He only proved that √2 is not a rational number. He did not prove that √2 is an irrational number. Yes, I'm concerned with proof by contradiction. — Ryan O'Connor
Constructivists deny the law of the excluded middle. You might be interested in this. For my own part I don't have any affinity for constructivism although it's enjoying a resurgence lately due to the influence of computer science and computerized mathematical proof systems. Brouwer's revenge, I like to call it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_(philosophy_of_mathematics)
If I flip a coin and tell you that it is not heads that is not proof that it is tails because it may have landed on its side. — Ryan O'Connor
Different issue. Landing on side should be included in the outcome space. In high school statistics we were flipping coins once and a nickel started rolling on its side and slowing down and darn near landed on its edge, but it hit the wall and fell over. But I
almost saw it happen.
Actually, I want to strengthen it even more so to say that a number only exists when it is being computed. If there is no computer currently thinking about 3 right now then the number 3 does not exist as an actualized number. It only has the potential to exist. — Ryan O'Connor
I see your point, but then existence becomes contingent on what everyone's thinking about and/or computing. 3 might or might not exist depending on what 7 billion people and a few hundred million computers are thinking or computing at this exact instant. What kind of standard for existence is that? Not one that would have much support from ontologist, I'd wager.
I think this sort of view is required if we are to avoid actual infinity. — Ryan O'Connor
If you deny the mathematical existence of the natural numbers you not only deny ZF, but also Peano arithmetic. That doesn't let you get any nontrivial math off the ground. Not only no theory of the real numbers, but not even elementary number theory. You may be making a philosophical point but not one with much merit, since it doesn't account for how mathematics is used or for actual mathematical practice.
Otherwise, how would a constructivist answer the question: how many numbers are there? — Ryan O'Connor
Well then you're an
ultrafinitist. You not only deny the existence of infinite sets; you deny the existence of sufficiently large finite sets.
I do actually have some sympathy for the ultrafinitist position, since it's the only mathematical ontology that is consistent with what's known about the physical world. But your particular flavor of ultrafinitism is untenable, granting existence to only those things that someone is thinking about or computing at any given instant. Under such a philosophy we can never say whether a given number or mathematical object exists.
My response to such a question is 'how many numbers are where? In what computer?' — Ryan O'Connor
Even the constructivists, with whom I've had many an interesting discussion in these very pages, believe in computable numbers. There is a countable infinity of them. Computable numbers, I mean, not constructivists.
The ultrafinitists don't put any particular upper limit on how large a number can be, only that there aren't infinitely many of them.
But you want to not only say that, but that whether a given number exists or not depends on whether someone's thinking of it. How can we ever determine that? It's an unverifiable standard. There is then no way to know whether any number exists and whether it still exists five minutes from now. It's impossible to hold such a view along with any kind of coherent ontology of numbers.
I believe that the decimal representation for 1/3 cannot exist but nevertheless the number certainly can. For example, it is LL on the Stern-Brocot tree. And we can do exact arithmetic using any rational number using the Stern-Brocot tree. — Ryan O'Connor
Why doesn't pi exist? It has a representation as a finite-length algorithm. By exist I mean mathematical existence of course, that's the only kind of existence I'm talking about.
But won't there always be undecidable statements? It seems like your definition is too restrictive as it would be missing some truths. — Ryan O'Connor
Well in any sufficiently interesting mathematical system we are always missing some truths. That's just a fact. But at least it's not contingent. The Continuum hypothesis is always undecidable in ZFC. Now and five minutes from now and five million years from now. And in ZFC + CH, it's provable. Now and five minutes from now. We have logical certainty about what exists, unlike with your system in which we have to constantly poll 7 billion people and several hundred million computers.
Why is it necessary to have a number system which is complete? — Ryan O'Connor
Because otherwise the real number line has holes in it. The
intermediate value theorem is false. There's a continuous function that's less than zero at one point and greater than zero at another, but that is never zero. Of course the constructivists patch this up by limiting their attention to only computable functions. The constructivists have answers for everything, which I never find satisfactory.
I have no doubt that pi is irrational (i.e. not a rational number). But a sandwich is also not a rational number. My argument is that just as a sandwich is not a number, perhaps neither is pi. Maybe it's an algorithm. — Ryan O'Connor
Of course LEM is always relative to a given universe of discourse. If pi is a real number that's not rational, then it's a real number that's irrational. Without the restriction to real numbers, you're right. It could be a sandwich. Time for dinner.