To start, would you not say that an assumption is a species of proposition? — tim wood

No I don't think that this is the case, because a proposition is a type of statement, and one can hold an assumption without stating it. But I don't think this distinction is relevant anyway.

Or perhaps I'm confused: "which claims something about being." What claim can there be about being that is not actually a claim about something else? That is, being, being the supremum genus, has no species and no accidents. How can you predicate anything of being? — tim wood

Yes, this is the difficult thing. We do make claims about such general things, universals. What does it mean to be a human being, to be an animal, to be alive, etc.. Notice that I phrased it as "what does it mean", There are many such examples, what does "colour" mean, what does "number" mean. When we make a statement which claims something about these ideas, we are generally trying to clarify the meaning of the term. Do you agree that this type of expression, clarifying the meaning of terms, is distinct from predication? These claims which we have, hold, or make, about the meaning of the terms, are what I call assumptions.

So if someone makes a claim about "being" this is an expression of what that person believes is the meaning of the term. Maybe it could be called defining the term. If you look, you'll notice that such definitions are generally assumptions. For example, let me take something very simple, like numbers, and start with the numeral "one". That word refers to a unity, an individual. Next we have "two". Two refers to one individual together with another, making an artificial unity of "two". Notice that I distinguished the unity which is referred to by "one", from the unity which is referred to by "two", by calling the latter "artificial" (whether or not this term is adequate is not the point). It is necessary to do this because the use of "unity" which refers to one is distinct from the use of "unity" which refers to two. These are two completely distinct types of unity. "Two" implies that the unity referred to as two, is already intrinsically divided into two, whereas "one" implies divisibility (of infinite possibility), with no such division having been made already. So the unity referred to by "two" is a false unity because it is of necessity already divided. In the use of "two", we must recognize a sort of contradiction, a unity, one thing referred to with "two", which already has a defined division into two equal parts, so it is not really a unity. Whereas "one" represents a unity without any such division. Therefore the "unity" of one is distinct from the "unity" of two, three, four, etc.., and we cannot say that "two" refers to a unit in the same way that we say "one" refers to a unit without equivocation. These are some of my "assumptions" concerning numbers.

I take it this your ontological principal. But in what sense is it just an assumption - and not an induction? — tim wood

This is a good question as well, and I'll tell you what I assume is the answer to it. The problem is that we do not have access to see, touch, or in any way sense the vast majority of things in existence. Therefore we do not have the capacity to make proper inductive conclusions concerning "all things". (Incidentally this is the biggest problem with what I consider the best arguments for God, formulations of the cosmological argument. They start from principles which appear to be inductive principles, but are really not drawn from sound induction, and so are dismissed by atheists as faulty assumptions). This is why ontological principles are better characterized as assumptions rather than inductive conclusions. If we start allowing that these are proper inductive conclusions, it sets a bad example.

Instead, ontological assumptions are drawn from examining all sorts of evidence, and drawing conclusions from who knows what sort of logic, mixed in with different intentions and pragmatic concerns. So it's better to call them assumptions than inductive conclusions.

If you're suggesting - arguing - that predication attributes to a subject, and neither subject nor attribution "touch" the object, then the ultimate predication, being, is also similarly ungrounded. If you deny induction and call it all assumption, then you rule out reason-as-process. For what indeed can you reason about but predication? (The reasoning itself - if you allow for such - being mainly governed by logic.) — tim wood

I don't agree with this. It may be the case that predication is required for deductive reasoning, but there are other forms of reasoning as well. Induction for example, though it often involves predication, does not require it. But, as mentioned it is difficult to draw a line between good induction and faulty induction. We can apply induction, for example, to different activities, deciding whether certain activities are successful for achieving desired ends. The process of trial and error allows us to focus in on the successful activity, and when it is found that a certain activity consistently produces the desired result, we might produce an inductive conclusion concerning cause and effect. The process of determining the correct activity is not a matter of predication, though it is a matter of reasoning.

Nope. You just ruled this out. More accurately, on your approach, is that we recognize samenesses in the predications. Which is exactly what you say just above. . — tim wood

You must have misunderstood what I said. The "sameness" recognized through predication is a false sameness. It is the "sameness" which is found within inductive reasoning (which is really similarity), and is not the "sameness" expressed by the law of identity. That's the problem, Kornelius switched the "sameness" of the law of identity (often called numerical identity), for the "sameness" of inductive reasoning (often called qualitative identity, which is really a similarity), so that the formulation of the law of identity expressed by Kornelius was based in an equivocation of the word "same".

Even on your approach, no. On your approach, you don't have access to an object, so comments about an assumption about an object is an assumption on and about an assumption. You've left yourself no back door to the object. — tim wood

I don't see the basis for this claim, I think it's drawn from a misunderstanding of what I said.

Reading the rest of your post, I see we "assume" the subject into real existence, real objective reality, — tim wood

No, it's the object we assume into existence. The subject has real presence to us, within our minds, but the object is what is assumed. That's why there is such a thing as radical skepticism concerning the sensible world.

Sure, in your Aristotelian sense. — tim wood

We're discussing the law of identity, and this was expressed by Aristotle, and the proper expression of it is maintained as the Aristotelian expression even today. So if we are to understand "the law of identity" we need to understand the Aristotelian principles behind that law. But if your intent is to replace that law with something else, then we ought not call it "the law of identity", because of the risk of creating ambiguity and equivocation.

You above state "that a thing is the same as itself." You call that a law. Is this true of only some things and not others? Or is it instead true of every thing? If it is true of every thing, then it is true for all things. And you can complete this. So how, exactly, do you disqualify your ontological law of identity from being a law of logic? — tim wood

Let me explain the difference. We can define "thing" as "that which is the same as itself", or we can look at different individual things and make the inductive conclusion that all things are the same as themselves. The latter, as explained above, is a faulty inductive conclusion because it is very likely that the vast majority of individual things are hidden from our senses. So, the law of identity, which defines what a "thing" is, is not supported by inductive logic, it's more of a stipulation. Therefore it is not a logical principle, i.e. it is not a logical conclusion. I will not deny that it is supported by some sort of reasons, and some sort of "necessity", but it is more of a necessity in the sense of "needed for" the purpose of understanding, and not in the sense of a necessary conclusion, which requires some sort of understanding as a prerequisite for logical process.

Now, under Aristotelian logic, the assumption is that every category has at least one member. So that on the square of opposition, A implies I. That is, given all, you extract some, at least one - it is all at least existentially qualified. Kornelius, however, informs us that these days existential qualification means at least one, whereas universal qualification does not mean at least one. It means all without affirming that there are any. Which is interesting. I take him as correct in what he says.

In sum, it appears your argument has about it a dog-in-the-manger quality. You claim a "law" as your own (in ontology), which is very clearly a closed circle of argument, and at the same time deny it outside that circle. But the grounds for that denial are as confined as the denial itself. And it seems pretty clear that whatever you claim for, is based in what you claim. Tough circle to get out of, not to be escaped by mere assertion. — tim wood

Again, I do not understand the relevance of this.

can barely handle long posts. If you reply to this, perhaps consider just setting out succinctly your argument against the law of identity being a law of logic. I will grant you have done this in Aristotelian terms - a different argument. But now do it in terms of logic. — tim wood

How would this be possible? To discuss the law of identity in terms of logic would be to reformulate it into logical terms, which would destroy its essence, as Kornelius did.

For the meaning of green is tied directly to what is green. We cannot dispute what is green, without disputing what is "green". Were the Inuit to say, "that, to me, is blue", while pointing to a green thing, he either does not know how to use the word blue, or he is colour-blind in some way. — StreetlightX

There is an undisclosed assumption here which disguises the real issue. The assumption is that there is a real, undisputable, boundary or principle, separating green things from blue things. If instead, you accept as a fact, that there is no such thing as "what green is", or "what blue is", because this assumption is only supported by Platonic Realism, then you might allow that some people see the colour of a thing as blue, while others see it as green, and this is just a fact of life. There is no need to dispute what green really is, only a need to respect individual differences and the reality of idiosyncrasies.

Your (Pitkin's) theory seems to me founded on an easy but unhelpful distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable systems. — bongo fury

It's unhelpful because it's an incorrect representation. "Negotiable" implies a medium between the two, by which the issue would be resolved, resolution of debt through a payment medium, money, for example. But such a medium in this case would be reducible to a Platonic Form. We cannot assume that the medium is some form of negotiated convention, because the issue is whether or not there is a basis, or foundation for such conventions. Therefore this would be a vicious circle, the reason to agree with another, is that the agreement has already been made. But that's nonsense.

So when we move to "justice", from "green", what Streetlight calls "the facts of the world", needs to be rejected because it is only supported by Platonic Realism, which bases these facts in a realm other than this world, the Ideal. And there is no such thing as "the facts of the world", to be considered here.

How is this not a case of equivocation on and confusion over the meaning of the word "same"? — tim wood

If Kornelius changes the meaning of "same" from how it is properly expressed in the law of identity, to prove that the law of identity is logically valid, then this proof is based on an equivocation and therefore invalid due to that fallacy.

But not just adapted and used, but proved within. Not merely borrowed, but thereby made a member of the family. Without (yet) addressing your claim of its being an ontological principle, why cannot it on these grounds just mentioned be a logical principle? — tim wood

No acceptable proof has been demonstrated yet. As I explained, the proof provided is based on an adapted version of the law of identity. And, as I've argued this adapted version actually violates the law of identity as expressed in its proper form.

Without taxing you to comment on these, what is meant by saying the law of identity is an ontological principle? I might be confusing "Principle" with "principle," here.)

Anyway, what is an ontological principle? — tim wood

An ontological principle is a statement, or proposition which claims something about the nature of being. The point I was making is that it is an assumption, rather than something proven by logic.

I believe that to understand why an ontological principle is a fundamental assumption rather than an inductive conclusion requires an analysis of the difference between subject and predicate. Once the subject is distinguished from the predicate as that which is described in the act of predication, then we can proceed toward understanding the distinction between the subject and the object (this might be described in Kantian terms of phenomenon/noumenon). An inductive conclusion is based on predication, and therefore makes a statement concerning a commonality in predication. The sameness which leads to the inductive conclusion is found in the predicate. So the sameness which is referred to with inductive conclusions is a sameness which is produced by predication.

Now we must validate the sameness of the subject, and this is the fact that we call distinct objects by the same name, because they are the same type of object. But this type of sameness can only be validated by predication as well, they are the same type of object, because the same thing can be predicated about them. This leaves us in a vicious circle whereby the object itself is inaccessible, and nothing can be validly said about the object, as Kant described with the concept of noumena.

So to say anything about the object itself, is to simply make an assumption about it. The first assumption that we make is that it is an object, a being, a thing, and therefore it has an identity as such. This is the law of identity, it's based in the assumption that there are real existing things, and that they have within themselves, their own identity, independent of the identity which we give them, which is as a subject. Once we have given the real object real existence, through this assumption, in this Aristotelian manner, we can proceed toward understanding what this real existence consists of, what validates this assumption. This is first and foremost, temporal extension, which the concept of "matter" accounts for.

And to be sure, the law of identity is proved above. That is, it is a valid conclusion in logic. — tim wood

The problem is that the formulation of the law of identity, which Kornelius used in the proof that the law of identity is a valid logical conclusion, is not a true representation of the law of identity. The law states that a thing is the same as itself. Konelius' formulation stated "for all things". So in stating that all things have something in common, they are the same in this sense, Kornelius has already violated the law of identity which states that "sameness" can only refer to the relationship between a thing and itself.

As to the law of non-contradiction, it's not difficult to show that if both p and not-p, then you can prove anything. It follows, then, as a conclusion that you cannot have both p and not-p. — tim wood

That you might be able to prove anything without such a law does not prove that the law is a valid logical conclusion. It only points to the usefulness of the law as a tool for understanding.

So what exactly are you claiming is, and what exactly are you claiming isn't, and what is your argument? — tim wood

The point being argued was the nature of the law of identity. I said it is an ontological principle, and Kornelius argued that it is a logical principle. My point was that despite the fact that the principle may be adapted and used by logic, it is grounded by, and justified by ontology. Therefore it is an ontological principle, not a logical principle, in the same way that ontological principles which are used in science, are not scientific principles despite the fact that they are used by science.

And there you have it... exactly as I initially charged. Talk of information at the level of DNA presupposes agency where none is warranted. — creativesoul

Clearly, agency is warranted, as there is purposeful action, and you've regressed back to your gratuitous assertions.. If you think that the activity which results in DNA replication is not carried out for that purpose, then you ought to be able to show this, with an argument, otherwise you are just making "gratuitous assertions" to support an unfounded assumption.

The idea of making a mistake also presupposes agency/intention. — creativesoul

Huh! Is this your argument? Purposeful acts may be mistaken, therefore acts which are not mistaken are not purposeful. Sorry, but you'll have to do better than that if you really want to demonstrate that the actions which replicate DNA are not intended for that purpose.

In addition, the only way that you can know that a mistake has not been made is if you know both, the intended outcome and the actual. So, that doesn't help your case either. — creativesoul

Actually, I believe that when actions are carried out, producing the same sort of object over and over again, as if by a template, we can conclude by inductive reasoning that these actions were carried out for that purpose. It's an inductive conclusion, because every time that we find such activity, such as machinery on a production line, there is intention involved. In no case do we find such activity without purpose.

And to take activity such as DNA replication, and argue that this is an example of such an activity without intention, would be simply begging the question, insisting that the inductive conclusion is not true in this case, for the sake of invalidating that inductive conclusion. In other words, it's just an unsupported assertion which is designed to undermine the inductive logic. So all you are doing is asserting that this case (DNA replication) is an exception to the rule, for the sake of invalidating the rule, such that the rule cannot be applied universally, and your case (DNA replication) may be accepted as an exception to the rule. Perhaps you might have some other examples which would back up your assumption that the rule might not apply universally?

Nobody except perhaps a religious fundamentalist is likely to question 'the age of the universe', because current views on the matter consensually 'work'. Therefore the issue of 'reasonableness' is vacuous. The question is a 'straw man'. However it is also the case that views about 'time' and 'universe' are human constructs open to revision on the basis of 'better' paradigms. — fresco

If our understanding of time, and the universe, are open to revision, then how is it inappropriate to question the age of the universe? Unless we question this, we will not derive those necessary revisions.

So my thoughts are not so much about truth, the truth that comes to us through social conventions, but the idea that logical decisions are right and therefore the best decisions made. Our love affair with this idea, the seduction of it, blinds us to the errors we make in the name of logic. Which is why I asked is thinking logic? I don’t think it is. — Brett

The point I was making, is that the logical conclusion is only as good as the premises. But it may be as you say, that people believe that logical decisions are "the best" decisions. I think this belief is false, "the best" decisions are the ones which we make in judging the premises. However, we tend to accept and reject premises without making the appropriate effort to judge them properly because we are already conditioned to accept some things and reject others. That's prejudice.

This part, I believe, is true. But then what is thinking without emotion? — Brett

Logic is thinking without emotion. Judging premises is thinking with emotion mixed in.

Can you make clear exactly what that last clause means? — tim wood

Isn't it obvious? Not one of the three fundamental laws of logic is a valid logical conclusion. For example, suppose there are rules which must be followed in order to produce a valid logical conclusion. It is impossible that the rules themselves are valid logical conclusions, because they are necessarily prior to any logical conclusion.

What is the goal of DNA replication, and who's goal is it? — creativesoul

The goal of that activity, which is commonly called DNA replication, is to produce two sets of DNA from one. Is that not obvious to you? There is activity, and the goal of that activity is DNA replication. I couldn't say who's goal it is, but that's the way goal oriented behaviour is. It's common that we cannot say who's goal it is in many cases of intentional activity. People often work together in groups, and the goal is communal. Who's goal is a communal goal? I couldn't tell you who's goal it is for me to follow the laws of the state, and various ethical rules. Nor can the RNA and proteins tell you who's goal it is for them to carry out the actions required to produce the replica DNA. But there's no doubt that this is goal oriented activity, because it is repeated over and over again, like a machine, consistently, with the same results, with very little if any mistake..

Just because we cannot identify the agent does not mean that there was not agency. When we come across physical evidence which indicates that an action was carried out with intention, for a purpose, and the agent is nowhere to be found, we do not conclude that the action was not carried out with intention, just because we cannot identify the agent. Agents are often stealthy in their actions. And, when we come across machinery in action, we can know that it was set up with intention, regardless of whether the agent that built the machinery is present.

Right, I see your reference supports my description very well. The introduction provides an almost exact rendition of what I said:.

In a very broad sense, agency is virtually everywhere. Whenever entities enter into causal relationships, they can be said to act on each other and interact with each other, bringing about changes in each other. In this very broad sense, it is possible to identify agents and agency, and patients and patiency, virtually everywhere.[1] Usually, though, the term ‘agency’ is used in a much narrower sense to denote the performance of intentional actions. This way of thinking about agency has a long history in philosophy and it can be traced back to Hume and Aristotle, among other historical figures. — Stanford

Notice, the "very broad sense", in which the toilet bowl cleaner is an agent, an entity interacting with other entities. Then there is the distinction which I made, which gives us the "narrower sense".

The only difference, is that in describing the "narrower" use of the term, Stanford uses the term "intentional", whereas I used "purposeful". By what reasoning do you insist that the actions which constitute DNA replication are not intentional, or purposeful? I think it is quite clear that these actions must be intentional. These are very complex interactions which are capable of producing two extremely similar copies of DNA from one, and consistently do, with an incredibly high degree of accuracy, there is virtually no mistake. How could such extremely complex interactions be simply random interactions of inanimate agents, like toilet bowl cleaner, producing copies of DNA? Don't you think that these actions must be purposeful, or intentional?

According to the common definition, an intentional act is one carried out for a purpose. So, taking the evidence, that the actions which replicate DNA, are extremely precise and consistent, in producing the replication with virtually no mistake, along with the additional premise, that when an extremely complex set of actions is repeated over and over, to produce the same result, those actions are carried out for the purpose of producing that result, we can conclude that these actions are carried out for that purpose, or "intention". On what basis would one argue that the actions which lead to the replication of DNA are not carried out for the purpose of replicating the DNA?

It appears to me, like you have adopted the false assumption that only beings with complex thought/belief may carry out intentional actions, and this has skewed your way of looking at things. But in reality, we see purposeful (intentional) acts throughout the realm of living beings, as well as within the various parts of living beings. Intention pervades all the activities within a living body, as these acts are carried out for their various purposes, including maintaining the existence of the body. When we see that a living being such as a human being, as a whole, a unit, acts with intention, this is just a reflection of the intention which exits within the living being, by which all the various parts of the being act with purpose or intention.

Yes,I think so. But are you suggesting it’s formed by the conventions of society? I don’t think you are, but a couple of sentences aren’t clear to me. — Brett

I think that what is the case is that we tend to take this skill, the skill of determining the truth, for granted. When we take it for granted, we believe that it is naturally handed to us from the conventions of our society. So it's like learning morals, or learning language, we naturally pick up on the conventions of the society which we live in, and these are our truths. This is based in taking it for granted that the conventions of our society are the "truths". So when we judge premises, we naturally judge truth and falsity according to the conventions which we take for granted.

However, in a society such as ours, with a vast variety of distinct publications, and numerous different people using different media forms for different purposes, we are exposed to distinct conventions which may be inconsistent with each other. In this case, we might choose our "truths" according to what appeals to us on an emotional level. To avoid the problems involved with this, we need to learn that skill of determining the truth, even though it is not taught in the educational institutions, because what is taught is the conventions, which might vary from one institution to another. So we need to ask, what is this skill, and how can we hone it?

Until you say what you think "agency" is, then your use of the term in any argument is not warranted. I said what agency is, and distinguished two forms, and "agency" in DNA replication is warranted according to that definition. You reject my definitions and seem to have some delusion about some form of "agency" which only beings with complex thought/belief can have, but until you describe what this "agency" is, you're just blowing smoke

The seduction. What’s doing the seducing? — Brett

What seduces us is the logic itself, as well as the premises. We tend to think that if it's logical then it's true. But we forget about checking the premises for truth, so the premises tend to appeal to our emotions.

There is an aspect of critical thinking which is highly neglected in the modern educational institutions of western society, and that is the skill of assessing premises. This skill involves things like understanding inductive reasoning, and recognizing abuses of language such as equivocations, and definitions produced for the sake of a desired conclusion. It is a type of common sense, or intuition. The problem is that we tend to take this skill for granted, as if it were a skill which is naturally gleaned just from existing as a human being within a society. In reality we naturally recognize what is believed as true according to the conventions of the society. But with the explosion of publication, and various forms of media within western society over the past several hundred years, conventions have become varied, scattered, and inconsistent. Now the skill of assessing the truth and falsity of premises cannot be absorbed simply by being within a society, it must come from some other source. .

So far, the only thing that logic has helped with is recognizing that a $48 savings on line is a better deal than full price at a store and that the subtle light green shading will not affect wear. Logic did nothing for the slight unease I felt (feel) about the coloring. I suppose I can send them back if they are ugly. — Bitter Crank

The appeal to logic is an extremely useful advertising tool, far more effective than the appeal to emotions and sentiments, because logic is more universal. Instead of trying to tell you, or influence you in relation to what you want, or need (old school advertising), the logical approach is directed toward those who have already decided what they want, demonstrating with logic, that here is the place to get it. Be aware of the possibility of false premises, "normally $175", for example, or black market counterfeits.

You win, Meta. You win. The Ajax(a household cleaning agent) that I clean my toilet with has agency. The cleaning is the agency. Perfectly reasonable talk in this context. Fer fuck's sake. — creativesoul

The point being, if you propose that there is a special sort of thing, called "agency", which only beings with complex thought/belief have, i.e. that complex thought/belief is required for "agency", then you need to describe what "agency" refers to, in order to distinguish this special type of "agency" from the type of agency that things like household cleaning agents have.

If you distinguish this special type of "agency", by saying that the agent acts for a purpose (final cause), as I proposed, then the actions of DNA replication fall into the same category as the actions of a being with complex thought/belief, acting for a purpose.

But you claim that there is a distinction to be made between the activities of DNA replication, and the activities of a being with complex thought/belief. On what principle do you base such a distinction? Is it the principle of moral, or legal responsibility? Beings with complex thought/belief can be held morally and legally responsible, while other beings cannot. If so, how would this support your claim that there is no information in DNA, and no meaning in the activity of DNA replication? Why would meaning and information be confined to the communion of beings with moral and legal responsibility and denied from the communion of cells with DNA?

.

You've a habit of calling premisses assumptions. — creativesoul

Yes, many premises are assumptions. And since you have yet to provide any support for that premise, it appears I am most likely correct in calling it an assumption.

You've take a strong stance against anything and everything I've offered. Hand waving. That's all you've done — creativesoul

Actually, I've offered definitions and explanations. You've given me only hand waving, asserting over and over again that agency requires complex thought/belief, without any evidence or argument to support this premise.

You want others to think/believe and/or agree with you that inanimate matter - rocks nonetheless - have agency. — creativesoul

There are many inanimate agents. Have you no education in chemistry? There are reducing agents, oxidizing agents, catalysts are agents, etc.. And "agency" is the act of an agent.

Agency requires thought/belief. Inanimate matter has none. — creativesoul

There you go again, repeating your assertion, without argument. However, as I've explained, agency does not require thought/belief, that's something you've just made up, as a premise to support some sort of argument. Of course it's a very unsound argument you have there, because your premise is very false.

This is simply not true. Physicists use light. — Fooloso4

In the International System of Units (SI), the unit of time is the second (symbol: s ) . It is a SI base unit, and it has been defined since 1967 as "the duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium 133 atom".[12] This definition is based on the operation of a caesium atomic clock. These clocks became practical for use as primary reference standards after about 1955 and have been in use ever since. — Wikipedia

Strange loops are inherently unpredictable. So yes, you are right that we cannot understand acts in terms of their consequences. Their consequences will be innumerable and unforeseeable. But we knew that , and it does not make this description wrong. — Banno

You're right, it doesn't make the description wrong. But a description which doesn't help us to understand the thing being described is generally not very useful, and therefore not very good.

I agree with you that "moving information from one head to another" is not a very good description of language. But I think "strange loops" to describe the relationship between actions and consequences, is a step in the wrong direction. In this sense, your description is wrong. If a move toward clarity in a description, is the right direction, you've moved in the wrong direction.

The relation between actions and consequences is a temporal relation. We move forward in time, lineally. "Moving information from one head to another" is consistent with how we understand the passage of time, in terms of entropy. "Loops" is not consistent. You have provided no descriptive mechanism to get us out of the entrapment of this paradigm of temporal understanding "entropy", to a new paradigm where "loops" and feedback into a system, actually makes sense. Such an image requires that there are systems, with boundaries. The description cannot be successful until the boundaries are determined. "One head to another" already assumes the necessary boundaries. If you deny these boundaries you no longer have separate systems, and therefore nothing to support the image of loops. If you allow the boundaries, then you need to account for the learning capacity within the system, such that feedback can be a learning experience. But this requires a comparison of temporally distinct events, memory, and the act of comparing. So it's not a loop we're talking about, it's memory, comparison of temporally distinct events, and judgement.

The juxtaposition of free will and determinism is a nonsense. Neither is coherent. What we do have is a complex looping of act and consequence — Banno

That's a vicious circle. If one truly has a desire to understand acts, and the causes of acts, which is integral to philosophy, then one would very quickly see that we cannot understand the causes of acts as a looping of the consequences of acts. That's rather nonsensical, like say that the effect is the cause of the cause.

As I said, there is good reason not to support old flags. But I never said that any flag was a symbol of racism.

This looping is not simple; it is strange. It traverses from level to level, between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics unexcused. It provides the illusion of free will. It is not limited to the self, nor the mind, nor the body, nor the various items that together make up the physical world. — Banno

How does "looping" provide the illusion of free will? For that matter, how is free will any more of an illusion than any supposed relationship that an individual has with any other individual, or any other thing? How is free will less real than "the complex interaction one has with the world"? Isn't free will necessary for that interaction?

It seems to me that the relationships we have with others are far more illusory than free will is. I can move my hands, arms, or get up and move at will, and this is extremely clear to me, but the relationship between myself and others is something which is vague and illusory.

One sees, reaches out, touches, holds, puts down. One is not situated passively, doomed only to absorb information. — Banno

Isn't this an attestation to the reality of free will, right here?

Case closed. — creativesoul

I'm still waiting for the argument to demonstrate that this claim, "agency requires complex thought/belief", is a conclusion rather than a gratuitous assertion. Continuing with gratuitous assertions is really proceeding in the opposite direction.

OED: agent, 2. a) person or thing that exerts power or produces an effect. b) the cause of a natural force or effect on matter.

As I said, one can distinguish agents which act for a purpose, from agents which do not act for a purpose, through the principles of final cause. But your assertion that agency requires complex thought/belief is nothing other than ridiculous. As is your claim that this is a conclusion rather than an assumption. Don't you agree that we need to root out such faulty assumptions, and get rid of them? Why keep asserting it when it's so obvious that the assumption is so wrong?

Complex thought/belief is required for agency. — creativesoul

This is false, there is agency in inanimate activity. It appears like you are attempting to create an unwarranted boundary between the "agency" of complex thought/belief, and the "agency" other living things. No such boundary exists. It would be completely arbitrary to draw a boundary between living beings with complex thought/belief (and therefore agency according to your arbitrary requirements for "agency"), and living beings without complex thought/belief.

I want to see true premises, and valid logic, to support your claim that agency in DNA replication is unwarranted, not arbitrary definitions to support a faulty assumption.

There is a distinction between purposeful and non-purposeful agency, which is supported by the principles of final cause. But I think it would be extremely difficult, and futile to argue that DNA replication is not purposeful activity, because clearly the actions involved are carried out for the purpose of replicating the DNA. How could anyone believe that this activity is not purposeful? And so biologists use the linguistic terms of "information", "transcription", and "translation", in describing this activity. Furthermore, there is an extremely high degree of accuracy in this activity which far surpasses any human linguistic capacity for accuracy (except perhaps in mathematics).

This conflates existential dependency and meaning. Existential dependency is causal. Meaning is attributed. So, the conflation between causality and meaning rears it's ugly head, yet again — creativesoul

It's all attributed. We say, by way of logical conclusion, that B is causally dependent on A. So "existential dependency" is attributed. And again, you are attempting to create an arbitrary and unwarranted boundary.

But the way I see it, meaning is not only correlation - it’s much more than that. If we equate meaning with correlation, then we may find ourselves arguing about whether or not DNA has sufficient agency to attribute meaning, for instance. — Possibility

Is there no use for this argument? If it can dispel a false, and very misleading assumption, I think the argument is quite useful.

The claim I objected to was this:

I cannot overlook the backdoor smuggling of agency when there is none warranted. All talk about information being within cells, rna, dna, etc. dubiously presupposes meaning where there is no creature/agent capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

Show me your argument to support the claim that agency is not warranted in DNA replication. Something is establishing a correlation between two distinct things, distinct sets of DNA. And as I explained to Terrapin Station, this is very clearly a meaningful relation (without it we wouldn't exist). The meaning involved in the correlation between a proposition and a state of affairs, depends on the meaning involved in DNA replication, for its existence, because without DNA there would be no propositions.

So, where's the argument to support what you call a "conclusion", (rather than what it really is, an assumption), that agency is not warranted. It appears to me, like you start with the assumption that agency is not warranted in DNA replication, and this false assumption has a negative affect on your understanding of "meaning".

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

That is an important point. We produce the idea of a world, a universe, the world existing for a year, ten years, a thousand years, a billion years, etc.. We produce all these ideas from our own experience of time passing. The passing of time is a fundamental aspect of our experience which allows us to produce these ideas. But we haven't even the foggiest notion of what the passing of time actually is. So the situation is that we experience the passing of time, and we create a world, a universe, from this experience, but since we have absolutely no idea of what the passing of time really is, we absolutely cannot establish any real relationship between the proposed existence of the world, the universe, and the passing of time. Until we conceive the true essence of the passing of time, speculations about the world or the universe, billions of years ago, are just projections of one's own experience (if I would have been there at that time, I think I would have experienced things like this), but we do not have the foggiest idea of what it means to be present at a time, so such speculations are not philosophically useful. Before we can make any useful propositions about the world existing at a particular time, we need a determination of what existing at a particular time really means, of which we seem to have absolutely no idea.

That's not an assumption. It's a conclusion. — creativesoul

I see, a conclusion without an argument. "Gratuitous assertions won't do."

Hi, andreiachim, welcome to the game.

...mastering the history of video game titles... — andreiachim

The history of video game titles?

Quite unlikely. The obvious answer is Nike just trying to manage a somewhat surprising situation in the best possible way. The idea that they 'planned' this all along is quite silly. You don't make a shoe that is then planned to be pulled off out of negative feedback from an athlete that is promoting your stuff. That isn't cunning marketing plan. — ssu

I agree with Harry. To create a controversy is one of the oldest publicity tricks in the book. And, since the negative feedback was from an insider, that's more evidence that it was a planned event. What's more, is that there are now limited edition collector item shoes out there, and whoever has a pair is set to make a big profit.

Has anybody here actually agreed or defended Colin Kaepernick's view that the Betsy Ross flag is a symbol of hate and an offensive slave-era emblem? — ssu

I did.

The flag represents the political state, and the political state exists as the ideology, which is gone because we do not support it. Why ought we support that flag? — Metaphysician Undercover

Meaning is something that individual people do. — Terrapin Station

What people do is activities. There is meaning in activities, but actions are not meaning.

I don't think it makes a lot of sense to try to quantify thing/process A versus thing/process B as "more meaningful"--at least not in general. It can make sense a la the report of an individual, where they're telling us something about the extent to which they think about A versus B in terms of meaning. — Terrapin Station

I don't believe that you believe this. I'm sure you must see some activities as more meaningful than others.

In any event, this is avoiding the point I was making and what I was asking. I explained how it makes sense to talk about DNA "matching" something. That's referring to a physical process, inherent in the properties of the substances involved, that results in something with similar structure, etc. being fashioned out of particular substances. In what similar way would we be talking about matching when we're talking about propositions and states of affairs? — Terrapin Station

You didn't make a point. I was talking to Creative about "meaning", not propositions. And Creative seemed to be denying meaning from DNA replication on the mistaken account that nothing is making a correlation in DNA replication and the incorrect assumption that there is no agent involved in DNA replication. So to simply attempt to change the subject, and introduce "propositions and states of affairs", does not make a point at all. To make a point, you would need to say how the correlation between two sets of DNA is related to the correlation between propositions and states of affairs. Until then, you're asking me to compare apples and oranges. That's why I answered you by saying that I believe one is more meaningful than the other. What else are you looking for?

As I said, if you plan to argue that there is no agent involved in the correlation between replicated DNA, I think you have a very silly argument on your hands. Activity implies agency, necessarily. Directed activity, like we find in DNA replication, implies activity with a purpose, which is a special type of agency described by "final cause".

So, a new way of doing business. Stir the country up with issues of racism, then watch the stock market. — Brett

The example was set by the present day American president, except the polls were being watched rather than the stock market (not much difference there though).

One thing I brought up in another thread about this is that we could say that two things "match" when they're structurally similar--for example, two shirts that we'd loosely call "the same shirt."

But when we're talking about the correlation between a proposition and a state of affairs, surely we're not saying that they're similar in that way, are we? (And beside that, extramentally, we have nothing to make a determination that they're similar.)

With the DNA example you use, we're talking about a physical process that manipulates materials in a particular way. If we're proposing this for a way that correspondence can work when it comes to something like truth value, what analogous (to DNA) physical process are we talking about? — Terrapin Station

The issue is "meaning". I think there is far more meaning in two extremely complex things like DNA which happen to match, than there is in the correlation between a proposition and a state of affairs. In comparison, the correlation between a proposition and a state of affairs is extremely simplistic, while the correlation between replicated DNA is extremely complex. Don't you think that the complex correlation is far more meaningful than the simplistic correlation?

Proposition: (1) is not logically valid, where (1) refers to the proposition (∃x)(x=x) (∃x)(x=x)(\exists x) (x=x) — Kornelius

That's the point, the law of identity is a metaphysical assumption, so of course it's not logically valid.

The Law of identity is held as a law that is logically true. — Kornelius

No, the law of identity is not held as a law which is logically valid. It is held to be true, and perhaps even sound, depending on how you define "sound", but it is not held to be logically valid. The three fundamental laws, identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, are all held to be true, but not one of them, on its own, is logically valid.

Does CK want to separate (somebody, himself, whoever) from the American Revolution? Maybe he feels it was an inadequate revolution? Too bourgeois? Just a bunch of privileged anti-tax whiners? Not a revolution for the slaves? Perhaps his criticism was too timid? — Bitter Crank

There was a civil war (whatever that means), and there were reasons for that war. The flag is a symbol of the political state, and there are many degrees of separation between the political state at the time of the American Revolution and now. As much as we may celebrate our independence with fireworks, military parades, or whatever the hoopla, there is separation between the political state then and the political state now. The name "Rome", carries on, and we think Rome has been around for thousands of years. There could even be a Romulus and Remus day, celebrated by some with great fireworks, but that political state is gone. The flag represents the political state, and the political state exists as the ideology, which is gone because we do not support it. Why ought we support that flag?

Hilarious over-analyzing and indignation over what is a straightforward non-issue. — Maw

Nike likes to create the sensational non-issue. It utilizes the oldest trick in the advertising book, free publicity from controversy. And since they're very careful to choose a non-issue, it can't backfire. Ever think it may have all been a setup? How many "discontinued shoes" are there going to be out there in the world, as expensive collectors items?

Got an argument, or perhaps minimal criterion for correlation(what all correlation is existentially dependent upon)? — creativesoul

Argument? If you do not believe that there's a correlation between the two distinct instances of DNA, when DNA replicates, then just say so. But I think that's a silly argument on your part.

The US dime used to bear what was a symbol of Italian fascism--the bundle of sticks and an axe called the fasces. It was an ancient Roman symbol. — Bitter Crank

The word "fascism" is actually derived from that Latin bundle word, "fasces", as is "fascine" which is a type of faggot. But the English, "fasten", is supposed to have a completely different, Germanic origin. Isn't that fascinating? The English can fasten up a faggot without being fascist. Well of course, not even if you're the fastest to fasten up a bundle, it doesn't mean you're fascist. None of this could be fastenating though, because "fasten" only sounds similar "fascin", and has a similar meaning, but they're different words. So they must be spelled differently to ensure that separation.

And, there's a reason why the American flag has fifty stars and not some other number. Though it might be history, there is a separation here. What was once an accepted symbol may not be acceptable today, if it reminds us of something we want to separate ourselves from.

All things are identical to themselves. Which is exactly the formulation I discussed and exactly the principle that implies nothing with respect to the number of existant objects. — Kornelius

Do you not recognize the difference between "a thing", and "all things"?

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. What justifies you formulation, that all things are the same as themselves, other than induction? The law of identity is not an inductive principle.

The whole is the interdependent things, there is no sense in saying that these interdependent things are independent, independent from what? — leo

Doesn't "whole", as a complete unity, signify to you, an independent thing?

All talk about information being within cells, rna, dna, etc. dubiously presupposes meaning where there is no creature/agent capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

When DNA replicates, it's quite clear that something is making a correlation between distinct things. If there was no correlation, it would not be a replication. So if agency is necessary to draw correlations between distinct things, then agency must be involved in DNA replication.

Push hard enough on the notion of information and a conflation between causality and meaning takes place — creativesoul

What are you saying, that information is meaning with causal power? But you wanted to remove agency, that's what I objected to. Meaning cannot be causal without agency. The form of causation here is commonly called "final cause", what you refer to as "the intent to acquire a desired result", and agency is implicit within this concept of "intent". Clearly, when we speak of "information" in this way, the assumption of agency is warranted, and cannot be overlooked.