can be read as implicitly psychological. While proofs can be formally true and meaningless, they tend to be written from and for an intuition of necessity.

This is why I used zero as the principle for ordering. Let's say someone claims that zero fulfills our notion of the ideal. The argument is that we haven't found any ideal, the category is an empty set, therefore zero is the ideal. However, zero allows for the possibility of ordering toward the negative or the positive, two distinct possibilities. So there is inherent within "zero" two distinct possibilities. Therefore it cannot be the ideal because the ideal must be one unique perfection. The ideal is like the empty set, but it cannot even be represented as zero, because we cannot put zero into that set, because this leaves it not empty. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't understand what you are trying to say here. Since '0' is just one part of a system (or of many systems), I can't imagine anyone saying that it itself is or is not ideal. I can only guess where you are coming from, but I can say that I found math far less metaphysical upon studying it than I first understood it to be. Or rather it's metaphysical in the driest and most desirable of ways. It works with basic structural intuitions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms

Yes this is what Socrates is famous for demonstrating, many people know how to do things without really knowing exactly what they are doing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. But what comes to my mind is this use of 'really.' If a poet or an engineer is functioning at the highest level and then a bum like Socrates comes along with questions that he himself can't answer and decides that the 'really' don't know anything, then this 'really' takes on an unworldliness. (I call Socrates a 'bum' as a joke, but there is something perverse about this hero.) We don't really know what it is to really know something, one might retort.

I would not claim that we "don't really know anything", unless you define "know" as requiring absolute certainty. But I don't think that knowing requires absolute certainty, and this is evident from the fact that I proceed with my endeavours, knowing how to proceed, despite the fact that I know that I may not be successful with any particular attempt. And, I never know at what time something may interfere and prevent me from being successful. This fact, that I am not completely sure of my success, inspires me to seek possible avenues of failure, to eliminate them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well this is basically my view. That's why Socrates is a bum when he suggests or implies that successful practice isn't enough. Did Coltrane really know what a saxophone was? Not for a certain kind of philosopher, even if this philosopher can't clearly imagine what 'really knowing' would look like.

Once something is deemed as certain, it is called upon, and used in our actions, without question, just like a habit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or we could say that we are implicitly certain about things that are called upon like habits. These implicit certainties can be made explicit by phenomenology or just ordinary conversation.

Suppose we have a failure, we need to determine the cause of the failure. If "x" has already been determined as certain, then "x" will not be considered as the cause of the failure. But we've already excluded the possibility that "x" is absolutely certain, so ought we not consider the possibility that "x" is the cause of the failure, despite the fact that "x" has been determined as certain? — Metaphysician Undercover

I generally agree. But thinking takes time and energy. We might say practice indicates the certainty of beliefs through the things we check first when something breaks down. I am 'sure' it's not the new spark plugs that failed until I can't find failure among the parts I wasn't sure about. This connects to the probabilistic reasoning we discussed in another thread.

Yes, that's exactly the point, we ought to demand such definitions, this is how we prevent misunderstanding and mistake. In daily usage, if we don't adequately understand, we simply ask the speaker to clarify what was meant. But in specialized fields of education, like medicine, and biology which deals with parts of animals, you cannot just point to your hand, and say this is a hand, because the extent of the object pointed to is vague. So we need to refer to things like fingers and the wrist, to create boundaries for that specific object, "the hand", and we do this with definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, and I think this is done successfully in the sciences. With philosophy, politics, and literary criticism, this becomes problematic. What is justice? What is truth? What is God? What is rationality? These aren't innocent, neutral questions. They are territory that is fought for rhetorically. When it comes to words like these, I try to pay attention and get a sense how different individuals use them and attempt to define them in a way that is binding for others.

An anecdote for context: I don't call myself a 'philosopher' and those who don't read much philosophy because I don't want to be mistaken for someone who claims to have special access to the 'true' meaning of these master words. I know or trust that in fact I'll be perceived as someone with mere opinions that are dressed up with this demystified-for-them word 'philosophy.' Of course I like the genre philosophy, and I've learned much from it, in my own eyes. But I can also see a certain kind of philosophy from the outside as a kind of pseudo-profound self-important handwringing. At its worst, it pretends to be a kind of armchair science or word math. This isn't aimed at academic philosophy, but rather at a trait especially common in a certain kind of male human, not necessarily young. In short, my comments are largely the expression of a preference for one style of thinking and talking as opposed to another. To some degree I do philosophy to clarify intuitive or gut-feeling rejections of ways of thinking and being. I 'put my finger' on why this or that feels wrong.

By observing life closely, we begin to understand it. The more we observe, the more skilled we become, and the more we understand. This is philosophy. — Rich

Sure. But I'd also say that we don't even have to look closely, even if that's advisable. Pain and pleasure will sculpt some kind of understanding in any case. I'd call that 'life' as much as 'philosophy.' For me philosophy would be something like the more abstract 'parts' of this accumulated understanding, which will usually include an understanding of understanding (this one, for instance.)

When we criticise the use of a certain word or phrase, we are not criticising the language as a whole, just that particular use of it. There's no inconsistency in regarding language use in general as a useful, meaningful activity while criticising the use of certain word or phrases as having no use or meaning. — andrewk

I agree, except with the that last part. If we are criticizing the use of a word, then it has a use, namely the one we are criticizing. Then, if we look to use for meaning, it must also have a meaning, since it has a use. Perhaps you meant an inferior use as opposed to a proposed new use or a cessation of use altogether, and a vague meaning as opposed to no meaning?

Of course I've been criticizing certain uses and certain meanings myself, suggesting that words like 'certainty' and 'objectivity' are often used in a kind of absolute, impossible sense, at least on philosophy forums. For me this is a waste of good words and less than ideal in terms of style. Of course I realize that I am just sharing and explaining my own preferences against others' in this case.

You asked whether 'hand', 'demand' or 'definition' are as problematic as 'exist'. Empirically they are not, as people tend not to disagree over what they mean, whereas they constantly disagree over what 'exist' means - including non-philosophers. — andrewk

True, 'exist' is more problematic than 'hand.' I imagine it becoming problematic in religion and physics. Is it more problematic than 'definition'? Being able to point at things helps, of course.

I like to use ostension as the root of meaning - that if we can trace the meaning of a word through a tree whose nodes are various other words until we reach terminal leaves, each of which is given meaning by ostension, then we know what the word means. Otherwise not. — andrewk

I understand the appeal of that view, but what exactly happens away from the terminal nodes? How do you decide how to split a nonterminal node into other nonterminal modes? How does 'justice' split? How does 'rationality' split? 'God'?

A simpler approach though would be that if everybody agrees on what a word means, and that agreement is borne out by experiment (e.g. Simon says 'raise your hand' and everybody raises their hand), then we can consider that we know the meaning. — andrewk

I like the idea that meaning is continuous with practice. There's no sharp line between the subjective experience of meaning and action in the world. What does it mean to be 'in love'? Of course certain feelings come to mind. But telling people that one is 'in love' with them is also like pushing a button. No one has to know exactly what is meant. Instead it's a typical objective occurrence (the 'materiality' of the words) that they have observed throughout their life in the context of the consequences of those words. 'If phrase X is uttered earnestly in situation Y, then A,B, or C has tended to happen, depending on E, F, and G.' From this perspective, knowing the meaning of the word would be getting these calculations more right than wrong, or rather applying these calculations successfully. Or perhaps it's best to view this calculation as continuous with 'meaning classic' and action in the world.

When we try to say what it means to exist, all sorts of logical problems arise. How can one say without doubt, "my hands exist", when one cannot say without doubt what it means to "exist"? So it becomes evident that we use words within language-games without actually knowing what the words mean. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is near the heart of lots of philosophical issues. We know how to use words without being able to conclusively describe how or what that know-how is. I think it's non-controversial that this slippery entity 'meaning' is largely a function of context. It's not clear that some ideal meaning of exist would convenient snap together with some ideal meaning of 'hands' and 'my.' We would also need an ideal way of snapping our ideal meanings together for more complex but still ideal meanings.

When you say we don't know what words mean, that seems true in one sense (we can ramble on forever about 'exist') and false in another (knowing what they mean is just knowing how to use them).

If we criticize the use of language in the absence of an ideal justification (a definition of exist, for instance), then we are using that same unjustified language to do so, implying that we expect to be understood --implying that we trust the language in practice as we question it in theory.

This is not to deny the strangeness of our situation. A person could say that we don't really know anything. But as soon as words move toward such absolutes they lose their power to distinguish situations in practical life. If I'm not even certain that I have hands, then of what use is 'certainty' except to mark the impossible hope of infinitely itchy philosophers?

It doesn't seem possible to get 'behind' this know-how or form of life. I have to use it if I want to try to do so. My objections to the inexplicitness of my knowhow are also thereby made possible. If I demand a definition of 'exist,' why not demand a definition of 'definition' and 'demand'? Why not of 'hand'? Surely we can problematize the use of 'hand' with a little imagination.

Say object #1 and object #2 are seen to be different, but not identified as different. They are both identified as "dog". We know the objects are distinct, be we are identifying them as the same. You might say that this is just a categorization, but for the sake of the logical process which follows the identification, they are the same. So for the sake of the logical process they are said to be the same, when they are really different. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. But in the science of formal systems we discover the relationships of categories/symbols/tokens and not of the marks we need to aid memory and communication. The theorems aren't about the marks. Beyond that, there's no denial that the marks are different. There's just no interest in the mark except as the representation of a category.

If I draw the letter a in two ways, even a child can agree that the marks are different and yet the 'same' (the same letter). This is an informal computation of the many-to-one function from marks to symbols. Some might prefer to use 'symbols' for what I mean by marks, which is fine. So for clarity I can just talk about the categorization function or categorization itself, which is allowed to place 2 or more different objects in the same conceptual bin. This is just an ability we find ourselves with. Existence is ultimately mysterious, etc. But I don't think there's problem with categorization. A person would have to use categories successfully in order to argue for their failure.

The meaning of "less than" is not demonstrated, it is stipulated by definition, in reference to an order. I don't think "less than" can be judged without reference to the definition, and therefore the order. If you want to argue that a definition is an ideal, I don't think you could succeed because definitions are not perfect, due to the ambiguity of words. — Metaphysician Undercover

But surely you didn't mean the usual order on the integers or real numbers? My point is that if something is less than ideal within or about mathematics, that this would tend to involve a notion of the ideal. Anything ideal for mathematics would already be in the right form for immediate adoption. I did give an example we could want a particular formal system (a field with 6 elements) and discover that such a thing is impossible. If we want the impossible, then math (in this case 'logical reality') is not ideal.

The future is seen as virtual (possible actions). Your choices are: when to get it (initiation of will), how to get it (directional action), what to do with it once you get it. — Rich

I agree that possible actions are at the center of our concern, but the future is also the background of possible actions, their context. Certain actions are possible or not according to whether this 'background' is one situation or another. Because I believe the avocado is down there, I can decide ahead of time whether to eat it rather than something else that is also down there.

Yes I agree that logic is impossible without this fundamental first step. But if contradiction is inherent within the first step, don't you see this as a problem? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure that we have a problem. We can distinguish between the individual marks and then categorize these marks. For instance, let A = {s2e, 2rt, e42}. Let f be defined on all strings over lower case letters and decimal digits so that f(s) = 0 if s does not contain the symbol 2 and f(s) = 1 if s does contain the symbol 2. Then f(s2e) = f(2rt) = f(e42) = 1. A less formal example would be three different dogs, each recognized as belonging to the category 'dog.' I can only offer this example because we already understand this category 'dog.' My formal example suggests how math basically scrubs 'ordlang' logic of its ambiguity, which is gets from our fuzzy language, so that it's structure can be focused on and examined.

The first law is the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I find the 'law' metaphor a little awkward here. "Each thing is the same with itself and different from another." This is a tautology or close to a tautology. We can give the same thing different names, but we wouldn't generally give different things the same name, remembering that a name would not be a fixed context-independent token in ordlang. I can talk about 'John' successfully if the context specifies which John and enriches the token 'John.' Of course a formal system avoids what could go wrong here by insisting that the token completely specify the entity. In a formal system the token is the entity. So we scan the page, see the mark 'abc' which is microscopically different from the mark 'abc' on the previous page, and map both automatically to the token or sequence of tokens 'abc.' (This is slightly tricky, because I can only talk about these marks by using tokens.

The second law is the law of non-contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

This 'law' again just seems to codify or tautologize the syntax of 'ordlang.' It's indulgent of me to try and fire up a meme, but I am trying to point at an inexplicit know-how that is also invisible in its smooth functioning.

Aren't we obliged to either forfeit the law of non-contradiction, or go back to our mode of identification and rectify this problem of contradiction inherent within identification? — Metaphysician Undercover

I hope I addressed this above, if obliquely.

I'm no mathematician, but I've noticed that set theory has contradiction inherent within it as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Depending on what you mean by 'contradiction,' that would make you famous. I think you mean that you have philosophical reservations about set theory ( the formal system itself). I can relate to that. When we talk about systems from the outside, we leave the cosy objectivity available within the system, as I see it. If I understand correctly, a mathematical contradiction in this context would be a 'legally' generated string with certain properties. Or rather it could be put in such a form. In practice almost no one works in 'machine code,' though I understand that to be a speciality itself. For example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_proof_checking

I do not believe that the resolution to the problem of contradiction being inherent within the first step, is to introduce other contradictions to cover it up. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we view formal systems as pieces of technology, then it makes sense to me that we might tinker with them. Cantor's original set theory was beautiful and revolutionary, but it allowed some contradictions. Mathematicians didn't want to just give up on something so promising, so they added a few constraints in the hope that they could avoid contradictions. They at least fixed the obvious ones, and they did this without losing much. I have Suppes' book, and it follows the history closely, with some great quotes of the philosophical motivations of those who fixed set theory up. The axiom of infinity especially begs for philosophical dicussion: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_infinity.

To demonstrate imperfections within something is to demonstrate that it is less than ideal. It is not necessary to show the ideal, in order to demonstrate that what we have is not ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

To me this is far from obvious. How do we evaluate/demonstrate the relation 'less than' without an image of the ideal? I will agree that we can prove the impossibility of certain systems. Every finite field has order p^k where p is prime and k>0, so we can't have such a field with 6 elements. If we determine that a finite field with 6 elements would somehow be useful or beautiful, then there would be a gap between the real and the ideal. But if we consider possibility (that the system works) to be an essential feature of the ideal, then I don't currently see how we couldn't immediately institute a particular vision of the ideal.

Admittedly, we don't always know ahead of time whether we are desiring the impossible.

To demonstrate problems within a system does not require that one put forward resolutions to the problems. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree in general, but my concerns above address the case of formal systems.

Indeed. We just generally try to maximize our chances for success.

So the basis of freewill - that is intelligent, selfish and goal directed behaviour - is there right from the ground up. As soon as a molecule becomes a message, we are talking about life being freed from the kind of strict Newtonian determinism that causes all the metaphysical angst about human freewill. — apokrisis

I see that you are pointing out a fascinating phenomenon. I'm a little uneasy about calling lower level replication goal-directed and selfish, but that's a quibble. I realize also that 'God plays dice' (or I trust the physicists on this), so strict determinism does seem like a dead issue.

It's not the future that is constrained by memory, it is the choices that we might make. — Rich

I remember that there's a ripe avocado on the counter downstairs. It wasn't ripe enough last night, so I left it there. I'm likely to make my way downstairs today, and I expect the avocado to be there. So my image of the future is constrained my the memory of this avocado. (My image of the future is something like a branching tree of possibilities, which could be phrased in terms of if-then statements, perhaps.)

I think they only hope that the operation succeeds. Even if there is a right way to transplant a heart, doing it that way does not guarantee success, which is all the patient cares about. — andrewk

That is of course their primary hope. But I think they associate the likelihood of success with the trustworthiness or lack thereof of the discipline. Why not drink some magic potion suggested by a random stranger and hope for success? I agree that objectivity is 'cashed' pragmatically. Esthetic reasons aside for the moment, we don't want objectivity for its own sake. We want tools we can trust, tools that won't break in our hand. But this takes us right back to objectivity.

Joe the Metaphysical Plumber tells me a purple spirit in haunting my pipes that he can exorcise for a small fee. Do I trust him? Probably not. Maybe he believes what he says, but maybe that's just his opinion (an idea false/useless for me despite its perceived use/truth for him). And that's probably because I'm familiar with other outlandish claims that didn't cash out. A child will believe perhaps in a giant bunny that brings candy once a year, that a fat man in red brings toys.

At some point I start to reflect on this critical process itself (a pattern in my trusting or not). I come up with a word for the most trustworthy kind of claims. I notice that staying close to uncontroversial facts as a foundation seems to work. These might be facts about stones of different sizes dropped from a height or games of chess. In both cases an inexplicit knowhow grounds the non-controversiality of these facts. (I can't say what exactly it is to understand how a bishop moves, or what a person is, but it's not usually a problem.) Someone claims to find underground water by walking around with little sticks. OK. Let's see if they find water better than someone wandering around guessing. If they fail, it's logically possible that our observation somehow fizzled their power. But who cares? We need their 'magic' to work as needed, and not only when we aren't asking it to.

I may even abandon an interest in explanation and focus on prediction and control, deciding that explanation often muddies the water. I can trust a black box if it gets the job done. That's how most people use their smartphones, I think. Prediction and control gets us near the pragmatic essence. What's left is morale, let's say. But even that is control of mood. Morale is tricky, though, because my mood is not a public entity. My behavior, sure, but whether I am 'happy' or 'enlightened' or 'saved' in some special 'metaphysical/religious' sense seems controversial. I may believe it, and others may shrug or spit. I can insist that it's an objective truth, that I am free of bias. But bias is almost by definition invisible to the biased person. We're back to the plumber believing in the purple spirit. I'm not denying the purple spirit. I'm saying it's going to be invisible for my criterion unless it leads to predictions and control. To be sure, these 'morale' entities obviously affect behavior, and I can imagine a black box that maps pubic words to predicted behavior. But the 'morale entities' themselves seem destined for invisibility in this sense, which is the way that many of their users like them, I think, for reasons that aren't necessarily cynical.

I know this is a long response, but I tried to connect objectivity to a pragmatic epistemology. In short, objectivity is a concept that helps us decide which tools to trust.

Instead we can just say that as humans we have evolved to instinctively trust what has worked in the past, so we trust surgeons, techniques and theories about how hearts function, that have worked in the past. — andrewk

Has the concept of objectivity served us well in the past? I'm not saying that this is an easy question. I'd suggest that it has served us well, but then I think most words that remain in the language are probably pulling their weight --even those filthy 'morale entities.'

The past constrains the future, but it doesn't absolutely determine the future. So the past leaves the future only relatively determined in terms of its propensities.

Physical models can of course simplify the situation and treat the dynamics of the world as mechanical and time-reversible. But that Newtonian view is known to be an over-simplification both due to the laws of thermodynamics and quantum theory.

If we put all our physical laws together, they tell us the world is a place where the past does constrain the future, but can't absolutely determine the future. — apokrisis

Right. That's my understanding, too.

It uses a symbolic memory and code - like genes, neurons, words - to step back from the world so as to be able to control that world. — apokrisis

That makes sense. It definitely reminds me of the conscious intention of human individuals. Philosophy, for instance, is (among other things) a kind of conquest of confusion and essential danger. The confusion part is obvious. The conquest of essential danger would include rhetorical strategies for making peace with the 'evils' of life, such as personal mortality, perceived unfairness, etc. This is the 'spiritual' side of philosophy, and I'd say that non-objective side.

On the lower levels though, I imagine some codes just replicating more than others. Would control not be metaphorical here? Or a synonym for successful as opposed to unsuccessful replication? (I haven't studied biology closely.)

If we remember that the object of the exercise is the 'I am' bit, then the problem with saying: when you are acquainted with the thought "the bacon smells good", it makes no sense to doubt that you are thinking that thought is that it doesn't explain what is meant by that 'you'. Indeed, there is no need for a 'you' to be involved at all, that reaction to the bacon need be no different in kind to a chemical reaction, where we find no need to posit that there is a 'you' within each chemical that is 'having' that reaction. Or, if we did extend 'you' to such things, that is not the sort of 'you' we were trying to get to, the one with 'consciousness'.

I think it only works the other way round. We must start from 'I am'. How do I know I am? I just do; I have no choice. If I say things like 'I think' it is only because it is founded on an already existing sense of myself, as something that does things. As I say at the beginning; 'I think...' is predicated on that 'I', there can be no 'think' without an 'I', so the 'I' cannot be the conclusion. — Londoner

Are you familiar with Hume's thoughts on the self? Or Sartre's on consciousness and intentionality? If they aren't already familiar to you, then you might like them, since some of the things you are saying remind me of ideas they also wrote about.

I would focus personally on the leap from the use of a single word to the assumption that it is connected to some entity. We use the word 'I' according to mostly unwritten rules. It has something like a cloud of meaning. When we try to be strictly logical with cloudy words, it's not surprising that we don't come to a consensus. On the other hand, we always already 'believe' in the ordinary language that we use to build philosophical systems in the first place, in the sense that we use ordlang without first examining it in order to examine it, in order to double back and question it. So ordlang has a kind of blind knowhow that can double back on itself to illuminate this or that aspect of itself, doing so by taking the rest of itself for granted, one might say.

For me this means that certain philosophers are only attempting to construct false foundations that aren't really propping anything up. In this case, a person could only want to prove that they were thinking if they were using the words in an extraordinary way. They are free to do so, and it may even pay off, but I think the rule is the same old arguments that go nowhere.

Thanks for the questions. Metaphor is a whole new subject; but I think it clear that the mind does not have places. — Banno

I agree that it doesn't make much sense to speak of the mind having physical places. But are you familiar with the expression 'on the tip of my tongue'? I think that's a spatial metaphor for a place right beneath the threshold of consciousness. This threshhold is arguably another metaphor. I say 'arugably' because metaphors tend to become literalized. If the mind does not have places, then perhaps rivers do not have mouths? And this is where I was coming from, the places in the mind are like the mouths of a river, which is to say largely literalized metaphors.

I think it's reasonable to think in terms of a continuum that runs from fresh metaphor (the kind a poet might be applauded for) to metaphor so old and dead that it functions literally. Of course there are structural words in the language and words like 'hand' that I would not call dead metaphors, but I think lots of important words are dead metaphors. Apparently 'spirit' comes from a word meaning 'breathe.' Perhaps breathing or breath functioned as a metaphor for the soul. Perhaps it became so popular, this metaphor, that a new public abstract entity was thereby created. Then philosophers could debate the properties of this entity.

The brain, on the other hand, can provide some interesting material. One will not find a belief by dissecting a brain - but could it be found in an MRI? — Banno

I haven't looked into this, but I can currently only imagine some correlate of belief (some quantitative pattern reliably associated with beliefs or purported beliefs determined through language.) I can imagine a fiercely accurate lie detector, for instance. In short, I think we agree on this particular issue.

But I still think that 'the mind has places' is true when interpreted charitably in the proper context. I'm not too concerned with defending that statement, but rather with giving ordinary language its due. Even philosophers leave their studies and use/understand these kinds of statements fluently.

Some people do, others don't, most couldn't care less. — Rich

I think everyone cares when they are on that operating table. They sure hope that there is a right way to transplant a heart, for instance. And folks also tend to want their words to be binding on others. A relatively uneducated person can be quite fierce about their political reasoning. Of course I agree that not everyone is interested in science and math for their own sake.

My preference is recognizing it as just another human creation and then dealing with it for v what it is. U have no need to gain higher ground by claiming objectivity. — Rich

I don't remember claiming higher ground, but of course I'm aware that this is the basic rhetorical move. I'd say that objective pursuits are about as far as we can get from the endless sophistry. Of course these pursuits can be taken up (from the outside) and used as tokens by the sophist, but that's a triviality and a different issue.

But we don't learn what's possible from the past, we make that up. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, I don't deny a kind of pure creativity. But I think our imaginations mostly manifest influence, and that's what I had in mind.

This is not really a case of the past constraining the future though. Our memories are selective, always incomplete, and sometimes wrong. So it's really a case of the person in the present attempting to use past experience to constrain the future, for the sake of some purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be more exact, I was suggesting that the past constrains the expected future via memory. The expected future is just an image, of course. I don't claim that the future is 'actually' constrained by the past, though I do in fact believe this on a gut level.

I agree with the last sentence quoted. We presently use the past to constrain the future in order to attain some goal. Or rather this is common state. Sometimes we are just daydreaming, of course.

Why would you think that a goal cannot be irrational? Irrational means unreasonable or illogical. Do you not think that a person may at sometime set as a goal something which cannot be obtained by that person? Wouldn't that goal be irrational? — Metaphysician Undercover

Our disagreement here is at most a matter of word usage. I cede that your usage is quite common & I agree that the kind of goal you describe above could be described as 'irrational.'

It's not a function of the past, it's how we relate to the past. And those properties of memory which I mentioned, that 'it's selective and sometimes wrong, indicate that it's really not a function of the past, but a function of the living creature, now. — Metaphysician Undercover

I may have asked for trouble by using a mathematical metaphor. I had f(m(p)) in mind. The expected future is a function of memory which is a function of the past. Hence the expected future would be indirectly a function of the past, mediated by memory, which is obviously not the identity function. And of course these are only mathematical metaphors, which I mention not for you but others.

It exists as a concept as opposed to subjective. Whether a human can be objective, I have yet to find the case. — Rich

If you are saying that humans are biased, then of course. Objectivity is something we pursue. In the case of formal systems there is very little room for bias. Interpreting formal systems from the outside of the system opens up the interstellar spaces for bias.

Exactly. I am saying the concept cannot be applied to anything perceived by humans. Others have their own subjective opinions about objectivity. — Rich

We don't have to see an impossibly perfect instantiation of the concept to apply the concept. I doubt that anyone honestly believes that some disciplines aren't more objective than others. If formal systems give up meaning entirely for almost perfect objectivity, then physical science gives up certain aspects of experience to obtain its own above average objectivity. It's a trade-off.

Yes, people have their faith and their God and their idols. It just seems that it is part of the human character. — Rich

Hey, that statue thing was a joke. But, yes, folks have their idols. Even you and me. But objectivity isn't my idol. It just has its charms.

I suppose what I can't see is what philosophical work you see the notion of Objectivity doing. What do we get from calling mathematics Objective that we don't already have and that is available to someone that says mathematics is just a family of language games, with each language game being based on a set of rules agreed by a certain set of people, and that these language games sometimes seem useful in deciding what to do next? — andrewk

I have only capitalized 'objective' recently as a joke, just to make that clear. For me philosophy is largely about demystification. The demystification of naive views or understandings of objectivity (the deflation of Objectivity) is (for me) old news. I understand myself to be working from a second demystification of philosophical language itself.

For instance, we can say that math is 'just' another language game. We can say that humans are 'just' another animal. But what is this 'just'? It's an intentional ignorance of difference, useful in some contexts and questionable in others. I'm pro-choice, but calling an 8-month fetus 'just tissue' rings false for me. Similarly, putting math on the level of politics strikes me as a bit ridiculous. Yes, we almost universally want murder outlawed. You have picked, however, the least controversial issue possible, with the exception perhaps of laws that protect children. We need only look at real politics (actual controversy) to see the great gap. Or we can look at the endless metaphysical wrangling over the meaning of words. We can look at this very conversation. Educated people can and do disagree on a regular basis about politics and philosophy. But those who are educated enough to read math hardly ever disagree. A student or an expert may be temporarily confused, but generally math is an especially normal discourse. Philosophy, on the other hand, is the supremely abnormal discourse, with a permanent identity crisis --its glory and folly.

I'm not suggesting that there is an absolute gulf between the science of formal systems and other language games, but then I think the concern with absolute gulfs is artificial in the first place. As I see it, it's the philosophers I'm criticizing who need absolute difference, absolute certainty, etc. I see no point in understanding the unqualified word 'objectivity' to have an 'impossible' meaning.


EDIT: On re-reading this, the tone is a little harsher than intended. Too much coffee in Mr. Coffee, perhaps...

You may desire objectivity, but where humans are involved, there never is. What you have possibly it's some concensus within a consenting group - maybe. — Rich

If objectivity doesn't exist, then the word is meaningless. Moreover, if objectivity does not exist, then you are just spouting opinion and bias above. I'm happy with 'reducing' objectivity to a kind of inter-subjective consensus. Others may look for holiness in this or that word, but it's not one of my vices.

To me it's old news, the wisdom of the sophist. All speech is a tool in the hand of irrational will-to-power. Yes and no. It doesn't scare me. It doesn't shatter the gold statue of Objectivity that I keep at the center of a temple of Reason in my back yard. No. It's just ambiguous. That doesn't mean it's worthless or false. It just means that it's unlikely to be objective. How can we agree on something if we don't know what we are agreeing on? I can offer you hundreds of lofty and sinister phrases like that. Having read the wicked books and the 'sentimental'/spiritual books (or enough of them), I'm rarely surprised by personalities these days. It's a special occasion when I bump into a truly original and relevant thinker.

Objective about what if they are meaningless. What is objective about this: _-++&__? — Rich

Are you familiar with formal systems? Or chess? We can discover objective truths about formal systems. I gave you a simple one.

But I can even answer your insincere question. _-++&__? is a finite sequence of symbols from a familiar alphabet containing one ?, one &, two +, etc. Anyone who can read the symbols as ordered from left to right (or right to left) will presumably agree, though some antisocial types might pretend not to (just as others will pretend to need a proof that they exist in another context, lost in vanity.) I count 8 symbols, so the length of that string is 8. These are objective truths in any reasonable sense of the word. On the other hand, we can tease out the meaning of your English words as words (and not strings) indefinitely.

Rules are meaningless without a human interpreting them and applying then. — Rich

Sure, and the sun rises in the morning. Who has or would say otherwise? Are you sure you aren't tilting your lance at windmills here?

Absolutely meaningless until a human applies some subjective interpretation. Often there is all kinds of differences opinion about what math means because of some ambiguity and it ends up in court. I know this from working on insurance policies. — Rich

I think you still haven't grasped the difference between a formal system and the entirely different issue of its connection to practical reality. Formal systems are about as unambiguous as it gets. That's the point. I'm not sure what kind of bold assertion on my part you think you are responding to.

the criterion of objectivity is not necessarily applicable to mathematics (or logic for that matter), as the ‘objects’ of mathematics are only ‘objects’ in a metaphorical sense. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the polite response. I think you might be reading too much into the symbolic similarity between 'object' and 'objectivity.' If you look up 'objectivity,' you'll probably found what I found --no mention of objects but rather an emphasis on lack of bias. Here, also, is the top of the Wiki page on objectivity in the philosophical context:

Objectivity is a central philosophical concept, related to reality and truth, which has been variously defined by sources. Generally, objectivity means the state or quality of being true even outside a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings. — Wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_(philosophy)

This is what I had in mind, and this seems to be the standard definition.

Sure, I won't argue with that. For me there is the 'false' doubt of [metaphysics] and then what I'd call genuine doubt. The notion of (infinitely) strong objectivity is arguably bankrupt if not even the most concrete, formal kind of math makes the cut. Because where is an example of such perfect objectivity? To me it 'smells' like something that comes from theology and Euclid in the first place. It's like the white smoke of an evaporated deity.

As you say, we can 'fall back.' But I'd contend that this pragmatic objectivity is what is usually meant in the first place. So perhaps we don't 'fall' anywhere. Instead it's perhaps a vice of some philosophers to misread ordinary language. (Not aimed at you or anyone in particular, but rather especially at my past self before exposure to OLP and other civilizing influences.)

Speaking of OLP, I like to call our inexplicit linguistic knowhow 'ordlang.' Just as ordlang makes philosophy possible, so an in-explicit grasp of the undefined symbol (along with ordlang, of course) seems to make a science of formal systems possible. This is an analogy I mentioned but didn't stress.
I mention this to emphasize that my claim that formal systems are objective presupposed ordlang, but then so does any pursuit of explicit knowledge, it seems to me.

Constraints of the past restrict the reality of what one can get, or bring about, create, in the future, but they do not put restrictions on what one can want, or desire. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not so sure about this. I think we learn what's possible from the past. We learn a set of acceptable desires. If we have nonconforming desires, we probably justify such desires in terms of still another part of our heritage, the ideology of the philosophical rebels, for instance.

In reality though, thinking is not necessarily clear, accurate, or correct. We often use thinking to rationalize goals which are really irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I use the words, a goal cannot be irrational. I do think I understand what you mean. We want things that are not good for us or won't really make us happy. I understand rationalization to be a kind of self-deception. Our intellectual hygiene can fail when we want something more than this hygiene (and at other times.) And then perfect rationality might be a sort of mirage or ideal. I mentioned formal systems in another thread because I think this is where we get quite close to perfect rationality ---but at the cost of reasoning about intrinsically meaningless symbols.

I agree that thinking can be unclear. In fact it is perhaps usually unclear and only clear enough for this or that purpose. I like a metaphor from computer science. If you want a better floating point approximation of the irrational real number, that will cost you.

This implies that thinking is really a process whereby intentions for the future incline us to make a representation of the past (memory), and bring this representation to bear upon future possibilities. Therefore it is not the actual past which is doing the constraining in the act of thinking, it is really just the representation of the past (memory), and this is why we are prone to making mistakes. — Metaphysician Undercover

How about we put it this way? Memory in the present is a function of the past, and the constraints we project on the future are a function of memory and therefore a function of the past (by composition of functions)? As to why we make mistakes, I think there are lots of reasons. We work with partial information, for one thing, and our 'operating system' which is 'ordinary language' or a 'form of life' is for the most part in-explicit.

So when we make decisions concerning free will and determinism, we must be careful not to consider these representations (memories) as the past constraining the future in a determinist way, because the memories are produced and employed in a free way. The consequence, mistakes. — Metaphysician Undercover

For me constraint and determinism are one and the same. A constraint determines. I still would argue, also, that it is not a given that memories are produced and deployed in a free way. Indeed, I think the continuity of personality, a familiar fact, suggests otherwise. Would you not agree, also, that desires are largely experienced as 'givens'? I find that I am thirsty or attracted to so and so. I cannot decide to be thirsty, though I can decide on an interpretation of an unclear desire. ('I'm in this mood because of X.') The tools I reach for to satisfy this or that desire are usually in memory. Occasionally someone clever combines techniques or even dreams up a new technique.

Remember how "hard free will" appeared as complete randomness? Nobody wants that. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's true, but I had the 'anxiety of influence' in mind. I don't think we like to be boring or cliche. I'll grant that especially fearful types might prefer that to jutting out in an embarrassing way.

And, it's quite evident in communication, and most social activity, we make an effort to be predictable. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we both provided half the truth here. As a courtesy, we try not to scare people off. Living in crowded cities, we need a background of 'programmed' interactions. The alternative would be maddening. But the foreground would be our intimate relationships and our creative work. Here we very much want to be unique in a positive way. Here being predictable is failing. The creative class wages a war against cliche.

Mathematics is not objective. They are meaningless symbols upon which humans apply meaning. — Rich

The meaninglessness of the symbols is one of the reasons that it is objective. There are truths about the game of chess that follow from the rules of chess. For instance, if I have only a king left on the board, then there is no way that I can checkmate my opponent. Proof: I would have to move into check to put the enemy king in check and mate, but I'm not allowed to move into check. If the rules are unambiguous, we can obtain objective knowledge about the game using logic. Or is it just my opinion that a lone king can't achieve checkmate?

Whatever is outputted by a computer (a tool created by humans) must still be interpreted by humans with different opinions. Hence the phrase garbage in garbage out.

Objectivity cannot exist in a subjective human experience. — Rich

It seems to me that you have to deny objectivity altogether to bring this home. You (pretend to) doubt 1+1 =2 and yet present your doubt itself as a binding, objective truth?

The meaning of '1+ 1 = 2' is philosophically ambiguous. If, however, we specify a particular convention or 'game' of dealing with symbols as symbols, then all of this mystery vanishes --within that context.

I'm inclined to think that some philosophy types relish a corona of ambiguity/mystery for its own sake and don't like even limited, clarifying, purpose-specific formalizations. For me, on the other hand, it's beautiful that we can invent 'spaces' in which strong objectivity is possible. In such spaces, a discovered truth stays discovered (and true) and can be more or less exactly communicated. Socially it's a utopia to that extent. The 'tax' on citizenship in this realm is an intellectual hygiene.

Yes - but then you’re in engineering, not philosophy as such. — Wayfarer

Economically I've specialized in science, but I've read many philosophers. I try to avoid name-dropping and an addiction to any particular jargon and instead approach issues in ordinary language. Comprehension/assimilation and the value of the assimilated philosophy itself is manifest or not in what I do with it. You may occasionally recognize a paraphrase of a well-known idea.

Perhaps you'll agree that philosophers can be the silliest kind of people as well as the most brilliant. The genre itself therefore has a mixed reputation. If I am to meet a self-proclaimed philosopher, I don't know whether I'm to meet a windbag who dresses up platitudes in mystification or a forger of new paradigms at the top of intellectual culture.

You’re still concerned with instrumental utility. — Wayfarer

As is every human being. But I am more of a theorist/artist.

I’m not trying to hijack the meaning of the word ‘objectivity’, but to draw attention to that as a criterion. — Wayfarer

I don't think you actually said anything though. It's as if you pointed at something and then mention that you pointed at something. And now that's a footnote? I'm not trying to be rude, and I'm happy to drop it.

This fundamental first step, to overlook the fact that two distinct instances of "a" are not identical in an absolute way and are therefore not actually "the same", for the sake of calling them "the same", is the basic incoherency of logic — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you mean, but I also think logic is impossible without this first step. In other words, the logic you think is violated by the many-to-one map from marks to symbols is itself founded on this map, at least to the degree that it can be formalized. All abstractions seem to include this many-to-one map/function. I see a particular dog and recognize it as a dog by negating its particularity. I place it in a category. It seems to me that knowledge is impossible without this function from particulars to categories.

A similar incoherency is found in the first step of mathematics, relating to the nature of "unity". The numeral "1" signifies a basic unity. The numeral "2" signifies two distinct unities, but also one unity as "two", at the same time. In performing mathematical operations we must overlook the fundament fact that "2" signifies two distinct unities, (just like we must overlook the fact that two distinct instances of "a" are not the same), and treat it as if it represents one unity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I see what you mean. But I think we'd have to get into specific philosophical visions of mathematics. In a unary representation (often used in Turing machine computations), the number that has representation '2' in base 10 has the representation '11' (or '111' if zero is encoded as '1'). I agree that conceptually the number 2 is a unity of basic unities. When numbers are constructed in set theory, they are sometimes sets that contain all preceding numbers, where 0 is the empty set. Or 0, {0}, {{0}}, ... where the 'depth' of the empty set represents the number. In these representations, the nested 'unification' is apparent.

These incoherencies are fundamental to the logical process. Nevertheless we must overlook them, ignore them, to proceed into the logical realm. However, they are significant, and these flaws indicate that mathematics and logic are less than ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think math and logic are pretty ideal. For them not be to ideal, in my view, would mean that we could imagine something better. If we could imagine something better, then that would already be within math and logic, since anything better would conform to mathematical and logical requirements.

Is the language that is 'printable' (as I like to think of it) by a right linear grammar a 'regular' language (recognizable by a deterministic finite acceptor)? Yes. How do we know? Because we have an algorithm for converting such a grammar into an associated DFA. I can be certain of this. I may waver forever about the metaphysical interpretation of the symbols, but a functional understanding of the symbols is enough to establish the theorem. A person might say that math deals with the abstract 'how' of symbols. I don't have to know what they metaphysically are (if this is even meaningful an objective question) to obtain objective knowledge about what is possible with them in particular formal 'games' (models of computation, for instance.)

If you are only saying that 'objectivity isn't everything,' then sure, of course not. But denying the objectivity of math strikes me as an attempt to hijack the usual meaning of a word 'objective.' (I looked it up just to make sure I wasn't imagining things --to make sure that I was being objective.)

The beauty of a symbolic approach to math is its metaphysical neutrality. Can you not relate to the joy of occasionally getting beyond the field of opinion into a field of amusing/useful objective truth? This is made possible by a move from the 'what' to the 'how.' The essential 'what' of the the symbol (apart from the givenness of it), the rules that connect it to other symbols in various ways, is arguably this same 'how.' I can grant that it is not a science of marks. It is roughly a science of symbol crunching, whose objects are publicly available albeit non-physical, at least in part. (The science would be impossible without physical marks for the aid of memory and communication.)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_computation

The point I would make is that mathematics is not necessarily objective, because it's purely inferential or logical - if this then that. — Wayfarer

I suppose what I especially mean by 'objective' here is 'not a matter of opinion.' If physics is objective, this depends on the uniformity of nature, an often implicit axiom of the gut. Math would be objective, I'd argue, as long as the truth of the implications you mention is established. It would rest (ideally) on logic alone, and not on experience and the uniformity of nature. In the theory of computation, not much is used beyond mathematical induction and proof by contradiction. The implications it establishes seem timeless. It seems logically impossible that they should become false.

Do you recognize that it is much more difficult to predict human behaviour in a particular situation then it is the behaviour of the inanimate object? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course.

One can believe the inanimate world to be deterministic without believing in determinism, which relates to human acts. This just requires that one accepts such a fundamental difference between human beings and inanimate things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that this is theoretically possible. At times, I read Sartre to be saying something like that. Consciousness is pure freedom, so I can't really be any of my roles, not even the defender of free will. So Sartre now cannot truly be Sartre five minutes ago. He has to drag his past actions along.This is an attractive theory. It's almost a painting of the ideal situation. We want be to freer and less predictable. We strive to increase our options and the complexity of our behavior. But we do this among others who are somewhat predictable, which is to say among personalities with a certain amount of continuity. The alternative is lots of bodies with 'brand new souls' who aren't essentially tied to what those bodies have done before they arrived (always just now.)

I'm still not seeing where you get this idea from. I think it's quite clear that we behave as if we believe in free will, not as if we believe in any type of determinism. When something is important we take our time to deliberate and make a responsible decision. — Metaphysician Undercover

But what are these same deliberations? Do they not largely involve the likely responses of others to our own actions? Deliberation is a kind of possibility machine. If I try this, then approximately X results. If I had tried this, then maybe I'd have Y rather than Z. We do this in a network of both objects and people. Of course people are far more complicated, and we have more feelings about people. But the calculation in both cases seems to involve a probabilistic constrain on the future in terms of the past. The softness of both determinism and free will is in this 'probabilistic.'

Right. In fact our character recognition is imperfect, but it's not practically a problem. I suppose I would just comment that justifying or making explicit character recognition would happen outside of theoretical computer science (which as I understand it is a kind of pure math.) Actual computers would rely on physics, induction, etc. Roughly, the idea of the deterministic computer seems to be founded on the 'given' understanding of the symbol as symbol. Turing, for instance, assumes that his machine can recognize the symbol in the scanned square. This symbol is something like a Platonic form, though we use marks as an aid to memory. I think Turing wanted his machine to be as concrete and mark-fed as possible, but categorizing marks gives the symbol. Better said, the informal program ability that maps an infinite set of marks to a finite set of intended symbols is assumed. Moreover, the mark printed by the machine is really a symbol if it is to be of value.

Information doesn't comprehend. Mind comprehends information and uses it to create. — Rich

But what is mind if not the is-ness or presence of creatively evolving information? What, in other words, is the mind apart from its contents? We might say that reality is self-organizing, creative information. Of course the word 'mind' remains essential in everyday discourse, so this is an indulgently metaphysical thesis. We might say that temporarily thinking of reality as self-organizing information could be useful/enjoyable. In this frame, 'information' is neither mental nor physical. It is the primary stuff that sorts itself into mental and physical bins for practical purposes. It would be the 'word' in the beginning, without which nothing else is possible. I'm touching on some like this in the thread I started on undefined but distinct symbols at the root of mathematical objectivity.

Humans makes choices and have will (energy applied in a specific direction) that they canexercise to effect that choice. The choices are constrained but unpredictable whichever creates the possibility of creative evolution. — Rich

Yes, I agree. Creative evolution is a good description of personality. It can reasonably be extended to a description of reality itself, which (especially in or through us, so far as we know) is creatively evolving.

I agree. There are habits everywhere in the universe, like a pendulum. — Rich

Right. 'Habits' is a nice word. We think of the universe as habitual and therefore in terms of laws. In the human case, however, we see that humans have a habit of changing their habits. We might then try to find a regularity in the rate or the nature of such changes. We might speak of paradigm changes as involving the change in a dominant metaphor.

Memory becomes an important concept in understanding actions and habits. — Rich

Indeed. Memory seems to be near the center of what it is to be human. The future is a cloud of desired and feared possibility that is shaped from the stuff of memory, one might say. Memory is (one might say) actuality chasing possibility and generating more actuality in this pursuit, and so more memory. Memory is the stain of the actual that has ceased to be actual, in this vocabulary. The memory is itself actual, as memory. The table will not fit in a closet. A memory of the table takes up far less space, and indeed lives in a virtual space that still (as we see it) constrains the future along with the conditions obtaining in physical space.

I agree. An equally unobservable and that is unsupportable by evidence and phenomenon. I just wonder why it is still discussed. — Rich

I think it figures into certain religious and political visions. Sartre believed in something like free will or pure consciousness, at least earlier in his life. It is an ennobling myth. It also justifies punishment and helps the rich understand some of their luck as achievement. On the flip side, a total denial of free will justifies sloth, despair, apathy. As I understand it, life is a game of both chance and skill, like poker or monopoly. The ideal general strategy may still lead to disaster, and a bad strategy in general could work in the particular case.

If the universe is not deterministic we have to figure out what it is. — Rich

I would say that we largely figure out what it is by detecting regularities in experience (determining it more sharply, finding tighter constraints). To be fair, this could be called 'how' as opposed to what it is. Still, an apple is largely (for us) a system of probabilistic relationships. If I eat one every day, it'll probably keep the doctor away, or so they say.

Based upon my own observations, our actions are constrained. The future is simply a possibility in our minds. We take actions based upon the possibilities. — Rich

I agree. The future exists as possibility, and in that sense (because we are future-directed) possibility is higher than actuality. The actual is framed and used in pursuit of the possible, and the possible is itself a function of the actual (including the memory of what was once actual.)