What do you mean not actually solving it? How isn't the demonstration that the problem doesn't exist in the first place a solution to it? It resolves the entire conundrum that arises out of it. — Agustino
Assuming that your present teleological distinctions represent complete descriptions is the same inductive leap which you accuse Hume of fumbling... I don't get how you you actually demonstrate that there is no induction problem...
We should employ Aristotle's "four causes" model because this model enables us to do ontology and metaphysics - in other words it enables us to understand the structure of reality and the way things fit together with each other. The approach to knowledge of modern science is opportunistic - it aims to create models of the world which enable predictability and which can be translated into mathematical terms. This isn't a problem so long as all you do with it is calculate and predict - but it is a problem if you are trying to understand the nature of reality. The motivation of the activity you engage in will alter the decisions you take, which can lead you to become blind to certain other truths.
The scientific approach, for this reason, offers merely useful models, but there are problems with those models when you attempt to abstract an ontology from them without any other theoretical alterations. They don't much care for coherency except in-so-far as it is required for predictability. This is exactly the disagreement MU and I are having with apokrisis in another thread - the metaphysics science adopts is opportunistic and does not much care for coherency. — Agustino
The problem with ontology and metaphysics though is that they tend to prevent us from doing good science:
In constructing your categories and classifications, you imbue your prior assumptions about "the structure of reality and the way things fit together" into their framework and case-work .
People like to point out that today's science might be tomorrows pseudo-science due to new evidence... This is actually a good thing though; science creates categories and descriptions like "mass" and "electron" but it does not open with the assumption that these labels and categories necessarily represent objective, complete, and universal truth (such as in many ontological approaches). Science leaves room for it's initial assumptions and place-holder models to continuously improve, whereas the assumptions involved in the four cause model are either permanent or quite difficult to alter.
So I guess your induction jump, and is ought
gap transfer (yay skateboarding!) goes a little something like this:
P1: There are objective categories and classifications that things belong to, and homo-sapien sapien is one of these categories.
P2: observing humans allows me to define elements of the objective homo-sapien sapien category
P3: humans who willfully deviate from the objectively human set of behaviors are bad/immoral humans
P4: promiscuity is not an objectively human behavior
C1: it can be stated with objective and normative certainty that willfully engaging in promiscuity is immoral
Premise one isn't so controversial, but as I've pointed out there are issues with assuming that the human category will be clean and straightforward like cups and watches. Premise two is where the induction problem rests, and I don't actually see how you demonstrate it doesn't exist by assuming it doesn't. Premise three I think is controversial mostly because it works from a limited (narrow) conception of the human category and the assumption that all humans must share every element from an objective list of properties. Deviation is a mechanism of progress and evolution which is not in and of itself harmful or immoral (if we're to include evolution in our understanding that is). Rather than a linear list of elements, the human category actually is more akin to a list whose elements are intentionally varied across individuals and depending on the environment we happen to exist for the specific purpose of ensuring the success and survival of our species.
If we really whittle down the definition of human to what is truly essential and universal, we're left with almost nothing useful. Is a mutated still-born fetus a human? Genetically, mostly or yes, but does it bear any other resemblance to what you would thrust as "essentially human"? What truly makes a human human? Are human vegetables human? If so why do we call them vegetables? Is to be human merely to be the thinking analyzing kind of creature that we pride ourselves in being? What does merely "is a thinking and feeling creature" tell us about what we morally ought to think or the astounding variance in what humans actually do think? What objective moral standards can you draw from these basic observations of what is universal?
It's more difficult to reason from a basic principle instead of a more specific one like "monogamy is essential to intimacy and fulfillment and promiscuity prevents monogamy", but the end results are moral positions which are more universally applicable and more universally universally persuasive.
The coherence of science doesn't come from starting premises which indicate objectively certain knowledge though. It' coherence comes from the fact that it continuously expands and improves it's existing theories, models, and predictive powers, such that overtime it begins to
approximate objective truth. The approximately objective truths that science has been known to produce don't come with the guarantee of objective and absolute certainty, but they do come with the guarantee that they're more useful and robust than the "truths" that every other methodology or school of thought has produced (save perhaps mathematics). The body of science coheres over time, and as a whole it's already more useful, coherent and sophisticated than anything that has come before it.
Well, I think you've picked on the wrong cause from Aristotle's model. That cause, the efficient cause, is actually precisely the one science says we do need to understand a thing. Efficient causes are important to understand because they show the link between causes and effects. The efficient cause of a statue is the sculptor. In this case, knowledge of the efficient cause shows us how the state comes about, and that it is the effect of another cause. But this efficient cause doesn't necessarily have to be external to the formal cause of an object (or to its essence) - such as in the case of radioactive decay. — Agustino
We want to understand what things are, and generally we need to understand how they came about in order to do that, but in some cases it's irrelevant. In order to understand how given computer works, you need to understand it's design (it's form), but you don't need to know who designed it or the processes involved in actually designing it. You also don't need to know how it was physically fabricated in order to have useful mastery over it's actual workings (our predictive power). Science is concerned with the non-agent that is the physical world.
I'm curious though; do you just take the accepted and cutting edges of science transmute them into your overall teleology? That is to say, does science actually do all the real work of classification and discovery while you sit back and cherry pick it's descriptions to hit with the "objective telos" stamp?
Well, the causes are all related to each other. Without an efficient cause, you cannot understand how the material and formal causes are related together towards the production of the final cause. How would you make sense of them then? — Agustino
Well we could start by not assuming we know the full extent of "final cause" (which then forces us to bend interpretation to fit our expectations), and we could let the various fields of science slowly do the work for us of proposing models (models which don't necessarily conform to the 4 cause rubric) that have predictive power (and are thus falsifiable), where over time stronger and more detailed theories will be developed which can basically answer every question you might have about birds or bees.
Until deeper and more fundamental models are constructed (reductionism) science humbly asks you to settle for place-holder theories (future pseudo-sciences) that happen to have stronger predictive power in their subject than anything else we have available.
basically understanding one particular aspect of existence is always performed by placing it in connection with all other aspects of existence and seeing how it connects. Like a piece within a puzzle. You cannot understand the piece except by classifying it in its proper context. — Agustino
Understanding what something is made of, versus how it came into existence, versus how it actually functions can be almost entirely discreet from one-another. I'm not saying we should never ask one or more of these questions, I'm saying we shouldn't labor under the assumption that by connecting these arbitrary dots we come to ultimate and objective truth.
Also, the slight suggestion above that categories prevent differences and variations isn't the understanding Aristotle had. Obviously, a particular triangle isn't the same as triangularity. But a particular triangle is a particular instantiation of triangularity, even though it may have features that only approximate the nature of triangularity. So there's obviously differences between particular things and universals. — Agustino
When things exist on a spectrum (color, mass, distance, quantity, IQ, force, devotion, etc...) and we arbitrarily delineate categories (like red-blue-green, light-heavy, near-far, few-many, stupid-smart, weak-strong, purposeless-fulfilled), we can have a somewhat difficult time noticing when something actually falls in-between categories rather than cleanly into one or the other. It could just be because we need more delineation between points on the spectrum, but because unknown spurious factors might be giving rise to variation that we're not even noticing, we therefore never need to explain and alter our theories. So my point here is that you have essentially created the two categories
natural, and
unnatural, and because of your hard and fast assumptions about what lands you in either category you have wound up failing to understand more than half the population who in so many ways exhibit behavior that doesn't meet the standards of your definition of what humans objectively ought to do.
this isn't at all true. I don't know why you conceive of Aristotle as some idiot savage that couldn't tell his right hand from his left hand and couldn't see that there exists variation between animals, that children don't inherit all the traits of their parents, and so on. He clearly did know this, in fact, Aristotle was the first to dissect a chicken egg and analyse the embryo and how it develops, including identifying that the embryo has a heartbeat. Doing so, he analysed exactly the evolution of the particular animal and noticed that this process was somewhat different and not exactly identical except in certain forms (patterns of organisation), between different particular eggs.
Aristotle was as scientific as you get in terms of mindset. In fact, he criticised Plato's Academy for spoon-feeding students imaginary things about Realms of Forms, etc. and not anchoring them in concrete and multi-faceted reality as his Lyceum did. — Agustino
Guesstimating four causes and calling it objective truth was the best Aristotle could do because he didn't have what modern science had: breakthrough discoveries and instruments. Understanding how the sun formed, or the goings-on of microbiology (including the ramifications of a genetically proven evolutionary biology) were not accessible to him. I'm not hating on the guy, I'm just saying that his four cause model seems like what a laymen would come up with had they never been introduced to the methods and tools of empirical science. The four cause model won't get you a better understanding of the physical world than science will; you can put metaphysical lipstick on science's prized inductive pig, but it's still an inductive pig.
Darwin's understanding is not at odds with Aristotle's model of causality. First of all, it couldn't be, because Aristotle's model is metaphysical anyway. It's important to understand this distinction between physical facts and metaphysics. But more importantly, the "complex worldly forces" are nothing but causal agents themselves, which fits perfectly into Aristotle's model. — Agustino
So what then does the leap into your metaphysical world actually grant us other than a frail excuse to claim the objectivity ("coherence") that you deny is a product of science?
My understanding of metaphysics is admittedly fraught with bias: I conceive that it is like some hypothetical external-external reality where concepts can be tangible facts, where morality and the laws of physics are actually written in stone, where some kind of ultimate and certain truth dwells, and where physical evidence doesn't matter because we have no direct access to that realm anyway...
Metaphysics can be whatever you want them to be. Certain, uncertain; changing.
What is so important to you about adding or preserving a metaphysical component to your world view?
I wouldn't say an organism's behaviour, in this case, is its final cause. No, not at all - it's final cause is that for the sake of which it behaves in the first place. And there's nothing in an organisms adaptability to its environment that stops us from comprehending it using the 4 cause model. Indeed, it is only within this model that we can understand how and why the organism uses its environment the way it does. — Agustino
Not all human action is directed towards reproduction though. If only by evolutionary accident, many humans are born destined to never reproduce. Our behavior doesn't necessarily obey our biological imperatives. The conscious and intelligent mind which makes humans so unique ensures that we have many chances of not simply
living for the sake of reproduction. People choose to live for the sake of living; living is the final cause: the freedom to behave as we choose. You're missing the point though: you cannot authoritatively interpret what evolutionary mechanisms exist in humans because you understand too little evolutionary theory and too little human biology. You assume that sexual monogamy is the method of reproduction we were designed for but in reality life-long pair bonding is just one of many sexual and social arrangements that human biology is capable of expressing and sustaining. Genghis khan supposedly impregnated thousands of women, so what might that say about the biology of his descendants?
Yep, Aristotle inferred his four causes out of an analysis of motion and change. — Agustino
So Aristotle thought that if you ask and answer a few basic and obvious questions when confronted with a world of change using prima facie observations, that he could catalog and therefore understand all objects in existence? It feels vaguely scientific, but it's child's play compared to the breadth and complexity of empirical science. "Humans" aren't just a category of thing with four tidy or digestable causes, they're a thing of immense complexity whose
function and behavior we're still working to comprehend, and which entails the comprehension of countless sub-theories and parts (which themselves have sub-theories and parts) with no end in sight.
No, as I said above, the final cause is that for the sake of which the thing acts. This is not the same as what the thing does. — Agustino
People consciously have sex because it feels good, not necessarily because they want to reproduce. You can say they're frustrating the evolutionary purpose of sex, but why should they give a fuck for evolution? Aren't the ends of the moral agent more important than the ends of evolution or their efficient cause?
To a certain extent yes, not necessarily a moral human. Why not? Because certain things that make a good human being - such as health for example - aren't entirely within one's control. So if a human being is sick, they're obviously not immoral, even though they are a bad human being in-so-far as they are sick, since they do not choose to be sick. That's why morality involves the application of free will with regards to teleology. — Agustino
Now I know what you meant by nature is slavery: you think that if we consciously act in any way which you can conceive as counter-productive to our evolutionary trajectory that we're being immoral, and so to be moral must be slaves to our biology by living conservative monogamous lives and create a new generation so it can create another generation which can then create another generation which can then create anoth-....
What's so morally obligatory about marriage and reproduction again? The sake of the species?
The obvious fact that non-adherence to it would logically imply choosing to harm one's self in more or less damaging ways. — Agustino
If you could legitimately flesh out the harm in the things you decry as unnatural you would actually persuade me to agree with you. I happen to currently hold the position that the level of sexual repression you advocate for is too harmful for too many (in terms of both health and happiness) to justify the bump in successful marriage rates.
It's harmful because it frustrates their telos, because frustrating their telos is harmful. [INSERT ARBITRARY TELOS HERE]
Well no, it's not entirely beyond our current level of understanding. Extreme variation of behaviour (more extreme in humans than in other animals) is easily accounted for by the form of the human being - man is a rational animal and as such has freedom of choice. Out of freedom of choice we would indeed expect to see very varied behaviour. — Agustino
"Humans have freedom of choice, therefore variance". Are you saying that variance is naturally built-in to the behavior of humans via reason?
If the variance that results from our evolutionary caused rational minds is part and parcel with it's function, design, and well-being, why do you contest that variance from some arbitrary standard is necessarily harmful. (I.E, irreversible vascetomies are immoral because
children are too important to try to not have, promiscuity is immoral because it appears to threaten
standard western monogamy, tattoos are immoral because permanently marking your body damages it's
purity, and having casual sex is immoral because it harms the intimacy that you might have with a future spouse).
You cannot just assume what the proper human telos is and then state that whatever goes against that telos is harmful and therefore immoral.
I can't tell when you're reasoning that something is harmful because it's unnatural and when you're reasoning it's unnatural because it's harmful
All people are teleologically oriented towards the same end - eudaimonia as Aristotle would say - but they each think there are different ways to get there. This does not mean that each particular human being is as wise as he can be in any way or that the ways he chooses are the right ones. The presence of choice and reason make chosing the wrong thing entirely possible in ignorance. — Agustino
Why would evolution endow us with enduring variability if there was only one correct answer to how to live?
No, just like the reductionism that Michael attempted before, this actually obfuscates the issues. Saying that we're identified merely by a set of genes may be, strictly speaking, correct, but it gives off the idea that we can be reduced to those genes in isolation, just how for Michael, sexual attraction can be reduced to the chemical happenings in one brain, in isolation from other brains. This is wrong. — Agustino
Obviously a fingernail isn't a human, but this is my point. We cant adequately reduce or summarize "human" into a consistent and universally applicable category because we're simply too complex and diverse.
A lot of things. They are negentropic biological systems far from equilibrium, which means they need to take in nutrients and pass out waste products (these are absolutely constant, it cannot ever be otherwise given our physical laws), — Agustino
Settle down there Spock...
humans are rational creatures with free will — Agustino
The illusion of free will, sure (
you won't believe it's not real free will!), but some of us are more rational than others... Does that mean rational blokes like you and me ought to be getting a lion's share of the reproductive opportunities?
The reason and choice thing is more or less what gives rise to moral questions in the first-place, but it doesn't clearly point us in any objective moral directions.
we are subject to disease and aging (which are also inevtiable), women have to be pregnant for 9 months, — Agustino
*sigh...
The 9 month gestation thing again...
What is it about a 9 month gestation period that makes it useful for deriving normative arguments about healthy living again? That women need help giving birth?
Is that really the breakthrough understanding of the universe that Aristotle had in mind?
there's a lot of invariant structures in what makes a human being human - much more than there are in triangles actually — Agustino
And humans are born with feet usually, and eyeballs too, usually, and we like a body temp of around 37 Celsius...
If we put all these basic facts about humans into your moral calculator, what results do we get? That we need to live monogamously to rear children successfully for the sake of propagating the species under the delusion of a scape-goat-god who forgives us for our natural god-given deviances, thereby alleviating our guilt and emotional distress which allows us to live truly free and moral lives?
The presence of variation though does not in any way affect what the objective standard is. There's also sick people in the world, does that mean that sickness is an objective standard of goodness, or that we cannot understand that sickness is bad? :s Of course not. The presence of variation in terms of health does not prevent us from understanding what a healthy human being is, and that health is good. — Agustino
Your insistence that the arbitrary standard you have identified is the objective one, and that any deviation from that standard is like a sickness, encapsulates the main fault with your reasoning... Just because something is not practiced or approved by the majority, or you, doesn't make that thing inherently sick or harmful or immoral.
You should abandon teleology as a moral framework altogether and just stick to arguing that your objective standard is the universal best and that deviating from it is harmful.
In fact, it is precisely an understanding of human form, however vague, and of human teleology, that enables us to universally accept that health is good and to be desired, and illness is bad and to be avoided. And if some human being freely chose to be ill, we would classify them as diseased, not as normal. — Agustino
You would classify someone with a tattoo as self-harming and immoral, all because you have made the logical leap of accepting that your teleological assessments have some ultimate and metaphysically objective quality; they're based on your own personal sentiments.
...Variation is exactly what we would expect, especially given the form of human beings which allows for freedom of choice, even when that freedom of choice goes against the organism's interests.... — Agustino
You allude that things are against an organism's interests, and you will say this is because it goes against their teleology (their final cause of reproduction and your vision of mental and sexual health) but at no point do you actually explain how things like homosexuality/promiscuity are actually harmful except in terms like "it frustrates their interests" or some unsubstantiated and unpersuasive hokum about intimacy and ludicrously slippery slopes ending with the fall of western society. You will give examples like "suicide" and "cannibalism" to illustrate how choosing to engage in harmful things is immoral, but you will never actually show in detail why the things you claim are immoral are actually themselves harmful. It's ultimately circular: X is harmful because it goes against our telos, X is against our telos because it is harmful.
No, I cannot accept that, because it implies that feeling happy is all that happiness consists of. That's wrong. A murderer can feel happy, it doesn't follow from that that he really is happy. Indeed, the more happy he is, the more unhappy he is in reality. — Agustino
It follows from the statement "a murderer feels happy" that "the murderer is happy".
"The more happy he is, the more unhappy he is" is just nonsense.
Yeah, freedom to choose is actually part of what it means to be human - you know, those invariant structures of being human that you don't really want to accept. — Agustino
Sounds like you are saying humans are invariantly variant.
Got it. Nine months in the womb, we eat shit sleep and die, and we're invariantly variant. 10/10 definition; would actually employ.
That's like saying that willingly putting your hand in the fire doesn't seem to be a clear case of harm and immorality. It's just playing with words. By definition that is a case of harm and immorality. Repressing a side of yourself by definition is harming yourself - that's what repressing it means - forcing it to stay quiet, disregarding it, not caring for it. — Agustino
Which side of myself is the natural one, the side of intimacy or the side of promiscuity? Why do you get to decide which is healthy and unhealthy?
Don't you see the circularity in saying "repressing a side of yourself is by definition a case of harm and immorality" when you have yourself subjectively and haphazardly chosen what is to be repressed and what is not to be repressed based on your own puritan like sexual standards?
Yeah, I can see that you are confused. Probably because you haven't much studied psychoanalysis before. — Agustino
So much of psycho-analysis is bull-shit, I really don't see why buying into facile theories like your model/rival scenario is worthwhile...
All rivalry leads to inability to enjoy objects. It's very simple how. The rival is an obstacle to your enjoyment of the object - by definition. Capitalism leads to the concentration of wealth in a few hands, hence the inability of the many to enjoy wealth. Promiscuity leads to the gradual impossibility of intimacy and sexual fulfilment. And so forth. — Agustino
Oh me.. Oh my...
So you're against capitalism then I take it?
In any case, in my experience promiscuity actually leads to sexual fulfillment and intimacy (maybe even life long monogamous intimacy). But these platitudes and maxims do not objective arguments make.
"Promiscuity leads to the gradual (and harmful) impossibility of sexual fulfillment"...
Without saying "because it's true", please explain why the above isn't bull shit?
And what is this if not fascination with rivals in the sexual game? :s — Agustino
Fascination with persuasion in a social and intellectual
ideas game. I wanted to know all the ways in which people are actually persuaded to change or develop their beliefs so that I can myself be more resistant to irrational forms of persuasion and utilize fully what rational forms of persuasion are available (and maybe the irrational one's on occasion, but I know you wont hold that against me!).
Yes that is a logical possibility, you have yet to show that it holds in practice. Furthermore, intimacy isn't some kind of currency that you have a limited amount of, so until you formulate a clear understanding of intimacy it is pointless to discuss this. — Agustino
You have yet to show that "promiscuity prevents intimacy" holds in practice, and since you're the one making that normative claim, the burden of proof is on you to actually demonstrate the strength and validity of your position with reason and evidence Once you show that promiscuity does destroy intimacy, then you can begin trying to show why intimacy is required for health and happiness in the first place.
I raised the question to show how easy it is to make a weak claim about what is possible and reveal how utterly unsupported the centerpieces of your moral stances on sex and sexuality are.
If I can say "well gee golly, what if casual sex isn't actually harmful and stuff?" and you're response is "that's possible, prove it" It makes your position seem very weakly defended. You should be able to prove to me why casual sex is harmful. I know I've asked you to explain it many times, but it always comes out as a string of hasty assumptions on a slippery slope which ranges from intimacy problems to the collapse of western society.
Right, even in our society we do need families in order to adequately take care of infants. Some people can do without this, precisely because the majority doesn't do without it. — Agustino
You mean the masses cannot take advantage of the massive daycare/nanny industry that is the public school system?
I hope you're not under the imagination that those women would be happy to be shared. — Agustino
Depends on the culture and the person unfortunately... There are many accounts of genuinely non brainwashed women who have no negative feelings because of the polygamous relationship they're in. Assuming that we all need to live and behave in this one way to be happy is the endemic problem with your stances toward sex.