I do not know what that means.

I am always open to enlightenment.

I am uncertain as to whether eternal and infinite are synonymous. I suspect their relationship to time may be different.

and therefore. . . ?

yes

Are you an agnostic about every empirical claim, such as whether you have an automobile? — Terrapin Station

I have no reason to believe our modes of access to the universe are comprehensive.

I have no reason to believe that our modes of access to the universe are comprehensive.

who said the existence of God is an empirical claim? And besides, are you seriously suggesting that our access abilities are absolute? garbage in, garbage out.

I generally enjoy discussions regarding the existence/non-existence of God. Unfortunately, those who profess to be atheists tend to get rather abusive, especially when compared to the believers.

You are not independent from it if you see it, or if you think about it, interaction doesn't reduce to the feeling of touch. What about a remote that you've never seen and never thought about? People somewhere designed it, others built it, others use it, which influences what they do, what they think about, which influences what others do and think about, which influences the world, which ends up having an influence on you. — leo

You seem to be suggesting that independent and interaction and influence and perception are all somehow synonymous. And again, you seem to be suggesting that there is no connection between the notions of dependent and independent. I would hate to think that I am dependent upon something just because I perceive it. You are essentially draining the concept of any useful meaning.
.

perhaps

or you could be less wordy.

Banno writes in English. I write in English. Being able to say it in the first person is not a sufficient criterion for separating the so called subject/object. It is all word salad.

If I had to explain it to you, it wouldn't be funny anymore.

I stole that.

I agree with Leo. The notion of "objective" truth is rooted in the age old "subject/object", "inner/outer" nonsensical Cartesian dichotomies. Calling something objectively true is tantamount to calling something truly true. It is nonsensical.

We are addicted to power and control. So much of religion is focused upon finding a way to make do as we please. If we just say the right things and do the right things then we will please god and god will give us what we want. we just want that power and control even over god. we do not to be like god, we want to be god.

Most of our language is simply about being there with others. We talk weather, we talk cars, we talk sports, we talk politics, we talk books, we talk movies. Very little of our everyday discourse hinges upon clarity. Being clear about what to get at the grocery story requires more clarity than most of our everyday conversations. So I would losing the notion of "all about."

I agree. Language is more about sharing a space than transferring information.

I agree with your general thrust. However, the interaction of things does not in and of itself define whether they are "independent." And that is especially true when one contrasts independent with dependent. I may well interact with my television remote, but that does not make me dependent upon my television remote. And I could choose to never interact with it be independent of it.

seriously, it is called all sorts of things and we are dealing with a translation. If I were to take up learning a new language, it would definitely be German. But I also remind myself that Being and Time was written under hurried circumstances and that there were portions (particularly Discourse and Space) that Heidegger was not happy with.

There is nothing more meaningfully expressive of our explicit understanding of entities as entities than our regular and ongoing involvement with them in a fluid and seamless manner. The ability to verbally express that same understanding pales in comparison.

Being as the always present yet necessarily hidden continually emerging openness that makes possible an awareness of beings as beings.

There is no point to laying out the process of interpretation without accounting for the primary results and aim of interpretation (facilitating the transformation from understanding to purposeful involvement in the world). And it is absurd to suggest that Heidegger would lay bare an “existential whole of Dasein” wherein the collective primordials account only for the least significant form of interpretive results.

If the relations among the primordials 1) State-of-Mind, 2) Understanding, and 3) Discourse (which together constitute the existential whole of Dasien) do not account for the non-verbal expressions of interpretation, then they cannot account for either our involvement in the equipmental whole (such involvements generally being non-verbal expressions of interpretations) or the ultimate for the sake of which (from which involvements draw their purpose).

There is our State-of Mind, there is our Understanding, and there is what we do.

Discourse is what we do!

The primary purpose is to once again ask the question of the meaning of being. The everyday mode of existence is the starting point for his explication of Dasein. The everyday is not Dasein's mode of being for in everyday existence our concern is not the question of the meaning of being, that is, what it is for us to be. Dasein is: — Fooloso4

It matters not whether your purpose is 1) to tell us the meaning of A by fully explicating B or 2) to fully explicate B in order to tell us the meaning of A. Heidegger has tied a full explication of Dasein to explaining the meaning of being in such a way that the two are inseparable to his purpose. And you already know this. If all he wanted to do was tell us the meaning of being, he could have stopped after page 26 of the M&R translation of B&T.

This is what Heidegger calls involvement with equipment, the 'ready to hand'. We can talk about ovens and baking potatoes, but that does not mean that talking about ovens and baking potatoes and lawn mowers and mowing the lawn are a priori conditions for using ovens and lawn mowers or that the activities are discursive. — Fooloso4

Seriously? I know what Heidegger calls involvement with equipment and at no point did I suggest that talking about anything is an a prior condition for using anything. (and by the way, the ready to hand and equipment are not synonymous). I did suggest that one cannot possibly render explicit their understanding of how to mow a lawn if they did not already have a general understanding of how to mow a lawn. The point being is that interpretations (the rendering explicit of understanding) are done for the purpose of acting upon the interpretation. And rendering explicit (interpreting) my understanding of the proper heat at which to bake a potato is done for the purpose of setting the oven to the appropriate temperature. And the act of setting the oven to the appropriate temperature is a non-verbal expression of my interpretation (explicit understanding) of how to bake a potato.

It does not follow from the equiprimordiality of state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse that discourse must include such things as mowing the lawn and baking potatoes. Their equiprimordiality means that none of them is primary, that they do not derive one from another. Our active involvement in the world is not reducible to discourse. — Fooloso4

Seriously again? The primary issue is not the definition of equiprimordial. You may rest assured I know what it means. Instead, the issue is whether when taken together these primoridials constitute the existential whole of Dasein. And they do. Please see B&T (M&R) at page 224 (German at 180).

It would be strange indeed if Heidegger laid out the “existential whole of Dasein” and it accounted for the expressions of interpretations made by Dasein except for the expressions of interpretations at the very heart of Heidegger’s originality, i.e., non-verbal acts expressing our interpretations (explicit understandings) of how to use (not talk about) equipment (such as ovens and lawn mowers). And if you think that is what Heidegger has done, then you are wrong. And I can live with that.

IF a primary purpose (perhaps the primary purpose) of Being and Time is to capture the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world;

AND

IF much (perhaps most) of the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world is comprised of what would be typically described as non-verbal acts (mowing the lawn, driving to the store, baking a potato);

AND

IF State-of-Mind, Understanding, and Discourse are equiprimordial and comprehensively constitutive of being-in-the-world;

THEN: Discourse must include those acts typically described as non-verbal OR Heidegger fails (MISERABLY) at capturing the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world.

Or put another way, you cannot capture the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world without accounting for those acts typically described as non-verbal.

exactly!

whether language is inherent in all actions does not determine whether an action is verbal/non-verbal.

If we account for those actions (in which language is inherent) that are verbal and call them Discourse, then we still must account for those actions (in which language is inherent) that are non-verbal (which for Heidegger will constitute most of our average everyday involvement in the world).

And if we call the latter something other than Discourse, then Disposition, Understanding and Discourse as comprehensively constitutive of being-in-the-world will not capture the non-verbal acts that make up the greater portion of our average everyday involvement in the world. And that would be a strange interpretation of Heidegger indeed.

So even conceding that language is inherent in everything we do changes nothing so long as we cling to the notion that Discourse includes only verbal acts.

Simply put, whatever term one uses for that which is equiprimordial with disposition and understanding, it must capture all expressions of interpretations or it will not capture our average every day involvement in the world. And if you are a Bavarian peasant, it will not even come close.

The degree to which one insists upon language as somehow running through and through our average everyday involvement in the world is the degree to which one's comportment toward being-with-others has become an emotional need for others.

As I understand Heidegger, Dasein is always a doing, but doing for Heidegger means a meaningful involvement with others in the world.which is at the same time a praxis, an understanding, an attunement and a discoursing. Discourse serves the same purpose for Heidegger that language does for Derrida and other post-structuralists. Rather than being a secondary phenomenon in relation to perception, it is intrinsic to all forms of experiencing. — Joshs

You will never be able to capture the average everydayness of our involvement in the world without accounting for all expressed interpretations. Either Discourse will include non-verbal expressions of interpretations or it will be defined in such a way as to claim that it does not include non-verbal expressions of interpretations but will capture them nonetheless. Philosophers are good at that. And the post-structuralists are especially good at that.

[X] is the expressing of interpretations. If your term for X does not capture all expressions of interpretations, then it is useless.

It is not a question of limiting the discussion but of identifying whether you are interpreting BT, introducing other works by H., or addressing something that is not in the text. — Fooloso4

I am addressing Heidegger and Language. Confusion also results when people presume their projects are the same as the projects of other people. My primary project is to raise interest in Heidegger. You seem to suggest that my project has something to do with judging whether Heidegger lacks clarity regarding language. I have already made that judgment and it is clearly stated in the first sentence of the original post.

It is clear that Heidegger says all sorts of things about discourse, language and silence. It strikes me as a fool's errand to reduce what Heidegger has to say about each to a single statement he may have said about each.

As for my father's tendency to silence, I was merely commenting upon its effect in regard to those occasions when he chose not to be silent. And in that sense, I was using the example of his silence to highlight Heidegger's distinction between those who are silent because they have nothing to say and those for whom silence is what they have to say.

As for "genuine" silence being about the disclosure of Dasein, that is true of all forms of disclosure. There is nothing else for Dasein to disclose but Dasein. Dasein is the disclosure of Dasein.

Carry on.

though most of us are quick to agree that morality and law are not the same thing, most of us are also quick to forget it.

got it. :smile:

"Discourse" - as opposed to language (assuming I understand what you wrote) - can express, but there is no appreciation of expression except in language via memory. That is, language is exactly front, center, and all around. — tim wood

Though Heidegger did indeed consider language to be the house of being, it is important to keep in mind that in Being and Time he is attempting to describe being-in-the-world in terms of the average everydayness of our involvement in the world. And most of the average everydayness of our involvement has little to do with expressions intended for the appreciation of others.

Most of our day is spent expressing our interpretation of our understanding of the world by taking the dogs for a walk, mowing the lawn, baking a potato, doing the dishes and so on. And such mundane involvements in the world take up far more time than the amount of time the average person spends upon expressions intended for consumption by others.

Though language might well be "front, center, and all around" when dealing with expressions intended for public consumption and evaluation, such expressions account for an extremely small amount of the daily involvement in the world of the average person.

And again and in Being and Time, Heidegger is in pursuit of the nature of being in our average everydayness.

Woke up
Fell out of bed
Dragged a comb across my head
Went downstairs and drank a cup. . .

A Day in Life is not a day in which "language is exactly front, center, and all around." In fact, it is quite the opposite.

Your opening post was about how Being and Time is misunderstood. If the text is to be understood we must attend to it. That is what I have been doing. It is what I thought you were doing. — Fooloso4

The thread is entitled Heidegger and Language and though I refer specifically toBeing and Time in the original post, there is nothing in the original post to suggest that I or anyone else must limit our discussion of Heidegger and Language to only Being and Time. If you would like to do that, I am fine limiting my discussions with you to only Being and Time.

And I see no inconsistencies between my comments and examples regarding silence and your subsequent comments. Returning to the example of my father, his own tendencies to silence had the effect of amplifying his words on the occasions when he did choose to speak.

Discourse is tied to being-with: — Possibility

Discourse is not exclusively tied to being-with.

Discourse is equiprimordial with both disposition (mood, state-of-mind) and understanding.

As such and by definition Discourse is tied to being-in-the-world in general and that would not change even if you were the only remaining Dasein.

Every being-in-the-world has 1) a disposition toward the world, 2) an understanding of the world, and 3) is in Discourse with the world.

And when it comes to our average everydayness, most of our Discourse with the world is neither verbal/linguistic nor intended to be publicly communicative.

Simply put and to put it another way, Discourse is the process whereby we render our disposition and our understanding in to active involvement in the world.

If you are unable to think of Discourse in non-verbal/non-linguistic terms, then [X] is the process whereby we render our disposition and our understanding in to active involvement in the world.

However and whatever term you find helpful, please keep in mind that it must also carry the burden of being equiprimordial with disposition and understanding. And that is no small task for any word.

To clarify, I interpret discourse as the process of expressing an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world. As you can see, the definition does not require that an expression be either public or communicative in any form, including verbal/linguistic forms (though it can be.).

And for those who are uncomfortable with the notion of a private discourse divorced from the verbal and/or linguistic, I am happy to interpret "[X} as the process of expressing an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world".

If we had no understanding of the world, we would have no basis upon with to choose one act over another or several others. But we do have an understanding of the world and in order to act with purpose there are times we must render "explicit" our understanding. For example and if one wants a good potato, it is not enough to understand that heat is useful for baking potatoes. One must understand how much heat and for how long, i.e., one's understanding must be more explicit than heat is useful.

And the process of rendering explicit our understanding is what Heidegger calls interpretation. In turn, discourse is an expression of our interpretation. And I express my interpretation of my understanding of what is necessary to bake a good potato by turning the oven to 425 degrees and setting the timer to 30 minutes at which point I would turn the potato and reset the timer for another 30 minutes.

And none of that would be possible absent a general understanding of cooking and a more explicit understanding of cooking a potato and the ability to put that understanding in to actions both verbal and non-verbal and both private and public.

Keep in mind, Heidegger is attempting to describe our regular and ongoing involvement in the world in our average every dayness, i.e,, walking the dogs, mowing the lawn, taking out the trash, baking potatoes. And very little of our average everyday involvement in the world is intended to be publicly communicative.

First, I do believe my opening remark for the thread was to the effect that Heidegger’s position on language is a bit confusing and that one of the ways to untangle it is to accept that he does not consider “discourse” and “language” to be synonymous.

Second, I too write for the “ear” of all those who may choose to read (and perhaps engage in) the ongoing discussion. And to be above board in that regard, my understanding and interpretation of being is obviously Heideggerian. But Heidegger is difficult to understand, leaves much room for interpretation, and leaves significant gaps in his overall ontological thrust. As a result, much of what I say includes my own interpretations of being and I do not in any form or fashion claim that Heidegger or anyone else for that matter would necessarily agree with them.

But this forum is not formal to the degree that I am going to write footnotes or necessarily delineate clearly between my interpretations of Heidegger per se and my own interpretations of being in light of the deficiencies in Heidegger’s work.

All of that having been said, I am not so certain that “silence” as a form of discourse is as complex as your questions suggest. When my wife and I had disagreements (I am a widower) and she went silent, it spoke volumes. Similarly and while I was growing up, my father spoke very little. But many is the person who would say to the effect, "your father does not speak much; but when he does, you are well advised to listen." And I do think those are the type of situations to which Heidegger refers.

And in that regard, one of the things I see in Heidegger is a continual refusal to frame issues in terms of opposites. Intentional silence is not the opposite of discourse (it is a comportment toward discourse), intentional solitude is not the opposite of daseining-with (it is a comportment toward daseining-with), and a lack of solicitude is not the opposite of care (it is a comportment toward care).

And finally, I recently read Heidegger's Analytic by Taylor Carmen. Chapter 5 is an excellent take on discourse and does push the envelope, though perhaps not as far as I. For those serious about Heidegger, the entire book is a must read. I suspect I will read it many times.

I can neither reasonably agree nor disagree with your premise since your only response to enquiries regarding your feebly supported sub-premises was to assure us of your certainty.

Under such circumstances, I thought it best to move along to discussions rooted in reason rather than proclamations of self-certainty.

So once again, thank you for your enlightening me.

some of us have a sense of humor and some do not.

carry on.

Correct. I'm a materialist/physicalist. — Terrapin Station

But you are still alive, so there is still hope for you.

:razz:

He says:

Discourse [Rede] is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding — Fooloso4

And therefore? Are you asking me whether I agree or what I think that means?

I suspect any understanding of discourse as equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding is rooted in thrownness and falling. And thrownness and falling together are such that we have to keep moving forward in the world and we do so by our actions. And discourse is the process whereby our state-of-mind and our understanding are transformed into actions.