Not so agreed. The non-assignment of a truth value does not validate a preference. If I say I don’t hold with x being true or not true, doesn’t imply I prefer one over the other. I could just be logically indifferent, or, in some typically empirical cases, unknowledgable. Still, a moral agent will not be indifferent, even if the logical possibility exists. — Mww
And because we remain in the purely logical, hence a priori domain, we are still being subjective. It also explains why you were given an comment (it is true murder is good/bad, right/wrong) that didn’t properly refer to the antecedent (there is a truth about murder being good/bad, right/wrong).
Best paragraph I’ve had to work with in days, so......thanks for that. — Mww
— Rank Amateur
I think I speak for both myself and Terrapin when I say that we object to your lack of explicit acknowledgement that you made a point which lacks logical relevance. You made a point which preaches to the choir, and does nothing else, except suggest a fallacious false equivalence, whether that was truly your intention or otherwise. Making that equivalence is either careless or deceptive. — S
I just said, "Thoughts are the only things that have truth values." Obviously I think there is truth, then. It's a property of some thought. (But not moral stances (at least not when we're keeping this simple, when I'm avoiding what would have to be a huge tangent on truth theory).) — Terrapin Station
Validity has to do with truth value. So no one's moral stance is valid on my view. Again this is because moral stances do not have truth values. — Terrapin Station
And no, almost no one--and definitely not me, would say that any arbitrary person's moral stances are just as good as other person's moral stances, because "just as good" is itself a value judgment that individuals make, and people--again including me--do not happen to judge all stances equally. Hence why I asked you earlier, "Equal from what perspective?" — Terrapin Station
Not to speak for S, but I don't know what there would be to say to that. Is anyone disagreeing with it? — Terrapin Station
Yes, and so what? (That's a rhetorical question - you shouldn't actually answer it unless you want to continue this digression and be exposed). The word "objective" obviously doesn't normally mean "near universal", and this is very easily demonstrated with examples. It wasn't the case that it was objectively true that the Earth was at the centre of the solar system, even when that was nearly universally believed. — S
The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism. — Rank Amateur
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
We are getting semantic now. — Rank Amateur
I thought we'd pretty thoroughly established this. Asking whether murder is right or wrong non-subjectively is like asking whether walking is right or wrong, or whether Birmingham is right or wrong. It's just not a question that makes any sense. — Isaac
You can only have it your way if you tell me that you believe that there is no truth statement you can make about murder
— Rank Amateur
By "truth statement" I'm presuming you mean something like "murder is..." where this corresponds to reality, yes. In which case I can say "murder is unpopular", "murder is the intentional killing of another in illegal circumstances", "murder is a six letter word"...
All those are truth statements about murder. I'm really not sure what you're asking for.
You are asking me make an argument to prove 2 + 2 = 4 without using math.
— Rank Amateur — Isaac
I think that your comment suggested a false equivalence. It literally equated two very clearly dif — S
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The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism.
— S
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
We are getting semantic now. — Rank Amateur
Doo you understand that on my view, moral stances are something that our bodies do? So if you're questioning my stance critically, you're questioning the origin of our bodies doing something, questioning why our bodies would do something where there can be such widespread commonality. — Terrapin Station
— Rank Amateur
Why? This is precisely the contested point and instead of providing an argument to support it you've just re-asserted your belief. I understand you believe there is a truth value about murder. I gather you're religious, so obviously the fact of such a truth value is an article of your faith, but what purpose has it here? This is a philosophy forum, I'm not sure I see the purpose in our just declaring articles of faith and leaving it at that. — Isaac
You know darn well it was about the commonality of some moral judgments not where our bodies came from.
— Rank Amateur
Moral judgments are something that our bodies do in other words. — Terrapin Station
The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism. — S
Well, obviously. If you believe that murder is objectively wrong (by which you mean someone committing murder is objectively wrong to do so), then is is simply a re-wording of your belief to say that a person who commits murder is objectively wrong to do so. — Isaac
What we haven't heard from you yet is your reason for believing that. You have so far shown that most people feel murder is wrong, now show what logic or mechanism makes it the case that the few who disagree must also feel that way. — Isaac
You believe, for some reason unbeknownst to me, that if morality is simply something that we do as individual human beings, there shouldn't be widespread commonality on some moral stances. — Terrapin Station
If you're talking about the unanimity thing, we have addressed it. Our bodies don't develop randomly, do they? You're not addressing that. You're not supporting the notion that there shouldn't be widespread commonalities if moral stances only occur in individuals. — Terrapin Station
So it shouldn't be a mystery that the vast majority of people think that murder is wrong either, — Terrapin Station
↪S
It's frustrating that you can't get folks to follow through on a line of questioning about this stuff, because that could help them understand the other view. It seems almost like they're afraid to "go down the rabbit hole" though. So whenever it looks like they're getting too close to the rabbit hole, they back off. — Terrapin Station