First, even if everyone agrees on it, borders aren't objective things, so they're not "real" in that sense. (Even if there's something like a wall or fence, or we're talking about border stations/border guards, etc.--that doesn't make the border itself objective/real; the wall/fence, etc. aren't identical to the border).

A border is a concept that people have and can agree on.

So nearly everyone can agree that there's a border between two countries (where they have to agree there are two countries), with no other territory between them, while disagreeing on just where the border should be considered to be.

What it is for there to be a border is for people to have a particular sort of geopolitical concept in mind. Pointing to it is pointing to that concept, and pointing to its expression, such as statements in almanacs, etc.

It's not irrelevant, — S

It's irrelevant if the crowd thinking something doesn't determine that something is right/correct.

You can't just appeal to the crowd when they happen to agree with you but say they don't matter when you don't agree.

The discussion doesn't seem to have much to do with "Is life/existence logical," which is a question that seems like a category error to me at any rate. Logic is a way that we think about relations. Asking if "life/existence is in general how we think about relations" doesn't make a heck of a lot of sense.

Re what we're actually discussing, we've actually talked about this quite a bit in a number of different threads recently.

My view on it is something I we could call "reference point relativism." Sometimes I talk about it in terms of reference frames instead of reference points, although with that there is a risk of confusion with respect to reference frames as they're traditionally approached in physics.

But the basic idea is that properties of objects vary at different spatio-temporal locations, including spatio-temporal locations on/in/etc. the objects themselves. That's because relations are an integral aspect of properties, and relations vary at different spatio-temporal locations. It's a spatio-temporal/relational situatedness, which isn't something that can be "escaped" in any sense. That has nothing to do with persons necessarily. But when persons are present, they experience this spatio-temporal/relational situatedness perceptually.

So, I'd say that the color or shape of a spinning ball, to use the example that we were discussing, isn't really something other than it appears to be at a particular reference point. It can appear to be different, contradictory ways at different reference points. None of those are more "real" than the other. They're just different.

In response to this issue in another thread, where the old "apparently bent object half-submerged in water" example was used, I said this (hopefully the allusions to specific things being discussed in that thread won't be too confusing):

"The whole point of my view is that talking about the properties of the water in the basin, to use your example, has to be done from some reference point/reference frame (I'm not using reference frame just the same as it's used in physics, just in case someone would think that I am), and talking about it with respect to 'the water itself' is just one reference point/frame out of a potential infinity of them, with it not being a preferred reference frame (since there are no objective preferences).

"So yes, properties are supervenient (if you like--I think that term can introduce some confusion) on underlying structure, but the underlying structure is 'everything in the reference frame.' It's only 'just the water' from the reference frame of only the water, which isn't a preferred reference frame. (Not that It's not-preferred compared to something else, either--again, there are no objective preferences.)

"So, for example, a coin really is round from some reference frames, and it's really oblong from other reference frames.

"The idea is a bit like perspective in visual art. Assuming we're trying to do something like realism (or photorealism), the properties of the items depicted will depend on the focal point of the image. From most angles, you can't draw a coin as something round, because it's not really round at that focal point, it's oblong. Or, the coin might really be as large or larger than a mountain from some focal points. That's not an illusion. It's really the way things are at that focal point. The underlying structure is everything in the reference frame, not just the coin, but the relative angle at that focal point, the lighting at that focal point, etc. And on, in, just above etc. the coin are all just different possible focal points.

"Focal point, by the way, doesn't imply a sentient creature's perspective. It's simply what things are like (in particular respects that we can represent visually in this case) relative to a particular spatio-temporal points. We can illustrate this sans sentient creatures with any machine that can measure properties from particular spatio-temporal locations--like a camera, for example."

In cases where the crowd is right, like the case under discussion regarding hate speech, why wouldn't I go along with them? I'd be a fool not to. — S

So the crowd doesn't determine what's right.

I have no problem going along with the crowd when I think they're right.

I don't think they're right in the case of hate speech, obviously. (Of course, assuming that most people actually agree that hate speech should be banned. I don't think that's at all clear, but I'm fine assuming it.)

When someone doesn't think the crowd is right, appealing to what the crowd thinks isn't going to work, obviously, unless the person simply categorically goes along with the crowd no matter what. If neither of us does that, then appealing to the crowd is irrelevant.

Justification is part of the nature of knowledge.

All that justification is, by the way, is "what S (the person in question) considers good, sufficient reasons for asserting that P."

The Münchhausen trilemma is about proof. Proof isn't something to worry about for reasons I've explained a few times.

One thing I don't understand about your views, by the way, is why you wouldn't think that there are correct judgments in ethics and aesthetics. There are certainly consensus opinions.

Also why wouldn't you be religious? By far there are more religious believers among humans than agnostics or atheists.

Surely you're capable of figuring out the appropriate context in which it is true to say that there's a right interpretation. — S

We want to fit in with the norm without rocking the boat/without any sort of philosophical questioning, etc.?

Rather, the statement is used to highlight the infinite regress of justification which fallibilism creates (how do you know A, and how do you know your explanation for why A is true, etc). The incoherence is the point. — Paralogism

There's no infinite regress, though.

If you ask me, for example, how I know that I have orange juice in the refrigerator, I can say things like, "Because I put it in the refrigerator yesterday and I only drank one glass," or "Because I'm looking at it right now." Those are the sorts of things that fuel knowing something. It's nonsensical to add another "know" to that, a la "how do I know that I know that."

So there's no regress. There's just the evidence (which can be empirical, logical, intuitive, etc.) for what is known.

What some people do is express a concern for certainty, though. "How can you be certain that you have orange juice in your refrigerator?" There's no need to worry about certainty, though. That's a neurotic red herring. Knowledge need not be certain to be knowledge. Again, the whole nut of scientific knowledge, for example, is that it's NOT certain. If it were certain, if it were not open to revision, it wouldn't be science in the first place.

At any rate, we can dispense with the charade that you don't have anything normative in mind by noting that such and such is the "correct 'meaning'" of something, or that such and such is "correct grammar," etc. (Previously you and others were attempting the charade that you were using "correct" in a purely descriptive way, to only denote that something was popular.)

No, there aren't. Knowing you, surely you mean either that there are popular interpretations, or otherwise maybe you'd be going with the author's intent, but neither makes an interpretation right.

Again, knowing you, you'd say something like, "What people mean by 'right interpretation' is the popular interpretation," and aside from the fact that that's not actually what most people have in mind by "right interpretation" (thus falsifying your own claim), we again have the problem that simply because something is popular, that does not make it correct, even if people insist that it does.

It is if you interpret it right. — S

There aren't right interpretations.

That's the problem, then. It's a problem to do with your poor judgement. You're like the 1 + 1 = 3 guy. Not only are you wrong, you're overconfident and ignorant of why the other members are right. And you're stuck in that situation with no one being able to get through to you. — S

Your problem is that you don't think you're wrong just because you go along with the crowd.

it is true to say that there are facts about whether something is a benefit. — S

No, it isn't.

If you're thinking that consensus makes it true, it does not. That's the argumentum ad populum fallacy yet again.

So, if you were the 1 + 1 = 3 guy, you wouldn't care, so long as you're meeting your own goals? — S

Of course. I would only care about a consensus if (a) I were very or fairly unsure of my own views, and (b) I had good reason to believe that the people I was looking at for a consensus knew what they were talking about/were correct.

Neither (a) nor (b) is the case here.

A mental gym? Well, it isn't working. — S

Sure it is. My assessment is what I care about there. Same thing as with the other gym and exercise I do. I'm going by my own goals, my own assessments.

The conclusion that it's not a fact that such-and-such is a benefit is unacceptable, — S

¯\_(ツ)_/¯ It's a fact that there are no facts re whether something is a benefit, aside from the fact that an individual assesses something to be a benefit. So that you find it unacceptable is irrelevant.

Argumentation in general does not need to, and most of the time does not, take a more traditional, structured approach a la formal, syllogistic, etc. logic "proper."

And if one has anything like a constructivist or other anti-realist view of what logic is, then there's no particular reason to favor a more formal logical approach anyway, except for what would amount to a personal aesthetic preference.

In my opinion, a lot of the more formal arguments that have been forwarded, typically in analytic philosophy, have seemed rather more stupid than the far less structured form of rhetorical argumentation.

Although none of this implies that fallacies aren't still a problem when they creep up.

The purpose of pointing out that your opinion won't matter? Well, why do you bother to come here? Just to do the equivalent of declaring that you think a car is a giraffe? Okay then. — S

One of the primary reasons I come here is to stay in practice thinking about philosophical stuff in an interactive situation and to stay in practice expressing my thoughts in the same context. It also gives me verbal expression exercise more generally. Also, because of the typical sorts of personalities that are attracted to boards like this, it also keeps me in practice re verbally sparring with that type.

So it's a type of "mental gym."

So let's say that someone agrees with most people on foundational views re good/bad.

In that context, what is supposed to be the rhetorical point of mentioning that most people feel that hate speech has no benefit?

Presumably the person we're addressing doesn't already think that hate speech has no benefit (otherwise why present an argument simply restating the views they already have?). So what do we think it will do in this context to mention that most people feel that hate speech has no benefit?

So god didn't create logic?

As I've said before, I'm not interested in the least bit in your opinion. — Isaac

So you're going back and forth with me, talking about our ethical stances on hate speech, talking about foundational views of good or bad, talking about "rules of rational thought," etc. while not being interested in my opinion. I guess that would explain a lot of things.

Not being interested in other persons' opinions, especially if they're different, is just the sort of respect and empathy you'd expect from someone very concerned with hate speech, by the way.

The purpose of anything isn't determined by rationality, by the way. And neither are normatives.

All you need to do about anything is ask me my opinion and I'll tell you. You don't have to assume that I agree with you about anything.

But okay, so you're continuing because you're assuming that I really do agree with you, lol.

OK, we'll try it a fifth time. Normatives are determined by individuals on the basis of what they consider to be good and bad. We are having a discussion about a normative. If we do not agree on anything that is good or bad, that discussion is pointless. — Isaac

Okay . . . well, at least you agree that normatives are not determined by what most people think. But sure, maybe we don't agree on what's good or bad enough that you think it's pointless to talk to me about this particular normative. In which case . . . don't stop responding to/addressing me, I guess? I don't know, I guess somehow that makes sense to you, to think that it's pointless to talk to me about it, but to incessantly direct posts to me about it.

If you don't share any foundational views about what is good or bad with your interlocutors, there is no point in engaging in a normative discussion. — Isaac

That can be your opinion, sure. It's certainly not mine.

So we apparently don't agree on foundational views about what is good or bad, yet you're continuing to post to me about this topic.

It is a normative question, that's just the definition of normative. — Isaac

Normatives are NOT determined by "what most people think." This is a very important point.

Imposing something on society which most people consider to be of little benefit, despite what they consider to be a risk of harm, is going to be generally agreed on by them to be bad. Sure.

The question is what the implication of that is for anything else.

What bearing does a shared view of what is good or bad have on normatives?

They don't. I never suggested they did. — Isaac

Sure. So again, I asked you, and you quoted, "What bearing on anything does the fact that most people consider it to have no benefit have?"

Your response began with, "The question is whether hate speech 'should' be allowed, which is a normative question."

If the fact that most people consider it to have no benefit has no bearing on it being a normative question, then why was that your answer to the question you quoted?

If x is a common opinion about the benefit of anything, the significance or implication of that is?

The question is whether hate speech "should" be allowed, which is a normative question. — Isaac

What do normatives have to do with what most people think?

It was quite clear - in someone's judgement. — Shamshir

Right. Whose?

If you will not propose a reasonable benefit of hate speech - you lead me to believe you cannot. — Shamshir

The challenge would be getting me to care what you'd believe, especially when you won't clarify the question.

That would make the word 'benefit' meaningless — Isaac

So you don't agree with S that you were only saying what most people considered a benefit? I figured as much, but I wanted to give S the benefit of the doubt.

At any rate, no, "benefit" isn't meaningless to many people just in case there are no facts as to whether something is a benefit.

So if I say, "it is of benefit to me to have a raincoat", I'm referring to my opinion of what a benefit is. — Isaac

Sure. You feel that it's a benefit to you to have a raincoat. It's not a fact that it's a benefit to you to have a raincoat.

I haven't specified in that sentence the means by which such heterogeneous opinion is summarised. — Isaac

That's fine. Whether you've done that or not, there's no fact as to whether it's a benefit.

Usually by democratically elected representatives, but it could be sociologists, psychologist, — Isaac

That's what you go by as to whether a raincoat is a benefit to you? lol

Again, at any rate, no matter who thinks it's a benefit, it's not a fact that it's a benefit. It's just how individuals feel about whatever it is.

I'm not sure (other than for rhetorical value) why you've missed of the end of my sentence. I said " is possible to express every idea in non-hateful ways, unless that idea is actual hate". So no, it's not entirely to do with certain word choices, but it is considerably to with that. — Isaac

So then we're not at all saying that we're allowing the expression of all ideas, and the distinction you're making is pointless.

We could try this: what would be an example of an idea that we could express by hate speech that could be expressed by speech you'd allow instead? The distinction would make sense if we have an example of that.

Not unless you clarify in whose judgment we're saying whether it's reasonable. Why you won't clarify that, I don't know.

So then, no, I'm not going to bother if you're not going to bother yourself.

"Reasonable" is always to someone. So I'm clarifying who needs to think the answer is reasonable.

Will you or won't you propose a reasonable benefit of hate speech? — Shamshir

Yes. But first I'm clarifying the requirement. Does it have to be something that you consider reasonable?

We don't have a burden to constantly satisfy your unreasonable doubts and denials. — S

Sure. So what would the purpose be of it rhetorically? That was the question.

Propose a reasonable benefit of hate speech. — Shamshir

It has to be something that you consider reasonable?

If one were to write, "Most people think there is no benefit to hate speech, and they don't care that you think otherwise," that would certainly be true, but what of it? What would be the point of even bothering to write that?

It just means that you'll disagree, while the rest of us agree, and your disagreement won't really matter in the bigger picture. — S

Won't matter to most people. Okay, and what about it? What would the purpose of that be rhetorically? Is it just an exercise in pointing out the obvious, with no aim to persuade, no aim to suggest facts or implications other than what most people think or do?