Looks like Firiston has worked on a new collaborative book The Pragmatic Turn

It looks interesting. I think I will check it out.

Thanks.

Signal Grounding Problem

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_grounding_problem

The symbol grounding problem is related to the problem of how words (symbols) get their meanings, and hence to the problem of what meaning itself really is. The problem of meaning is in turn related to the problem of consciousness, or how it is that mental states are meaningful.

In the NYT opinion piece that @Wayfarer linked, Nagel pointed out that even if science figures out the exact physical process that our body uses to produce consciousness, it will not address what it feels like to be conscious. Science will likely be able to identify the chemicals that are released and the receptors that are excited when we have these feelings but, again, that will not be what it feels like to us when it happens.

My first question after reading this is “so what?.” What it feels like is an answer I experience every day. What I am interested in are the mechanics of consciousness; to gain insight into how my feelings work.

It strikes me that the signal grounding problem hits the rocks at ‘yeah, but that analysis doesn't tell us what it feels like.” How could it? In terms of hard scientific analysis of the process, I am guessing it will have to stop at something like 'and then the dopamine is released.'

Not really. Like all biologists, he sees the line defined by the combination of metabolism and replication. Life has to have both the chemistry and the control. — apokrisis

Thanks for for pulling Nick Lane out of the muck where I was treading.

The symbols "1.2,3" for example, must be used in the conventional way in order for the arithmetical concepts to exist. These conventions do not exist "in physical form inside our head", they exist as relations between us. Since the existence of a concept can only be understood through reference to relations between human beings, then we cannot say that the existence of a concept is something "inside our head", because it is just as much something outside our heads, in between us, as it is inside our heads. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I do think that a concept itself can 'exist physically' inside a single head, I also think you bring up a good point that a concepts real utility is it can be communicated and refined through sharing with others, possibly becoming ingrained in lots of heads through our culture. I hope this is not getting to headdy :)

After reading Nagel's argument, I'm skeptical. I see consciousness as an emergent phenomenon (he uses the term fluke) of complex life so it is hard for me to see how consciousness predates life. But hey, in 2018 no-one has proof for this stuff, and I give him points for keeping the debate in the realm of science.

Life cannot have arisen solely from a primordial chemical reaction, and the process of natural selection cannot account for the creation of the realm of mind.

Those are two big unqualified assumptions. I'm guessing that is not a direct Nagel quote.

subjective consciousness, if it is not reducible to something physical, … would be left completely unexplained by physical evolution—even if the physical evolution of such organisms is in fact a causally necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness.

--Nagel?

I have heard the human brain described as the most complex structure in the universe. I see no good reason to assume that this marvel of an organ, along with the rest of the body, is an insufficient host for consciousness to emerge.

I’m also not sure the concept of consciousness not being ‘reducible’ makes sense. If you take the view that consciousness, as we know it, emerged from processes in the body, then reducing consciousness to a body makes no more sense than reducing the harmonics of a car engine to a car engine. These things go the other way around.

Each of our lives is a part of the lengthy process of the universe gradually waking up and becoming aware of itself.

--Nagel?

This is the way I see it too. Nick Lane argues that there is not a hard line where life begins. Bacteria are completely driven by the chemical reactions that assemble, shield, energize, and propel their activities. How are they more alive than the molecules that assembled and drive them? The answer seems to be a matter of degree, rather than a hard line. In this broader sense, I think both Nick and I agree with Nagel’s characterization. I also remember Carl Sagan and others having said something similar.

`

To recap.

My point in the OP was that concepts (even concepts involving truths, numbers and fictional things) exist in physical form inside our head. It is not the most profound point in the world, but it does provide an answer to Quine asking "how can we talk about them?" if they do not exist in his narrow view of ontology. I am saying the even in his narrow view of ontology, we can talk of all concepts as physical products of the human mind. I don't think you really even challenged that.

You and apokrisis said yeah, but that these theoretical physical brain patterns that hold these concepts say nothing, by themselves, about the meaning of these concepts, and I said yeah, that is right, that is a tougher question. I also said I was simply pointing out that the concepts exist in a physical way.

apokrisis then brought up the signal grounding problem, which is interesting, and I hope to get to, but in my view this represents an extension of the discussion, rather that a challenge to whether these concepts take a physical form in our head.

In the meantime, you and I have vered into a discussion about my use of the term 'evolutionary invention' to describe our brains, which was the point we were doing some back and forth on when you said "it doesn't provide a solution to the problem articulated in the OP".

@Wayfarer

Yes, it is complicated. It is much easier to talk of some God shaping us into being over a few days than to wrap our heads around a natural process evolving over 4.5 billion years. Our culture is still struggling to grasp the implications of evolution and incorporate these concepts into everyday language, and to this end will need to extend a couple of words like 'invent' and 'agent' to get it done.

I agree with Ruse that there is the science of evolution, and the philosophical implications of evolution, and these are two different things. I also agree that while in science class the teacher and students should stick to the science. Once the bell rings is another matter, and in my view, it is a virtuous act to try to communicate the implications of what they know to the public at large.

Rather than paraphrase Nick Lane, I'll quote him from "Life Ascending, The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution."

There is no inventor, no intelligent design. Nonetheless, natural selection subjects all traits to the most exacting tests, and the best designs win out. It is a natural laboratory that belittles the human theatre, scrutinising trillions of tiny differences simultaneously, each and every generation. Design is all around us, the product of a blind but ingenious process. Evolutionists often talk informally of inventions, and there is no better word to convey the astonishing creativity of nature. To gain an insight into how all this came about is the shared goal of scientists, whatever their religious beliefs, along with anyone else who cares about how we came to be here.

When I use the word invention to describe the evolutionary process that produced our brains, it is in this context that I use the word. And Nick is right, there really is not a better word to describe the making of all the components that we are comprised of. Evolution is a newly discovered phenomenon in terms of human understanding. It is not surprising or inherently wrong that culture adopt some of the language that we used in older belief systems that asserted how we came to be here.

“It does not mean that the hardware we use was not invented through evolution.”
— Read Parfit

Again - there is an implied agency in this sentence. — Wayfarer

Webster Dictionary: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agent

something that produces or is capable of producing an effect

There is a sense in which science has moved into the role previously occupied by religion - as the kind of court of appeal for what ought to be considered real, the ‘umpire of reality'. And that shows up as physicalism, the attitude that 'whatever can be known, can be known by means of science'. — Wayfarer

Nothing is perfect, but in my view science is the best ‘umpire of reality’ if you mean accurate reference for ‘how nature works.’ I can broadly be described as a physicalist, and know quite a few others that belong to my local Humanist organization. From this perch, I have not met a single person who has said 'whatever can be known, can be known by means of science'. What we do tend to agree on is that denial of scientific facts, whether for economic self interest, religion, conspiracy thinking or ignorance, is a dangerous way to go about making decisions related to matters of public importance.

The 'law of the excluded middle' and the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 did not come into being as a consequence of anything Darwin discovered. — Wayfarer

Long before we had formal math, I can imagine the Darwinian advantage of a band of humans learning to communicate that first 2 tigers went into that cave, and then 2 more went into the cave, then 3 came out.

I get your point that our ability to reason lead us to many discoveries not directly tied to survival of the fittest, but that fact does not mean that the hardware we use was not invented through evolution.

Regardless, I am going to give up on making my point about Quine, and my next post will just plunge in to semantics, because that is clearly what you guys want to talk about, and it is pretty interesting.

That Miller book looks interesting too, I will have to add it to my list.

@apokrisis

Theoretically, as thinking creatures we are able to physically manipulate components in our brains so that they abstractly map to something. When I look at this book on my desk, my brain theoretically makes some physical neuron mapping of that book that can be referenced when I think thoughts about the book being on the desk. If I work at it, and it helps to close my eyes, I can also imagine Ant Man on my desk waving at me. Theoretically, when I do this my mind physically manipulated components in my brain to make a model of Ant Man. My only point in the OP is that the model of the book and Ant Man both physically ‘exist’ in an ephemeral way in my brain, and therefore qualify as existing and can be "talked about" as conceptual models, even under Quines inadequate, one-dimensional, semantically poor, matter specific view of ontology that is largely lacking in meaning.

I think what you are saying is that I do not get my OP is looking at this through an inadequate one-dimensional, semantically poor, matter specific view of ontology that is largely lacking in meaning. To that I agree, and reply that was all I was attempting. I read the symbol grounding problem link that you referenced, and agree it is an interesting problem, I just do not think it is unique to the discussion of brain patterns.

If some gizmo were able to identify the model of Ant Man in my brain and wrote that as 'kdhfh' in a language called Braineze, the definition of 'kdhfh' would be ‘The model of Ant Man on a desk inside Read Partit’s brain.' In this case, the word would have the same status of any other word in relation the the signal grounding problem. I agree if I was just shown 'kdhfh' without the definition, I would have no way of interpreting it, but that is also the case any word where the definition is withheld. In the case of Braineze, we figured out the definition through the use of the theoretical gizmo to identify the pattern and assign it a word the first place. Also, since Braineze is a symbolic representation of the physical model in my brain, my brain can bypass Barineze through accessing that model in its own native way, something another person would need braineze to do.

I actually have some thoughts from the physicalist view related to the signal grounding problem, but I need to let them grind a while in my head. I am also curious if my explanation conveys to you that I get the problem.

So sure, every concept exists as a pattern of neural activity. It is a set of physical marks. But where in your physicalist conception of this situation is the meaning of the marks? I see only syntactical operations - the mechanics. I don’t see physicalism accounting for any semantics, any interpretance. — apokrisis

The argument I am making in the OP is that concepts in our brain deserve the ontological status of physically existing. We do not question whether marks on a paper exist, even if they are devoid of any meaning.

I don't see how viewing the brain as purely physical gets in the way of semantics. The brain is obviously capable of storing, retrieving and crunching these patterns in ways that are meaningful to us. Isn't that where to find the semantics and interpretance?

@apokrisis

After a few days of digesting your post, combined with some internet searches, I think I now understand you points.

My motivation for the post was to take on Quine on his own turf. The camp of philosophers that say things like ‘How can we talk about Pegasus?’ are not really my cup of tea. My immediate answer (in my head) when I read something read something like that is “You just did. What is your point?” or “ We talk of it as fiction?” But snarky responses leave open the question about how the concept of Pegasus, or some number, might exist in his ontological framework. After thinking about it, I concluded that any concept produced through thinking (numbers, Pegasus, whatever) must have a physical backing in neurons, and even under Quines limited definition, the concepts themselves exist in this physical sense. They can later be put in other physical forms like books and art. These concepts may or may not or may not describe something that is compatible with the laws of nature, but the concepts still exist in a physical way. That is my entire point. I am not saying that is the most important story about the meaning behind the concepts, nor am I arguing a straight line from there to a fully analytic or deterministic view.

Having said that, I do have some views on topics you covered.

This is why AP winds up in modal realism. Unicorns might not exist in our world, but they could have evolved in some other world with the same natural laws. So they are a definite possibility. — apokrisis

Now that I have read up on some possible world theories, I think I fall into the Abstractionism camp in that non-actual possible worlds are theories about how the world could be or could have been. If this committee had chosen that set of blueprints the world would have been different. I suppose in some theoretical possible world where evolution took a different turn, a non-magical unicorn might have existed. Still, I find possible world theories most useful when thinking of the impact of our actions. I may be missing something, but I don’t see the point of attempting to describe these worlds through using formal modal logic unless it is for an AI project or something.

A brain of course evolved. But brains are not machines or computers. — apokrisis

Our brain is our brain, and any attempts to describe it in 2018 will be a rough approximation at best. Having said that, I think the term biological machine best fits my understanding. I am also a compatibilist when it comes to free will and do not see that as a contradiction. In theory, even if, as some experiments indicate, we have parts of ourselves that mechanically decide an action in a moment prior to our being conscious of the decision, we can later, mechanically evaluate the outcome of that decision mechanically change a belief about how we should have acted. I think changing a belief changes how we subconsciously processes information. That belief change does not guarantee the subconscious decision aparitus will react differently the next time, but I think it does increase the chance that it will.

But science of course has moved on, both in physics, but especially in biology. And this is returning us towards a more sophisticated Aristotlelian "four causes" ontology. AP feels so last century now. You are dealing with a historical curiosity is all. — apokrisis

I think Aristotle's system better as well. A vaguely remember him having written 'the question isn't if something exists, but how it exists.' In my view, Quine ignored that wisdom.

Well, you did say that thoughts, language and reason 'exist in an ontological sense' as brain processes. But now you say that 'all we can do is experience them'. So - does the nature of first-person experience need to be understood in terms of brain processes, in order to understand them? Are they really physical or neurological in nature? That question is the basis of the well-known 'hard problem of consciousness' first articulated by philosophers David Chalmers. — Wayfarer

I expect science will figure out many more specific details related to the physical processes behind how our brains work. They already have crude devices that can monitor physical brain activity, and in a controlled experiment can determine what button someone is going to decide to press before before they are conscious of what they decided. That is why I think scientific gizmos will be the ticket to identifying where we store abstract concepts in our brains and how they are used when we reason. There is much we can learn from contemplation, meditation and other self examination, but I don’t think discovering the physical location of where we store concepts is one of them. Also, the claim I am defending gets nowhere close to a full theory of consciousness.

I'm dubious about treating evolution as an agency. The expression 'given to us by Evolution' seems to me an example of the way that modern culture tends to attribute to biological evolution the agency that was previously attributed to God (especially because Evolution is capitalised.) — Wayfarer

I don’t know why you are dubious about treating evolution as an agency. We could get hung up on the definition of agency, but evolution was definitely the process that guided the transformation from bacteria to us, including our brains. We know that from the fossil record and DNA analysis that can identify evolutionary descendents with the same accuracy it caught the Golden State Killer. In 2018, I don’t see the point of someone (not saying you) trying to maintain some definition of God that requires denial of evolution That version of God will continue to be buried in a an ever growing mountain of fossil and biological evidence.

But without wishing to detract from the science, the problem is that such thinking is reductionistinsofar as it wishes to understand reason, language and abstract thought purely through the lens of the biological sciences. But biological science is not directly concerned with such faculties, except for in a secondary sense; the point of the theory of evolution is to explain the origin of species, not to solve complex problems of philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

I believe evolution hardwired humans to reason in the same way it produced long necks in giraffes. So yeah, evolutionary science has a critical role to play in philosophy of the mind, but not the only role by any means. I’m not someone who thinks science has the answer for all things. Even if science discovers exactly what we are and how we function, there is still the looming question of ‘now what?’, which is where philosophy should still play a critical role. But even the question of ‘now what?’ needs science, because most matters of public importance require understanding how nature actually works to sort out real from imagined threats, and to get predictive results from our actions when we decide the ‘what’.

And again, identifying language and reason with neural processes begs the question of where reason receives it warrant. If it is indeed only a matter of successful adaption to the environment, then in what sense could it be said to be true? This actually is a very deep question, and is the subject of many philosophy texts. — Wayfarer

I’m not that into worrying about the ramifications of our ability to reason, being produced by evolution. One can choose not to believe it, but we can’t choose what happened over the last 4 billion years. If one believes evolution made our brains, I don’t see it changing 'reason' receiving a 'warrant'. We just say we received it from evolution, and move on with our daily lives like we always have.

But, concepts are not physical. If you had a brain injury - God forbid - your brain might have to vastly re-organise its activities so as to compensate. In such cases, the part of the brain that is normally associated with one aspect of cognition can be re-purposed to deal with another, in order to compensate. (This is one of the findings of neuroplasticity.) So, if the process was only physical, then this couldn't happen, because changing the matter, i.e damaging the brain, would stop you from being able to count or understand numbers (which in some cases it would.) But in cases where the brain successfully re-configures itself to be able to count, then the cognitive requirement is actually changing the physical configuration. It's 'top-down causation' in this case. — Wayfarer

I agree that concepts are not purely physical. Excluding the possibility for advanced aliens :), there are, no doubt, many concepts that have not yet been discovered, but have the ‘potential’ to be discovered. Parfit argues that these exist in a wide non-ontological sense. I’m not so sure exists is a good fit for these things, and the ‘wide non-ontological sense’ is another way of saying ‘do not yet exist’ to me. But this is just parsing words. For me, life forms that can reason are required for advanced abstract concepts to exist in the physical world. And on Earth, I think these concepts first take physical form inside our brains.

I am very close to a person who had a large non-cancerous brain tumor removed. After his operation he had to relearn basic motor skills and had entire childhood years removed from his memories. I think these symptoms provide support for memories and concepts residing in physical locations in our brains. In keeping with what you described, he was able to relearn his motor skills and relearn about events he no longer remembered, but I suspect this stuff took up a new physical home elsewhere in his brain.

Whether knowingly or not, your general approach could be described as being in line with scientific materialism - which is of course a very influential attitude in modern culture, but which I think ought to be questioned. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I do identify with scientific materialism, but there are many camps under that tent, and I am not quite sure where I fit. I also think everything should be questioned.

While studying this question I ran across Parfit who argues, roughly, that human thoughts (where our math, morality and fiction are developed) map to physical entities in our mind through neuron patterns and such, and thereby exist in the ontological sense.— Read Parfit

This use of "ontology" for example, looks like it should be "metaphysical." This goes back to your example of Pegasus: in metaphysical terms, talking about Pegasus is nonsense. There is no Pegasus. But clearly and obviously there is, and he comes with a long history. The way out of this contradiction is to recognize that it is not a real contradiction. Metaphysically, no Pegasus. But "Pegasus" is meaningful name. One simply asks, what does "Pegasus" mean, and then what it means for there to be such an idea as Pegasus - and so on. — tim wood

Thanks for this. I hadn’t read Parfits section on ontology in a couple of years so I re-read it this morning, and I now realize Parfit did not make the exact argument I am making. That is just how I had remembered it at the time I wrote the original post, so I am just going to have to defend this on my own.

As I understand it, to exist in the narrow ontological sense, something needs be made of matter. Qualifying ‘somethings’ would include rocks, birds, brains, neurons and chemicals Non qualifying things include abstract entities like numbers and logical truths and Pegasus.

If Pegasus was actually comprised of matter and did romp around outside our brains, then Pegasus would exist in the ontological sense? The fact that Pegasus does not meet these requirements pushes the concept of Pegasus into the broader metaphysical realm that includes abstract entities and fiction?

All of this discussion is leaving out the physical processes in the brain that gave birth to Pegasus in the first place. When Pegasus was first thought of, the concept took physical root in someone's mind as a configuration of matter therein. When that person then talked of Pegasus and wrote of Pegasus and drew Pegasus, they implanted that concept in other people's brains. I am arguing that the place that Pegasus lives in our brain deserves ontological status, regardless of whether an actual Pegasus is romping around outside of our minds.

Parfit argues that we can ask if claims are compatible with the laws of nature.— Read Parfit

You ought to consider that any "laws" are just human constructs. like any other concepts If you think that the "laws of nature" are some independently existing laws, then how would we know whether the humanly constructed laws are a proper representation of the independent laws, or "fictions"? We'd have to ask, are the humanly constructed laws compatible with the independent laws. But all that we have to go on is the world we perceive, the humanly constructed laws, and logic and reason. So it's quite clear that Parfit's suggestion doesn't solve the problem of distinguishing fictitious ideas from non-fictitious ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, the laws of nature are a human construct, but that does not change the fact that they are the best reference for whether or not some other claim is compatible with how nature works.

Yes our perceptions are flawed at best, but the rigorous methods, evidence and peer review required for a theory to reach this scientific designation provides an important standard to sort out less rigorously established and conflicting claims about how nature works.

@Wayfarer

In the Feser quote you posted, he asserts that “thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes.”. He theorized that physical brain patterns like what would represent the number 1 in our head, “By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity.”

I must admit I am scratching my head a bit by his use of the word “with”. Brain scientists use gadgets to identify brain processes, all we can do on our own is experience them.

Moving on to his larger point, I suppose if you isolated a group of electrochemical states “by themselves’’ you could argue they are meaningless in that sense, but I think the shortcoming of his reasoning is that these states are not isolated. Instead, they are subset of the larger thinking apparatus given to us by Evolution. These states are an important part of the same apparatus we use to ponder the concept of ‘meaning’ in the first place.

I am curious. Do you subscribe to the theory that Evolution made our brain, and the brain produces thoughts solely through some physical process? If so, the fact that we can think about abstract concepts implies those concepts exist in some physical form in our mind?

Furthermore, if you were to try and ascertain the sense in which 'neuron pattersn and such' constitute'human thoughts', then this would require interpretation and judgement: that this pattern of data means or equates to such and such a thought. But the nature of meaning, and the nature of judgement, is precisely what it is, that such an analysis is intended to explain. So such a judgement can't help but be circular or question-begging. — Wayfarer

The only thing I am defending is that when when someone ‘discovers’ or ‘learns’ an abstract concept like the number 1, that concept then takes a physical form in our brain. Once this concept is physically in our brain, this physical entity deserves an ontological status; it will have causal effect in future physical thinking events within the larger apparatus.

I find it a little embarrassing for you that you deny that lipids can spontaneously from in the right conditions— Read Parfit

If it's true, then where is the evidence? Where are all these lipids which are spontaneously forming in the right conditions? Or is it simply the case that "the right conditions" just don't exist and therefore lipids just aren't spontaneously forming? And, "the right conditions" is a convenient fiction which substitutes for "magic". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you want evidence of lipids spontaneously forming in the right conditions, just check out the gut of the average American :).

When you ask something like, “where is the evidence?” in hydrothermal vents, or other places, it turns out that your question is very hard answer since Earth is not a sterile lab at this point. Lipids are in about every living organism, and when you find them in these places, it is pretty much impossible to tell if they were assembled from their component elements, or the byproduct of existing life. They have been produced in the lab, but that only gets the science so far. This is just one aspect that makes the science hard, and it is something that scientists will have to sort out, but this difficulty has nothing whatsoever to do with magic.

I find your regularly invoking the term “magic” for any unanswered aspect of a scientific theory both disrespectful and unhelpful. It is disrespectful because science is the opposite of magic, and you must know it gets under the skin of anyone that respects the process of science to be accused of relying on it. I think there is a good argument that your repeated accusations of my relying on magic are a form of taunting.

But past that, it is simply unhelpful in discourse. You use the term as a substitute for making a constructive counter argument. In my view it took way too many exchanges for you to finally say that what you meant by “magic” is that the right conditions do not exist.

I think the facts support my assertion that lipids spontaneously form in the right conditions like those that exist in a alkaline hydrothermal vent.
— Read Parfit

That's why Requarth said "speculation far outpaces evidence" in Lane's book, and why I say you invoke the magical appearance of a membrane. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is interesting that you know Requarth was referring to lipid membrane formation when he said that. To hear Nick Lane tell it, the tougher question about the hydrothermal vent theory is how the CO2 and H2 reaction became mechanized. There is considerable scientific debate on this point. Nick stakes out a position, other prominent scientists disagree. They are all scrambling to be the first to demonstrate their ideas in the lab. I would suspect that Requarth was referring to this speculation, but his sentence is vague.

I find it a little embarrassing for you that you deny that lipids can spontaneously from in the right conditions. While you do posses notable debating skills, no amount of diversion or word twisting can change how the lipid molecule does or does not form.

@MU

I'm not gonna lie, I meant to refer to molecular forces, which, no doubt, are influenced by atomic forces. I'm obviously not a chemistry expert. Regardless, I think the facts support my assertion that lipids spontaneously form in the right conditions like those that exist in a alkaline hydrothermal vent.

I'm educated in high school chemistry, biology, and physics. The existence of lipids is not caused by "atomic forces". You really don't seem to know what you're talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

https://www.ck12.org/c/physical-science/atomic-forces/lesson/Atomic-Forces-MS-PS/

Have we put to bed the issue of whether lipids and lipid membranes can spontaneously form in the right conditions through atomic forces?
— Read Parfit

I would call that magic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seriously? If you are using magic for a metaphor for atomic forces, then you are just playing word games. If you think atomic forces are actual magic, you need to take a high school chemistry class. Your metaphysical argument puts great weight on the term “inanimate physical thing”. The least you could do is brush up on the underlying forces behind physical things before you start making wholesale assumptions reflected in D.

Notice the quote "speculation far outpaces evidence in many of the book's passages". As I explained to you, it is a waste of time to read speculation which goes in the wrong direction. The evidence is on the side of the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Have we put to bed the issue of whether lipids and lipid membranes can spontaneously form in the right conditions through atomic forces?

As for the book review, I’ll let Requarth finish. “But perhaps for a biological theory of everything, that’s to be expected, even welcomed.” Lane's book is also filled with lots of hard science, and to the degree he advances unproven theory, these theories will be arbitrated through the hard work of science, as they should be.

For a moment, I imagined a Requarth critique of your one paragraph metaphysical logic concluding the non-physical did it, but that too is speculation.

Let me rephrase C then, if you want to nit pick. No inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am a little surprised a self described Metaphysician would call a textbook flaw in logic “nit picking.” How about we refer to your revision as C2?

A) The living physical body came into existence as an organized structure.
B) Therefore the "organizer" precedes the physical body.
C2) No inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing.
D) Therefore the organizer must be non-physical.

I'll start my critique of C2 by pointing out that “inanimate” can have multiple meanings. I suspect you mean the old school ‘there is no life in an element on the periodic table’ kind of definition, but that does not explain how lipids can spontaneously form, in the right conditions, and then organize themselves into membranes. If you peer into the world of protons and electrons, one finds their actions far from inanimate. So in a very important sense, there is no such thing as an “inanimate physical thing.”

If you are trying to use a strict definition of life as he threshold for animate, Nick Lane points out in his book that life is a spectrum rather than some hard line. Take a mushroom spore, in the right conditions it can can exist indefinitely as a static collection of molecules. Is that spore alive? If so, how?

Every so called “inanimate” component inside a ‘living’ cell physically acts and reacts on its own, in accordance with the atomic forces of the molecules they are comprised of and surrounded by, and the cell itself is acting and reacting with atomic forces in its environment.

Sure, but they are already lipids. I used "magic" to refer to apokrisis' description of the appearance of the membrane, as if it just suddenly appeared without the need for any prior lipids or proteins. if you want to go further and talk about the creation of lipids and proteins, prior to the creation of a membrane I'm still going to ask the same questions, where did the lipids come from, spontaneous generation (magic)? — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ll take your moving the label “magic” from spontaneous membrane formation to spontaneous lipid formation as a small amount of progress :)

Of course, in the right conditions, molecules like a lipid also spontaneously form through the chemical bonds of their constituent atoms.

At the moment, I am reading Nick Lane’s new book “The Vital Question, Energy, Evolution, and the Origins of Complex Life.” which I highly recommend if you want to get past looking at this stuff as magic.

Yes, and I thought your use of the word "magical" was an attempt to substitute sarcasm for an actual counter argument.— Read Parfit

My use of "magic" was warranted. Apokrisis described at length, how the existence of life is dependent on an asymmetrical relation between protons and electrons, as if this were the essence of life. Then apokriisis casually added "suddenly all it took was a membrane". So the key feature, which accounts for the emergence of life is not the asymmetrical relation between photons and electrons, but the magical appearance of this special membrane. It's not hard to refute an argument for abiogenesis which relies on the magical appearance of a special membrane. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your use of the word “magic” in relation to membrane assembly reveals a lack of understanding in how atoms and molecules ‘want’ to act according to these forces apokriisis described.

If you take a spoonful of lipids and place them in a cup of water that is in the right temperature range, these lipids will quickly assemble into the same type of membrane that encase our cells.

Check out figure 17.3.2 entitled “Spontaneously Formed Polar Lipid Structures in Water: Monolayer, Micelle, and Bilayer”. Our cells are encased in a Bilayer.

https://chem.libretexts.org/LibreTexts/University_of_South_Carolina_-_Upstate/USC_Upstate%3A_CHEM_U109%2C_Chemistry_of_Living_Things_(Mueller)/17%3A_Lipids/17.3%3A_Membranes_and_Membrane_Lipids

I think I owe Wayfarer a response on this subject a few pages back. Regardless, I don’t think you are going to get to a “must” in D from “non-physical in right there within our own minds”, but try me :)
— Read Parfit

OK then, here's the issue. We observe all sorts of things which have been created artificially through human activity. I think you will agree with that. The dualist apprehends what is obvious, that non-physical things like ideas and concepts, and the associated activities of reason, logic, intention and will, are responsible for the coming into being of these artificial things. The physicalist, for some unknown reason denies the obvious, that these things are non-physical, but then has no real way to account for the coming into being of artificial things. Artificial things are seen as natural, coming into being as a natural effect of living things. This just defers the problem because the coming into being of living things needs to be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the interest of giving you a concise response, can you give a couple of examples of artificially created things you are referring to? If you are talking about maths, for instance, I think abstract is more concise term than artificial.

Logically, C could be tossed. Whether or not something is “well known” does not make it true or false, and we have already established a physical body needing an “organizer” in A and B.
— Read Parfit

OK, so your dismissing inductive reasoning as not capable of assuring truth. That's not an unusual tactic, but we might just as well say that we can never be sure that a premise is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

The logical problem with C is that it is not even wrong. C only argues that it is well known that no inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing.

The most you can infer from C is:

Therefore it must be well known that the organizer was non-physical.

Not exactly the truth you are shooting for?

Would you be open to rewording C?

It was impossible for pre-existing physical processes on Earth to have organized the first living organisms.

I think that is your intended point, and gives you a more plausible line to keeping D intact?

The rest of your post raises some deep and important issues. I doubt I will be able to reply to them until this weekend.

I'll spell it out again so you don't have to go back. The living physical body came into existence as an organized structure. Therefore the "organizer" precedes the physical body. It is well known from the observation of inanimate physical things, that no inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing. Therefore the organizer must be non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, here is a breakdown of your argument:

A) The living physical body came into existence as an organized structure.
B) Therefore the "organizer" precedes the physical body.
C) It is well known from the observation of inanimate physical things, that no inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing.
D) Therefore the organizer must be non-physical.

Logically, I agree with A and B.

Logically, C could be tossed. Whether or not something is “well known” does not make it true or false, and we have already established a physical body needing an “organizer” in A and B.

Logically, D is pulled from thin air. You made no case why the “organiser” “must be non-physical”. You did not even use the term “non-physical“ until after your last 'Therefore'. You did not establish how a non-physical "organizer" exists or explain how it would interact with the physical in the way you say it must have done.

Your use of the word “must” in D is further called into question given an alternate "organizer" has been described as alkaline hydrothermal vents in a broadly plausible scientific theory that does not require any non-physical entities. This theory details how the tiny krebs cycle (with membrane) could be forged in alkaline hydrothermal vents which just happen to have all the necessary molecular components and millions of tiny pockets that are the same size as bacteria.

This is just one example of a theory makes the use of "must" in D pretty flimsy. There are other theories like "we're living in a simulation" and "aliens seeded earth" that could just as easily be substituted for "be non-physical" in D.

The only objection came from apokrisis who said that there is no evidence of anything "non-physical". But both wayfarer and I replied by referring to the fact that the evidence of the non-physical is right there within our own minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I owe Wayfarer a response on this subject a few pages back. Regardless, I don’t think you are going to get to a “must” in D from “non-physical in right there within our own minds”, but try me :)

To simply ignore this logic, and proceed to adopt abiogenesis as a principle, and then attempt in some haphazard way to support abiogenesis with science, is nothing other than unreasonable behaviour. Did you read my reply to apokrisis, who postulates the magical appearance of a membrane? — Metaphysician Undercover

I hope you will not continue to say I ignore your logic. I admit my description is somewhat haphazard when compared to someone with scientific training, but I think it is unfair to say that pointing to leading scientific theories on the subject is unreasonable behavior.

Did you read my reply to apokrisis, who postulates the magical appearance of a membrane? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and I thought your use of the word "magical" was an attempt to substitute sarcasm for an actual counter argument.

The living physical body came into existence as an organized structure — Metaphysician Undercover

By “the living body” do you mean the first living bodies? By that I mean bacteria and their predecessors existing ~3 billion years ago?

I will give you a detailed reply to the rest of your stated logic, I just want to hit some terra firma with you first.

Not an expert here. My understanding is that time does not have to be a "thing" for matter to confirm to the second law of thermodynamics. Time is simply how we frame these changes in entropy. The 2nd law provides the reason a dropped egg will never reform, which is why backwards time travel is sketchy theory. Rate of speed may slow down the entropy of the moving objects, in relation to the slower moving objects, but entropy is always increasing?

Nick Lane’s latest book indeed makes the case that life anywhere could only take the form of electron respiratory chains and proton gradients. — apokrisis

I was not aware of his new book. Thanks!

This is consistent with my claim. At the bottom of such physical activity, the most fundamental, there is still a need to conclude existence of the non-physical to account for the cause of existence of such physical activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no logical “need” to conclude the existence of “non-physical” entities being the cause of physical activity. That is just a theory with without meat on the bone.

Abiogenesis is unsupported, random speculation, therefore unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unike your theory of intent filled non-physical entities, the alkaline hydrothermal vent theory provides a level of detail that is falsifiable.

I agree with apokrisis that you need to get caught up with the advances in scientific theory in this area.

I read some of the referrals, I found it wildly speculative, as I said, and uninteresting. Read Parfit seems to try to make a point by referral, and I don't like that form of argument. If Read understands the material, why not explain it to me in a way which relates to my point, rather than referring me to various articles, which don't seem to be relevant to the point I am making. — Metaphysician Undercover

You find broadly plausible scientific theories related to abiogenesis “uninteresting”, and “don’t like that” I refer you to the source of my claims. These statements make me wonder how much effort you put into your "wildly speculative" conclusion. :(.

Consider that the entire living body, any living body, consists of directed activities. I think that there is evidence of this, that every part of the physical body is active, and directed in the sense of acting as a part of a whole. This means that no physical part of the living body could come into existence without consisting of a directed activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fossil and biological evidence show that we slowly evolved from bacteria over millions of years. While there are still details to fill in related to abiogenesis, we know for a fact that the tiny krebs cycle and RNA/DNA were the necessary drivers for our branch of life to kick start from single celled organisms. These very physical and basic molecular activities, which are driven by chemical bonds, are that force I think you miss.

https://www.ducksters.com/science/molecules.php
https://www.ducksters.com/science/the_atom.ph

Therefore we must conclude that the thing which directs the activity of the physical living body is prior in time to the physical body itself. This is the non-physical soul. Do you see what I mean? If the living body only exists as directed activity, then the thing which directs the activity must be prior to the physical body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since there is a broadly plausible and very physical explanation for how our bodies came into existence, I disagree that we must conclude anything non physical is necessary. Overwhelming fossil and biological evidence provide a detailed story of how living creatures developed our capacity to conduct directed activity through physical means over millions of years.

I have enjoyed this conversation. I think your assumption that a soul is a separate entity is an error that makes further conclusions based on the assumption nonsensical. In my life, I have heard plenty of personal testament about a separate soul, but have seen no evidence. What I have seen is science continually discovering physical activities in our brain and the rest of our body that humans have historically assumed is the work of a separate soul.

Aristotle had no way of knowing about the fossil and biological evidence showing plants and animals share common ancestors in bacteria that lived 2.5 million years ago, yet he showed his brilliance in deducing there was something plants and animals had in common. In 2018, I think it is unfair to Aristotle to invoke his name as a reason to conclude there is a separate soul. In light of the current facts we know about evolution and biology, I like to think that if he were alive today, he would be the first to point out the updates to that are necessary to his theory,

“The article you referred describes the chemical composition of DNA, and the duplication of genetic material, it does not describe what created it, or caused its existence. Nor does evolutionary theory explain this cause.”
↪Metaphysician Undercover

I know I owe you a couple more replies that I hope I can get to this weekend, but I just want to do some quick mopup.

Although I mentioned Nick Lane’s book on evolution as a reference to leading scientific theories concerning the evolutionary creation of the krebs cycle and RNA/DNA, I did not provide links.

https://www.nature.com/articles/nrmicro1991

http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/362/1486/1887.short

In my last post to you I gave you two examples (Monads and shitting in the street) of how an absurd preference could lead to an absurd thesis. In a philosophical debate, it is generally incumbent on you to either point out a flaw in my examples, or explain how the outcomes are equally good as your thesis argues.

You instead countered:

"But there is no one fact that we can all hang our philosophical coats on".

So what? Does you theory that every thesis is equal since it is based on preferences hang its hat on one fact? How does that counter my examples?

What Aquinas argues in this passage is that the intellect and the soul of the human being are united as one, such that the human soul is an intellectual soul. The soul was always understood as separable from the body, even following Aristotle's definition, designating it as the form of the body, because forms are in principle separable. The question considered by Aquinas was whether the intellect is separable in the same way that the soul is separable. Aquinas argues that the human soul is an intellectual soul. So the soul maintains its status as the form of the living body, but in the case of intellectual beings, the soul is an intellectual soul

So it is not as you claim, that Aquinas changes the meaning of "soul" to "mind". What he argues is that the soul of an intellectual being is a special type of soul, an intellectual soul. "Soul" maintains its definition as the first actuality (form) of a living body, but he gives the intellectual soul special status in comparison with the vegetative soul, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am curious, do you believe what Aquinas argued?

“Evolution accounts for the creation of gene expression. Phosphodiester and hydrogen bonds are examples of expression between the handful of molecules comprising and animating DNA?”
— Read Parfit

The article you referred describes the chemical composition of DNA, and the duplication of genetic material, it does not describe what created it, or caused its existence. Nor does evolutionary theory explain this cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, the article just described the chemical expression side.

@Wayfarer too. If you are not familiar with the leading evolutionary theories related to the forging of the krebs cycle 3,400 - 2,500 million years ago, I suggest the book “Life Ascending, The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution” written by Nick Lane. I imagine if he read my sentence”Evolution accounts for the creation…” he would suggest I change it to “It is broadly plausible that Evolution accounts for the creation…”.

Aristotle's definition of soul: the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. — Metaphysician Undercover

“You use soul as a metaphor for chemical reactions behind gene expression?”
— Read Parfit

No metaphor here, this is a description of reality. Prior to what I think you mean by "gene expression", we need to account for the creation and existence of genes themselves. If we are describing things in terms of semiotics, we cannot just refer to the reading and interpreting of signs, we must account for the creation and existence of signs. — Metaphysician Undercover

Evolution accounts for the creation of gene expression. Phosphodiester and hydrogen bonds are examples of expression between the handful of molecules comprising and animating DNA?

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK21261/

At this point it seems we have reached the first grade of actuality of life on earth as specified in the Aristotle definition you provided. Digging further into what causes these molecules to express themselves through these bonds seems to be a broader question than the subset of nature that we call life?

It is often the case that we can describe the same act by referring to either a physical agent or a non-physical agent. If we say that a certain person did such and such, the person, a physical human being, is a physical agent, acting in the world. But if we turn to the person's intent, then we must account for the non-physical cause of that physical agent's action. Here we must turn to a non-physical agent. — Metaphysician Undercover

A few posts earlier, I made the case that the term non-physical is unhelpful since it requires further parsing to get at an author's meaning. Are you referring to unknown physical processes? Are you talking about some theory of an actual non-physical entity? I see no reason to believe intention is anything more than a complex aggregation of physical processes based in the mind/body mechanics given us through evolution.

“What I've observed is philosophy can be essentially divided into opposing concepts. For every thesis there's an antithesis. The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.

There's no flaw in the logic I suppose. Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them.

Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).

Therefore, philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.”



For the sake of argument, let's say that I prefer a worldview that everything is comprised of 3 types of Monads as Leibniz put forth in his philosophy. Lest also say I put forth a thesis repeating Leibniz. A philanthropist, preferring the rigor of modern day science commissions an antithesis that will pass the scrutiny of the the peer review process at Journal Nature. Which thesis do we have most reason to believe?

Moving to moral theory. For the sake of argument, let's say I prefer to believe that germs and viruses do not exist, and this is the axiom behind my reasoning in my thesis entitled “Public health, sumglic health, why we should regularly poop on the street.”

At some point, facts matter.