Zizek's essays on violence are relevant here. Discussing the Paris riots (2005 - or thereabouts), and recent terrorist attacks, he argues that what the protagonists lack is a positive narrative. Even those who claim one, such as Islam, are in fact fighting from a position within, and naturally at the bottom of, a western/capitalist world view.

The message underlying the violence and destruction is purely and simply self expression, with no higher meaning or purpose.

This leads to two, hopefully relevant, questions: can we choose our metanarratives; and is it necessary to accept the wider social/cultural environment in order to function, as a "social animal" at all?

Couple of points. First, Socrates was not killed. He was ordered, and agreed, to kill himself.

Secondly it was not accidental, nor a failure on his part. In The Apology, which, with corroboration from other contemporary sources, is regarded as largely historically accurate, Socrates was first ordered into exile. After this judgement he gave a speech so provocative - he demanded that Athens provide for his basic needs while he continued his program of undermining the positions espoused by those who considered themselves wise - that the jury had little choice but to order him to drink hemlock. He did this, at the age of 87 (and after refusing to act on a plan for his escape - see Plato's Crito), to ensure his place in history. To see to it that we would still be discussing his philosophy two and a half millennia later. It should be noted that to have one's name pass into history is what the Athenians regarded as immortality.

Context here is key. Socrates' position is that no - one, especially not some arrogant 18 year old brat, should be certain that what they believe is true. This is not an absurd Pyhrronian scepticism, it is the refutation of hubris. The realisation that our fragile, mortal selves are incapable of attaining absolute metaphysical truth, and that there will always be better answers beyond our grasp.

I've read very little anarchist literature, largely, as mentioned, because I consider it fanciful. This is not to say that I don't sympathise with the aims and principles elucidated.

In previous posts I think I have misunderstood what we mean by alienation. Or perhaps that there is considerable ambiguity in the concept itself. If we are discussing the ignorance and distance we all have from the production of what we consume, then this seems inevitable, though with troubling consequences. As you point out, how do we know that our air and water are clean?

Another interpretation of alienation is, again, as you say, the Marxist version. Workers are alienated from what they themselves produce. This is far more troubling. Even among the obscenely rich there are those (Soros, for example) who decry the vast, and in recent decades, widening, gulf between workers and owners wealth. However, I find the recognised alternatives, such as socialism or communism, to be worse than the problems they solve.

This, not least, because the various factions tend to collapse into mutual antagonism. The Communist Manifesto (which isn't a manifesto at all - it's a prophecy) provides a quintessential example. The final, and by far the longest, chapter consists of an aggressive refutation of various forms of socialism.

The French and Russian revolutions provide fair evidence of the flaws of their ideologies. In each case, temporary euphoria has rapidly given way to pragmatic concerns which proved insurmountable until the imposition of a brutal totalitarian regime.

Thank you for the recommendations, by the way, especially LeGuin. Haven't read a good political sci-fi in some time.

Chomsky argues that anarchism is not disorganised, but is instead organisation without hierarchy. Fanciful as this may sound, it does offer a potential to alleviate the "inherently bad" aspect of (corporate) organisation without the wanton destruction of everything we rely on for our survival.

If we assume, for the sake of argument, that this is at least theoretically true, is a consequence of this that alienation from production is not an important factor in our lives?

On a different note, are we really, relatively speaking, all that alienated? Does a monkey know how fruit is produced?

Amusing, but no. I chose the name Shatter as a deliberately pretentious allusion to my desire to rip the guts out of the vain, ignorant, indolent society of which I find myself a part.

As to effective ethics resulting from a healthy balance between reason and emotion, it does sound good, Aristotalean moderation and so forth, but I can't help feeling that if it was as simple as that someone would have sussed it out by now.

This and so many other theories proposed share the assumption that there IS a morally correct way to behave. I find this problematic.

I submit that morals are not discovered, they are created. They are a consequence of the way we share the experience of social life. All well and good, but we don't, at least in the so called civilised world, belong to a single social group. What is the right thing to do if the demands of your workmates contridict those of your local community? What if legal obligations (which routinely claim to be a manifestation of absolute morality) would involve a betrayal of family?

Is it possible that we fail to grasp morality because we are grasping at air?

The fundamental disagreement here seems to be between those who believe that simply working for oneself, or one's family, is better than working for someone else and using the proceeds to provide for oneself etc.

It seems to me that if the former suggestion was valid we would never have "progressed" to the advanced industrial societies we live in today. I build electrical installations, someone else arranges for me to have food and drink. Would I do a better job of providing all of these requirements myself? Emphatically no! I cannot be an expert in everything.

"Moral police" is a fascinating phrase. Maybe I've just read too much Orwell, but doesn't it seem rather ominous, as though such a group would be (or is) ironically, profoundly immoral?

As such, I accept that having morality enforced by an external source is an anathema. However, this doesn't mean that my personal emotional attitude is morally right either.

For example, the hatred I feel for the **** who stole my girlfriend is, even to me, clearly not morally right. How are we to figure out which emotions are morally right except through the application of reason?

As a philosophical sceptic, I'm essentially bound to accept the possibility that any argument may be valid. I'm struggling with this one, though.

When you say that you are "certain of everything", I assume you're not suggesting that everything you think is necessarily true, since this would qualify as ludicrous narcissistic drivel. This only leaves one other option; that you only accept an opinion if you can find no room for doubt.

As to the latter, without providing a basis for absolute certainty, aren't we in effect reduced to the Socratic position that nothing is certain, except for our own lack of certainty?

@unenlightened

You're saying that the subjective/objective distinction is metaphorical?

This is a purely metaphorical duality, surely? As such, it seems to be a dangerous one. Easy as it is to conflate our subjective perspective with objective truth, and given how emotionally charged gender discussions tend to be, wouldn't it be better to avoid this anthropocentrism?

Seems to me that we're assuming a universal standard for pleasure here. I used to play (rock) music, but have since discovered that I am much happier working as an electrician. I assume that many, if not most, people do not feel the same way.

I still love music, but I take much greater pleasure in listening than playing.

My point is: if the renumeration were equal, ie.the same pay, risk, women's underwear etc. would we all choose the same vocation? I doubt it.

Then again; does this simply mean that some are more interested in pleasure than others, or do we take pleasure in different things?