In conclusion, if one accepts the principles mentioned above and uses them as guides for interpreting our current situation, one cannot help but wonder if we're long overdue for the overthrowing of plutocracy and the system which sustains it: capitalism. The more we clearly see the problem, the better we can see the solution, formulate appropriate goals towards a solution, and generate corresponding local, individual and collective actions to this end. — Xtrix

The things is, there never has been a "legitimate" legitimatization. It's not as if Gods or lineage where anything other than a story some people told to give their rule legitimacy.

To put it bluntly, the truth is that ultimately there never has been another legitimisation than holding power. One has the mandate of heaven, until one has not... which is essentially the same as saying one can be in power, until one loses that power.

Our current situation isn't any different from times past. Those in power want to keep it and tell stories to that that effect, and those that don't believe those stories want the ones in power gone because.... well, they want some of that power too.

Questioning legitimacy is fine and all, because there really is no reason to just accept any of it, but i'm not sure what kind of 'solution' you expect? If we ever would manage to overthrow the current rulers you will invariably get a new class of rulers, which will effectively only be legitimized by the fact that they managed to overthrow the previous rules, by power in short... rinse repeat.

If we are well aware of the dangers, why do we continue down the same path as fast as we possibly can? What is pragmatic about largely ignoring thousands of hydrogen bombs aimed down our own throats? Seems like the definition of insanity to me. — Hippyhead

Like I said, because it follows market and geopolitical logic. Countries and large companies need to invest into this because otherwise the become economically irrelevant. And scientist need to go where the money is, otherwise they are out of a job...

If I had to bet money on this right now I would lay my bet on the notion that we are trying to build a
highly globalized technological civilization for the first time, and getting such huge things right on the first try is typically unlikely. If one takes a long enough view, everything may work out in the end. — Hippyhead

Yeah agreed, unfortunately five years term democracies typically are not very conductive to taking a long view on things.

I hear you. Not arguing with that, except the "if it happens" part. Doing anything about this may very well be impossible, agreed. But we are great philosophers :-), so we're supposed to try. — Hippyhead

As a great philosopher I have tried :-). I identified the source of the problem in geopolitical and market dynamics, which surpas the national level at which things usually get deciced. Therefor you need to have a dialogue and agreements on it at an international level. Not that this will be easy, but that's where you need to look for a solution I think.

That said, I find this interesting largely because it may illustrate how the group consensus, even that of the very brightest and most highly educated people, could be horribly wrong. — Hippyhead

Sure some may have it wrong, but most are probably well aware of the dangers... and take a pragmatic attitude on it :

What I'm ignorant of is the pointlessness of worrying about things which are probably inevitable and beyond anyone's control. — Hippyhead

It's not one or even a group of scientists driving this process. It's countries locked in geopolitical struggles and companies in market struggles with eachother who pump huge amounts of money in these things... the rest follows. This is beyond anyone's control and probably inevitable... if it happens ;-).

I am not necessarily referring to the mind-body problem, my question could have been ''can we understand everything understandable?''. Some would say no. It is like an ant can't understand maths, we would be like an ant in comparison with another species, that species would look like a worm compared to a more evolved one, and so on. How plausible is that, why/not? — Eugen

The reason the ant analogy doesn't really work is because we have language and so can build up knowledge and pass it on to next generations. Some things that would have seem unfathomable to understand two thousand years ago, a teenager today could understand in a couple of hours/days. Ants never surpass their biology in the same way.

There doesn't seem to be a clear intellectual limit to understanding things, just that understanding new things requires more effort progressively. There are other limits than intellectual limits though, like the fact that we can only access the world via our senses.

9) If the logical outcome is eventual chaos, what would be the point of developing more new knowledge, given that it would likely be swept away in that chaos? — Hippyhead

The point is what you state in 2), it give us more control over our environment.

We don't know with any kind of certainty that the logical outcome is eventual chaos.

Even if that would be the eventual outcome of "the process of knowledge accumulation", knowledge is not a singular thing. Some types may be dangerous, some not so much etc... I feel drawing conclusions at this kind of high level of abstraction is kind of meaningless.

And even if we were to assume that such a general conclusion can be meaningful, it doesn't follow that this should be the only perspective a human being living here and now should take. The universe will eventually end in extreme chaos because of entropy regardless of what we do, that doesn't mean that nothing we do now has any point. Meaning shouldn't necessarily be measured by ultimate outcomes only.

No probably not.

When you are young you have a lot of energy, and little experience of how the world works. Adding to that you are, just by virtue of not having had a lot of time to build up a something in the world, usually not in a situation where you stand to lose much... and so among the youth the conditions are right for developing a culture that wants to change things.

Maybe, but by saying "we can't not", I was actually aiming to be much broader than that. In the context of this discussion, I think it extends out to simply that we make assumptions about how changes we make to the environment affect the behaviour of others. The very premise of criminal punishment is just such an assumption - that an environment in which criminals are punished will alter the behavior of would-be criminals to deter them from such activities.

All psychology is, when it gets involved, is a more formalised and better tested collection of these assumptions. Not perhaps the strength with which Geologists can tell us the earth is round, but significantly better (I hope) than whatever some random judge happens to reckon. — Isaac

I want to say I certainly applaud these efforts, just to make that clear.

So when I say "X's free choice was constrained by his circumstances such that he should not be punished for his actions to the same extent as someone less constrained" I'm not really saying anything about morality. I think the moral intuition is already assumed (that someone with less free-choice is more deserving of leniency - think gun-to-the-head). I'm just making the case about the existence and strength of such constraints. — Isaac

But, and this is maybe more nitpicking than anything else, I don't think the gun-to-head analogy works here. If it were a matter of free choice that would have to lead to acquittal it seems to me, and not leniency which already implies some guilt... which leads me back to my initial intuition that leniency is not so much a matter of free choice.

I could give other examples, like age-exemptions to responsibility, which also don't necessarily align with the self/non-self distinction and free choice.... but seem to be more a matter of an assumed lack of knowledge of the consequences etc.

There are a lot of different moral intuitions at play here, which you probably don't disagree with.... I guess my qualms are not so much with the methods of testing, but more with these moral intuitions themselves, or rather with the lack of clarity of which moral intuitions are applicable when.

So assessing the origin of constraints on choice as self/non-self is just run-of-the-mill practice. It may be shaky, but we're going to do it anyway (we can't not) so we either do it with some attempt at scientific-style objectivity, or we just make it up. — Isaac

Maybe this question is born out of ignorance, but what is the attempt at scientific-style objectivity here?

I wonder if "we can't not" because we have some kind of a priori moral intuition that this is the right way to judge these matters... or if this moral intuition comes from our notions of identity and agency. If it's the former, maybe there is some merit to just calling it what it is, a moral intuition, and not to try to fabricate some theoretical post hoc justification.

To me the distinction of self/non-self seems problematic as a basis for attributing responsibility because identity is such a fluid concept. Maybe it works in this case, but it seems like we would run into trouble quite quickly if we were to try to apply it consistently across the board... I could be wrong.

I think my word choice has caused some confusion. I introduced the notion of preferred simply to be clear that there aren't any objective measures of selfhood we can use to distinguish external (non-self) constraints on choice from internal ones (like preference). In some cases it will be obvious (a gun to the head is obviously an external constraint) but in some cases we have to take a clients subjective judgment into account (anything from feeling depressed without cause to actually hearing voices which do not feel part of oneself).

So one's environment creates external constraints in obviously external ways, but also in ways which are subjectively external - mental processes which are not identified with the self, which one would prefer not to have, but are present nonetheless. — Isaac

Thx for the clarification, this makes more sense... though I'm still left wondering why identification with self would be taken as a criterium for being lenient in court, or for attributing responsibility more generally.

It's not that I can't see some arc or rationale behind it, in the sense that the concept of responsibility seems to be tied to some agency necessarily. And so if something can be said to not be caused by the self, the agency is lacking for attributing responsibility... But this all seems build on very shaky grounds, because there is no objective measure for selfhood as you said... but more than that, identity is also ever changing and not entirely disconnected from how the world will react to certain presentations of self.

I mean, it seems one could expect an accused to present himself in court as someone who didn't want to do what he is accused of, and indeed even come to believe and convince himself that he didn't want to do it, after he realizes what the consequences are.

That's the point. Given a full notion of free-choice we would not be able to make such an argument as, upbringing or not, the person was completely free to choose their behaviour and so can be held entirely responsible for it. — Isaac

But my point is that I don't see on what basis you are going make that argument even if we don't assume a full notion of free-choice. What is the argument then? Some parts of our upbringing contribute to our preferred choice, and some parts that seems to influence our choices (in a bad way in this case) can be considered outside of our preferred choice because ...? What does 'preferred' mean?

I'm sometimes required to help plead for judicial leniency on the grounds of a person's upbringing or environment. The basis for such action is that somewhere in this muddle we (those involved at the time) can agree that such influences were outside of the person's preferred choices. — Isaac

The basis for such an action seem more like mercy to me... i.e. the poor fellow couldn't help but turn out that way given his upbringing and has it already bad enough as it is without the extra punishment.

Considering upbringing as something outside of one's preferred choices seems like a strange notion given that, I would assume, one's upbringing is always to some extend part of what determines one's will or preferred choices.

This could lead into an interesting debate on the value of capitalism and whether the trickle down effect actually works. — Roy Davies

I'm not entirely sure what you are getting at specifically. But in general, I think markets are effective and efficient at producing some goods and services. That is valuable and I certainly wouldn't want to do away with that altogether. At the same time it seems obvious to me that this is not the only thing that is of value. So if capitalism would lead to every other value getting subordinated to profit motives then something is off it seems to me.

In this concrete case of social media, you could say google and facebook are good at producing some kind of service, but apparently they do so at the cost of other things we find important. Add to that that these kind of services seem to inherently tend towards forming monopolies, and it isn't clear anymore that free markets will remain all that effective in producing these services.

So it seems to me that we need some correction to the free market here. At minimum they need to be regulated properly, and possibly you need to split them up or even pull them out of the market altogether and set them up as some utility company because these kind of services have become so important in this day and age.

It's not even a question. We are driving our children insane. Or rather the machines we have invented are doing so at our command. — unenlightened

I think the more general problem is that the goals of something that has that much influence and power over us are determined merely by profit incentives.

It's just that when philosophers use the word there is usaully a conceivable meaning behind it. — khaled

Well, I'd say that's a bit of a contentious claim since philosophy has been the handmaiden of religion for a couple of millennia.

Some say it is a substitute for "uncoerced" for one. That's what it means in the legal sense at least. I can't think of anything else but there are probably other wackier definitions — khaled

Right, so maybe there is a problem with the concept since it isn't really clear what it means? Like, for how long have we been having these discussions... that seems like a clear indication that there is a problem with it.

But you can't consider decisions in the brain "macro level things" I think. I remember reading Synapses and microtubles are small enough for quantum effects to actually matter. — khaled

I'll refrain from making any claims about this, because I don't know enough about it.

There is no proof that people couldn't have acted otherwise even given what you say. Determinism is very difficult to swallow not only because of recent advnces in quantum physics but also because it is completely untestable. After something happens you can't go and test if something else could have happened. — khaled

There is no proof right, but then again nothing ever really gets proven in science, that's the purvue
of logic and math only.

On a macro-level things do seem to behave according to deterministic laws, by and large . Brains then would be an exception to the rest of the world, which would be a bit odd it seems to me.

And although I'm no expert, I don't think quantum indeterminacy really plays at the macro level.

As far as I understand your opposition then I don't understand how a will can ever be "free". If you can choose between food item A or B, you need some sort of will to be able to choose. If you have to choose between will A or B you still need some sort of will to be able to choose. Having a will is required in order to make a choice. So by necessitating that a will must be chosen in order to be called "free" you create a sort of infinite regression because in order for a will to be free it must have been chosen by another will which must have been chosen by another will which must have.......

I feel it's a bit unfair when you define "free will" as an inconceivable concept and then proceed to say "free will doesn't exist". Sounds like "A square circle doesn't exist" to me. It's not a meaningful definition and is not what most people refer to when they think "free will" (though probably many people don't know what they refer to when they say it) — khaled

I don't see how will never being free is a problem really. I would be a bit like saying that it's unfair to define water as wet because we happen to have a concept like "dry water". We don't have a right to a will that is free just because a concept like free will exists.

And yeah I think you're right that most people don't really know what they mean with it, other than some vague reference to the fact that we make choices. We experience ourselves making choices, yes, but I don't think you need free will to explain making choices, "will" would be enough it seems to me. So my question remains, what does the word free do there?

I think it's a religious concept to talk people into guilt... and it seems reasonable enough to me to question concepts we get from those kind of sources. It's not because we have inherited a concept like say "orginal sin" or "souls" that we absolutely need to find a meaning for it so that it makes sense right? We can also say, yeah no it doesn't make sense, let's just do away with the whole concept.

Well, I may not know exactly what's going on, but probably just enough to know that Sartre's idea of radical freedom is maybe a bit to radical :-).

Anyway, I do like the Moustace, but I take your point that his idea of will is probably a bit outdated by now.

Just watched it.

Manipulation is not exactly a new thing, religions used it, politician use it, parents use it... heck even this documentary about manipulation had fitting music in the background so as to illicit some kind of emotional response.

What is new though, is the scale and sophistication of the manipulation, that truly is unprecedented. What's even more scary is that the whole AI revolution is only in its infancy at this moment.

My first reaction was to regulate it or to even pull it out of the market as some utility company so that the profit incentive would go away. But then again, can we really trust government or any group of humans for that matter with this much power? I think that is the problem, it's just to much potential power.

Therefor I'm tempted to agree with the lady at the end, just outlaw this kind of large scale data-gathering on humans. I could live with less sophisticated algorithms. Of course chances of this happening are rather slim because we live in a world with competing countries, and not under one world government, which makes regulating and enforcing this kind of thing traditionally very difficult... especially if a lot can be gained with it.

So... I'm not optimistic.

Right, I will admit that I don't exactly know what's going on there, I used it mostly as a container-term, not necessarily as an exact one to one representation of something that goes one in our minds.

But then again, I don't think I'm the only one that doesn't know. And maybe that's part of the problem with morality and free will that it just assumes a kind of agency without really knowing what is going on.

Banno, I think I agree that they are two ways of description on a different level or from a different perspective, but I don't think I'm pitting free will against determinism here. It's more an argument at the conceptual level I think, and I don't know if that necessarily has a lot to do with determinism. Maybe it does, I'm not entirely sure...

We make choices. What is that we that is making the choices? I'd say we are our will, by and large. That's still not really all that illuminating maybe... Let's say our will is a compound of different forces competing with eachother, maybe mediated by reason, maybe influenced by external sources etc... Whatever it is, my question would be, where does the freedom come in? What kind of, or what degree of freedom is it, if there is any? And what kind of freedom do we need or expect for moral responsibility?

Maybe reason could play a role there, but it still seems like you need some pre-existing volition to make a decision ultimately, logic on it's own can't tell you that. So it seems even only at the conceptual level, free will doesn't make a whole lot of sense.

Therefor i'm tempted to say, we have a will [period]. It's not really free because we (our will) do not choose our will.

If free will is only the claim that we make choices, then yes I have no qualms with that, that seems (maybe trivially) true to me.

Maybe to clarify.

If we do not choose our will, and our will determines what choices we make... you could say that that implies there is no way in which we could have chosen otherwise. Acting otherwise implies in some sense that we would have another will, which we have no control over.

Can you say someone is morally responsible if he couldn't have acted otherwise? Maybe if the ability to act otherwise is not a criterium for moral responsibility etc...

What's lacking, or what would such an account require in order to "suffice" in this way? — Luke

I'm not quite sure as I indicated in my first post. Maybe there is a problem with our conception of morality being tied to freedom in the first place. Maybe we just lack adequate or accurate psychological descriptions at this point to make relevant distinctions for the purpose of assigning moral responsibility... In law for instance we do see some attempts at this, in that we do exempt people in some cases from legal responsibility, like age, (temporal) insanity etc... but we do not exempt other things that seem otherwise pretty similar. I feel like there's something there, but it does all seem a little bit murky and arbitrary to me.

It could mean, as you note, that nothing outside our will is forcing us to make that choice. — Luke

Yes, and I wouldn't have a problem with that per se. But what really matters is not so much if there is an account that would be acceptable, but if that account suffices to be able to speak about moral responsibility right? That's what really at stake it seems to me.

Yes, this is how I also understand Strawson's argument. I'm calling it a bad argument because the will is the source of our choosing between options. According to Strawson "how one acts is a result of, or explained by, “how one is, mentally speaking” (M)." To have truly free will, Strawson argues that we must be able to choose M (or how one is, mentally speaking) from scratch, whereas I would argue that one requires M in order to be able to choose anything, so one is not able to choose M without M. If "how one acts is a result of...M", then one cannot act without M (in order to choose M). — Luke

Ok, I fully agree to all of this... I think we make choices and our will determines those. In fact we need a will to be even able to make choices.

Where we possibly disagree, is that I wouldn't call that will free, precisely because we don't choose our will. You might say we are 'free' to make choices according to our will, but what does the word free really mean in that instance? I can see making a distinction between making choices based on our own will and being externally coerced into certain choices, but that to me isn't so much a difference between free and not free, but rather between externally or internally determined.

I will say I think of the concept of 'free will' as a religious invention to make people feel guilt with the purpose of controlling or manipulating people, so I'm biased against the idea... so maybe I'm not giving the most charitable interpretation of the concept.

In Stoveian fashion (as I understand it), I would say this is likewise a bad argument, because to have free will (in everyday terms) means that we are free to choose according to our will or according to our desires. We shouldn't be expected (in philosophical terms) to "get out of them" in order to remake the will as we desire. For then we would have no desires with which to choose how to remake the will. — Luke

I think the issue is that free will in everyday terms doesn't give you the kind of agency that is necessary for moral responsibility, so it doesn't really matter for the argument whether we have that kind of free will or not. Or in other words the issue I think he raises, is that you would in fact have to be able to choose your will to retain the idea of moral responsibility. I'm not sure I entirely agree with this, but I think that is the argument anyway.

Ok fair enough, we need not always be disagreeing.

The world is egocentric, that is, it revolves around your perception of existence. As an individual, I have no other possibility of perceiving the world besides my own, as you can only perceive the world through your Being. — Gus Lamarch

Yes, I think I could agree with that. I don't think anything I said is at odds with that. Is there some point I'm missing?

Right now I'm watching at my screen and there doesn't seem to be an entire universe attached to it... so
I'm not sure what to make of that statement. Maybe if you explain it, it might make some sense, or maybe not, I don't know.

I don't think anybody really believes that they are the only thing that exists, even if logic would show that is the only thing we can be certain of.

But even assuming for a moment that you are the only thing that exist, how would that you be free, in the sense that you can decide who you are? What is it that is deciding who you are, if there is no pre-existing you that has already has some content, that is already defined to some extend?

What might this <1% of free will look like? Let's look at this theoretical situation: you're faced with deciding between two choices. All of the forces that would make you want either choice are absolutely equal. Would you be unable to choose? If you were able to choose, would that be the sliver of free will or would that just be randomness? Is randomness even possible? — A Ree Zen

No it would be "(another part of)will" deciding to chose, because you don't like indecision for instance.

We decide, "we" are "our will"... but we do not decide what our will is.

If it's will it's not free, if it's free it's not will. The concept doesn't make sense.

Right, there's certainly some self-serving going on too.

Still I can't help but think there is something more to it. Take the protest against wearing masks for instance. I have to wear a mask as soon as I leave my house, and I don't feel that it impacts my 'quality of life' in any meaningful way... and find it hard to believe that it would bother other people that much. So why is it that something that innocuous would be met with that much protest, especially considering what is at stake? It seems as if even the slightest concession to some collective goal is to much to ask. One might point to ideologies that put an emphasis on individual liberties, and look for an explanation in people wanting to rationalize their ideologically inspired beliefs. But that seems to be merely pushing the question a bit further to why do these ideologies find so much support in the first place, especially when faced with a world that clearly demands collective action on a number of levels.

Anyway, you're right that this does not bode well for solving the climate crisis. Question is what would be a solution, if there is any? I don't think the solution is more information about the end times, like this type of OP seem to assume, because as I said, it seems more a matter of not wanting to believe (for whatever reason), than a matter of ignorance, incorrect information or stupidity.

Yes there is a difference if you look at it from the perspective of being true or sensible or whatever... all I'm saying is that I don't think that is what motivates those people holding those ideas. They want to be defiant (because the feel they have been lied to), those beliefs are just a rationalisation or post hoc justification for their defiance.

Kenosha Kid, I'd like to add to that, that while the idea itself from the example you gave may be stupid, I can understand the general sentiment behind it. People have been lied to continuously in order to get them to sacrifice for the greater good, only to learn that the greater good usually meant some select group.

So rather than stupidity, it seem to me it's more a case of wilful defiance. There is no trust whatsoever in what authorities say, and a sense of living in a world that is only out to get you... which has led to a deep cynicism and instinctive reactions to try to repel manipulation.

This is I think maybe the biggest problem we have, because it leads to a lack of collective agency.... and without that you can't even begin to try to implement any sort of societal change.

Except that's not what happens in any economy anywhere. Assuming the majority of business owners cast aside all ethical considerations in the operation of their businesses (which they don't), they cannot expect to disregard the multitude of formal government regulations that exist in every country without negative repercussion. — Hanover

But they (multinationals anyway) do to some extend, by moving (parts of) their business to countries that have the most favorable regime for a particular part of their business. Which leads countries to compete among eachother to offer the best conditions. You see, it's not as if business are really 'subject' to some democratic legal order anymore, they now float somewhere over and across countries and set the rules to some extend by exploiting competition between nations for their business. That's the big change with open borders and globalization.

Capitalism is all about profit-maximization.
— jorndoe
And hence it's not an all encompassing ideology about everything, as it's opponents desperately try to portray it. — ssu

No it's not, but it does seem to determine a lot of policy, be it via lobbying or via politicians having internalized a lot of it as an ideology.

So the problem is not necessarily with capitalism itself, but with the fact that there doesn't seem to be some larger value-frame that is strong and independent enough to resist its attempts to influence.

The shop-owners and blacksmiths have taken over the empty castle.

Thanks for that... no time to reply right now, I have to get some sleep. But I got to say, I like your perspective on things.

Far better is simply to have so much investment on renewables that they actually are cheaper than oil. That's the real death knell for fossil fuels. — ssu

Yeah, I mean I have no problem with investing heavily in renewables, but that wouldn't even be necessary if real costs where taking into account. Or that's what I would think in theory. Someone will have to pay the costs eventually... So longterm it would seem like a more effective solution that is more generally applicable, then constant ad hoc subsidising because prices fail to take some costs into account.

Motivated by an insane logic. Same logic that burns crops while millions of people starve. — JerseyFlight

Bit of a pedantic remark, but the logic is actually quite straightforward and laser-focussed on a certain goal. There's nothing wrong with their logic, it's just that they only have a very limited conception of value.

And because the price of oil is currently too low, when the economy recovers supply won't be able to meet demand and the price will slingshot high. — praxis

Not necessarily slingshot if there are a lot of reserves, and if the economy doesn't fully recover right away... but eventually one would think so yes.

Incorporation is moral hazard.