"Objective" doesn't have anything to do with commonality or agreement. "Objective" simply refers to whether something occurs independently of persons.

I don't think that anyone is arguing the relative commonality of any stances. No one disagrees that the vast majority of people think it's wrong to murder, for example. — Terrapin Station

The question was why is there such unanimity, and is there some pragmatic difference between near universal agreement and objectivity.


It seems what you really want to argue is if morality has a is a human or supernatural origin. I am not arguing that, I am happy to say that you can have a very large degree of objective morality without any supernatural origin.

So anyway, I prefer cheese and onion flavour crisps and raping babies to ready salted flavour crisps. How about you? — S

I think that is my point. Believing in high degrees of subjectivity in moral judgments reduces them to preference

There is near universal agreement about what we feel. Most people feel that they shouldn't murder someone and they feel that they should ostracise, or somehow discourage anyone who seems like they should murder people. So our feelings on many matters of moral judgment are similar. That means it is 'close to' an objective fact that most people feel that way. — Isaac

Agree

So, for the one person who doesn't feel that way, what bearing does this objective fact (that most people think otherwise) have on your objective judgement of his moral feeling? All you can say objectively is that it is at odds with the majority. That doesn't require him to act any differently without some further link which you have not provided. I dread the day that being at odds with the majority position places on us a duty to change our behaviour accordingly. — Isaac

If, as I do, believe there is a high degree of objective truth that murder is wrong, I would say that person is objectively wrong.

If you believe there is a high degree of subjectivity, you can only say to him, that most people find your judgment that murder is ok incorrect. And try to change his mind, but if he chooses not to, you have no standard to value his judgment against, and must accept it as his subjective moral judgment, you can disagree - but that is all. It is now reduced to just preference.

incredulity is not argument, and obviously not very effective on me. I am open to reason if you would care to take a deep breath and actually address the point.

'Universal' doesn't necessarliy mean 'objective'. — ChrisH

I undersatand that, but it does not answer how we as human beings have near universal moral judgments on many things, if there is not some things with a high degree of objectivity- do you have a theory?

"Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behaviour that they consider more significant than etiquette." — S

I am not allowed to disagree with that?

Sweet Jesus. You are very much back at square one, as if twenty pages of correcting errors in understanding has achieved nothing. — S

Yea, I still see a logic flaw, you don't. Does it matter? Is one of us right and the other one wrong? Is there a truth about the nature of morality that we both may be unaware of? Nothing any of you has said effectively answers this point.

I understand there are circumstances and norms, and situations that effect moral judgments. But they are branches from a trunk. There is enormous unity regardless of culture or situation on many things most humans would consider morally wrong. Now you can chalk up that near universal consistency to evolution, God, or something else, but it exists and it is not coincidence.

What is the difference then between near universal agreement and nearly objective?

you have missed the point

that was my point, moral or not is just preference, there is no truth. Vanilla or chocolate, Red Sox or Yankees. One is not the true answer.

so if there is no truth value in any relative moral judgment, why make them? It just turn all such judgments to preference. Murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate.

this is an actual question not an argument. How does the language of moral relativism work? These are still judgments being made, and qualitative words are used to express them, good or bad right or wrong true or false. Now I understand that all of those words have some amount of degree, things can be righter, or wronged, but at the basic level the are either dichotomous or meaningless. Good can not be bad, right can not be wrong, etc.

So is the moral relativist using words with a high degree of objective meaning to declare their position?
And if that itself is not inconsistent, how can such words have any meaning at all, if they can be used interchangeably by anyone about anything. Can one event be both good and bad, and if so what does that do to the concept of truth?

If moral relativists disagree about if an action is right or wrong, does that mean that both are true? That neither are true? That there is no such things as truth in moral judgments?

or kill each other like sharks

think we both just basically said the same thing re Nietzsche

all due respect, and I mean that. None of that self description is close to an argument against the point I was making.

I'm not "choosing" to place myself somewhere on the scale, I'm making an honest assessment and reporting that assessment. — S

The difference is?

thank you for the history, truly thank you for taking the time and making the effort.

My main issue in the debate is not that morality purely objective, as you can see above I have already conceded such a thing is not possible. As well as no such thing as purely subjective morality is possible. We as individuals and as a culture and as a society place ourselves somewhere on the continuum between those exteams. What ever particular label you place on the points in between I am not that concerned with.

My issue is if you chose as best you can to place yourself close to subjective end, you are forgoing the right to evaluate the moral judgment of others. It can't just be subjective for you. Nietzsche has to assume the guy stabbing him in the back with a knife is just listening to his particular truth, and his personal morality based on that truth

completely agree

agree as I have said a few times - my view is there is a continuum with pure subjectivity on one end and pure objectivity on the other - and we all place ourselves individually, and society generally somewhere along that continuum.

Here's what I conclude:

1. You have no argument, or at least no valid argument.

2. You aren't willing to help yourself out of your own incredulity. Rather, you want us to repeat our earlier attempts ad neaseam, even though there is little evidence that you'll get it this time instead of repeating the same problems.

3. You don't realise that your criticism of moral relativism as meaningless is not uniquely a criticism of moral relativism, but applies in general and can easily be turned back on you. — S

you of course realize that relative to my point of view all of equally applies to you. Ironic

Those beliefs are objectively immoral if you count universal inter-subjective agreement as being objective. But I would see that agreement as being socially evolved, not as given from on high. — Janus

no issue - don't care very much on the basis of the objectivity - just there has to be some degree of objective standard in order for their to be some value judgement.

I can't see why you would say that. If the vast majority of people agree, that is feel the same way, about the broader moral issues: theft, deception, murder, rape, pedophilia, and so on, then there is a shared cultural set of morals. To say that you wish to live harmoniously with your fellows and yet hold contrary views about those issues, would be to contradict yourself. You would be a liar or a fool in that case. — Janus

tell me any meaningful difference between what you propose as subjective, and those beliefs are to a high degree objectively immoral. Just some coincidence that the vast majority of subjective moralist all view them the same way ?

I know what your conclusion is. I was questioning this supposed argument you referenced. — S

non answer to the response to your question

But I think that you need to go back and reconsider the explanations already given, not that I need to repeat them. — S

non answer to my challenge to your claim of fallacy

That's not true, because people become moral subjectivists. They're not born that way. I became one myself, because I found it convincing enough. But yes, obviously if you're not convinced by it, and that can't be changed, then it is meaningless in a sense. That's not unique to moral relativism, it is true in general. How do you suppose we see your position? — S

nothing at all to do with the point - but thanks for sharing

This is true if you are holding to a notion of individual subjectivity. If you hold to a notion of collective subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, then not so much — Janus

there still is no better or worse, you can have more or less widely agreed - inside or outside the predominate view, even the overwhelming predominate view - but if you hold to subjectivity - still can't get to better or worse. You can add comparative terms, but you still can't add qualitative terms and hold to subjectivity.

You've been arguing it? Are you sure about that? — S

yes, that is my entire point - there is no meaningful value judgement that can be made about competing moral views if you hold to subjectivity - they can only be different - there is no meaningful subjectively better or worse.

So an argument from incredulity. You don't see how it is possible, so it's not possible. — S

then please show me how it is possible, before you invoke the fallacy - show it applies please.

Moral subjectivists don't claim or accept that, so it doesn't work as a criticism at all. — S

and they are welcome to their view, but it has no real meaning to anyone else -

the objective realm is the entirely wrong place for doing that sort of work. — Terrapin Station

can you give just one example of anything that is subjectively better than anything else, in any sense of the word better, that is not just an opinion/view.

Judgments, by their very nature, are things that occur in the subjective realm, not the objective realm. — Terrapin Station

In your view - that in no way is any kind of a truth statement

No one said the two subjective moral stances were equally valid. — Isaac

that is my position that i have been arguing - not theirs.

How can one subjective moral view be better than any other subjective moral view - if the basis for both is purely the subjective view of the person who holds it? Any judgment on either view that does not employ some degree of objective morality as a standard to measure against is just one more subjective view.

If all moral views are subjective, by definition none can be objectively better than any other.

Right, but how does objectivism help us with this kind of problem? If I was an objectivist about morals, you could just disagree with my reasoning. I mean, just take a glance over any of the posts on this website, are people being regularly persuaded by rational argument, or are people sticking to almost exactly what they started out saying regardless of any argument to the contrary? — Isaac

I agree - the difference is now it is not 2 subjective moral views in opposition - now it is one moral view aligned with an objective norm and one not. I can still chose, as many do, to be outside the objective norm, but that is a very different position than I hold a different - but equally valid subjective view.

Isaac - I can help you with the right answer - here it is:

Rank - Me and a few million other relative morality believers all seem to hold 2 of the same subjective beliefs - the first one is we think Hitler is a monster, and the second one is we subjectively believe we are going to hang anyone who doesn't subjectively think he is a monster too.

Now I am convinced.

Wish there was kind of name we could use for such a widely and commonly held belief.

no - sorry as a moral relativist i appreciate that is your subjective moral view, but it is not my subjective moral view. And as one believer in subjective morality to another we both know there is no objective answer on if Hitler was moral or immoral - so we will happily have to go on acknowledging that we are both right subject to our own views of morality.

(and of course - hope it does not need to be said that IRL I know Hitler was an abominably immoral man)

Whoosh.

I clearly wasn't accusing you of actually having that view. — S

ok - no worries - enjoy the rest of the day

goodness gracious of course i don't - you just couldn't resist one last ad hominem could you. Did that really add any philosophic significance ? Just don't understand the motivation for such comments.

That's fine, so long as you don't twist what I say and walk away with a misunderstanding which you perhaps don't even realise is a misunderstanding. That some degree of objectivity is required to make sense of morality is completely irrelevant. Moral subjectivists are not solipsists. It would be foolish to treat them as though they were, by interrogating them about the objectivity involved which no reasonable person would deny. — S

I will leave here subjectively believing what I darn well please and there is nothing subjectively you can say to change my mind :)

we are good - as soon as you acknowledged, as you did that there needs to be some degree of objective view in comparing moral judgments - i am fine - I have no need to find where exactly that line is.

Basically, one needs to ferret out other stances that the person has, and then try to appeal to them via those stances. In other words, it's a matter of "trying to talk them into something" using things that they already accept/that they're already comfortable with, to try to lead them to a different conclusion. Or, this is similar to the traditional sense of what an ad hominem argument is--it's a matter of appealing to views the person already has, appealing to their biases, to push them to a different view. (But in this case, the ad hominem approach isn't a fallacy, because we're not even dealing with things that are true or false, correct or incorrect.)

At that, it might not be possible to persuade the person to a different position. "Hitler didn't do anything morally wrong" might be foundational for them, for example, so that it doesn't rest on any other views they have. Or their stances might be so situation-specific that there's not a sufficient way to generalize that would lead them to different stances. — Terrapin Station

fine with all that - your right I don't change my mind. And it leaves us with two different subjective options about the morality of Hitler and no objective way to resolve our differences.

that does not seem a good endpoint to such a moral judgment to me.

You didn't ask me a question, you gave me a challenge which I refused on the basis that it isn't necessary. Don't pretend to be unintelligent. — S

and now we enter semantics - and ad hominem - seems the discussion is nearing an end

Are you like a child who has just snatched a toy out of the hand of another child? No, I don't believe that you are, so no argument from me is necessary. I've already explained what I would try to do. You don't need to see me act it out with you. You are more intelligent than that. — S

that is a non answer to a direct question -

Some degree of objectivity doesn't make any real difference. That I feel a certain way about something is itself factual, not opinion. That's a degree of objectivity. That still doesn't mean that morality is objective. There is no objective standard, as feelings differ. We don't accept that different beliefs about the moon to indicate an objective standard. Morality isn't like that. It's different. — S

getting closer - my view is there is no such thing as either absolutely subjective or absolutely objective morality - it is a continuum and we place ourselves somewhere on that continuum.

maybe this is a better way of me making my point.

My subjective moral judgment is that Hitler did nothing that is morally wrong.

Assume your subjective moral judgement is Hitler did lots of stuff that was morally wrong

Make an argument - absent of any objective moral standard to change my mind

Are you not saying that we can't make a subjective judgment comparing two different stances? — Terrapin Station

this is very hard - we can all make whatever subjective judgments we want, you can even say your subjective judgement of my subjective judgement is wrong.

But if you are committed to subjectivity - there is no way to compare subjective judgments. Each attempt is just one more subjective judgment.

Opinion, if you call it that (I prefer the term "moral judgement" as it conveys the importance better), is all I have. It is founded on moral feelings. I would try to get him to empathise with my feelings on the matter. This can and does work in some cases. It is very evident when a child realises that they've behaved badly by, for example, snatching a toy out of another child's hand. At first, they judge that what they did was morally acceptable, but then you get them to empathise with the victim. — S

no issue at all with that - that is my point - as long as the basis of every argument you make is your own subjective judgement. Any plea to anything else adds some degree of objectivity.

I'm not comparing subjective judgements. I'm comparing his actions to my subjective judgement, not comparing his subjective judgement to my subjective judgement. I don't care about his judgement, its his actions that bother me. — Isaac

you have missed the point - neither person A or B have done the action - person A and B are making subjective judgments on the same action X - than someone else did